Comments by "doveton sturdee" (@dovetonsturdee7033) on "The Battle Of The Best Tank Commanders Of WWII | Greatest Tank Battles | War Stories" video.
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@michaelwilson9849 The 'Battle' as the movie called it, the Battle of El Guettar, between 23 March & 3 April, 1943, was actually inconclusive.
At more or less the same time, 26 March, 8th Army broke the Axis defences at the Mareth Line, and slightly later, on 6 April, drove the Axis forces into wholesale retreat at the Battle of Wadi Akarit.
Odd that George C. Scott's comic masterpiece of a movie missed those details, wasn't it?
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@waynepatterson5843 Oh well. In 1940 the Royal Navy was the largest navy on the planet. However, I see you have now become a Sealion enthusiast.
Mine Blockades : The German navy had eight converted minelayers, possibly supported by a further seven destroyers capable of minelaying. By September, 1940, the Royal Navy had 698 fleet & auxiliary minesweepers in service, almost all in home waters. Additional, the Royal Navy carried out nightly patrols of the Channel throughout the invasion threat period. Perhaps you might consider the effect of a 4 inch or 4.7 inch HE shell exploding on a laden mine deck?
U-Boats:- In September, 1940, the Kriegsmarine had precisely 27 operational 'frontboote,' of which 13 were at sea on any one day. However, none were near the Channel, because in October 1939, the Germans had sent three there and all three were sunk. The Channel was a deathtrap for submarines. The next time the Germans sent any there was after D-Day, out of desperation. Air cover, and the various Naval Escort Groups, slaughtered them.
Coastal artillery :- By the end of August, 1940, the Germans had established over 150 medium, heavy, & super heavy gun batteries along the Channel coast, and these began firing at British CE & CW convoys, which consisted of small coasters and colliers, as they passed up and down the Channel, from 12 August. Between 1940 & the end of 1944, there were 531 such convoys involving a total of 9097 ships. Care to guess how many were sunk during this period? Thirty-one. Care to guess how many were sunk by your wonderful batteries? NONE! In fact, seven were damaged. IN THE WHOLE OF THE WAR. Would you care to explain how these wonder guns, which failed to sink small coasters moving at around six knots, would sink or deter destroyers and light cruisers moving at more than twenty five knots.
Luftwaffe :- The Luftwaffe in 1940 was a tactical air force, trained to support the army. It had had no training at all in anti-shipping operations, and didn't even acquire a torpedo bomber arm until mid 1942. At Dunkirk, it had spectacularly failed to prevent the evacuation of 323000 British & French troops. With everything in their favour (ships either stopped or moving slowly, and crowded with troops) the Luftwaffe bombers managed to sink, of 41 RN destroyers present, precisely four. Using your skill and judgement, please explain how that same Luftwaffe would manage to inflict significant damage on the anti-invasion forces that the Admiralty had assembled by September, 1940. As you certainly don't know, these forces consisted of around seventy destroyers and light cruisers within five hours steaming of Dover, with a further five hundred or so smaller warships in support, and, within twenty four hours, at most, there were a further 51 cruisers and destroyers available.
Barges :- Indeed, because of a lack of other alternatives, the Germans intended to use converted Rhine barges, towed by tugs and trawlers, to transport troops (without artillery, motor transport, or tanks, but with plenty of horses) across the Channel. The Kriegsmarine estimated that it would require eight days and nights to transport nine divisions across the Channel. Would you care to guess what might happen at night, for example, when aircraft could not operate, by the Royal Navy could?
If you actually knew anything about the Sandhurst War Game, or, indeed, about Sealion at all, you would have known that whichever scenario the gamers tried, it ended up with the RN entering the Channel almost unmolested and annihilating the barge trains.
You might wish to read:-
'Invasion of England, 1940' by Peter Schenk.
'Hitler's Armada' by Geoff. Hewitt.
'Coastal Convoys' by Nick Hewitt.
'The U Boat Offensive, 1914-1945' by V.E. Tarrant.
'History of the War at Sea, Volume 1' by Stephen Roskill.
For starters. Unless, of course, you wish to remain in your current state of remarkable ignorance.
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Oh, and I forgot to add.
Ironic, really. El Guettar was a spoiling action undertaken by von Arnim, over two weeks after Rommel had departed Tunisia. The Panzer Division used, 10th Panzer, only arrived in Tunisia in December, 1942, and, apart from a 4 day period, was never commanded by Rommel, but was part of von Arnim's 5th Panzer Army, as I wrote earlier.
Rommel no more 'planned' this action than John Paul Jones did the Battle of Midway, despite what the ludicrous movie, and many less well informed, people, might claim.
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@whispofwords2590 Actually, the Afrika Korps (15 & 21 Panzer Divisions, 90 Light Div., and 164 Inf. Div.) at the time of El Guettar were part of the Italian 1st Army, under General Messe, which was defeated at Mareth & routed at Wadi Akarit by 8th Army.
The German force at El Guettar was 10th Panzer, which only arrived in Tunisia in December, 1942, and was part of von Arnim's 5th Panzer Army. It was transferred to Rommel's command on 19 February, and took part in the Battle of Kasserine. By no stretch of the imagination, even the most fevered, could it be considered to have been 'trained by Rommel' and it was only commanded by him for four days.
Aren't facts a nuisance?
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@northwestprof60 Indeed, which just shows how inaccurate the movie was. The German spoiling action at El Guettar was carried out by 10th Panzer, which had arrived in Tunisia in November, 1942, and, apart from three or four days at Kasserine, had never been commanded by Rommel, but had been part of Von Arnim's 5th Panzer Army.
By the time of El Guettar, of course, Rommel was no longer in Tunisia, but his old Afrika Korps, now part of 1st Italian Army, was at Mareth, in the process of being defeated by 8th Army. Shortly afterwards, 1st Italian was routed at Wadi Akarit, by the same people. Oddly, none of this is mentioned in the movie.
Rommel no more planned El Guettar than John Paul Jones did Midway.
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Actually, the German force at el Guettar was 10th Panzer, which had only arrived in Tunisia in December, 1942, and had been part of von Arnim's 5th Panzer Army. It had actually served under Rommel's command for around four days, at Kasserine. The el Guetter spoiling action was von Arnim's by the way, not Rommel's.
At the time, what was left of Rommel's army ( 15 & 21 Panzer, 90 Light, and 164 Infantry, were being defeated at Mareth, as part of Messe's 1st Italian army, before being finally routed at Wadi Akarit, On both occasions, by 8th Army.
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@soulfella1 If you are writing about Sealion then in September 1940 German had no heavy ships at all, apart from one heavy cruiser, Hipper. Bismarck, Tirpitz, & Prinz Eugen were not yet in service, and Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were under repair following damage during the Norwegian campaign, These repairs were not completed until November.
Prince of Wales & Repulse were sunk by high performance torpedo bombers, flown by crews trained in anti-shipping techniques. In September, 1940, the Luftwaffe had no torpedo bombers, and had not been trained in these methods. German aircraft did indeed attack warships in the Channel, but in the whole of the war, the Luftwaffe sank 31 RN destroyers. In September 1940, the RN had more than 100 in Home Waters.
There was intermittent RAF air cover at Dunkirk, but even the RAF's own website confirms long periods on each day of the operation when no cover was provided.
The 50 ex US destroyers did not appear until after the invasion threat had dissipated, late in 1940. The British feared that, had the French fleet been ordered to support an invasion, a landing might have been attempted, which was why it was attacked.
In 1940, the bulk of the RN was in home waters, apart from Cunningham's fleet in the Mediterranean. Finally, the escape of three German warships through the Channel in early 1942 was a strategic retreat by the Germans, and three fast warships speeding through the Channel in a matter of hours is hardly the same as attempting to land troops from hundreds of converted river barges on a hostile shore over eight days and nights without the protection of a surface fleet.
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@waynepatterson5843 Very good. Add the total number of boats up, and it will give you twenty seven. As I said in my earlier post. Furthermore, 17 of these were Type IIs, which carried 5 torpedoes each, and were of the same type which were lost in the Channel without achieving anything in late 1939.
Clearly, you don't have access to the Royal Navy 'Pink List' for 16 September, 1940. If you even knew what this document was, you would know that it listed the location and operational state of every RN major warship, and was produced fortnightly. It was, in effect, the Order of Battle of the Royal Navy. A similar one, by the way was produced for minor vessels.
The List does indeed given the names of over 70 light cruisers within five hours of Dover, and the others further away to which I have already referred, and which I won't repeat. Would you like me to provide you with the name of every vessel?
There was no need for escorts for the Home Fleet, because firstly the Home Fleet already had destroyers with it, as I haver previously stated, and secondly the Admiralty did not intend to send the Home Fleet further south than its base at Rosyth unless the Kriegsmarine sent heavy ships in support of Sealion, which wouldn't have happened because, as we now know, there was only one operational German heavy ship available at the time. If, of course, you consider a heavy cruiser to qualify for this description. Why, by the way, would the Admiralty seek to sink barges with 15 & 16 inch guns, when 4.7 inch, 4 inch, & 3 inch quick firing guns are far better suited to the task?
Perhaps you should read the books I recommended, as you don't seem able to give any sources of your own?
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@waynepatterson5843 You are getting desperate, mon Brave! Firstly, the mine barrages were never possible. For every German minelayer, there were at least 20 British minesweepers, as I have already mentioned, I believe. Add to that the nightly British destroyer patrols from Plymouth & the Nore, and you really are in considerable difficulty.
As the coastal convoys were important to the British, as they delivered essential coal supplies for domestic & industrial use, pray explain why your wonderful batteries simply didn't do precisely as you romantically suggest, and place pre-registered concentrations in front of the route these little colliers would take, in order to stop them? Do you really, by the way, believe that a RN destroyer flotilla, hastening to attack an invasion convoy of towed barges, would be deterred by SPLASHES?
You have just made three posts of increasing irrelevance. Why not just give up and go elsewhere?
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@waynepatterson5843 Do you deal entirely in irrelevancies, or is it that you simply cannot understand what is relevant and what isn't? You have referred to one freighter damaged, an unarmed liner bombed in mid-Atlantic, and a number of similar attacks on unarmed merchantmen by Condors. Don't you know that Condors were only ever effective when attacking lone merchantmen and that, once defensive armaments were fitted, they were ordered not to carry out such attacks, as they were too vulnerable to be risked, and too valuable as reconnaissance aircraft?
I have already answered your question concerning RN destroyer availability by referring to the RN Pink List. I have a copy, whereas you don't, and my copy deals with the critical period for any attempted invasion. If you would like a copy, contact the British Records Office at Kew. The Public Record Office reference is ADM187/9.
By the way, your source seems to think that all the cruisers in Home Waters were attached to the Home Fleet, which in a mistake the badly or inadequately informed often make, as, in addition to the Home Fleet, the RN also had a number of separate 'Commands' in Home Waters.
If you are interested, and you may wish to keep this as part of your education, cruisers in Home Waters on 16 September, 1940, were :-
Scapa Flow :- 2 heavy cruisers and 2 light/AA cruisers.
Rosyth :- 3 light/AA cruisers.
The Humber :- 3 light cruisers.
The Nore :- 2 light cruisers.
Portsmouth :- 1 light cruiser.
Plymouth :- 2 light cruisers.
Firth of Clyde :- 1 light cruiser.
In addition, there were also 6 heavy and 5 light cruisers repairing, refitting, or completing in various British ports. There was also a Dutch light cruiser, operating as part of the RN, under repair.
The names are all available if you ask nicely!
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@waynepatterson5843 Odd how people tend to become abusive when they run out of credible arguments. Still, I have already posted details of the actual number of minesweepers elsewhere. Read the book I recommended for further information. As to minelaying, aircraft mines can only be laid in shallow waters or estuaries, and in September 1940, the Kriegsmarine had precisely seven destroyers capable of minelaying, and nine auxiliary minelayers. Perhaps you would explain precisely how these ships would avoid the nightly RN destroyer patrols. I have asked before, yet oddly you haven't responded. You still haven't, by the way, explained why your guns did not use these techniques against the convoys or even, years later, why they were not used against the D-Day flotillas.
You seem to have adopted the standard response of the Sealion 'would have' enthusiast, in that you confidently assert that 'this is what the Luftwaffe (or Kriegsmarine, or whatever) would have done' but are rather short of credible arguments when asked exactly why they didn't 'do it.'
Incidentally, in the whole of WW2, the Luftwaffe sank 31 destroyers, or less than half the number available to confront the Sealion barges and their tugs within five hours of them being observed.
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@soulfella1 I cannot really answer your post in detail as it is largely incoherent. You make a reference to June 1940, then start writing about Pedestal. What connection is there?
Just to correct the sections I can understand. Operation Pedestal ended on 15 August, 1942. Ohio was helped into port by the destroyers Penn, Bramham, & Ledbury. Brisbane Star, Melbourne Star, Port Chalmers, & Rochester Castle also reached Malta. Pedestal was attacked at various times by axis aircraft, submarines, and light surface units. The Italian surface fleet was not committed.
The Atlantic convoys were never halted, and the 40 (actually 50) US four stacker destroyers were not part of lend-lease, but pre-dated it, and were part of a 'ships for bases' agreement.
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@kickassandchewbubblegum639 As Abe Lincoln said, 'Better to Remain Silent and Be Thought a Fool than to Speak and Remove All Doubt.' Good advice for you to consider.
In 1940 , the Germans had a small number of DFS 230 light assault gliders, capable of carrying nine lightly equipped men each. Commercial aircraft were already under military control. A Ju52 could accommodate, at most, 18 paratroopers. Once the first wave landed, the British know where they are, and are able to respond.
By September, 1940, the British had considerable forces in place capable of dealing with a small number of lightly armed paratroops, who would have lacked transport, artillery or armoured support, and had no hope of relief.
Please, please! buy a book about Operation Sealion and read about the reality, rather than simply indulging yourself in bizarre fantasies.
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@kickassandchewbubblegum639 Tell me when Churchill said what you claim. You might also explain why, if Churchill really did think that, he sent a troop convoy, with three full armoured regiments, and supporting AA, AT & Field Regiments, to North Africa in mid August, 1940? If think you are about to be invaded, would you really send your best equipped troops, and half of the total number of your most battleworthy tanks (the Matilda II) to another Continent? Don't believe me? Then read about the 'Apology' convoy, which sailed on 22 August. I did refer to this earlier, but it appears you chose to ignore it.
I am not, by the way, interested in what 'everyone and his mother said.' I have read the archives from the time (both the British & German ones) and, like the vast majority of my colleagues writing on this subject today, I know that an invasion was never a real possibility as long as the Royal Navy held total naval supremacy in the Channel.
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The 'Battle' as the movie calls it, the Battle of El Guettar, between 23 March & 3 April, 1943, was actually inconclusive. Look it up for yourself.
At more or less the same time, 26 March, 8th Army broke the Axis defences at the Mareth Line, and slightly later, on 6 April, drove the Axis forces into wholesale retreat at the Battle of Wadi Akarit.
Odd that George C. Scott's comic masterpiece of a movie missed those details, wasn't it?
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@waynepatterson5843 The American defeat at Sidi Bou Zid, between 14 & 17 February, was inflicted by 5th Panzer Army, commanded by Von Arnim. Kasserine, between 19 & 24 February, including Thala, by the way, was the only time, apart from 6 March at Medenine, when defeated by 8th Army, that 10 Panzer was directly commanded by Rommel. By Mareth, 10 Panzer had returned to 5th Panzer Army, Rommel had departed for pastures new, and von Arnim was owner of the poisoned chalice.
If you seriously wish to believe that Rommel established the 'new Panzer Doctrine' by the way, then feel free. Presumably, you haven't heard of Heinz Guderian? It is self-evident that you don't actually know what most German generals actually thought of Rommel's abilities, an example being Von Rundstedt, whose nickname for him was 'Marshal Laddie.' Incidentally, Rommel's book on Panzer Tactics was never completed, and only exists in scattered, manuscript, form. Someone should have told George C. Scott.
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@whispofwords2590 The 'Battle' as you call it, the Battle of El Guettar, between 23 March & 3 April, 1943, was actually inconclusive. Look it up for yourself.
At more or less the same time, 26 March, 8th Army broke the Axis defences at the Mareth Line, and slightly later, on 6 April, drove the Axis forces into wholesale retreat at the Battle of Wadi Akarit.
Odd that George C. Scott's comic masterpiece of a movie missed those details, wasn't it?
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@waynepatterson5843 Exactly which 'RN Records' does your 'order of battle' come from? You seem remarkably reticent about it, to date.
You haven't by the way, named any RN warships as yet, let alone stated where you believe that they were. I really do not propose to list the 698 minesweepers in service by September, 1940. According to Lenton & Colledge, in 'British & Commonwealth warships of World War 2' by the end of 1940, the British had the following minesweepers in service:-
Fleet minesweepers 40, Auxiliary minesweepers 57, Paddle minesweepers 39, Naval Trawlers and Drifters 49, Requisitioned trawlers and drifters, 821.
I presume you do understand precisely how large the British fishing fleet was at the time, and consequently how easy it was to mass produce auxiliary minesweepers almost literally within a few weeks? Perhaps you could obtain your own copy of the RN list for the operational status of minor war vessels for yourself from the National Archives?
If you wish to know the facts about Condor operations, I recommend 'The Rise and Fall of the German Air Force, 1933-1945.' It explains how Condors attacks reduced almost to none once merchantmen received more than light machine guns as AA weapons. However, I fail to see the relevance, unless you seriously propose trying to use Condors against the RN anti-invasion forces. Perhaps, in that case, you could tell me how many warships your Condors actually sank?
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@erichvonmanstein6876 Presumably, you didn't read these earlier comments I posted?
'Hardly worth talking about. In 1940, the operational ships of the German navy consisted on one heavy cruiser, three light cruisers, and seven destroyers. The Royal Navy had some seventy cruisers and destroyers within five hours' steaming of Dover, at the same time.'
'Actually, in September, 1940, they had 63 U- boats, of which 27 only were operational front line boats, and on average 13 were at sea on any one day during the month.'
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@dutchhoke6555 The Germans only had around 5,000 paratroops in September, 1940, and only just over 220 operational transport aircraft. Moreover, how long are such lightly armed units likely to survive unless quickly relieved by ground troops.
The German navy in September, 1940 was almost non-existent. All it could muster was one heavy cruiser, three light cruisers, and about a dozen destroyers and large torpedo boats. The Luftwaffe had not been trained in anti-shipping operations, and had just failed badly at Dunkirk. In fact, in the whole of WW2, it sank 31 RN destroyers, and no RN warship larger than a light cruiser. The RN, by the way, had around 70 light cruisers and destroyers within 5 hours of the Dover Straits, supported by some 500 smaller warships.
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John Cornell I hadn't read that, but I have never believed that, subsequently, there was ever a 'Race to Messina' as depicted in the ludicrous movie. Certainly, there was no Montgomery-led pipe band, arriving to be humiliated by Patton (or was it George C. Scott?).
I suspect that there was some, albeit unintentional, accuracy, in the movie, however, in that it depicted events as Patton imagined them to have been, rather than as history shows that they were. Ladislas Farago's book (Patton - Ordeal & Triumph) on which the movie was based, is adored by Pattonites, but I recall reading it long ago and concluding that it was nearer to a hagiography than an academic study.
Montgomery, however, had one shameful condition which has always rendered him unacceptable to many people. He was not American.
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G.F. Howe, the official US Historian, estimated that 275,000 Axis troops surrendered in Tunisia. 18th Army Group estimated 244,500 (157,000 German). Rommel later suggested 130,000 Germans, and von Arnim 100,000 Germans & 200,000 Italians. The British official history estimated 238,243 (unwounded) prisoners, of which 101,784 were German.
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@robertbennett9949 Why not give the full quotation, which sheds rather a different light on Montgomery? :- 'Personally, my whole attention was given to defeating the rebels but it never bothered me a bit how many houses were burnt. I think I regarded all civilians as 'Shinners' and I never had any dealings with any of them. My own view is that to win a war of this sort, you must be ruthless. Oliver Cromwell, or the Germans, would have settled it in a very short time. Nowadays public opinion precludes such methods, the nation would never allow it, and the politicians would lose their jobs if they sanctioned it. That being so, I consider that Lloyd George was right in what he did, if we had gone on we could probably have squashed the rebellion as a temporary measure, but it would have broken out again like an ulcer the moment we removed the troops. I think the rebels would probably [have] refused battles, and hidden their arms etc. until we had gone.'
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@waelomar7065 I think it was a political, not a military, decision. In terms of Generalship, I believe Auchinleck to have been superior to Alexander. However, Montgomery, for whatever reason, detested Auchinleck, and once the first choice, Gott, had been killed, it was inevitable.
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@waynepatterson5843 Oh, well, Guderian then :-
'Rommel's sad experiences in Africa had so convinced him of the overwhelming nature of Allied air supremacy that he believed there could be no question of ever moving large formations of troops again. He did not even think that it would be possible to transfer panzer or panzergrenadier divisions by night.'
'It is nevertheless a matter of considerable regret that Rommel failed to understand the need for possessing mobile reserves. A large-scale land operation, which in view of our hopeless inferiority on the sea and in the air offered us the only chance of success, he held to be impossible and he therefore neither wanted nor tried to organize one. Furthermore, at least at the time of my visit, Rommel had made up his mind where the Allies would land. He assured me several times that the English and American landings would take place in the coastal area north of the mouth of the Somme; he ruled out all alternative landing-places with the argument that for such a difficult and large-scale sea crossing the enemy, for supply reasons alone, must seize a beachhead as close as possible to his principal ports of embarkation. A further reason was the greater air-support that the enemy could give to a landing north of the Somme. On this subject, too, he was at that time quite impervious to argument.'
I did try to find out Manstein's views, but Manstein didn't seem to think Rommel important enough even to mention in his memoirs.
The rest of your post doesn't justify your apparent insistence that Rommel was in any way relevant to el Guettar. He had direct command of 10 Panzer, as I have said, for a few days at most, and his book on infantry tactics was hardly relevant to the development of any sort of Panzer Doctrine. Do you really think that 10 Panzer was in any way influenced by him, or that von Arnim slavishly tried to follow some sort of imaginary plan dreamed up by Rommel for el Guettar. Perhaps you do, or at least feel the need to convince yourself. If so, simply parroting a whole list of dates and formations really isn't either effective or credible.
As to 10 Panzer, do you not perhaps consider that, as part of Army Group Centre in Russia between June 1941 & April, 1942, it might possibly have developed some combat skills which were not those imbued in it by Rommel during the short period during which he indirectly commanded it, although as part of a larger force?
Still, if you have an odd need to cling to a belief that, in some mysterious manner, Patton defeated the ghostly spirit of the Desert Fox, fair enough.
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