Comments by "Bullet-Tooth Tony" (@Bullet-Tooth-Tony-) on "Biographics"
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@OscarDirlwood
While Napoleon was a great commander, he was often too arrogant to realise the limitations of his own army. This can be seen in the French conquest of Syria (which failed), where he underestimated Ottoman defenses at Acre, thus losing the campaign, and eventually, after he left, Egypt. Such arrogance would’ve caused Napoleon to make mistakes against a well prepared, formidable Frederick the Great, and Frederick the Great would’ve defeated Napoleon.
Frederick understood the limitations of the Prussian Army. He barely expanded Prussia out of Germany, and usually fought defensive wars against aggressors. If Napoleon and Frederick fought, Frederick would have the advantage of the terrains and home-turf, and he would’ve been able to use his tactics against the French like he did against the Russians and Austrians. The Prussian soldiers of Fredericks era were also far more professional and better trained than the Prussians that Napoleon fought who by that point had turned into a conscript army.
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There are many directives for this operation: Monty's original, Monty's later notes (that went missing enroute to SHAEF), Dempsey's instructions and O'Connor's orders. A transcript of Monty's revised notes below:
Notes on Second Army Operations 16th July-18th July
1. Object of this operation.
To engage the German armour in battle and 'write it down' to such an extent that it is of no further value to the Germans as a basis of the battle.
To gain a good bridgehead over the River Orne through Caen, and thus improve our positions on the eastern flank.
Generally to destroy German equipment and personnel.
2. Affect of this operation on Allied policy.
We require the whole of the Cherbourg and Brittany peninsulas.
A victory on the eastern flank will help us to gain what we want on the western flank.
But the eastern flank is a bastion on which the whole future of the campaign in North West Europe depends; it must remain a firm bastion; if it became unstable the operations on the western flank would cease.
Therefore, while taking advantage of every opportunity to destroy the enemy, we must be very careful to maintain our own balance and ensure a firm base.
3. The enemy.
There are a lot of enemy divisions in the area south-east of Caen:
21 Panzer Division 16 GAF Field Division
1 SS Panzer Division 272 Infantry Division
12 SS Panzer Division
Another one [116 Panzer Division] is coming and will be here this week-end.
4. Operations of 12 Corps and Canadian Corps - 16th and 17th July.
Advantage must be taken of these to make the Germans think we are going to break out across the Orne between Caen and Amaye.
5. Initial Operations 8 Corps.
The three armoured divisions will be required to dominate the area Bourgebus-Vimont-Bretteville, and to fight and destroy the enemy.
But armoured cars should push far to the south towards Falaise, and spread alarm and despondency, and discover 'the form.'
6. 2 Canadian Corps.
While para 5 is going on, the Canadians must capture Vaucelles, get through communications and establish themselves in a very firm bridgehead on the general line Fleury-Cormelles-Mondeville.
7. Later Operations 8 Corps.
When 6 is done, then 8 Corps can 'crack about' as the situation demands.
But not before 6 is done.
8. To sum up for 8 Corps.
Para 5.
Para 7.
Finally.
Para 6 is vital.
B.L. Montgomery
15-7-44
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@bnm0883 Blucher was most certainly not better. Blucher was untalented and got his ass handed to him in the 1814 campaign and the Battle of Ligny, would Blucher have successfully pinned his army to the ridge at Mont St. Jean and repelled Napoleon’s attacks all day?
Wellington had the foresight that he already knew where he could successfully engage and trap Napoleon’s army before the campaign had even begun. The advance of the Imperial guard at Wellington's centre was stopped before Blucher's army had broken through at plancenoit.
Wellington NEVER lost a field battle, and beat EVERY single French general sent against him.... Jourdan, Victor, Massena, Clauzel, Ney, Soult... And Wellington really won everywhere he fought India, Denmark, Portugal, Spain, France and Belgium, showing a diverse range of battles in defence and attack.
He is definitely the most successful land commander of the age besides Napoleon and possibly Suvorov. There's a reason that Wellington's campaigns are still studied in military academies world wide and not Blucher. Blucher is overrated.
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@fredbarker9201 Most of the 1796-1797 campaign was pedisterian, around Mantua was the brilliance, the rest apart from the 3rd coalition and six days campaign were nothing special. That Wellington would be able to comprehensively defeat an Austrian Army of about the same size as his forces does not seem a large stretch.
The Vittoria Campaign was as aggressive, and daring as anything Napoleon ever did. Wellington would not have committed the horrible blunders Napoleon did..Wellington unlike Napoleon knew when to retreat and was able to do so without the wholesale destruction of his army. Napoleon's ego tended to make his defeats disastrous.
When it comes down to it.
Wellington, tactical, strategical, logistics, discipline, no horrible blunders
Napoleon - Operations, morale, Grand vision (though very two edged), some really really horrible blunders,
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@fredbarker9201 The reason for this is Marlboroughs career in my opinion is a lot more impressive than Wellingtons, despite having less victories than Wellington.
One of the few aggressive military geniuses, who was also gifted in diplomacy and he was undefeated in battle a feat which only a few generals have managed to achieve. When you read about Marlboroughs life, his diplomatic and political schemes are just as impressive as his military victories. Just have a read about his march over the Danube to relieve Vienna whilst being tailed by French armies theres a picture on google of his operations and just how much risk he took. One great example is where Marlborough's army advanced 40 miles in just 18 hours bypassing the French Ne Plus Ultra lines in 1711 and not losing a single soldier.
Marlborough was excellent in all aspects whether that's strategy, tactics, operations, politics. Even Napoleon respected him for his prowess. Marlborough came VERY close to seizing all of France, but was unfortunately let down by some lack of support.
He controlled the flow of the battlefield. He kept himself in a position where he could scope the entire battlefield. In all of his battles, Marlborough would create a numerical advantage at a point of his own choosing where he could deliver a strike that would crush his enemy.
To achieve this whilst he was outnumbered, which he often was, Marlborough sought to fix the attention of the opposing generals on another part of the field by making ferocious but controlled attacks. As the enemy redeployed his forces to meet these attacks, Marlborough would switch the weight of his attack to the chosen point and strike with overwhelming strength.
Many generals have tried to adopt such tactics, but few have been able to maintain such complete control over their own soldiers as to be able to mount such forceful attacks whilst restraining their men from launching all out assaults.
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@bigwoody4704 "On GOODWOOD the British Army lost 500 tanks and killed fewer than 50 German tanks.30 destroyed by air power."
Sigh ....
No they didn't. WHY are you using over exaggerated German figures of the battle?
The fundamental problem with how Operation Goodwood has been studied is tank losses and the fact it's been calculated differently for the two sides.
The losses for Allied tanks have normally been counted by the number of tanks still operational at the end of each day of the operation, even though a large number of those counted as lost will be operational within a couple of days. While the German tank losses only count those tanks which are completely lost and unrecoverable after the end of the operation. So you end up with Allied losses of nearly 500 tanks against German losses of around 100 tanks, but if you use the same type of calculation for both sides, in this case the German system, Allied losses fall to 150-200 while German losses remain the same at 100.
British tanks knocked out and recovered, but then written-off were -correctly - classed as combat losses, but in the German Army every recovered tank was automatically listed as 'Under repair' even it it was a CTL and was being cannibalised for spares.
Then when the Germans were routed and fled, leaving the hulks behind, they were reclassified as 'Abandoned' - which was a non-combat category. Thus for Goodwood both the British and the Germans appear to have lost about 140-150 tanks destroyed, though at least 17 of the German tanks were Tigers and over 30 were Panthers, and each of these was much more of a loss to the German army than the loss of a Sherman or Cromwell was to the British.
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@chrisbradshaw6135 So your blaming Falaise on Montgomery now? It was as much Omar Bradley's fault as anyone else. He and his Chief of Staff ordered Patton to halt and pull back XVth Corps in several phone calls on Aug 13. He did not contact Montgomery to ask that the Army Group boundary be shifted, and discouraged Eisenhower's offer to do so. Patton was so upset he ordered a stenographic record of the conversation with Bradley's Chief of Staff be included in the 3rd Army History.
And furthermore between 135,000 and 200,000 Germans were killed; and 20,000 to 50,000 Germans were captured. 1,300 tanks, 20,000 vehicles, 2,000 guns. Five panzer divisions destroyed and 20 infantry divisions destroyed. That is a good result, the majority of those troops who escaped left all of their heavy equipment behind anyway. You would think that this was an Allied defeat rather than than an utter DISASTER for the German army according to some accounts. Eisenhower noted every hundred miles he walked there were German bodies and material strewn everywhere.
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@fredbarker9201 At Bautzen he had 200,000 men. He also outnumbered the Austrians at Ulm by 80,000. and had more than the Russians at Borodino and Smolensk. Then theres Lodi, Brienne, Somosierra, Montereau, Montenotte, Landshut, Czarnowo, Mormant, Champaubert, Saint-Dizier, Shubra Khit. So while Napoleon did win some battles against the odds, he also won some very favourable battles as well.
Alexander started off in a small city state, Caeser had the might of the Senate against him, Napoleon was born into a nation that had over 30 million people and the largest army on the continent with hundreds of thousands of troops to conscript. So tell me how Napoleon faced harder odds?
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@ronaldmcdonald2817 Wellington is easily the superior in my mind. Wellington's Peninsula Campaign was key to undermining France's control over Europe, and he performed very well at Waterloo. Wellington's plan worked out EXACTLY as he wished, more or less. He fought a tenacious and effective defence against Napoleon's (or rather, Ney's) ham-fisted tactics. Your statement makes exactly as much sense as saying Robert E. Lee deserves no credit for Chancellorsville because he wouldn't have won without Jackson's flank attack.
The best Charles ever really did was a bloody tactical defeat at Aspern-Essling in which he only won thanks to overwhelming numbers, any real general would have wiped out a substantial portion of Napoleon's vulnerable army following Aspern-Essling, whereas Charles simply sat and waited for Napoleon to try the same thing again.
Wellington won more victories against the French than Blucher and Charles combined. Bluchers only claim to fame is getting embarassed by the French in multiple battles in Germany and arriving late at Waterloo to a victory against a French army that had already been smashed by Wellington for 6 hours. Pfft some record that is .
There's a reason that Wellington's campaigns are still studied in military academies world wide and not Charles and Blucher. Blucher is overrated and Charles was nothing special. The only great generals were Napoleon, Wellington, Suvorov, Davout, Lannes, Soult and Massena.
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@ronaldmcdonald2817 That's not about the same at all. That's a 2 to 1 advantage Charles possessed, including 292 guns against Napoleons 154. Arch Duke Charles was really poor at taken his chances, had a lack of ruthless , killer instinct.. His shifting of the axis attack at the start of 1809 was just wasting time at critical point. At Aspern Essling why smash the bridges before the French cross? Waiting till half the French army was across would have so much better. Acre is arguably worse than Aspern, as acre ended a war/campaign in french defeat, where as aspern ended only a battle in French defeat.
Charles didn't even have to risk a single infantryman in order to obstruct Napoleon. He could have simply bombarded the island of Lobau with artillery, or more daringly, assaulted it, as it was vulnerable following the battle, and thus secure his position. After the battle, Charles actually pulled back, and seemed content to merely watch Napoleon while he waited for Archduke John. For a entire month, he simply did nothing of consequence.
Blucher also had a 5 to 1 advantage in many of his victories, btw the Prussian army's movement and tactics were mostly planned by Von Gneisenau, not Blucher. They are mediocre generals at best, who won thanks to an abundance of manpower. None of them took on Napoleon at a disadvantage.
In contrast Wellington at Bussaco, Torres Vedras and Fuentes De Onoro, he defeats one of Napoleon's best marshalls Massena outnumbered and in the Pyrenees campaign he beats another in Soult outnumbered, and also held out against Napoleon for 6 hours (outnumbered with a 5,000 men disadvantage). In all honesty Wellington could (and probably should) have been well beaten before the arrival of Bulow's IV Corps. Instead Napoleon spent 6 hours hurling columns at an unbreakable line and cavalry at unbreakable squares, as well as tying up thousands of men trying to occupy well defended redoubts. Wellington never fell back at all, the fact his elite Guards men repulsed the Imperial Guard without the Prussians is evidence of that.
Wellington NEVER lost a field battle, and beat EVERY single French general sent against him.... Jourdan, Victor, Massena, Ney, Soult... And Wellington really won everywhere he fought India, Denmark, Portugal, Spain, France and Belgium, showing a diverse range of battles in defence and attack. He is definitely the most successful land commander of the age besides Napoleon and possibly Suvorov. Blucher and Archduke are third rate generals in comparison to what Wellington achieved in his career. That's why no one studies them.
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@ronaldmcdonald2817 Again if i have nearly 100,000 troops and my opponent has 80,000, that's not an even fight whatsoever 🤦♂ that's about the same odds as Montgomery had at El Alamein against Rommel.
Much of Napoleon's army was vulnerable near Lobau. Artillery could certainly have done some serious damage. For over a month after the battle, Charles sat there and watched Napoleon grow stronger, while elements of Napoleon's army defeated Archduke John elsewhere. In fact, he didn't even do a very good job of watching Napoleon; he got so distracted with relatively distant concerns, that he was caught completely off guard by Napoleon's second crossing, leading to Charles' decisive defeat at Wagram. Chandler's classic work on Napoleon notes that Charles' failure to exploit his victory was nearly as astonishing as the way Napoleon handled this stage of the campaign.
Errm yes he did, Blucher had an abundance of troops at his disposal in virtually every battle he fought. And even then he still got beaten at least 8 times which is embarassing, he should be called Marshall Blunder, he was nothing more than a morale booster, he was no real tactician or strategist like Wellington. Wellington NEVER suffered a major defeat. Ask yourself why military academies still study Wellington to this day and not Blucher 😜
Stop lying. By the late afternoon, D'erlons Corps no longer existed, the French heavy cavalry were destroyed, the Corps in and around Hugoumont were done, as well as the one that had taken La Haye Saint. All due to Wellington's efforts. Napoleon basically had his Imperial guard left and we both know what happened to them when they were finally committed to attack Wellington's centre, totally routed. in the words of Wellington "They came on in the same way and we beat them in the same way"
Finally, Quatre Bras was a draw, as it denied both sides what they wanted. Wellington could not join up with Blucher, but also the French could not stop Wellington from setting himself up at Waterloo. Initially it may appear that the French had gained the greater benefit, but in hindsight it ultimately led to the French losing the campaign. Nevertheless a battle where the opposition retreat is not a defeat.
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@ronaldmcdonald2817 Why is it so hard to acknowledge that Charles outnumbered Napoleon? 😂Just curious, if Archduke Charles was so good, why was he not given command of the Austrian Army after 1809? Aspern-Essling was at best, inconclusive and he was beaten at Wagram, not a particularly impressive record.
Blucher was not a good tactician and strategist at all. Blucher relied upon Von Gneisenau for much of the leg work. Blucher only had the spirit to lead armies but was weak tactically and had no grasp for Napoleonic warfare this was evident in the Six days campaign and Ligny. Wellington was a far superior tactician.
Wellington was able to concentrate his forces, while the much larger French forces were forced to occupy Spain. What Wellington did was looking at Napoleon's approach to fighting a campaign and adopting and improving it. the Austrians, Russians and Prussians were far slower to adapt to this and it cost them dearly on many occasions.
None of the Coalition commanders in central europe studied Wellington's proven system and implemented it, by 1814 they were still doing the same thing as they had done in 1805 again and again trying to bludgeon through Napoleon's army in costly frontal attacks. Wellington on the other hand won his battles at a tolerable loss in terms of casualties. Wellington was also always outnumbered in the theatre of operations, unlike Blucher and Charles which makes him even more impressive.
Wellington defeated 3 invasions of Portugal, expelled the French after Vimeiro, destroyed Massena's army while having a numerical disadvantage in the Torres Vedras campaign, tied up a large chunk of French forces and lead much of the allied effort in the Peninsular. You can bring up Southern France, but that doesn't diminish the fact he performed superbly on the tactical level and managed to drive Soult out of strong defensive positions in the Pyrenees, winning several battles across difficult terrain.
Napoleon was effectively beaten before Blucher arrived. He may have won the field if 'Marschall Vorwarts' hadn't arrived to deliver the coup de grace, but the meat grinder of Waterloo meant that his forces were decimated and would have been badly in need of rest and reinforcements; the reality being that they would have been forced to march on and likely fight again shortly afterwards. Napoleon's tactics were to split his opponents and overwhelm them with numbers, winning wasn't enough, he had to win with as few casualties as possible. The situation back in Paris was that even with victories, Napoleon's position was at best precarious and reinforcements were by no means guaranteed.
Wellington's tactics at Waterloo was to hold the French and make sure that they paid for every inch of ground. Would he have stood if Blucher's intervention was doubtful? I have the feeling that he may have, as he knew that his tactics on this battlefield, and the tactics he knew Napoleon was likely to employ, would mean that the French would at best achieve a phyrric victory.
Blucher wasn't an incredible commander, nobody studies him . I've already repeated this.
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@ronaldmcdonald2817 Besides the Rhine Campaign he had Stokach, Ostrach and Zurich in the Swiss Campaign, though he took high casualties despite having a big numerical advantage. In Italy the Austrians were already destroyed by the time he arrived, he couldn't really do much to stop Napoleon and it was a feat that he managed to escape with his army in tact. He lacked aggression to carry out offensives and his heart wasn't in the right place most of the time.
Wellington was the better general and possibly one of the greatest generals of all time in my opinion. Defensively he was a master of positioning and maneuvering, never losing a major battle. He had daring offensives such as Vittoria, Assaye and Salamanca, proving that he was competent offensively and could seize the moment unlike Charles. His campaigns in India, Torres Vedras and through Spain were brilliant and in my opinion some of the greatest military feats in modern history. It's an insult to even include Blucher.
And I disagree about Waterloo.
Wellington takes a deserved part of the credit. He was holding the line as promised and the Prussians arrived as planned.
The French were not winning. They had failed to take 2 out of 3 strong points, and had most of their cavalry expended, most of their infantry had been shattered outside Hougoumont, in D’Erlons crushed attack, storming La Haye Saint (which took them most of the day) and at Papelotte and Plancenoit.
Wellington on the other hand still had effective garrisons in Papelotte and Hougemont. His centre was exhausted, but he’d only had 1 cavalry regiment routed. Contrary to myth he still had lots of brigades who were comparatively fresh.
He had a Full Dutch-Belgian Division still untouched, most of his light cavalry brigades were still effective, his Dutch heavy brigade and the household brigade were still in fighting condition.
His British brigades, 2nd Guards were in good condition, 5th Brigade was desperate, 3rd Brigade has barely been scratched, 4th Brigade was also borderline fresh, 8th Brigade was also fairly unscathed... but they had taken a pounding at Quatre Bras, 9th Brigade were very beaten up but again they’d had it worse at Quatre Bras, 10th had taken losses in the cavalry attacks.
So there was lots of troops (I didn’t go into the Hanovarians and KGL) in Wellingtons army still in relatively good condition. Napoleon couldn’t say the same. His Imperial Guard were mostly tied down. He only had the middle guard left which he threw away...The Wellingtons line was wavering myth is revisionism but not born out by hard study.
When the Middle Guard attacked, only really troops that looked unsteady were British 5th Brigade... a brigade heavily engaged at Quatre Bras and in the thick of it again all day at Waterloo, but their unsteadiness at this point was not the case for the whole army as some like to pretend.
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@bigwoody4704 Quote The Battle of Alam el Halfa took place between 30 August and 5 September 1942 south of El Alamein during the Western Desert Campaign of the Second World War. Panzerarmee Afrika (Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel), attempted an envelopment of the British Eighth Army (Lieutenant-General Bernard Montgomery). In Unternehmen Brandung (Operation Surf), the last big Axis offensive of the Western Desert Campaign, Rommel intended to defeat the Eighth Army before Allied reinforcements arrived.
Montgomery knew of Axis intentions through Ultra signals intercepts and left a gap in the southern sector of the front, knowing that Rommel planned to attack there and deployed the bulk of his armour and artillery around Alam el Halfa Ridge, 20 miles (32 km) behind the front. Unlike in previous engagements, Montgomery ordered that the tanks were to be used as anti-tank guns, remaining in their defensive positions on the ridge. When Axis attacks on the ridge failed and short on supplies, Rommel ordered a withdrawal. The 2nd New Zealand Division conducted Operation Beresford against Italian positions, which was a costly failure.
Montgomery did not exploit his defensive victory, preferring to continue the methodical build up of strength for his autumn offensive, the Second Battle of El Alamein. Rommel claimed that British air superiority determined the result, being unaware of Ultra. Rommel adapted to the increasing Allied dominance in the air by keeping his forces dispersed. With the failure at Alam Halfa, the Axis forces in Africa lost the initiative and Axis strategic aims in Africa were no longer possible.
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@markuhler2664 Sorry this is late, but here's the issue with Lee. Rather than being under Eisenhower, he was operating from Washington.
Eisenhower had no jurisdiction over any of the logistics arrangements on his side of things. In August, Com Z Headquarters under Lee moved from the UK to a camp at Valognes in France. Although Eisenhower had expressed a desire that headquarters not be located in Paris. This involved the movement of 8,000 officers and 21,000 enlisted men from the UK and Valognes, and took two weeks to accomplish at a time when there were severe supply shortages.
Com Z then occupied 167 hotels in Paris, the Seine Base Section headquarters occupied 129 more, and SHAEF occupied another 25. Lee established his own official residence in the Hotel George V. He justified the move to Paris on the grounds that Paris was the hub of France's road, rail and inland waterway communications networks. The logic was conceded, but the use of scarce fuel and transport resources at a critical time caused embarrassment for the Allies.
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@bnm0883 "Wellington steps that we have forgotten apart from the British who are looking for a hero like you."
Sure, that's why he's ranked second place behind Napoleon in most successful generals of all time, theres a video on here that shows that if you don't believe me. The Spanish, Portugese, French and Indians remember him.
😂
Blucher also had a 5 to 1 advantage in many of his victories that's not brave, btw the Prussian army's movement and tactics were mostly planned by Von Gneisenau, not Blucher. He won thanks to an abundance of manpower. Never took on the french army at a disadvantage. In contrast Wellington at Bussaco, Torres Vedras and Fuentes De Onoro, he defeats one of Napoleon's best marshalls Massena outnumbered 30,000 against 65,000 and in the Pyrenees campaign he beats another in Soult outnumbered, 62,000 vs 100,000, and also held out against Napoleon for 6 hours (outnumbered with a 5,000 men disadvantage).
In all honesty Wellington could (and probably should) have been well beaten before the arrival of Bulow's IV Corps. Instead Napoleon spent 6 hours hurling columns at an unbreakable line and cavalry at unbreakable squares, as well as tying up thousands of men trying to occupy well defended redoubts. Wellington never once fell back in retreat despite all of this, the fact his elite Guards men repulsed the Imperial Guard without the Prussians is evidence of that.
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@bnm0883 So is Wellington
"Quote Wellington is famous for his adaptive defensive style of warfare, resulting in several victories against numerically superior forces while minimising his own losses. He is regarded as one of the greatest defensive commanders of all time, and many of his tactics and battle plans are still studied in military academies around the world"
The French were not winning at Waterloo. They had failed to take 2 out of 3 strong points, and had most of their cavalry expended, most of their infantry had been shattered outside Hougoumont, in D’Erlons crushed attack, storming La Haye Saint (which took them most of the day) and at Papelotte and Plancenoit.
Wellington on the other hand still had effective garrisons in Papelotte and Hougemont. His centre was exhausted, but he’d only had 1 cavalry regiment routed. Contrary to myth he still had lots of brigades who were comparatively fresh.
He had a Full Dutch-Belgian Division still untouched, most of his light cavalry brigades were still effective, his Dutch heavy brigade and the household brigade were still in fighting condition.
His British brigades, 2nd Guards were in good condition, 5th Brigade was desperate, 3rd Brigade has barely been scratched, 4th Brigade was also borderline fresh, 8th Brigade was also fairly unscathed... but they had taken a pounding at Quatre Bras, 9th Brigade were very beaten up but again they’d had it worse at Quatre Bras, 10th had taken losses in the cavalry attacks.
So there was lots of troops (I didn’t go into the Hanovarians and KGL) in Wellingtons army still in relatively good condition. Napoleon couldn’t say the same. His Imperial Guard were mostly tied down. He only had the middle guard left which he threw away...The Wellingtons line was wavering myth is revisionism but not born out by hard study.
When the Middle Guard attacked, only really troops that looked unsteady were British 5th Brigade... a brigade heavily engaged at Quatre Bras and in the thick of it again all day at Waterloo, but their unsteadiness at this point was not the case for the whole army as some like to pretend.
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@bigwoody4704 Monty’s concept was of a concentrated mass of Allied armour, with all available logistical support devoted to it, directed against the Ruhr, a threat which would force the remaining German armour to give battle, and then let the great Allied superiority in armour and air power destroy it.
When you have that level of superiority, what you need is a large set battle to exploit it. If this basic concept had been applied, the Germans would have been forced to come out and fight for the Ruhr, just as the Japanese were forced to come out and fight for Leyte. Once the German armour was finished off, the road to Berlin then really would lie open.
This was the Schlieffen plan in reverse, a wide flanking move to reach round and stab the enemy in his industrial heartland. The appearance of the mass of Allied armour on their west flank heading round towards the Ruhr would inevitably force the German armour to come to meet it. The Allies would then be able to fight their decisive tank and air battle, on the flat plains of North Germany.
It is worth noting that the Germans also used the Schlieffen plan, or a variant of it, in each world war. Each time, their idea was an outflanking move in the west, sweeping round through the Low Countries, not a broad front advance. This shows that, in strategic terms, the German General Staff agreed with Monty or it shows that Monty took a leaf out of the Germans page.
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@zak-de1lq I'd recommend reading up on Marlboroughs march across the Danube, that's a good start. Marlborough prioritised speed and aggressiveness both on the march and the battlefield. Marlborough always positioned himself in positions where he could both see and effect the outcome of the battle.
When he saw the danger, he reacted quickly, or sometimes was proactive (as at the Schellenberg). He always had a tactical reserve, which he fed in and used at the precise moment it needed to be committed to swing the battle.
He also had a formidable army, which was extremely tenacious, with commanders he empowered to make tactical decisions themselves rather than checking in, like the French had to do, This army always relentlessly pushed forward, even in the face of extreme danger, making it almost impossible to steal the initiative away from.
He was very very tactically aware (like in using terrain at Ramillies to mask his reverse countermarch on the left flank to reinforce the flank for the push), which makes him not only one of the most formidable battlefield tacticians, but amongst the best in military history, imho
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Divalvaro Yes but their are also people who also want to know more on the backgrounds of the generals that they fought against. We all talk about Alexander, Caeser and Napoleon, but forget there are other generals who were also good on the battlefield like Scipio,Khalid Ibn Al-Walid, Subutai, Wellington, Sulla, Belisarius, Richard the Lion heart, Robert Lee, Pyrrhus, Frederick, Gustavus Adolphus etc
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