Comments by "Gregory Wright" (@gregorywright4918) on "Drachinifel" channel.

  1. Glad it wasn't my handwriting - my 4's look like 9's...
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  2. They knew from the start that was impossible, so they planned to win the first battle with greater reach, greater hitting power, and greater spirit...
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  3. Once the Philippines were taken, the Southern Resource Area was effectively cut off from the Japanese Home Islands. Not that they had that much of a transport fleet at that point (end 1944) anyway. Most of that battle was fought in 1943 and 44.
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  4. The phrase "Obviously..."
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  5. Captain Nemo was there to buy her plates from the scrapper for a "submersible vessel" he was dreaming about building...
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  6. The highly improbable is what draws the most attention - particularly of armchair historians of the future...
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  7. "Only ones"? Who knocked out the Yorktown at Midway? Let's not forget the IJN subs either... damaging Saratoga twice and sinking Wasp.
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  8.  @colbeausabre8842  The Enterprise and the Saratoga were a tag-team between being the only carrier and being in the shop for repair...
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  9. Fear of guilt by association?
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  10. It makes sense given their cruise liner origins, although it broke with IJN tradition to try to vent below the flight deck off to the sides. Most of the other nation's carriers brought the smoke up through the island, though the angling was cute.
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  11.  @ph89787  And I'll bet before we're through Mister, I'll - make a Carrier - out of you...
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  12. The Ohio and Malta, by Michael Pearson.
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  13.  @bkjeong4302 If Warspite was using radar she would have had a better tactical picture, and IJN destroyers did not use circular formations at night yet, more like box or line formations at night. Warspite could have snuck up on them from astern if they were only doing cruising speed (or damaged by Albacores). They were not retreating, but trying to get into position for next strike in morning.
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  14. There is an amazing picture of a bomb going off on the deck of the Enterprise, don't know of the photographer survived or not...
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  15. The Kaga was the slow one - she was rated for 28 knots, but due to time between refits probably made more like 27. Yet the IJN aircraft were lighter than USN, so it may not have made much difference.
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  16. Drach vs Mrs. Drach?
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  17.  @robertewalt7789 The first two might be comparable, but airplanes were mostly made out of aluminum, so you can't just recycle the steel.
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  18. The Shokakus had an extra 2,000 tons and 100 feet in length, which meant a much bigger hanger deck, thus a bigger air group. They had triple the SHP, and engines designed to be run often at the max, compared to the Hiyos breaking down so much due to being pushed too hard. The Independences were less than half her size, but built on the hulls of Cleveland-class cruisers with 4 shafts and 100,000 SHP.
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  19. The IJN favored the downward-curving funnel for boiler exhaust, and that tended to occupy the middle of the starboard side. Early designers proposed putting an island (once they recognized its usefulness compared to pilot-preferred flat deck) on the port side to offset the overhanging weight of the funnel. That also allowed them to locate in in the middle rather than further forward (which it would have to be on the starboard side), where it would be harder to see the stern landing area. But once they did that the pilots started to complain about air current eddies over the stern landing area, and they also noticed that trainees tended to drift towards the port side due to the torque of the single propeller engine. So later carriers located it further forward on the starboard side, and even later the IJN integrated the funnel with the island like all the other navies were doing.
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  20.  @sirboomsalot4902  Big difference between naval warship construction standards and commercial standards.
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  21. Officially the Officer of the Deck, but in battle that would often be the Captain (with the XO in CIC). Note that a number of those turns were to starboard - the island is on the starboard side, so they can see better on that side, to avoid other nearby ships maneuvering. The helmsman is located in the middle of the bridge, but follows the commands of the OOD. There is a picture of a Yorktown-class bridge around somewhere.
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  22. It was built to make a difference in the Main Battle, so held off from "smaller fights"...
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  23. Although serious, the damage was mostly topside. The torpedo hit the Raleigh took at Pearl would have sunk her had she not been moored with a lot of external help.
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  24.  @gildor8866  Yes, evasive action does mess up the gunnery solution, and after all, we are out of range of their torpedoes, right?
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  25. How about doing the Hiei, the San Francisco, the Graf Spee, or the Musashi?
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  26. Your mom might make for an interesting interview about her memories...
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  27.  @juicysushi  British battle experience with radar might have made a difference here, as they had found and adjusted to the complexities of using it at night. Getting hit first with air-dropped torpedoes from planes you cannot see or hit back, and then getting hit again by ships that your lookouts cannot see yet might infuriate the IJN. When it happened in the Solomons, after the Americans learned from their bloody noses, the IJN did not react well.
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  28. And at such a distance from the homeland. The Pacific war was fought at least 5,000 miles from home, while the European and Mediterranean wars were also fought 3-5,000 miles from home. Only the RN Pacific Fleet came close to this, and that depended partly on USN supply systems and bases to support them.
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  29.  @t.bunker2511  Maybe they need a "war grave-free" certification for metal used in instruments, like "dolphin-free" was a big thing with tuna...
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  30. The big problem was Halsey not changing course until too late, and many small ships low on fuel. Halsey had promised MacArthur he would support the invasion, but needed to back off for a day to refuel. His destroyers were particularly low. The weather kept getting worse but Halsey was trying to keep close rather than steaming away from the incoming typhoon. Several captains warned him a major storm was coming, but he waited too long. Not a ship design problem, a leadership failure.
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  31. Probably the Barents and North Seas were a bit more lively than the South Pacific, hence the differences in design...
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  32. To a British frigate captain, anything but the gates of hell is still a good time for a battle... seriously, that's why they had the warning about getting a court martial.
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  33.  @ph89787  The "through-deck cruisers" was a looney fad of the early 1930s.
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  34.  @nco_gets_it  Part of that is budgetary - the F-35 was originally supposed to be the "low" in the "high-low" pair with the F-22, but its costs ballooned during development when everyone tried to add everything they needed to the project because they realized it was the only airframe in the pipeline. The "next" generation looked like the UCAV, but that was too far out and had significant opposition from the manned community. The bigger problem is the "one airframe to do all jobs" mentality, which I would attribute to McNamara's bean counters of the 1960s.
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  35. Although Colorado was ordered in 1916, the Nagato was laid down in 1917 (CO in 1919), launched in 1919 (CO in 1921), and commissioned in 1920 (CO in 1923). The US, UK, and IJ were all working up to 16" guns, but the UK was trying to outlaw them via treaty so stuck with 14" for KGV.
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  36. Shipbuilding is a complicated, synergistic practice that requires multiple sources of materials supply, skilled labor and government funding support. Warship building even more so, and the bigger warships require extraordinary effort. It can be built up over time with concerted government-business effort, but it cannot be thrown together overnight. It took the Japanese 20-30 years to build up their own capability to build small ships, and another 10-20 to transfer the advanced building techniques from UK to Japan for boilers, turbines, armor and guns for battleships. Commonwealth countries such as Canada had been encouraged to build commercial ships and small warships, sometimes by supplying vital components like turbines from the UK. Drydocks and naval support yards had been established in Canada, South Africa, India and Australia as well. The other element of consideration is that the bottleneck items such as turbines, guns and armor plate were being manufactured at a rate that could support the existing building ways in the UK, so there was little excess that could be diverted to supply building ways overseas, and starting new manufacturers of those items would take longer to bring up to speed than the war was likely to last.
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  37. The joys (to creators) of YouTube release-on settings...
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  38. It should be called the "Campaign of the Atlantic"...
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  39. You probably do not set the courses (the lower rack of sails) if the boilers are blowing smoke...
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  40.  @Justin-rv7oy  From what I've read the Japanese university researchers were investigating radio waves interwar, but the IJN was not paying much attention till it was highlighted by a naval attache in Berlin in 1939 (?date). The big problem they had was their indigenous electronics industry was small, low quality and focused around a few research universities. The really good stuff was imported from Europe or USA. What they saw happening in the European theater in 1939-40 forced them to try to catch up, but those sets being deployed in 1942 were experimental sets and had the A-type scopes rather than PPI. Experience in the Solomons in later 42 was not good, since the early scopes could not distinguish the background clutter very well, and IJN night vision was so much better, that commanders did not see the benefit and push for it. Yes, they were ahead of the Italians, but a lot of what they were fielding was experimental or not very sophisticated and the commanders did not rely on it.
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  41. You cannot counter what you don't know (or don't believe to be true), and the oxygen reduced some of the bubbling wake of the torpedo so they were harder to see coming. Again how prewar doctrine dominated, they were designed to be fired at the battleship line, not destroyers and cruisers, so long range and big warheads were key. Many IJN destroyers and cruisers had one reload for each tube, and trained hard on fast reloads. It was not designed for the close-in, sudden night encounters in the constricted waters of Solomons, but it did work. What it also did was lead to massive use of them in 42, depleting their stocks.
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  42. Their oil was coming from the Middle East, the food from places like Canada, Africa and Australia, and the parts from factories in the UK. Of course those factories were getting fuel, steel and aluminum from the US via the Atlantic convoys.
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  43. Why is it called "point blank" for range? If you leave a rangefinder setting blank, does it default to 0?
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  44. An ASM is an Anti-Ship Missile, what you are looking for is ASAT - Anti-Satellite...
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  45. Underway refueling gear is the difference between a regular tanker and a fleet oiler.
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  46.  @RCAvhstape  You Only Live Twice"?
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  47. They would not float very long, if at all, so retrieval was not attempted. There is a lifting point, but that is for crane transfer from dock to deck in port.
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  48. They are doing what they can. They concentrate on key areas, for flotation and visitor access, but they don't have enough volunteers. Hint, hint...
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  49. Ark Royals would have been nice; the Wasp was a stupid attempt to squeeze a Yorktown down to a Ranger, and suffered for it.
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  50.  @jefferyindorf699  Another use of the CVE's was in close air support of landing operations, freeing the fleet carriers to defend the landing operation and strike at nearby locations that might interfere or send aircraft to attack the landing ships. I believe the Taffys 1, 2, & 3 were tasked with this during the Battle off Samar.
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