Comments by "Bullet-Tooth Tony" (@Bullet-Tooth-Tony-) on "Bernard Montgomery: The Spartan General" video.
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There are many directives for this operation: Monty's original, Monty's later notes (that went missing enroute to SHAEF), Dempsey's instructions and O'Connor's orders. A transcript of Monty's revised notes below:
Notes on Second Army Operations 16th July-18th July
1. Object of this operation.
To engage the German armour in battle and 'write it down' to such an extent that it is of no further value to the Germans as a basis of the battle.
To gain a good bridgehead over the River Orne through Caen, and thus improve our positions on the eastern flank.
Generally to destroy German equipment and personnel.
2. Affect of this operation on Allied policy.
We require the whole of the Cherbourg and Brittany peninsulas.
A victory on the eastern flank will help us to gain what we want on the western flank.
But the eastern flank is a bastion on which the whole future of the campaign in North West Europe depends; it must remain a firm bastion; if it became unstable the operations on the western flank would cease.
Therefore, while taking advantage of every opportunity to destroy the enemy, we must be very careful to maintain our own balance and ensure a firm base.
3. The enemy.
There are a lot of enemy divisions in the area south-east of Caen:
21 Panzer Division 16 GAF Field Division
1 SS Panzer Division 272 Infantry Division
12 SS Panzer Division
Another one [116 Panzer Division] is coming and will be here this week-end.
4. Operations of 12 Corps and Canadian Corps - 16th and 17th July.
Advantage must be taken of these to make the Germans think we are going to break out across the Orne between Caen and Amaye.
5. Initial Operations 8 Corps.
The three armoured divisions will be required to dominate the area Bourgebus-Vimont-Bretteville, and to fight and destroy the enemy.
But armoured cars should push far to the south towards Falaise, and spread alarm and despondency, and discover 'the form.'
6. 2 Canadian Corps.
While para 5 is going on, the Canadians must capture Vaucelles, get through communications and establish themselves in a very firm bridgehead on the general line Fleury-Cormelles-Mondeville.
7. Later Operations 8 Corps.
When 6 is done, then 8 Corps can 'crack about' as the situation demands.
But not before 6 is done.
8. To sum up for 8 Corps.
Para 5.
Para 7.
Finally.
Para 6 is vital.
B.L. Montgomery
15-7-44
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@bigwoody4704 "On GOODWOOD the British Army lost 500 tanks and killed fewer than 50 German tanks.30 destroyed by air power."
Sigh ....
No they didn't. WHY are you using over exaggerated German figures of the battle?
The fundamental problem with how Operation Goodwood has been studied is tank losses and the fact it's been calculated differently for the two sides.
The losses for Allied tanks have normally been counted by the number of tanks still operational at the end of each day of the operation, even though a large number of those counted as lost will be operational within a couple of days. While the German tank losses only count those tanks which are completely lost and unrecoverable after the end of the operation. So you end up with Allied losses of nearly 500 tanks against German losses of around 100 tanks, but if you use the same type of calculation for both sides, in this case the German system, Allied losses fall to 150-200 while German losses remain the same at 100.
British tanks knocked out and recovered, but then written-off were -correctly - classed as combat losses, but in the German Army every recovered tank was automatically listed as 'Under repair' even it it was a CTL and was being cannibalised for spares.
Then when the Germans were routed and fled, leaving the hulks behind, they were reclassified as 'Abandoned' - which was a non-combat category. Thus for Goodwood both the British and the Germans appear to have lost about 140-150 tanks destroyed, though at least 17 of the German tanks were Tigers and over 30 were Panthers, and each of these was much more of a loss to the German army than the loss of a Sherman or Cromwell was to the British.
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@chrisbradshaw6135 So your blaming Falaise on Montgomery now? It was as much Omar Bradley's fault as anyone else. He and his Chief of Staff ordered Patton to halt and pull back XVth Corps in several phone calls on Aug 13. He did not contact Montgomery to ask that the Army Group boundary be shifted, and discouraged Eisenhower's offer to do so. Patton was so upset he ordered a stenographic record of the conversation with Bradley's Chief of Staff be included in the 3rd Army History.
And furthermore between 135,000 and 200,000 Germans were killed; and 20,000 to 50,000 Germans were captured. 1,300 tanks, 20,000 vehicles, 2,000 guns. Five panzer divisions destroyed and 20 infantry divisions destroyed. That is a good result, the majority of those troops who escaped left all of their heavy equipment behind anyway. You would think that this was an Allied defeat rather than than an utter DISASTER for the German army according to some accounts. Eisenhower noted every hundred miles he walked there were German bodies and material strewn everywhere.
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@bigwoody4704 Quote The Battle of Alam el Halfa took place between 30 August and 5 September 1942 south of El Alamein during the Western Desert Campaign of the Second World War. Panzerarmee Afrika (Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel), attempted an envelopment of the British Eighth Army (Lieutenant-General Bernard Montgomery). In Unternehmen Brandung (Operation Surf), the last big Axis offensive of the Western Desert Campaign, Rommel intended to defeat the Eighth Army before Allied reinforcements arrived.
Montgomery knew of Axis intentions through Ultra signals intercepts and left a gap in the southern sector of the front, knowing that Rommel planned to attack there and deployed the bulk of his armour and artillery around Alam el Halfa Ridge, 20 miles (32 km) behind the front. Unlike in previous engagements, Montgomery ordered that the tanks were to be used as anti-tank guns, remaining in their defensive positions on the ridge. When Axis attacks on the ridge failed and short on supplies, Rommel ordered a withdrawal. The 2nd New Zealand Division conducted Operation Beresford against Italian positions, which was a costly failure.
Montgomery did not exploit his defensive victory, preferring to continue the methodical build up of strength for his autumn offensive, the Second Battle of El Alamein. Rommel claimed that British air superiority determined the result, being unaware of Ultra. Rommel adapted to the increasing Allied dominance in the air by keeping his forces dispersed. With the failure at Alam Halfa, the Axis forces in Africa lost the initiative and Axis strategic aims in Africa were no longer possible.
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@bigwoody4704 Monty’s concept was of a concentrated mass of Allied armour, with all available logistical support devoted to it, directed against the Ruhr, a threat which would force the remaining German armour to give battle, and then let the great Allied superiority in armour and air power destroy it.
When you have that level of superiority, what you need is a large set battle to exploit it. If this basic concept had been applied, the Germans would have been forced to come out and fight for the Ruhr, just as the Japanese were forced to come out and fight for Leyte. Once the German armour was finished off, the road to Berlin then really would lie open.
This was the Schlieffen plan in reverse, a wide flanking move to reach round and stab the enemy in his industrial heartland. The appearance of the mass of Allied armour on their west flank heading round towards the Ruhr would inevitably force the German armour to come to meet it. The Allies would then be able to fight their decisive tank and air battle, on the flat plains of North Germany.
It is worth noting that the Germans also used the Schlieffen plan, or a variant of it, in each world war. Each time, their idea was an outflanking move in the west, sweeping round through the Low Countries, not a broad front advance. This shows that, in strategic terms, the German General Staff agreed with Monty or it shows that Monty took a leaf out of the Germans page.
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