Comments by "Bruce Tucker" (@brucetucker4847) on "Kennedy, the Lying Politician | The Cuban Missile Crisis I Prelude 2" video.
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If you're going to discuss the origins of the Cold War and the nuclear arms race, it borders on the criminal to exclude the crucial fact that in the wake of WW2 the US and UK underwent a massive demobilization while the USSR did not - sources vary, but in 1948 the US Army probably had approximately 400,000 soldiers while the Soviet Red Army still had something like 4 million. You speak of, for example, confrontations in Berlin as if these confrontations were on anything remotely approaching an equal basis militarily, which is absolutely contrary to fact. For the US, nuclear weapons were seen as a relatively inexpensive way to balance out this massive Soviet conventional military superiority. This policy continued throughout the Eisenhower administration: conventional US forces were built up substantially after the outbreak of the Korean War, but never to anything approaching the level of Soviet forces until the Vietnam War escalation. NATO was another part of the western response to this massive Soviet military establishment, the largest peacetime military force in the history of the planet.
This becomes particularly important in looking at the Cuban missile crisis. Less informed observers will point to the US superiority in nuclear warheads, and the deployment of land-based nuclear missiles in places like Turkey with the ability to strike the USSR, and say the US was overreacting because the missiles in Cuba weren't doing anything the US wasn't already doing to the Soviets. But this ignores the larger strategic context in which these weapons were deployed. No world leaders in 1962 saw nuclear weapons solely in terms of a nuclear exchange trying to wipe out the other's cities; they were assets in a much larger and more complex strategic picture. Specifically, the US nuclear threat was seen primarily as a deterrent to Soviet use of their massive conventional superiority to overrun western Europe. NATO didn't have the conventional military capacity to invade eastern Europe, while the USSR and the Warsaw Pact didn't dare invade western Europe for fear of provoking nuclear retaliation; thus, there was a stalemate in which neither side had much to gain by starting a war.
Putting missiles in Cuba or anywhere else that gave the USSR a substantial capacity to launch a retaliatory nuclear strike changed the situation dramatically. The threat Kennedy and the military planners feared from this wasn't a Soviet first strike (which still would have been suicidal), it was that by making Soviet retaliation a serious threat it removed NATO's nuclear deterrent from the table in the scenario of a conventional war in Europe, and thus gave the Soviets a free hand to launch such an invasion if they chose without having to worry about a nuclear response. Put simply, Soviet missiles in Cuba made the threat of a massive conventional war in Europe much more likely than it was in the absence of those missiles.
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