Comments by "Bullet-Tooth Tony" (@Bullet-Tooth-Tony-) on "TIKhistory"
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Three prominent German commanders all thought the same, it was the wrong strategy.
First is Field Marshall Von Runstedt
“the best course of the Allies would have been to concentrate a really strong striking force with which to break through past Aachen to the Ruhr area. Strategically and politically, Berlin was the target. Germany’s strength is in the north. He who holds northern Germany holds Germany. Such a break-through, coupled with air domination, would have torn in pieces the weak German front and ended the war. Berlin and Prague would have been occupied ahead of the Russians. There were no German forces behind the Rhine, and at the end of August our front was wide open.There was the possibility of an operational break-through in the Aachen area, in early September. This would have facilitated a rapid conquest of the Ruhr and a quicker advance on Berlin. By turning the forces from the Aachen area sharply northward, the German 15th and 1st parachute Armies could have been pinned against the estuaries of the Maas and the Rhine. They could not have escaped eastwards into Germany.”
Second is Hasso Von Mantueffel, commander of the 5th Panzer Army.
“I am in full agreement with Montgomery. I believe General Eisenhower’s insistence on spreading the Allied force’s out for a broader advance was wrong.The acceptance of Montgomery’s plan would have shortened the war considerably. Above all, tens of thousands of lives- on both sides- would have been saved.”
Lastly, Gunther Blumentritt, one of the key planners of the German invasion of Poland and France.
"After the war, Blumentritt disagreed with the Allies' strategy in the west at this time, noting the precarious nature of the German position with only one armoured division against the twelve of the Allies. He stated that had Montgomery's Anglo-Canadian 21st Army Group been unleashed earlier for a concentrated armoured assault (as Montgomery had wished) rather than fighting on a broad front, "Such a breakthrough ... would have torn the weak German front to pieces and ended the war in the winter of 1944."
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@lyndoncmp5751 Even Horrocks himself thought it was a mistake to not advance further.
"On the 4th of September, we were ordered to halt our advance as we were out-running our supplies particularly petrol, which was still being brought up from the beachhead a turn-round of some six hundred miles for the lorries. This was a tragedy, as the only troops between us and the Rhine, stretched out in a thin line, was one German division, the 719th, composed mainly of elderly gentlemen who hitherto had been guarding the north coast of Holland and had never heard a shot fired in anger, plus one battalion of Dutch SS, and a few Luftwaffer detachments. Had we been allowed to advance we could have brushed this meagre force aside, bounced the crossing over the Rhine, and probably gone right through to the Zyder Zee. A further advance like this would, of course, have entailed a certain risk, but we already had one hundred kilometres of petrol within reach, and another one hundred twenty-four hours away; moreover, we had captured Brussels Airport, so -surely additional supplies could have been flown in if we had got into trouble. I have always felt that this was a risk worth taking"
"the 11th Armoured Division could have advanced 18 Miles further North to the base of the South Beveland Peninsular, thereby preventing German movement to and from the Peninsular. As it was, no such order was given and consequently Von Zangen was able to extract the remnants of his Fifteenth Army from the pocket around Brekens by ferrying them across the Schelde, mostly by night and then moving along the South Beveland Peninsular and from there into Holland."
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@johnlucas8479 Would logistic problems have defeated Monty’s big left hook?
If I may put in another word, the question of logistics is often raised. The Allies in autumn 1944 had great strength in manpower, armour and all equipment, but prior to opening up a large Channel port, it was impossible to bring all their strength to bear on the front line.
Eisenhower stated this problem meant Montgomery’s planned thrust could not have been maintained logistically. Carlo d’Este echoes that view. However, Monty’s plan, if implemented as he intended, would actually have solved the logistic problem more swiftly than any other approach.
First, you take all the armour and motorised units of four armies (Crerar, Dempsey, Simpson, Hodges) and make one mobile attacking force, under a single commander (Montgomery or Bradley). Secondly, you take the logistic resources (engineers, pioneers, transport, fuel, etc.) of five armies (the above four plus Patton) and use them to support the attack. You send this mighty force driving ahead on the left wing through Belgium and Holland, leaving non-motorised troops behind in static defence.
The attacking force is now more mobile than ever, because it is 100% motorised, and has more fuel than ever, because it has five armies’ worth of fuel in place of four. At the same time, the combined engineering and pioneer resources of five armies give it the ability to surmount rapidly any and all physical obstacles it may meet. It is also easier to resupply these forces, as they are all in one place, not dispersed on a wide front. In this way, the immediate logistic problems are solved.
The nub of the matter is this: the amount of fuel and resources initially available under Ike’s plan and Monty’s plan is the same. As events showed, that amount was sufficient to let five entire armies move forward steadily in line abreast along the whole front. If you extract the armour and mass it in one sector, and give it all the fuel and support, you can then drive that smaller but much more powerful force ahead a lot faster and a lot further.
What can the enemy now do against this fast-striding behemoth? Any German armoured force in or near its path faces a sharp dilemma: either fight where you stand (suicide) or withdraw to concentrate with other units (surrendering territory). The only logical course for the German armoured and mobile units is to withdraw, pull together whatever strength they have and postpone battle until it becomes unavoidable.
However, it is quite possible that Hitler, initially at least, would have issued non-withdrawal orders. In that case, each Panzer force would have been destroyed in turn as it came up against the Mighty Mobile. Either way, the Allied advance would rapidly clear the Low Countries of German armour. Now Antwerp and other ports could be opened up.
In this scenario, German occupying troops left stranded by the disappearance of their armour and supplies would no doubt resist for a time and would sabotage and destroy port facilities as much as they could (as happened in the actual event). However, the difference in this case is, first, the time they have available for sabotage is less, because the clearance of the region has been that much quicker, and secondly, the resources the Allies have for repairing facilities are that much greater (five armies’ engineers instead of one or two).
As a result, Antwerp and other ports would have been in operational use by the Allies a good deal earlier than actually happened, and the Allied thrust would have been reinforced all the more.
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@johnlucas8479 Would logistic problems have defeated Monty’s big left hook?
If I may put in another word, the question of logistics is often raised. The Allies in autumn 1944 had great strength in manpower, armour and all equipment, but prior to opening up a large Channel port, it was impossible to bring all their strength to bear on the front line.
Eisenhower stated this problem meant Montgomery’s planned thrust could not have been maintained logistically. Carlo d’Este echoes that view. However, Monty’s plan, if implemented as he intended, would actually have solved the logistic problem more swiftly than any other approach.
First, you take all the armour and motorised units of four armies (Crerar, Dempsey, Simpson, Hodges) and make one mobile attacking force, under a single commander (Montgomery or Bradley). Secondly, you take the logistic resources (engineers, pioneers, transport, fuel, etc.) of five armies (the above four plus Patton) and use them to support the attack. You send this mighty force driving ahead on the left wing through Belgium and Holland, leaving non-motorised troops behind in static defence.
The attacking force is now more mobile than ever, because it is 100% motorised, and has more fuel than ever, because it has five armies’ worth of fuel in place of four. At the same time, the combined engineering and pioneer resources of five armies give it the ability to surmount rapidly any and all physical obstacles it may meet. It is also easier to resupply these forces, as they are all in one place, not dispersed on a wide front. In this way, the immediate logistic problems are solved.
The nub of the matter is this, the amount of fuel and resources initially available under Ike’s plan and Monty’s plan is the same. As events showed, that amount was sufficient to let five entire armies move forward steadily in line abreast along the whole front. If you extract the armour and mass it in one sector, and give it all the fuel and support, you can then drive that smaller but much more powerful force ahead a lot faster and a lot further.
What can the enemy now do against this fast-striding behemoth? Any German armoured force in or near its path faces a sharp dilemma: either fight where you stand (suicide) or withdraw to concentrate with other units (surrendering territory). The only logical course for the German armoured and mobile units is to withdraw, pull together whatever strength they have and postpone battle until it becomes unavoidable.
However, it is quite possible that Hitler, initially at least, would have issued non-withdrawal orders. In that case, each Panzer force would have been destroyed in turn as it came up against the Mighty Mobile. Either way, the Allied advance would rapidly clear the Low Countries of German armour. Now Antwerp and other ports could be opened up.
In this scenario, German occupying troops left stranded by the disappearance of their armour and supplies would no doubt resist for a time and would sabotage and destroy port facilities as much as they could (as happened in the actual event). However, the difference in this case is, first, the time they have available for sabotage is less, because the clearance of the region has been that much quicker, and secondly, the resources the Allies have for repairing facilities are that much greater (five armies’ engineers instead of one or two).
As a result, Antwerp and other ports would have been in operational use by the Allies a good deal earlier than actually happened, and the Allied thrust would have been reinforced all the more.
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@flyoptimum In the final analysis, the only real failure in the operation is that resistance was stronger than expected, both around Arnhem and Son. I don't think anyone can be faulted for that, even the intelligence services. Reports of Panzer divisions in the drop zones were just that, reports, among hundreds, thousands, of other intelligence reports, which had to be analyzed, assessed, given their due, passed off to officers commanding, who then passed them off to planning. Then throw in a little dodgy weather to limit allied air superiority and hinder resupply.
But in the end, XXX did reach the final bridge. Late, yes, but they got there. If Market-Garden had months or years of planning as Overlord did instead of what, two weeks? it would have come off better and Montgomery may well have been hailed as the greatest Allied commander of the war.
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@bigwoody4704 More planes? Woody these are the statistics.
In 1941 the British produced 20,000 aircraft, almost double Germany's 12,000 air craft.
In 1941 the British produced 4,800 tanks, the Germans produced 2,400 tanks. In 1942, 8,600 British tanks and 3,600 German tanks. During the whole war Germany produced roughly 350,000 trucks to Britain's 460,000 trucks and 815,000 Canadian trucks.
So they clearly were not as far ahead.
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@johntrottier1162
Monty’s concept was of a concentrated mass of Allied armour, with all available logistical support devoted to it, directed against the Ruhr, a threat which would force the remaining German armour to give battle, and then let the great Allied superiority in armour and air power destroy it.
When you have that level of superiority, what you need is a large set battle to exploit it. If this basic concept had been applied, the Germans would have been forced to come out and fight for the Ruhr, just as the Japanese were forced to come out and fight for Leyte. Once the German armour was finished off, the road to Berlin then really would lie open.
This was the Schlieffen plan in reverse: a wide flanking move to reach round and stab the enemy in his industrial heartland. The appearance of the mass of Allied armour on their west flank heading round towards the Ruhr would inevitably force the German armour to come to meet it. The Allies would then be able to fight their decisive tank and air battle, on the flat plains of North Germany.
It is worth noting that the Germans used the Schlieffen plan, or a variant of it, in each world war. Each time, their idea was an outflanking move in the west, sweeping round through the Low Countries, not a broad front advance. This shows that, in strategic terms, the German General Staff agreed with Monty or it shows that Monty took a leaf out of the Germans page.
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I think this is an excellent point. If my numbers are correct, the LW has 3,500 combat aircraft in June 1941, and 2,500 of those are deployed in the East. From July 1940 to June 1941 the LW has already lost about 2,500 aircraft and pilots, 1,900 in the BoB, and another 600 in subsequent operations. (Greece, Crete, Malta, N. Africa, Channel, France, UK)
So it would be reasonable to conclude that without those 2,500 aircraft lost, the Luftwaffe could have deployed at least double the number of combat aircraft to attack the USSR than it did historically.
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@flyoptimum "He was ineffective during the Normandy campaign, taking far to long to take Caen."
Monty's performance in Normandy was good and he gave Rommel another spanking. I don't really care whether he took too long to capture Caen, the point is he took the city and succeeded in the operation instead of risking his forces and taking lewd casualties. Montgomery was correct that neutralising Caen would effectively cut off all the Germans towards the beach heads, rendering Cherbourg practically useless. Even an attack on Caen would force the Germans to redeploy and rethink their strategy. Most people forget that Monty was the most experienced of the Allied generals and played the key role in Normandy, which was needed to kick start the reconquest of France.
" He was slow to counterattack however and astonishingly left most of those glories to Patton. "
What Montgomery did, and it should not be under appreciated was lay the foundations for the US Army to redeem itself, catch their collective breath, organise better defence and then hand out a beating to a German Army which was really on a fool’s errand.
He, almost instantly, recognised what the German aim had to be and ensured, by placing his units in a position to thwart any breakthrough guaranteed no German force could possibly break into a position to threaten the port. This shored up one flank. He then took control over a crumbling command and enabled the US commanders to stabilise the north.
"The breakout is largely credited to Omar Bradley leading the push south and east from the western sector."
The breakout took place while Monty was still in command of all the Allied land forces in France, so Bradleys breakout was his breakout as well.
"Market Garden was his idea, was pushed for by him"
It might have been his idea but he had ZERO control over what happened in the Operation, which gets conveniently forgotten. These are the facts, Monty had no control over the command of 1st Allied Airborne, no ability to appoint or dismiss subordinates, nor any control of objective targets or the timing, location & sequence of drops.
21st Army Group was to assume control of the Airborne Corps only AFTER they linked up, at which point it was far too late to rectify any of the appallingly bad planning decisions that Brereton and Browning had made.
Here are two direct references.
First, Zaloga
Quote In spite of this, the new organization made its debut on August 16, 1944*, *as the First Allied Airborne Army (FAAA)*, directly *subordinate to SHAEF rather than to Montgomery's 21st Army Group or Bradley's 12th Army Group*"
Zaloga - "US airborne divisions in the ETO, page. 57"
US Airborne Divisions in the ETO 1944–45
Second, from the US Army history website:
Quote*" On the Allied side, the planning and command for the airborne phase of MARKET-GARDEN became the responsibility of the First Allied Airborne Army*. The army commander, Lt. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton*"
The Siegfried Line Campaign: Chapter 6
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@flyoptimum The senior chain of command in Normandy was like this, Dempsey and Bradley were the Army commanders who took their orders from Monty, who took his orders from SHAEF. Normandy was Monty's success, and the Allied armies attained the areas that Monty had made as objectives for the campaign 3 days sooner than had originally been intended.
From what I understand Montgomery was reluctant to carry out the operation in the first place, given the changes to the Air Borne planning that he did not make. He only took interest in the ground offensive mainly.
I don't agree with the notion that he's incompetent, because he was chosen specifically to be the man who would oversee the defence of the Kent coast in 1940 for the potential German invasion of Britain. As you know he was also given command of the Normandy ground forces and the Northern flank in the Bulge, you don't get those kind of roles unless you have a proven record, and the fact is he was the most experienced Allied commander, who understood both the strengths and weaknesses of the British army and also understood what it took to defeat the Wehrmacht.
The truth is, after the war mainly due to war of generals memoirs , post war historical revisionism and nationalistic jingoism, several authors the likes of Ambrose, Carlo D'Este threw unjust accusations against Montgomery in an attempt to bring down his reputation as if he did not lead first an army then an army group sucessfully to victory from Africa to all the way to Northern Germany. Mainly for his record in Normandy and Northwest Europe Campaigns. He was even accused of degrading US soldiers in the Bulge, even though it has been proven that the Germans intercepted and messed around with his messages and edited what he said in order to make him look bad, when he infact actually PRAISED the US soldiers on the ground.
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@bigwoody4704 I wonder if Carlo d'Este read the following:
Excerpted from "Appreciation on Possible Development of Operations to Secure a Lodgement Area", produced by 21st Army Group Planning, May 7, 1944 (one month before D-Day). This was forwarded to First US Army Group, among others, on 18 May under a covering letter which reads in part, "With regard to the outline of action at Part IV, this represents the Commander-In-Chief's [Montgomery's] intentions as far as they can be formulated at this stage."
IV. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
"The type of country immediately South of the initial bridgehead does not favour a rapid advance. The Allied build-up relative to the estimated German build-up indicates that a period may supervene round about D+14, when there will be a grave risk of operations stabilising on a line which gives the Germans advantages in defence. The greatest energy and initiative will be required at this period to ensure the enemy is not allowed to stabilise his defence."
"Once through the difficult bocage country, greater possibilities for manoeuvre and for the use of armour begin to appear. Our aim during this period should be to contain the maximum enemy forces facing the Eastern flank of the bridgehead, and to thrust rapidly toward Rennes. "
"On reaching Rennes our main thrust should be towards Vannes; but diversionary thrusts with the maximum use of deception should be employed to persuade the enemy that our object is Nantes."
" If, at this time, the enemy weakens his Eastern force to oppose us North of Redon, a strong attack should be launched toward the Seine. "
Part IV of the Appreciation continues, advocating alternating attacks on the East and West flanks of the bridgehead in reaction to German reinforcement moves, in order to bring German reinforcements sent to the American front back to the British front.
Thus it is fairly clear that Montgomery intended before ever landing to hold in the East and strike in the West, unless an opportunity presented itself for a favourable attack in the East. Certainly there is NO indication of anyone contemplating a breakout on D+2.
I feel d'Este got that bit wrong.
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@lufasumafalu5069 British incompetence? Ok it's time for a history lesson....the British Empire stood alone for 20 months and after the evacuation of Dunkirk, destroyed 30% of the fighting strength of the Luftwaffe, which was not fully rebuilt and entered the Soviet campaign greatly diminished. Engaged the Germans in Africa, Greece, and tied up 300,000 German troops in Norway for the duration and captured over 250,000 in Tunisia.
Destroyed the capital ship strength of the Kriegsmarine forcing them to rely on submarines, discovered the enigma codes that allowed the allies to decipher the German war plans, crushed 80% of the German armoured divisions in Normandy, which allowed the U.S to advance to cherbourg, conquered Hamburg and all of Northern Germany.
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@aniksamiurrahman6365 What glory of D-Day? These are the facts. D-Day has huge relevance for the postwar world, absolutely enormous. If D-Day hadn't happened, the whole of Germany and probably Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Austria, maybe the Low Countries too, and possibly even France would have been in Soviet hands, maybe even Spain.
D-Day gave the Western Allies the time they needed to establish a military presence on the Continent, as far east as they did manage to get, and also to guarantee & provide safeguard for the independance of several European countries where they hadn't campaigned (eg Sweden, Finland, etc). Most importantly, perhaps, the West got control of the most heavily industrialized parts of Germany.
Without D-Day the Allies would have been unable to secure the independance of most European nations - we would have had no leverage at all in Europe and we would have been completely ignored by the Soviets if there even were negotiations of the sort that took place at Potsdam.
Yes the war was decided in the East by the Soviets, but that doesn't mean the Axis were not still in the fight. One of the reasons that Operation Bagration was possible is because the Germans deployed many of their best divisions to France, leaving their forces in Belarus thinly spread and lacking front line armour and armour reserves. The Germans didn't have much with which to oppose Bagration. Huge expanses of front and not enough to plug the gaps since 12 Panzer divisions that would have halted the Red armies advance were committed to Normandy instead.
Stop being so biased.
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"when they had pretty much lost every battle they had fought in that war so far."
Not every battle.
British battle victories over the Axis.
Battle of the River Plate, 13 December 1939
Battle of Britain, 10 July – 31 October 1940
Siege of Malta, 11 June 1940 – 20 November 1942
Attack on Mers-el-Kébir . 3 July 1940
Battle of Cape Spada. 19 July 1940
Operation Hurry, 31 July-4 August 1940
Battle of Cape Passero, 12 October 1940
Operation MB8, 4 - 11 November 1940
Battle of Taranto, 11–12 November 1940
Battle of the Strait of Otranto, 12 November 1940
Operation Excess, January 10–11, 1941
Battle of Cape Matapan, 27–29 March 1941
Action off Sfax, 16 April 1941
Sinking of the Tirpitz, 12 November 1944
Sinking of the Bismarck, 26–27 May 1941-
Sinking of the Scharnhorst, 26 December 1943
Bombing of the Gneisenau, 26-27 Feb 1942
Battle of the Barents sea, 31 December 1942
Operation Halberd, September 1941
St Nazaire Raid, 28 March 1942 AKA, The Greatest Raid of All
Battle of the Duisburg Convoy, November 8–9, 1941
Battle of Cape Bon, 13 December 1941
Operation Albumen, 7/8 June, 1942 and 4/5 July, 1943
Second Battle of Sirte, 22 March 1942
Operation Stone Age, 20 November 1942
Battle of Skerki Bank, 2 December 1942
Battle off Zuwarah, 19 - 20 January 1943
Battle of the Campobasso Convoy, 3/4 May 1943
Operation Tenement, 13–15 July 1944
Battle of the Ligurian Sea, 18 March 1945
First Naval Battle of Narvik, 10 April 1940
Second Naval Battle of Narvik,, 13 April 1940
East African Campaign, June 1940 – 27 November 1941
Battle of Gondar, 13–27 November 1941
First Battle of El Alamein, 1–27 July 1942
Battle of Longstop Hill, 2-23 April 1943
Second Battle of El Alamein, 23 October–11 November 1942
Battle of Madagascar, 5 May 1942 – 6 November 1942
Battle of Keren, 5 February – 1 April 1941
Battle of Damascus, 18–21 June 1941
Battle of Beirut, 12 July 1941
Battle for Caen, 6 June – 6 August 1944
Operation Compass, 9 December 1940 – 9 February 1941
Operation Colossus, 10 February 1941
Battle of Bardia, 3–5 January 1941
Battle of Derna, January 24–26 1941
Battle of Beda Fomm, 6–7 February 1941
Capture of Kufra, 31 January – 1 March 1941
Battle of El Agheila, 11–18 December 1942
Siege of Tobruk, 10 April – 27 November 1941
Second Battle of Bardia, April 12 1941
Battle of Sollum, April 12 1941
Siege of Giarabub, December 1940 – 21 March 1941
Operation Brevity, 15–16 May 1941
Battle of Halfaya Pass, 1941
Battle of Fort Capuzzo, May 15–16 1941 General Fedele de Giorgis surrenders
Operation Crusader, 18 November – 30 December 1941
Battle of Bir el Gubi, November 19 – December 4 1941
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@bigwoody4704 With regards to Falaise....the initial design of Cobra was to execute a deeper envelopment by attacking down the west bank of the Seine.
Two divisions of XV Corps set out for Dreux on 15th August, and reached the Seine at Mantes on the 18th. .2 divisions ( 90, 2d Fr Arm) remained at Argentan, and reinforced by 80th division attacked north on 18th August. 5th armoured division turned left and attacked down the Seine on 20th August. XIX Corps came up on the left flank and attacked on the 21st, and neared Elbouf on the 24th, meeting the Canadians on the 26th. With Montgomery's approval, this attack had cut across the front of both the British and Canadian armies but was again unable to prevent many Germans from escaping across the Seine.
There is another comment to be made about the number of Germans who escaped the partial encirclement which I don't think has been mentioned yet. Most of them were actually from support units rather than being fighting troops.
According to Martin Blumenson in 'Breakout and Pursuit':
"How many Germans escaped? No one knew. At the end of 20 August Army Group B reported that "approximately from 40 to 50 percent of the encircled units succeeded in breaking out and joining hands with the II SS Panzer Corps." This was an optimistic assessment. By the end of the following day, the strength of six of seven armored divisions that had escaped the pocket totalled, as reported at that time, no more than 2,000 men, 62 tanks, and 26 artillery pieces.
Later estimates of the total number of Germans escaping varied between 20,000 and 40,000 men, but combat troops formed by far the smaller proportion of these troops. The average combat strength of divisions was no more than a few hundred men, even though the over-all strength of some divisions came close to 3,000. The explanation lay in the fact that a partial exodus had begun at least two or three days before the breakout attack--when shortages of ammunition, gasoline, and other supplies had already become acute.
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@johnlucas8479 What you have to remember also is that on day 1, Gavin decided to take an artillery regiment rather than another infantry unit. The logic behind this decision was that he wanted to guard his flank against the 1,000 tanks in the Reichswald, and bringing artillery to blindly pound the forest was the best way to protect that front. When he realised there wasn't anything of note in the Reichswald, he then decided to send a unit to Nijmegen.
The reality is that he could have taken an extra infantry unit and sent it to Nijmegen on day 1. He didn't do that. Or, he could have sent a unit to Nijmegen anyway since nothing came out the Reichswald until day 2, and what did emerge was easily beaten back when the second lift came in, the 82nd counter-attacked the 406th Division and inflicted 1,000 losses on the Germans, for the casualties of just 11 American paratroopers.
If the bridge had been secured, the 10th SS wouldn't have been able to dig in at Nijmegen and therefore Thirty Corps wouldn't have been engaged in house-to-house fighting in a city and could have advanced.
Thirty Corps had advanced from Son to Nijmegen in two hours. They could have advanced from Nijmegen to Arnhem if the bridge at Nijmegen had been taken and the route clear. Assuming Nijmegen bridge was taken and held, on day 3 Horrocks would have had to battle the 10th SS north of Nijmegen. That's an easier battle than fighting in the streets of Nijmegen which the SS had 3 days to fortify. Instead, they had to battle 10th SS at Nijmegen, and then the 9th SS too because Frost was finally overwhelmed once they crossed Nijmegen.
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@scottduncan6654
That's a very twisted distortion of History by you.
I wouldn't call an advance of 780 miles in 19 days pursuing Rommel all the way to Tunisia plodding 🤪 Moving slowly in Sicily? His Eighth army actually advanced 300 miles in 17 days across mountainous terrain, taking Syracuse, Catania and Augusta. Messina was a PR victory, the Germans and Italians STILL ESCAPED so it didn't matter whether Messina was captured or not.
No he DID NOT say preinvasion that he would take the town on D+1 that is a complete lie. Even at St Paul's School in London in April 1944, 2 months before Operation Overlord had even started, the plan Monty unveiled was as follows.
Quote " The British and Canadian armies were to decoy the enemy reserves and draw them to their front on the extreme eastern edge of the Allied beachhead. Thus while Monty taunted the enemy at Caen, we were to make our break on the long roundabout road to Paris. When reckoned in terms of national pride, this British decoy mission became a sacrificial one, for while we tramped around the outside flank, the British were to sit in place and pin down Germans. Yet strategically it fitted into a logistical division of labors, for it was towards Caen that the enemy reserves would race once the alarm was sounded".
Market Garden was far from a disaster either, the Allies seized up to 64 miles of territory from the Germans driving them out of most of Southern Holland whilst seizing multiple towns/cities like Eindhoven, Grave, and Nijmegen as well as liberating hundreds of thousands of Dutch civilians.
Most of the failures of Market Garden can be attributed to the Air Borne generals like Browning and Brereton who were part of the First Allied Air Borne Army, which I should point out to you was subordinate to SHAEF , not to Montgomery's 21st Army Group. Montgomery is not responsible for the failures of Market Garden.
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@bigwoody4704 Yes but unlike Arnhem, Plunder and Varsity were successful, Within a week of the start of Plunder, the Allies had taken 30,000 German prisoners of war north of the Ruhr.
General Eisenhower called it "the most successful airborne operation carried out to date", and an observer later wrote that the operation showed "the highest state of development attained by troop-carrier and airborne units".[54] In the official summary of the operation, Major General Ridgeway wrote that the operation had been flawless, and that the two airborne divisions involved had destroyed enemy defences that might otherwise have taken days to reduce, ensuring the operation was successful.[55]
Several modern historians have also praised the operation and the improvements that were made for Varsity. G. G. Norton argued that the operation benefited from the lessons learned from previous operations,[56] and Brian Jewell agrees, arguing that the lessons of Market Garden had been learned as the airborne forces were concentrated and quickly dropped, giving the defenders little time to recover.[19] Norton also argues that improvements were made for supporting the airborne troops; he notes that a large number of artillery pieces were available to cover the landings and that observers were dropped with the airborne forces, thus augmenting the firepower and flexibility of the airborne troops. He also highlights the development of a technique that allowed entire brigades to be landed in tactical groups, giving them greater flexibility.[57] Dropping the airborne forces after the ground forces had breached the Rhine also ensured that the airborne troops would not have to fight for long before being relieved, a major improvement on the manner in which the previous large-scale airborne operation, Market Garden, had been conducted.[58]
Historian Peter Allen states that while the airborne forces took heavy casualties, Varsity diverted German attention from the Rhine crossing onto themselves. Thus, the troops fighting to create a bridgehead, across the Rhine, suffered relatively few casualties, and were able to "break out from the Rhine in hours rather than days"
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@georgesenda1952 That's a myth. Patton was already at a standstill long before the planning for Market Garden had even started. Don't buy into what you've heard in Hollywood films like the 1970 film Patton because it's not historically accurate.
Quote Patton finally began receiving adequate supplies on September 4, (two weeks before MG) after a week’s excruciating pause”
- Harry Yeide, Patton the German View
Market Garden only had priority in extra supply transport laid on. It didn’t take away any actual supplies from any US army. Nor did Market Garden stop all operations on the western front. Patton’s 3rd Army was still trying to take Metz and US 1st Army began its Hurtgen Forest campaign on September 19th, 2 days after Market Garden began.
The US 1st Army offensive in the Hurtgen Forest and Aachen in October 1944 used FOUR TIMES as many men and supplies as the ground element of Market Garden, which wasn’t even a full 2nd British Army offensive which only involved a single corps.
Quote “ It was commonly believed at Third Army H.Q. that Montgomery's advance through Belgium was largely maintained by supplies diverted from Patton. (See Butcher, op. cit., p. 667.) This is not true. The amount delivered by the ' air-lift ' was sufficient to maintain only one division. No road transport was diverted to aid Montgomery until September 16th. On the other hand, three British transport companies, lent to the Americans on August 6th " for eight days," were not returned until September 4th.'“
Chester Wilmott, The struggle for Europe 1954.
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@johnlucas8479 In hindsight, regarding Antwerp it seems that the order to stop might have been a mistake John.
Quote "The city and port fell to the 11th Armoured Division in early September, but Montgomery halted ... Corps for resupply short of the wide Albert Canal to the north of the city, which consequently remained in enemy hands.[94] Horrocks regretted this after the war believing that his corps might have advanced another 100 miles (160 km) with the fuel available.[95] Although some doubt this could have been achieved without delays,[93] it is now known that ... Corps was opposed by only one German division , although Allied forces were unaware of this at the time.[96] The pause allowed the Germans to regroup around the Scheldt River, and by the time the Allies resumed their advance, the First Paratroop Army (General Kurt Student) had arrived and set up strong defensive positions along the opposite side of the canal
Quote "the 11th Armoured Division could have advanced 18 Miles further North to the base of the South Beveland Peninsular, thereby preventing German movement to and from the Peninsular. As it was, no such order was given and consequently Von Zangen was able to extract the remnants of his Fifteenth Army from the pocket around Brekens by ferrying them across the Schelde, mostly by night and then moving along the South Beveland Peninsular and from there into Holland."
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@morden279
When it came to combat in the early years of the war, 1940-42, inexperience, poor doctrine (or poorly applied doctrine) and training, as well as strategic miscalculations meant that it's performance was mixed at best. Heading into 1944-45, there was also a serious manpower shortage that the British had to contend with, as well as the declining status of Britain in the Alliance and as a Great Power.
Despite this, the British Army proved to be a capable and innovative force, and the results achieved by Montgomery O'Connor and Horrocks in Northwestern Europe, Leese and McCreery in Italy, and of course Bill Slim in Burma, are testimony to that fact.
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" The only reason why Montgomery is still even thought of is due to British inadequacy over their ultimate contribution to victory in WWII. The Americans and mostly the Soviets defeated the Germans."
Bollocs, the British Empire stood alone for 20 months and after Dunkirk, it destroyed 30% of the fighting strength of the Luftwaffe, which was not fully rebuilt and entered the Soviet campaign greatly diminished.engaged the Germans in Africa, Greece, and tied up 300,000 German troops in Norway for the duration and captured 250,000 in Tunisia, destroyed the capital ship strength of the Kriegsmarine forcing them to rely on submarines, discovered the enigma codes that allowed the allies to decipher the German war plans, crushed 80% of the German armour in Normandy at Caen, which allowed the U.S 1st army to advance to Cherbourg, conquered all of Northern Germany and took the surrender of the German army at Luneberg in 1945
Not what I would consider inadequate.......
"And it was their commanders that directed the battle"
And for the record D-day was actually commanded by Frederick Morgan, Leigh Mallory, Admiral Ramsay and Bernard Montgomery not Ike.
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@elessartelcontar6578 Having just recently read through the Normandy portion of the Official History of the Canadian Army, Col. Stacey (the author) provides ample documentary evidence demonstrating a holding action in the Caen sector was always part of Montgomery's plan.
Excerpted from "Appreciation on Possible Development of Operations to Secure a Lodgement Area", produced by 21st Army Group Planning, May 7, 1944 (one month before D-Day). This was forwarded to First US Army Group, among others, on 18 May under a covering letter which reads in part, "With regard to the outline of action at Part IV, this represents the Commander-In-Chief's [Montgomery's] intentions as far as they can be formulated at this stage."
IV. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
The type of country immediately South of the initial bridgehead does not favour a rapid advance. The Allied build-up relative to the estimated German build-up indicates that a period may supervene round about D+14, when there will be a grave risk of operations stabilising on a line which gives the Germans advantages in defence. The greatest energy and initiative will be required at this period to ensure the enemy is not allowed to stabilise his defence.
Once through the difficult bocage country, greater possibilities for manoeuvre and for the use of armour begin to appear. Our aim during this period should be to contain the maximum enemy forces facing the Eastern flank of the bridgehead, and to thrust rapidly toward Rennes.
On reaching Rennes our main thrust should be towards Vannes; but diversionary thrusts with the maximum use of deception should be employed to persuade the enemy that our object is Nantes.
If, at this time, the enemy weakens hsi Eastern force to oppose us North of Redon, a strong attack should be launched toward the Seine.
Part IV of the Appreciation continues, advocating alternating attacks on the East and West flanks of the bridgehead in reaction to German reinforcement moves, in order to bring German reinforcements sent to the American front back to the British front.
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@georgesenda1952 The problem with Lee is that he wasn't even subordinate to Eisenhower, he was in Washington!
So Eisenhower had no jurisdiction over any of the logistics arrangements on his side of things. In August, Com Z Headquarters under Lee moved from the UK to a camp at Valognes in France. Although Eisenhower had expressed a desire that headquarters not be located in Paris. This involved the movement of 8,000 officers and 21,000 enlisted men from the UK and Valognes, and took two weeks to accomplish at a time when there were severe supply shortages.
Com Z then occupied 167 hotels in Paris, the Seine Base Section headquarters occupied 129 more, and SHAEF occupied another 25. Lee established his own official residence in the Hotel George V. He justified the move to Paris on the grounds that Paris was the hub of France's road, rail and inland waterway communications networks. The logic was conceded, but the use of scarce fuel and transport resources at a critical time caused embarrassment for the Allies.
Lee was more interested in siphoning off supplies for his endeavours in Paris hotels rather than sending them to the frontlines. This guy apparently pissed off every man around him, up & down the chain of command.
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@classicalextremism ", Eisenhower and the civilian leadership are looking to end the war conclusively."
But the Broad front was NOT the strategy go about ending things quickly. The Allies reached the Rhine/Siegfried line and were stuck there for 6 months , in a series of bloody static battles. The Broad front strategy was to encircle the Ruhr in the fall of 1944.
Instead, the Allied armies were stopped at the Rhine and fought a series of very costly battles (Aachen, Metz, Hurtgen forest) for small gains. By March they were still stuck behind the Rhine, and stayed there until the Soviets broke down the front door in the Vistula-Oder offensive., at which point German resistance degraded rapidly.
The Broad Front strategy would only work if the Germans were in disarray, otherwise all 3 attacks would fail.
Monty believed (correctly) that the Germans were rebuilding their defences, therefore a single powerful thrust to seize a Rhine crossing was the best option.
Ike ignored warnings that the Allies were overstretching their supply lines because he wanted to "Keep Patton moving", which proved futile.
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@mgt2010fla
Initial and Final manpower commitments for all units in Ardennes Campaign
American British German
Initial 687,498 111,904 498,622
Final 680,706. 111,100 *425,941
Source - Dupuy, Trevor N.; Bongard, David L.; Anderson, Richard C. Jr. (1994), Hitler's Last Gamble: The Battle of the Bulge, December 1944 – January 1945, HarperCollins
The Americans and British under Montgomery’s command engaged 2 armoured battle groups of the German 5th Panzer army near Dinant by the Meuse.
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@fritz1816 If they got to the other side, production was:
Oil production in metric tons in 1937, 1938.
Iran: 10,331,000 10,359,000
Iraq: 4,255,000 4,272,000
Bahrein: 1,062,000 n.a.
By contrast, Romanian oil was 6.6 million in 1938.
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@johnlucas8479 Whats your opinion on the view that Japan should have attacked the Soviets through Siberia instead of going after the US? Many people on the content about those sort of scenarios seem to think it would have prevented Siberian troops from reinforcing Moscow and making the situation worse for the Red army.
I know that, before they got involved with the Americans they had plans to strike the Soviets in a plan called "Kantokuen"
From what I read the Japanese had 1.5 million men, 40,000 trucks, 2,000 tanks, 3,100 aircraft, 450,000 horses and 10,000 pieces of artillery ready to do it.
It was all set for September 1941 until the US took action against Japan.
Would it have worked?
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@johnlucas8479 Were they really bogged down though, i mean on paper the Japanese seemed to have firm control over a lot of the coastal areas and cities in China.
When the attack started they would be heading to Blagoveshchensk, Kuibyshevka, Lake Khanka, Sakhalin, followed up by Khabarovsk, Komsomolsk, Skovorodino, Sovetskaya Gavan, Nikolayevsk, Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky, Kamchatka Peninsula. Some of the targets would be taken by the navy not the army in Manchuria. Look at a map of the capital of Mongolia and draw a line up, that was where they planned to be at the end of 1942, then they planned on limited actions as they intended to dig in and hold. Baykalsk would be in operation range, but they would be setting up there main defences in Naushki/Lake Baikal.
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@bigwoody4704 At the start of the battle 9th Panzer had no tanks, just a few assault guns and a number of armoured half tracks, it also only had about 6,000 men, of whom only 3,000 were combat troops.
10th Panzer wasn't much better with just 8 Panthers, 16 Panzer VI's and 4 Stug III's.
That is approximately it for armour around Arnham, of course, thanks to the closeness of Germany, armoured reinforcements were rushed to the area, but the claim there were large numbers of tanks in the area when the operation was launched is completely wrong.
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@lyndoncmp5751 It is now known that an opportunity might have been missed by not clearing out the Walcheren Islands in the Estuary.
Quote "The city and port fell to the 11th Armoured Division in early September, but Montgomery halted XXX Corps for resupply short of the wide Albert Canal to the north of the city, which consequently remained in enemy hands. Horrocks regretted this after the war believing that his corps might have advanced another 100 miles (160 km) with the fuel available. Although some doubt this could have been achieved without delays, it is now known that XXX Corps was opposed by only one German division, although Allied forces were unaware of this at the time. The pause allowed the Germans to regroup around the Scheldt River, and by the time the Allies resumed their advance, the First Paratroop Army (General Kurt Student) had arrived and set up strong defensive positions along the opposite side of the canal"
Quote "the 11th Armoured Division could have advanced 18 Miles further North to the base of the South Beveland Peninsular, thereby preventing German movement to and from the Peninsular. As it was, no such order was given and consequently Von Zangen was able to extract the remnants of his Fifteenth Army from the pocket around Brekens by ferrying them across the Schelde, mostly by night and then moving along the South Beveland Peninsular and from there into Holland."
Even Horrocks himself thought it was a mistake.
"On the 4th of September, we were ordered to halt our advance as we were out-running our supplies particularly petrol, which was still being brought up from the beachhead a turn-round of some six hundred miles for the lorries. This was a tragedy, as the only troops between us and the Rhine, stretched out in a thin line, was one German division, the 719th, composed mainly of elderly gentlemen who hitherto had been guarding the north coast of Holland and had never heard a shot fired in anger, plus one battalion of Dutch SS, and a few Luftwaffer detachments. Had we been allowed to advance we could have brushed this meagre force aside, bounced the crossing over the Rhine, and probably gone right through to the Zyder Zee. A further advance like this would, of course, have entailed a certain risk, but we already had one hundred kilometres of petrol within reach, and another one hundred twenty-four hours away; moreover, we had captured Brussels Airport, so -surely additional supplies could have been flown in if we had got into trouble. I have always felt that this was a risk worth taking"
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@randylucas2458 You know it's funny you say that, as British forces fought in every single major theatre from start to finish. Not only was the war on our doorstep, we remained standing as the ONLY European nation taking on Germany and in fine fashion. Read some of the German accounts of the RAF bombings of major German cities, namely Hamburg and Cologne who were the first in history to endure a 1,000 bomber raid in a single night, those bombings happened every single night, year after year with the likes of Speer and Hitler himself commenting on their effectiveness.
Not only that but the RAF were hitting Germany hard in the skies too, such as during the Battle of Britain in which the security of Britain for the remainder of the war was ensured before the US had even entered the war and plans for a British invasion were abandoned by Hitler and he focused on Russia. Which now gets me on to what we did to make sure they were also coping on the Eastern front, such as all the aid supplied to them for FREE.
3,000+ Hurricanes, 4,000+ other aircraft, 27 naval vessels, 5,218 tanks (including 1,380 Valentines from Canada), 5,000+ anti-tank guns, 4,020 ambulances and trucks, 323 machinery trucks, 1,212 Universal Carriers and Loyd Carriers (with another 1,348 from Canada ), 1,721 motorcycles, £1.15bn worth of aircraft engines, 1,474 radar sets, 4,338 radio sets, 600 naval radar and sonar sets, hundreds of naval guns and 15 million pairs of boots. In total 4 million tonnes of war material including food and medical supplies were delivered. The munitions totaled £308m (not including naval munitions supplied), the food and raw materials totalled £120m in 1946 index. If that wasn't enough, the British ships returning from Russia were carrying gold to pay the *US*.
Campaigns in Africa and India were failures? Ah give it a rest you muppet, Montgomery alone sought the removal of Rommel from North Africa following El Alamein and Bill Slim did the same with the Japanese at Kohima and Imphal.
"the only people you've ever been able to beat were the French the world's losers at war you could not beat Germany but we did."
Nope, In the final 100 days of the Great War the BEF engaged, and defeated, 99 of the 197 German Divisions in the West.
♦The Battle of Amiens, 8 August 1918 ('the black day of the German Army');
♦The Battle of Albert, 21 August (the day on which Haig told Churchill 'we ought to do our utmost to get a decision this autumn');
♦The Battle of the Scarpe, 26 August;
♦The Battles of Havrincourt and Epehy, 12 September (the approaches to the HindenburgLine);
♦The Breaking of the Hindenburg Line, 27 September - 5 October (35,000 prisoners & 380 guns taken, the British Army's greatest feat of arms in all its history);
♦The Battle of Flanders, 28 September;
♦The Second Battle of Le Cateau, 6 October;
♦The Battle of the Selle, 17 October;
♦The Battle of the Sambre, 1-11 November.
These were Haig's victories, handsomely acknowledged by French Marshal Foch:
|*Never at any time in history has the British army* achieved greater results in attack than in this unbroken offensive The victory was indeed complete, thanks to the Commanders of Armies, Corps and Divisions, thanks above all to the unselfishness, to the wise, loyal and energetic policy of their Commander-in-Chief, who made easy a great combination and sanctioned a prolonged and gigantic effort
And furthermore look how many German forces surrendered to Montgomery in 1945 in the Netherlands, northwest Germany including all islands, and Denmark. Overall in WW2, it was the Russians who tore the guts out of the German army, they annihilated over 200 German divisions.
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