Comments by "doveton sturdee" (@dovetonsturdee7033) on "Imperial War Museums"
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@raghave1043 Nonsense. Actually, the Bengal Famine had a number of causes, among which were the number of refugees from Japanese held areas, the inability to import food from those same areas, stockpiling by hoarders and, perhaps worst of all, the Bengal administration, which tried to minimise the crisis. The worst that could be said of Churchill was that he should have known what was taking place, but didn't. After all, in 1943, he had little else to worry about.
You could also add the refusal of FDR to allow the transfer of merchant shipping, by the way. What is without dispute, except by those who choose to blame Churchill for everything since the Black Death, is that once he did find out, he transferred food distribution to the British Indian Army, and had grain convoys diverted from Australia to India.
I appreciate, of course, that you won't believe any of this, as it doesn't suit your agenda.
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@jetaddicted Which Indians? There were around 600 Indian (Muslim) mule handlers, in four companies. Three companies were evacuated, although the fourth, on detached duty on the Maginot Line, was captured. Those who reached Britain were actually honoured with marches through a number of towns (the newspapers of the time confirm this), and Britain's, the toy firm, even produced models of them, for heaven's sake.
Actually, when the Belgians surrendered, a British Division, commanded by Montgomery, as it happens, undertook a difficult night transfer to block the resulting gap in the allied line.
I have never understood why people like you, with no actual knowledge, insist upon displaying you ignorance and prejudice in such a manner. Perhaps you might try to explain?
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Oh dear, the distorted revisionist claptrap about the Bengal famine yet again.
Actually, the Bengal Famine had a number of causes, among which were the number of refugees from Japanese held areas, the inability to import food from those same areas, stockpiling by hoarders and, perhaps worst of all, the Bengal administration, which tried to minimise the crisis. The worst that could be said of Churchill was that he should have known what was taking place, but didn't. After all, in 1943, he had little else to worry about.
You could also add the refusal of FDR to allow the transfer of merchant shipping, by the way. What is without dispute, except by those who choose to blame Churchill for everything since the Black Death, is that once he did find out, he transferred food distribution to the British Indian Army, and had grain convoys diverted from Australia to India.
I appreciate, of course, that you won't believe any of this, as it doesn't suit the agenda.
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Dynamo reduced a catastrophe to a mere defeat. For the Royal & Merchant Navies, it was a remarkable victory, and for Bertram Ramsay a triumph. What a pity that the recent 'Dunkirk' movie seemed almost to write the Royal Navy out of the story, in favour of the 'Little Ships' myth.
What a pity, also, that the subsequent evacuation of 192,000 troops from French Atlantic ports, Operation Aerial, has, apparently, been lost to history.
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@nukni4225 Churchill would have known about a similar phrase used by Garibaldi. Between the wars, Churchill contemplated writing a biography of Garibaldi. The phrase Garibaldi used was ' "I offer hunger, thirst, forced marches, battle, and death," which was hardly stolen by Churchill.
However, that wasn't what you claimed. You wrote ' Remember his "we shall fight in the mountains, we shall fight on the beaches ..." Stolen from Garibaldi,' and you cannot produce a source to justify your statement.
Therefore, you should not muddy the waters. You should apologise for your false claim, or concede that you are a liar.
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@Boppy-B-B How is that 'segregation?' Gurkhas did, by the way have their own officers, as also did Indian formations.
Within an 'Indian' Brigade, by the way, there were usually three battalions. Two were Indian, and one British. Read about, for example, 4th Indian Division at 2nd Alamein, which had three infantry brigades, consisting of 3 British & 6 Indian, battalions.
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@msreviews5576 Actually, Churchill had significant influence on the strategy of the Western Allies throughout to war. One of his major achievements was to dissuade George Marshall from forcing through his ideas about a landing in France in 1942 or 1943. The Island he saved, by the way, together with the Commonwealth & Empire, remained the dominant force in the west until the last nine months of the war in the west. Certainly, D-Day would never have been possible without the British & Canadians.
He didn't, by the way, 'win the war,' which is why I have never claimed that he did. The war was won by a great alliance, with the Soviet Union playing the major part on land. Churchill, and the British resistance in 1940-41, made possible that resistance.
Churchill didn't 'fade away' after the war, either. He was Prime Minister again from October 1951 until April 1955, when he stepped down at the age of eighty.
Finally he didn't make any reference to a "shall reign a thousand year " empire. He actually said, 'if the British Empire and its Commonwealth last for a thousand years, men will still say, "This was their finest hour."
Did the words 'Commonwealth' & 'if' pass you by?
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@jamesb2166 So? In 1929. The Labour party won 287 seats with 8,048,968 votes, the Conservatives won 260 seats with 8,252,527 votes.
In February, 1974, Labour won 301 seats with 11,645,616 votes. The Conservatives won 297 seats with 11,872,180 votes.
These anomalies do occur in any constituency based electoral system from time to time.
The following is perhaps more symptomatic of the general mood in the country:- The 1950 Election, which Labour narrowly won, showed a swing to the Conservatives of 4.3% and a swing away from Labour of 1.6% There was a further 4.6% swing towards the Conservatives in the election of 1951.
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@kalyana9705 Are you really deluded enough, or gullible enough, to believe that, at a time when 2.5 million Indians had volunteered to join the Allied forces, Churchill would have engineered a mass famine in the sub-continent? Presumably, you are not a member of Mensa!
Actually, the Bengal Famine had a number of causes, among which were the number of refugees from Japanese held areas, the inability to import food from those same areas, stockpiling by hoarders and, perhaps worst of all, the Bengal administration, which tried to minimise the crisis. The worst that could be said of Churchill was that he should have known what was taking place, but didn't. After all, in 1943, he had little else to worry about.
You could also add the refusal of FDR to allow the transfer of merchant shipping, by the way. What is without dispute, except by those who choose to blame Churchill for everything since the Black Death, is that once he did find out, he transferred food distribution to the British Indian Army, and had grain convoys diverted from Australia to India.
I appreciate, of course, that you won't believe any of this, as it doesn't suit your rather prejudiced agenda.
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'Utter defeat of Empire forces in Asia?' Read about XIV Army and the defeat of the U-Go Offensive.
Then read about the Bengal Famine, but the facts, not the revisionist myth. The Bengal Famine had a number of causes, among which were the number of refugees from Japanese held areas, the inability to import food from those same areas, stockpiling by hoarders and, perhaps worst of all, the Bengal administration, which tried to minimise the crisis. The worst that could be said of Churchill was that he should have known what was taking place, but didn't. After all, in 1943, he had little else to worry about.
You could also add the refusal of FDR to allow the transfer of merchant shipping, by the way. What is without dispute, except by those who choose to blame Churchill for everything since the Black Death, is that once he did find out, he transferred food distribution to the British Indian Army, and had grain convoys diverted from Australia to India.
I appreciate, of course, that revisionists won't accept any of this, as it doesn't suit the agenda. It is, however, factually accurate.
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@nukni4225 So it appears that you lack the integrity to confirm that your first post was entirely false? I rather expected that that would be the way you would respond.
You aren't really worth the time of any honest person, but to correct one or two of your additional falsehoods:
First lie, Churchill was not in any government position when Britain & France declared war, and hadn't been since 1929.
Second lie, he was not a serviceman when imprisoned by the Boers, and was not asked to give any 'word of honour' to anyone.
Third lie, he stole nothing from Garibaldi. Garibaldi died when Churchill was four years old. Churchill admired Garibaldi, as I said earlier.
Fourth lie, that he forged the signature on his own paintings. Perhaps to be fair that isn't so much a lie as merely an infantile comment.
Fifth lie, his speeches were, in the main, recorded after the war, but their texts were recorded at the time in 'Hansard,' often read out on the radio by BBC newsreaders, and usually printed in full within a day or two of them being made in national newspapers throughout the Empire. Nothing was edited or changed.
Fifth lie, he was never called a 'war hero' but he served at the Battle of Omdurman, left the army to become a journalist in 1899, but later commanded a Scots regiment on the Western Front for nine months in WW1. You may not consider serving in the military in wartime gallant, but frankly your opinion is of no merit.
So yes, I do indeed call you a liar.
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@Simon_Nonymous My pleasure. Ernie has always escaped criticism for his actions, which appear to have been based upon his anglophobia rather than any actual alternative strategy. To give some idea of how catastrophic his behaviour was, in November, 1941, 7 merchant ships were lost in convoy, and 6 lost when sailing independently. For December, the figures were 6 & 17.
After Paukenschlag began, and King refused to institute convoys, the losses in convoy from January to June 1942 were 6, 10, 3, 3, 14, and 14, yet the losses of independents, almost all off the East Coast of the US, were, for the same months, 43, 61, 89, 78, 115, and 122.
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@nigeh5326 The technology, in the form of the depth charge, asdic, and HF/DF, already existed. WW2 German boats such as the Type II, VII, & IX, were basically nothing more than developments of late WW1 designs.
Moreover, expansion of the U-boat fleet only really became a serious option after the fall of France. Prior to that, whatever fleet existed was, in effect, trapped in German bases with the only way into the Atlantic the long and dangerous voyage around the north of Scotland, seriously reducing the operational duration of the boats.
In effect, an expansion of the U-boat fleet prior to the war not only warns the British of what to expect, but assumes that in 1938 the Germans already assumed what the strategic situation would be in late 1940.
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@pacificostudios What 'allied shipping in the Mediterranean?' Merchant vessels rarely used it, except for supply runs to Malta, and the threat to Malta had largely dissipated after Pedestal in August, 1942, and Stoneage in November, 1942.
Crete, Sardinia, and Corsica were as relevant as the Channel Islands to the overall prosecution of the war, Crete in particular being, at best, a Pyrrhic victory which effectively destroyed the German paratroop arm, which thereafter was used as a ground force only.
Taking Corsica would have forced Germany to fortify the Provence more than they did.' Why? Certainly to nothing like the extent that the Germans were obliged to occupy Italy, and send their troops there.
An assault on Norway would still have involved moving Allied resources back to Britain from the Mediterranean, and the benefit to the Soviet Union was likely to have been slight. The distances involved, and the crossing of the North Sea, in Autumn & Winter, would increase the hazardous nature of such an operation. Indeed, hitler's fixation on Norway as the Zone of Destiny' resulted in 350,000 being based there at the time of surrender in May, 1945. Why would the Allies attempt such an operation when the same result, that of keeping a large number of German units away from the main battlefront, by means of a deception plan, Operation Fortitude North?
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@markhitchcock4704 You can say it, but it wouldn't be true. The Halt Order was issued by Von Rundstedt, to allow his armour to be serviced and repaired before commencing the second stage of the campaign. Like many senior officers, he feared a repeat of the Miracle of the Marne of WW1.
Hitler had already been assured by Goering that the destruction of the Allied pocket was 'a special job for the Luftwaffe,' and was foolish enough to believe him. Surely, if you want your enemy to come to terms, wouldn't there be more chance of that were his field army to be caged in PoW camps, rather than safe behind an impenetrable sea barrier?
If your lovable peacefully intentioned Hitler was not intent upon conquering the whole of Europe, did the invasions of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Denmark, Norway, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, and Belgium, all take place without his knowledge?
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@jimlofts5433 Churchill sent support to Greece because he had previously promised that 'Any country which opposes Hitler will have Britain's aid.'
There really was no alternative to the allied campaign in North Africa and then Sicily/Italy if US troops were to see action in Europe before 1944. FDR supported the 'Germany first' strategy, but knew that US public opinion would not tolerate the failure of their troops to engage for around two years, and would demand more immediate action, probably against Japan.
The allies were in no condition to attempt to land in France until, 1944, but British & Commonwealth troops were already in Egypt/Libya. After completing the Tunisian campaign, where else, realistically, could these troops be deployed?
As I wrote earlier, Churchill proposed the Gallipoli operation, but neither authorised it, planned it nor executed it. Blame Herbert Asquith if you must.
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Actually, looking for a means of removing the Ottoman Empire from the Central Powers, thus inflicting a massive reversal on Germany. Potentially, a viable alternative to the unfolding carnage on the Western Front.
As to Cannon Fodder, it seems you aren't actually aware of the casualties.
Australia 28,150 New Zealand 7,991 France 27,000 India 4,779 Newfoundland 142 Britain/Ireland 73, 485. Ottoman Empire 251,309.
These are total casualties, both killed and wounded.
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@nukni4225 You mean the BBC programme 'Fake or Fortune' which in 2015 tried to prove that a painting attributed to Churchill was a fake? Actually, the programme failed to prove anything of the sort. Even so, where is the sin on Churchill's part if someone tried falsely to claim that a picture was painted by him in order to boost the sale price? That is rather like saying Rembrandt should be blamed because someone falsely attributed a 19th century fake to him. In point of fact, Churchill described his paintings as 'daubs' ang gave away far more to friends then he ever sold.
Tell me which 'good and honest' history books claim that Churchill stole from Garibaldi, or that 'fight them on the beaches' or 'blood, toil, tears, & sweat' was stolen from him, or that his wartime speeches were edited, or that he gave any word of honour to the Boers, or that he turned a local conflict between Poland & Germany into a World War, or that he had no military decorations?
I have asked you for your sources before, and you have consistently failed to provide them. In short, you have demonstrated yourself to be a liar, and, to use a phrase many of my American friends tend to use about people like you, a complete 'horse's ass' with nothing to say worth listening to.
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@robertotamesis1783 Sorry, but you really are wide of the mark. Churchill did not, despite 'Darkest Hour' ask FDR for destroyers. They were actually offered by the US Ambassador to Paris, and the British saw the old four stackers as useful Atlantic escort stop gaps until new construction became available. In short, they were offered, not requested.
The Germans in September 1940 had no landing craft at all, just large numbers of canal barges, hastily converted and to be towed, at just above walking pace, into the Channel by tugs and trawlers. The known presence of the Royal Navy, in large numbers within a few hours of Dover, was a far greater deterrent than the weather, although by mid October that would have become a problem given the lack of seaworthiness of the Barges.
Air lift helicopters in 1943? No, they hadn't. Moreover, in 1943 weren't the Germans rather busy elsewhere?
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@Ballinalower The U-boat offensive was based on the assumption that the calculations of Von Holtzendorff, Kaiser Bill's Chief of Naval Staff in WW1, was still applicable. This determined that, in order to starve Britain into submission, 600,000 tons of British shipping needed to be sunk each month. After, December, 1941, this figure became meaningless, but in any case even prior to Dec. 1941 the monthly tonnage figure rarely exceeded 300,000, and in many months was below 100,000 tons.
The possibility was a remote one.
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@DZ-1987 No. Apart from Jutland, the High Seas Fleet spent the whole of WW1 avoiding action with the Grand Fleet. Apart from two aborted sorties later in1916, and a raid against the Russian Navy in the Baltic in October, 1917, the HSF spent almost the entire rest of the war snugly at anchor in the Jade, whilst the British Northern Patrol, of Armed Merchant Cruisers and trawlers, systematically blockaded Germany into starvation and revolution. You may read about the Turnip winter for yourself.
To be plain, there was no reason for the Grand Fleet to operate in the North Sea, as the HSF was rarely, if ever, there. Early in the war, raids were, indeed, made by German battlecruisers against East Coast towns, on a hit and run basis. The hope was that the RN would send a number of ships to the East Coast, as the German hope had always been to catch and destroy a detached portion (a Battle Squadron, perhaps ) of the Grand Fleet in order to reduce the numbers against them.
Fortunately, Jellicoe and the Admiralty were not foolish enough to fall for this.
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@theuksmostwanted6103 Churchill was born in 1874 and died almost 50 years ago, yet you seek to attack him because he didn't subscribe to the transient and bizarre opinions prevalent at the present time?
Certainly Churchill believed that British culture was superior to that of India, China, or Africa. Other European countries, and certainly the United States, believed exactly the same of their own, largely because every advance in science, technology, and education since the mid 16th century had been developed by Europeans. I wonder how, in 100 years time, observers will view some of the lunatic opinions which currently exist/
As to the use of poison gas, would you explain why using shells, bombs, and bullets is quite acceptable, but using gas isn't? The use of gas was, at the time, actually regarded as less brutal than the other weapons I have mentioned by many, if not most, military men of all nations of the period. To give you just one quote among many, "Gas is a more merciful weapon than [the] high explosive shell, and compels an enemy to accept a decision with less loss of life than any other agency of war."
As to Churchill being an aggressive tyrant, which wars of aggression did he pursue, and, as the democratically elected Prime Minister of the UK in WW2, how was he a tyrant?
By the way, presumably you are aware that Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi referred to Africans as an inferior breed of humanity? Would you wish to add him to your list of evil people?
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@Ralphieboy Actually, preventing the French fleet from returning to mainland French ports and, potentially, being ordered by Vichy to support an attempted German invasion.
Maintaining British naval control of the Mediterranean, and engaging the Italian fleet on the rare occasions when it did appear. This wasn't often and, to quote the old song, 'If they won't fight us, what can we do more?'
Screening Arctic Convoys against a possible sortie by Tirpitz or Scharnhorst, before ensuring that one Sharnhorst emerged, she did not return.
Finally, using older battleships of the 'R' class to protect Atlantic convoys from possible attacks by German raiders. Particularly during Operation Berlin.
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'When the Americans came into the war they took charge of British and Canadian troops on D-DAY.' Really? The Allied Ground forces commander was British, the Air Force commander was British, and the Naval commander was British.
3261 0f 4127 were British manned, 892 of 1213 warships were RN or RCN, two thirds of 11,600 aircraft were RAF, and two thirds of the troops who landed from the landing craft were British/Canadian.
The minesweeping in advance of D-Day was almost entirely carried out by RN & RCN ships, and the Escort & Support Groups which destroyed any U-boats which tried to intervene were RN or RCN.
Oh, and of course the Intelligence Operation was dominated by Bletchley Park.
In the East, the largest single land defeat sustained by the Japanese Army was Operation U-Go, in March-June, 1944. Inflicted by the Anglo-Indian XIV Army.
The French liberated Paris, whilst the British liberated Brussels and Amsterdam, before reaching the Baltic and ensuring Denmark did not fall into the Soviet Sphere of influence.
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@sharonprice42 By captured, I assume you mean 'destroyed.' The British sen onlly two Armoured Units with the BED, 1st Armoured Division & 1st Army Tank Brigade. Ist Armoured Division had 250 tanks, of which 110 were light Mark Vis, armed only with machine guns only, whist the remained were a mixture of cruisers, A9s, A10s & A13s. A small number were captured intact, but only one German unit ever used any, actually 9 A13s, as training vehicles in France & the Netherlands until mid 1941.
1st Army Tank Brigade consisted of two regiments, wquipped with a total of 12 Light tanks, 77 Matilda Is (armed with a machine gun) & 23 Matilda IIs, armed with a two pounder gun. These had been lost in action or destroyed by their crews, either at Arras or afterwards. Only one Matilda II is known to have been used by any German unit, after the turret was replaced by a German AA gun, on the French coast.
If you have a source which tells you anything different, what is it?
.303 Ammunition was useless to the Germans as it was incompatible with their own weapons. A similar comment applies to the AA & AT weapons.
Trucks were of more use, nut only briefly until the lack of access to spare parts became too great.
You keep posting exactly the same thing, time after time, without providing any evidence for your nonsense. You are becoming tedious.
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@fus149hammer5 Very few people actually assume that. Most assume that the barges could expect the Luftwaffe to attempt to protect them.
This, however, would be the same Luftwaffe which had not received any training in anti-shipping techniques, and had just failed badly at Dunkirk. The same Luftwaffe which, in the whole of the war, sank 31 RN destroyers, and no RN warship larger than a light cruiser. Just for your information, in September, 1940, the RN had over 110 destroyers in Home Waters, of which 64 were in bases within five hours of Dover.
You can forget torpedo attacks by this Luftwaffe, by the way. The Luftwaffe didn't even have an operational torpedo bomber until mid 1942, so Prince of Wales & Repulse, both sunk by high performance torpedo bombers flown by highly trained crews, do not come to mind at all.
Minefields? Really? The Kriegsmarine had seven auxiliary minelayers. The Royal Navy had around four hundred fleet & auxiliary minesweepers. Moreover, what happens to these minelayers, carefully laying their mines, when they encounter one of the nightly Royal Navy destroyers patrols operating out of Plymouth and Sheerness.
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Isn't hindsight wonderful? By June 1940, Germany had invaded Czechoslovakia, Poland, Denmark, Norway, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, and Belgium (all, by the way, without declaration of war) and had conquered France. Large German forces were within 22 miles of a UK defended almost entirely by the Royal Navy.
The Soviet Union had done a disreputable deal with Germany over Poland, and had occupied the Baltic States. Was Soviet Russia really the greater threat to Britain than nazi Germany.
The reality, as recognised by both Churchill & FDR, was that nazi Germany was the greater of two evils, and that 'my enemy's enemy is my friend.'
If you are ashamed to be British, probably that is due to your lack of knowledge.
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You don't know much about the Bengal Famine, do you? I suppose that is what happens when education is replaced in favour of indoctrination. :-
Actually, the Bengal Famine had a number of causes, among which were the number of refugees from Japanese held areas, the inability to import food from those same areas, stockpiling by hoarders and, perhaps worst of all, the Bengal administration, which tried to minimise the crisis. The worst that could be said of Churchill was that he should have known what was taking place, but didn't. After all, in 1943, he had little else to worry about.
You could also add the refusal of FDR to allow the transfer of merchant shipping, by the way. What is without dispute, except by those who choose to blame Churchill for everything since the Black Death, is that once he did find out, he transferred food distribution to the British Indian Army, and had grain convoys diverted from Australia to India.
I appreciate, of course, that you won't believe any of this, as it probably won't suit your agenda.
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@oldgitsknowstuff The Director was made aware, by Brian Urquhart himself, that he never met Browning, and that there were no photographs of German tanks, but was told by Attenborough that the bulk of the audience would be American, to whom British incompetence would appeal.
For the same reason, the second Bridge at Nijmegen, captured by XXX Corps, was excluded, but a totally fictional scene showing the heroic Robert Redford berating the British for abandoning the Airborne in order to 'drink tea' was put in. Even the American officer this was supposed to depict was offended by the scene, and wrote, without success, to Ryan's widow about it.
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@oldgitsknowstuff It was a Parachute Division, not a Regiment. It was a complex operation, and I agree not everything could be included. So, then, why include invented scenes which did not happen, the first being the meeting between Urquhart & Browning, which did not happen, the second being the tank photos. which did not exist, and the third being that XXX Corps could have reached Arnhem had they not stopped for tea? There are a number of others. I know exactly what a 'brew up' is, by the way.
The tank reference had nothing to do with the vehicles used in the movie. Don't you recall the scene where Urquhart shows Browning pictures of German armour, and Browning dismisses them? Never happened. Neither the meeting nor the photos. Urquhart did have concerns about the operation, but not because of non-existent German tanks, but because he feared that the experienced German commanders in the area would be able to react more quickly than expected.
Instead of simply taking the movie at face value, why not check out the facts?
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@JimmysEssay In point of fact, the U-Boats never came remotely near blockading Britain. Certainly nowhere as near as the Kaiser's boats did in 1917. Doenitz calculated that his boats needed to sink 600,000 tons per month. In fact, the U-boats rarely surpassed 300,000, and were often below 100,000 tons.
Oh, and the Battle of the Atlantic. Between January, 1942, and the end of May, 1944, the causes of U-Boat losses were as follows :-
RN/RCN surface vessels :- 135, RAF :- 126, US Navy aircraft :- 63, Miscellaneous losses :- 38, US & USCG surface ships 28, USAAF :- 15, and Allies :- 7. Check in 'The U-Boat Offensive, 1914-1945' by V. E. Tarrant, if you don't believe me. I assume, however, that your prejudices are far too deeply ingrained to be altered by mere facts.
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@JimmysEssay 'This is basic stuff mate.' Indeed, Britain and France declared war on Germany in support of an alliance with Poland, which was intended, unsuccessfully, to deter Germany from further expansion in Europe.
Germany, of course, by July 1941 had invaded Czechoslovakia, Poland, Denmark, Norway, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Belgium, and the Soviet Union, without declaring war on any of them. Generally, those countries learned that the arrival of tanks, troops, aircraft and in many cases einsatzgruppen represented the nazi equivalent of a declaration of war.
Britain sent her main field army, of thirteen divisions, to support a combined Franco-Belgian army of over 100 divisions. The Belgian army then capitulated, and the French army largely collapsed. Britain, a small land power with the largest navy on earth, then used her navy to evacuate the BEF, and much of the French First Army Group, from the Dunkirk pocket, and attempted to re-land troops in Cherbourg, before being told that the French army was no longer able to resist further.
After that, the British, largely again because of their navy, successfully ensured that a German invasion was never attempted, and provided a rallying point for opponents of nazism in Europe and beyond.
Granted, it is difficult to see how Britain and her Commonwealth alone could have liberated occupied Europe, but the lunatic German attack on her former friend, the Soviet Union, entirely changed the situation, especially since the US, although neutral was providing aid for Britain and, after Barbarossa, the Soviet Union.
After Pearl Harbor & the German declaration of war on the US (unusual, that, as Germany generally simply attacked without such a courtesy), Britain then led the campaign in the west. The Royal and Royal Canadian Navies eventually won the Battle of the Atlantic, the RN convoyed supplies to North Russia, with two of 78 convoys only suffering significant losses, the Royal Navy held control of the Mediterranean, prevented any major Japanese campaign in the Indian ocean, and was largely responsible for planning most of the Assault Landings in the west, such as Torch, Husky, Avalanche, & Overlord. This enabled the growing US Navy to concentrate almost entirely in the Pacific against Japan, although the most significant Japanese land defeat of WW2 was the repulse of their operation U-Go, which caused them 55,000 casualties. Only for about the last six or seven months of the war were US ground forces in the west greater in numbers than British & Commonwealth ones. Oh, & by the way, isn't it odd that a 'bit part player' provided the commanders of the Naval, Ground Forces, and Air Forces, during Operation Overlord?
The reality is that Britain could not, alone, have defeated Germany, but there again neither could the United States. The Soviet Union might, possibly have done so, but as a post war Soviet historian wrote, 'The Soviet Union was largely responsible for the defeat of Hitlerism, but it largely did so using US trucks, eating US food, using US radios, and wearing British boots.'
That is what almost every historian working in the field will actually tell you.
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@kemarisite Firstly, destroyers, US or otherwise, were not obliged to steam at 30 knots. The modern RN vessels which accompanied Arctic convoys, for example, had no problems when operating at reduced speed. Nor had those US boats which had briefly accompanied North Atlantic convoys in early 1942. Moreover, what actions did the US Atlantic Fleet undertake in early 1942 which required massive destroyer escort numbers?
Yes, Coast Guard cutters, DEs, or corvettes and sloops were more suited, but as these were not available, did that really justify allowing the mass slaughter of freighters in large numbers?
Armed merchantmen had very little hope of protecting themselves from U-boats. Generally, the first warning the merchant ship had was went a torpedo exploded.
'Note that the Royal Canadian Navy immediately organized convoys, despite the lack of escorts, and this appears to have cut sinkings of the Canadian coast from 37 in January and February to 11 in March and April.' Indeed. Isn't that the point I am making? The RCN itself noted that U-Boats preferred to hunt further south, in a convoy free environment.
In April, the RN & RCN detached 24 escorts from their own resources to support US efforts, but still convoys were not established. The British then set up their own convoys between Halifax & Trinidad, later Aruba. Between May and August, they escorted 14 convoys, totalling 76 tankers, withouit a single loss.
Incidentally, if I am wrong about the authority of the US War Shipping Administration, how was it the Kentucky and Ohio, two fast tankers, were transferred to the British Ministry of War Transport for service in the Mediterranean in early-mid 1942?
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Not quite. Even Fighter Command's historical website details the long periods during which there was no air cover.
Estimates of RAF losses over Dunkirk vary between 106 & 177 of all types. The RAF Museum estimate just over 100 aircraft lost. The Museum account also states :-
The measure of Fighter Command’s success, however, is not in the destruction of enemy aircraft but the extent to which it defended the evacuation. Initially, the RAF attempted to provide continuous air cover, but faced with large German formations it adapted its tactics and instead looked to provide air cover in strength — with patrols involving four squadrons — but not continuous air cover. The move from stronger patrols at less frequent intervals was not successful.
The four squadron patrols were often unable to cooperate effectively over Dunkirk. The flying conditions over Dunkirk, with low-cloud and thick smoke, would have taxed pilots experienced in combat operations as part of larger formations. During DYNAMO, it was almost impossible for patrols involving more than two squadrons to maintain contact and fight together. By the time the patrol had reached the French coast the squadrons had become separated and the patrols broke up into single, or pairs of squadrons, with part of the patrol below the cloud cover whilst others, having initially been instructed to provide top cover, flew above it. The result was that there was ineffective support between the squadrons at different heights and the force structure of the patrol was wasted.
The larger patrols also quickly became disorganised in combat, as the squadrons fragmented into sections, largely dissipating the effect of the patrol. Norman Hancock, a Pilot Officer in No. 1 Squadron, recalled that:
‘You went as a squadron towards your target. You were in appropriate formation but once you’d engaged the enemy then by and large people tended to split up. You might get the odd pair who stayed together, but by and large the squadron was split up and individually attacked targets. You didn’t stay as a solid machine of 12 aeroplanes pointing in the right direction. It didn’t work that way… everybody disappeared. … [After the first attack] there was no cohesion to the squadron.’
The patrols by four squadrons reduced the combat effectiveness of Fighter Command and it is evident that more frequent patrols, involving only two squadrons, would have been more effective. This was a lesson drawn and learnt from the air cover by the officer in charge, Air Vice-Marshal Keith Park, and he applied that lesson during the Battle of Britain despite the vociferous advocation of larger formations from elsewhere in Fighter Command.
Following the move to larger formations there were only two clear days of weather for the Luftwaffe to launch full scale attacks. On the first day, 29 May, the evacuation suffered heavily and the Royal Navy temporarily suspended the use of its modern destroyers — a decision which based on the lift capacity of remaining ships would have left over 100,000 men to be captured. On the second day of clear weather, 1 June, daylight evacuations were suspended. One defence of the RAF’s air cover is that German artillery fire west of Dunkirk was at least as responsible for that decision. A detailed review of the decision behind the suspension indicates this is entirely false.
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@sailingtoatlantisandliveab2455 Slavery wasn't despite what appears to be your conviction, solely British. Moreover, you will not find a 'colony' where the existing population, or any part of it, was deported as slave labour. The bulk of slaves transported by British ships were acquired from local tribal leaders in West Africa (a handy way of getting rid of the excess population, or of useless mouths captured in battle from other tribes) or from the long established Arab slave traders who had been active in the area for generations. The trade was organised by private companies from most European countries, not by the British or English governments, and the British government, in the form of the Royal Navy, were by far the most active in supressing it after 1833.
Bengal, by the way, had already been conquered by the Mughals in the 16th century, and the collapse of the Mughal Empire left Bengal in a state of virtual anarchy. I presume that you have no objection to one Indian power subjugating another, by the way? Would you, perhaps, like a list of known famines in India in pre-British times, or do these not count in your world view?
I cannot really comment on events in America after the end of the War of Independence, except to ask how they can be relevant to the British Empire. Moreover, it borders on the infantile to seek to apply 21st century values to events over 200 years ago. Why not condemn Antoninus Pius for not introducing a Health Service into the Roman Empire in 140 AD, or Hammurabi for not devising old age pensions in 1800 BC?
In conclusion, has it ever occurred to you that the British Empire, uniquely in history, was the only one voluntarily given up by the 'masters' or, equally uniquely, that most of those former 'colonies' have maintained close relationships with Britain since independence?
Don't both to reply, as I have no such further intention.
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I recall being told by my parents that Harold Wilson visited Preston in 1964 and made speeches to the workers at Warton, Preston, & Samlesbury, stating that TSR2 was safe in his hands. As a result, in a desperately tight election, one of the two Preston seats which had previously been Tory, Preston South, changed hands.
Within weeks, the jigs on which the TSR2s were being built were broken up, on Harold's orders. The British then paid the US in order to purchase their F111, and then paid them again in order to cancel the purchase.
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@2adamast You only seem to refer to the British retreating. What were the much larger French forces in the area doing? From 20 May, by the way, the operations of Allied forces were being supervised by Weygand, although no one told Gort that Gamelin had been replaced until 23rd.
Weygand devised a plan for the BEF to move south on Amiens, to take station on the French left. At the time, seven of Gort's divisions were in action on the Escaut, and could not disengage without being followed up. Instead, Gort planned an attack around Arras, which was to have been supported by the French Cavalry Corps, and two divisions of French V Corps southwards from Douai. Most of this support did not materialise, and the attack, after initial success, was called off. The (impracticable) Weygand Plan was called off at the meeting between Gort & Blanchard on the morning of 26 May, when the arrangements for a joint withdrawal were determined. At the time, of 128 miles of the Allied front, 97 miles were held by the BEF. The Gort-Blanchard plan intended to reduce the 128 miles by 58 miles, although the imminent collapse of the Belgian army, was feared.
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@thosdot6497 My mistake for a typing error. I should have put 1 not 12 April, as the figures were those which applied to the RNAS on the last day it existed.
On 1 April, 1918, the RFC had 4000 combat aircraft. On 1 September, 1939 the RAF had 2600. A contraction of 35% On 1 April 1918, the RNAS had 2949 combat aircraft, on 1 September, 1939, the FAA had 232 aircraft of all types. A contraction of 92%. You did ask.
The unedifying spectacle of inter-service rivalry in the 1920s and 1930s is distressing in view of what happened as a result. Both the Navy & the RAF were fighting over a declining defence budget, with the result that, as someone once wrote, 'The RAF spent most of the funding on bombers (which, according to the Air Ministry fantasists, would 'always get through.' These people saw Douhet's theories as a means of justifying their existence, after all), some on fighters, a few spare quid on Coastal Command, and the contents of Trenchard's jacket pocket after a night out at his club on the Fleet Air Arm.'
The United States seemed to manage very well in WW2 with an Army Air Force, a Naval Air Service, and Marine Corps, all independent of each other.
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Why is trying to avoid mass slaughter 'cowardice?' The Munich agreement was enormously popular in France and Britain, where the civilian population (presumably, in your gung ho view, oddly) were quite keen on not having their menfolk killed in large numbers once again. Just out of interest, by the way, the first Spitfires entered service in August, 1938 and, whether you like it or not, the Agreement gave British an extra year in which to re-arm. Would you like a list of the warships which were commissioned, launched, or ordered during that period?
I'm sure you find it easy to condemn people from your comfy chair, 85 years after the event.
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The Germans never came close. Doenitz worked on a calculation that, in order to bring Britain to terms, 600,000 tons of shipping per month needed to be sunk. By the end of 1941, the Germans on only exceeded 300,000 tons on three occasions. Usually, they were below 200,000 tons. After December, 1941, even 600,000 was a serious underestimation.
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@drpoundsign Quite the reverse. FDR was asked by Churchill for shipping resources. FDR refused them. The texts of telegrams which passed between to two leaders are available in the Churchill Papers are available for anyone to read.
Actually, the Bengal Famine had a number of causes, among which were the number of refugees from Japanese held areas, the inability to import food from those same areas, stockpiling by hoarders and, perhaps worst of all, the Bengal administration, which tried to minimise the crisis. The worst that could be said of Churchill was that he should have known what was taking place, but didn't. After all, in 1943, he had little else to worry about.
You could also add the refusal of FDR to allow the transfer of merchant shipping, by the way. What is without dispute, except by those who choose to blame Churchill for everything since the Black Death, is that once he did find out, he transferred food distribution to the British Indian Army, and had grain convoys diverted from Australia to India.
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@Ballinalower To be honest, that is a really tough one, given all the variables involved. Realistically, I don't believe that the British could have held Burma, but that, as 2,500,000 Indians volunteered for the allies in WW2, I doubt that the Japanese could have taken over India, but would probably have been involved in a protracted and brutal slogging match.
I have never believed that Japan had any real ambitions in India, other than to establish a presence which would disrupt supplies to China, and I have always had doubts about invasions of Australia & New Zealand, given the distances involved, and the comparative lack of the raw materials available there.
The real question, which I really cannot answer, is whether the United States would simply stand by and allow Japan to seize large areas of the Far East, especially after FDR's embargo had put Japan under such pressure in the first place. To be honest, as a naval historian, I don't know enough about US internal politics at the time, but would be interested to read the views of some one (anyone!) who does.
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@romanclay1913 Please explain, as you seem to believe that you are an 'ideas' person, how sending Hess to meet Hamilton, an individual hardly at the heart of government, was likely to have been more effective in bringing about discussions than approaching the British ambassadors in Spain, Switzerland, or Sweden, or even asking the United States to act as an honest broker?
By the way, if Rudolf wanted to meet the 'arch appeaser' Samuel Hoare, he was flying in the wrong direction, as Hoare was actually one of those ambassadors at the time. Didn't your conspiracy theory mention that? Odd, as I read it in one of several books.
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@doejon9424 The Blitz is generally regarded to have ended in mid May, 1941. The US didn't, by the way, 'step in' but was dragged in after Peral Harbor and the German declaration of war.
What did the Blitzkrieg do, exactly? Defeated France, and obliged the British, with their tiny army, to concentrate on their strengths. These being a huge and effective navy, a modern, well equipped air force, the increasing support of the Commonwealth & Empire, and a manufacturing base greater than that of Germany.
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@doejon9424 'The British were running low on mechanized weapons and soldiers.' Really? so short that, as early as August, 1940, they were able to send a Troop Convoy to reinforce the Western Desert Force in North Africa? The 'Apology' convoy of 22 August.
'They had a supioror Navy despite the German U-boats & destoyers.' Presumably, you mean the U-Boats which never came close to success in the North Atlantic? Or the 10 destroyers which were all the Germans had in September, 1940, when the British had 178, of which over 110 were in Home Waters? Or the 400+ with which the Royal Navy ended the war?
The RAF, which, far from lacking 'raw numbers' was consistently operating greater numbers of aircraft, and producing a strategic bombing arm the size of which the Germans could only ever dream about, from mid 1940 onwards?
Technical advancements? Which? There were many projects, but how many were practicable, or saw battlefield service?
'We can only speculate what advancements Germany would have had from 1945- 1948 / 1950. The would've had the fleet of jet fighters, who knows what kind of tanks, various types of ships, accurate rocket warfare.. industrial military complex at it's finest.' Indeed, you must speculate, because you seem to think that Germany had unlimited and inexhaustible resources. Where would the fuel come from which the jets would use? Tanks such as the Maus or the E100? Lunatic ideas? Ships? The Kriegsmarine had stopped building warships after 1941, because of lack of raw materials and manpower. Instead, they concentrated on the U-Boat as a cheap & desperate expedient, which from May 1943 was a broken force. Accurate rocket warfare? The V2 could, with luck, hit somewhere in the London or Antwerp area. 'Industrial Military Complex?' Oh, please! Germany was a shambles of organisations competing with each other. The Germans never even managed to adopt a total war economy, as the British did almost immediately.
'Aircraft carrier?' One almost completed vessel, with an intended Air Group of modified land based aircraft, including the Bf109, with an undercarriage almost ludicrously unsuited to carrier operations. Life expectancy in the Atlantic? A few days, especially since the protective escorts a carrier needed in WW2 simply did not exist in the German navy.
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@doejon9424 What do you mean by 'run dry?' The only land front after June 1940 was North Africa, and there was never any shortage of vehicles at any time. Conversely the axis, because of the problems in actually getting supplies across the Mediterranean, struggled to maintain the forces they had there, and were generally short of fuel.
'It took the invasion of Normandy to push them back.' What does this even mean? By the time of Normandy, the axis had already been expelled from North Africa, Sicily, and half of Italy, as well as suffering massive defeats in the East. As to D-Day itself, actually, two thirds of the men who landed were British/Canadian, 3261 0f the 4127 landing craft were British crewed, 892 of 1213 warships were British, and two thirds of 11,600 aircraft were RAF.
'And you better believe that the campaign in North Africa would have been shut right down if the bulk of Marines didn't have to deal with Japan & island hoping in the Pacific. They would've been sent over there.' What does this even mean, either. There were precisely seven US divisions involved in North Africa, all in Tunisia after Torch.
The 'thinly spread' RAF was, by the way operating 56 fighter squadrons over Northern France by May, 1941, and by the end of the war operated just under10,000 aircraft.
Whether the Bf 109 was superior to the Spitfire is questionable, but largely irrelevant, as the Luftwaffe failed to win the Battle of Britain.
On a one-to one basis, late war German tanks were generally superior, although very little was superior to the Soviet T34/85. German late war vehicles, however, tended to be over-engineered, mechanically complex, difficult to maintain in battlefield conditions, an slow to manufacture. In fact, the Soviets built just under 49,000 T34/85s, the US a similar number of M4s, whereas the Germans built just under 500 Tiger IIs, just under 1400 Tiger Is, and around 6,000 Panthers.
Finally. Yes the Firefly was an American hull, but the gun which made it so effective against Tigers was the British designed & produced 17 pounder. 2,200 were converted. More than the total number of Tigers of both types built.
You need to do some reading instead of relying on myths and falsehoods.
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@iamnutty8471 In that case, then surely you must blame Herbert Asquith, not Churchill? Or is it simply that, like Herbert Asquith, you find Churchill a much more pleasing target for blame?
In terms of 'Chain of Command' by the way, Churchill was the civilian head of the Royal Navy. The professional head of the Navy was the First Sea Lord, who until mid May 1915 was Sir John Fisher, and after him Sir Henry Jackson.
Churchill had no place in the army Chain of Command which was headed at the time by Lieutenant-General Sir James Wolfe Murray, who of course, reported to Asquith. Murray himself was heavily influenced by Herbert Kitchener, and was replaced Sir Archibald Murray in September, 1915.
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@daveofyorkshire301 Actually, my information comes from, among others, 'Whitehall Histories: Naval Staff Histories. The Evacuation from Dunkirk..'
The Naval Staff Histories were in the Public Record Office for some time prior to being published from 2000 onwards. They contain around 220 pages of detailed accounts, statistics, and analyses of the evacuation on a day by day basis, and list every vessel which took part, together with the number of men they lifted, and the fates of vessels which were lost.
Edward & Mary, by the way, was not part of the flotilla, at least according to the Naval Staff History and to The Association of Dunkirk Little Ships. She, along with several other Hastings-based fishing boats, and the Hastings lifeboat 'Cyril & Lilian Bishop' went to Dover, but only the lifeboat was actually used. 'Cyril & Lilian Bishop' was under the command of Acting Petty Officer W.H. Adkin during the evacuation.
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No, Operation Sealion was wargamed in 1974 at Sandhurst, the senior commanders being experienced WW2 commanders such as, on the German side, Galland & Ruge.
In order to allow some level of fighting on land, the Germans were (falsely) given a landing window of opportunity when the actual dispositions of the Royal Navy were artificially adjusted, moving them further away than had been the reality.
The result? The German first wave landed on 22 September, at dawn. Two days later, the RN anti-invasion forces arrived (17 cruisers and 57 destroyers, with smaller support vessels, which was actually reasonably accurate), annihilating German transports in the Channel. The last pockets of German resistance, out of ammunition and supplies, surrendered on 28 September.
Apart from the fact that the RN anti-invasions forces were, in the main, based at the Nore, Portsmouth, & Plymouth, rather than further away as in the game, no-one seriously quibbled about the result.
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@jonathanwilliams1065 But the new French Government was to be headed by two enthusiastic collaborationalists, Petain & Laval. I doubt that Darlan, with his concern about the honneur of the French navy, would have agreed to the surrender of the French fleet to Germany or Italy, but he was not irreplacable.
Moreover, the British concern was not that it be surrendered to the Germans, as they had no immediate means of manning it, but that French ships, with French crews, would appear in the Channel under orders from the Petain/Laval government to operate in support of a German invasion attempt on Britain. Put simply, it was not a risk the British government were willing to take. Interestingly, when FDR heard of Mers, he remarked that, had Britain been in the same position as France, he hoped that he would have taken similar action against the Royal Navy.
The scuttling of French ships at Toulon in late November 1942 is hardly relevant. By then, the war situation had changed beyond recognition, and the eventual defeat of Germany by the US, Britain, and the Soviet Union was becoming apparent. That certainly was not the case in July, 1940.
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Actually, the Bengal Famine had a number of causes, among which were the number of refugees from Japanese held areas, the inability to import food from those same areas, stockpiling by hoarders and, perhaps worst of all, the Bengal administration, which tried to minimise the crisis. The worst that could be said of Churchill was that he should have known what was taking place, but didn't. After all, in 1943, he had little else to worry about.
You could also add the refusal of FDR to allow the transfer of merchant shipping, by the way. What is without dispute, except by those who choose to blame Churchill for everything since the Black Death, is that once he did find out, he transferred food distribution to the British Indian Army, and had grain convoys diverted from Australia to India.
Sorry, I know this doesn't meet the required agenda.
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Not without the Distant Covering force, which might have been too far away to intervene. That said, the scatter order based on inadequate information was a mistake. What was right for an Altantic convoy scattering to avoid a lone raider, with no U-boats in contact and far from enemy aircraft, was wrong for a convoy threatened by, potentially, a whole task force, supported by U-boats and aircraft. My view is that the convoy should have stayed united, and Hamilton's cruisers sent in support.
However, I have, as we all do, the considerable benefit of hindsight.
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@chernobylcat1791 Douhet was a theorist who, basically, argued that bombing civilians would bring about civil unrest. The population would rise up against their government, and a new government would agree to an armistice. It was, of course, nonsense, in that it didn't work against the British or the Germans when it was actually tried, but the British Air Ministry 'Bomber Barons' Goering, and le May, all believed in the theory.
One area where it did work, albeit unintentionally, was that it obliged the Germans to retain a large proportion of their air force for home defence, and to keep many anti-aircraft guns around their cities when they were desperately needed on the battlefield.
You mistake me. I haven't said that I believe it to be a 'good idea' but I do believe it to have been an inevitable one. If you wish to degrade your enemy's industrial capacity, you must destroy his factories, and the workforce in the factories is civilian.
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@dost328 No, it was not. Then, as now, in Britain, a suggestion by a Minister was simply that. The final decision was that of the Prime Minister, which is why he was, and is, so-called.
Whatever you might think, Churchill had no role in the planning of the Operation.. Nicholas Lambert's book ' The War Lords and the Gallipoli Disaster' is clear on the subject. He argues that Asquith ultimately decided on the Gallipoli operation, not in a meeting of the subcommittee on war policy, but in a meeting of the subcommittee on food prices.
Facing skyrocketing wheat prices, due to the war and crop failures in the Southern Hemisphere (particularly Australia), Asquith needed a way to reduce food prices to prevent political unrest. And because he was a good free market Liberal, storming Gallipoli is seen as more militarily possible than instituting food rationing.S
At the same time, the Russians were demanding an immediate loan of 100 million Pounds, to prop up the Rouble, which had become virtually worthless on international markets after their defeats in East Prussia. Asquith ultimately came to believe that Gallipoli offered the chance for a decisive victory against the Ottomans, solving the wheat problem, by reopening the granaries of Romania and Southern Russia to international markets, and restabilizing Russian government credit, all in one blow.
So yes, Churchill was responsible for pushing the operation, but it is Asquith’s government and he made the final decision. However, when both the naval operation and the amphibious landing failed, Asquith made sure that it wasChurchill who took the blame.
You could also refer to the demand from Russia for support to ease the pressure on their southern flank, in an urgent communication sent by the Russian Chief of Staff to Herbert Kitchener.
Actually, I have done my homework.
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@Boppy-B-B Actually, the Tobruk garrison was originally 9th Australian Division, supported by (British) 3rd Armoured Brigade. The only Indian troops seem to have been a small contingent from the 18 Indian Cavalry Regiment, attached to 3rd Armoured Brigade.
From mid August, the Australians were lifted out by the Royal Navy, and replaced by the Polish Carpathian Brigade, 70th (British) Infantry Division, & 4th Royal Tank Regiment, who were eventually relieved during Operation Crusader.
When Tobruk fell in June, 1942, the defences had been allowed to fall into disrepair, and 2nd South African Division could not hold them.
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@nickdanger3802 Sorry, I am surprised that you should post such a fatuous comment. Of course the RN & RCN used a lot of American built equipment, but the crews who fought & won the Battle were British & Canadian. To follow your argument, it would be logical to assume that the US Navy victory at Midway should not be credited to the American air crews, but to the Douglas Aircraft Company, who built the Dauntless. It would, of course, also be foolish and wrong.
Churchill said, I believe, 'give us the tools & we will finish the job.' Huge American resources did indeed supply many of the tools, but I did not anticipate that you would seek to belittle the efforts of the RN & RCN in this manner.
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@yingyang1008 Would you care to give examples of the regular scenes of which you speak?
Norway was a military failure, certainly. Should the British and French have simply remained inactive and not attempted to intervene? The Norwegian naval campaign, by the way, was a disaster for the Kriegsmarine's surface fleet, which remained largely irrelevant for the rest of the war.
Mers el Kebir was a justified action. The British had no idea, at the time, how closely a Petainist would co-operate with Germany. The French armistice/surrender had required that the French fleet return to French Atlantic ports, where it would be placed under German 'supervision.' The British concern was that it might be used in support of a German invasion attempt.
Dresden (an Anglo-American joint operation) was undertaken at the request of the Soviet Union. I have never heard a credible argument from people who apparently believe that, in an industrial war, the soldier who loads the shell into the gun is a legitimate target, but the 'civilian' who manufactures the shell, or provides the food without which armies could not fight, is not. In one sentence, There are no civilians in modern warfare.
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@richardcrow5827 You need to read the War Diary of Army Group A. The Germans had no issues with fuel or ammunition, which is why I didn't say that they did. What concerned von Rundstedt was the fact that his armour had covered a significant mileage. He, like many other senior commanders, was eager to begin the second phase. Hitler was at Army Group A's HQ at the time, but agreed with the judgement, firstly because he knew that the Dunkirk area was poor ground for armour, secondly because German infantry was arriving in support, thirdly because he saw an army backed against the sea as trapped, whereas the British saw the sea as an open escape door. Fourthly, but most importantly, Goering had told him, on 23 May, that the elimination of the trapped armies was 'a special job for the Luftwaffe.'
'Ths is not in any history books and has remained secret always.' Oh please! Halifax had been a consistent opponent of Churchill, and had sought to use Mussolini as an intermediary in any peace deal. After Dunkirk, Halifax was more or less an irrelevance, especially after the resignation of Chamberlain due to ill health, when he was the last remaining appeaser in the cabinet, until Churchill managed to dispose of him by making him British ambassador to the United States.
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@Boppy-B-B Perhaps you could explain what motivated Canada, Australia, New Zealand (and South Africa by the way) to join the vile tyrannical British in a war against Hitler?
The convoys crossed the Atlantic as successfully as they did because of the Royal Navy's Escort Groups. Canada did indeed play an increasing role, but not until 1942.
The Japanese did not seek to invade India, but to carry out a major incursion which would disrupt allied supply lines to China. Doubtless you won't have heard of Operation U-GO, the 85,000 Japanese troops committed to it, or the 60,000 or so Japanese troops killed, wounded, or missing from the disaster that unfolded.
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@ericbeaton7211 British units defending the perimeter included, among others, elements of the following regiments: the Loyals, Leicesters, Sherwood Foresters, Warwickshires, East Lancashires, Borders, Coldstream Guards, Duke of Wellington's, Green Howards, Durham Light Infantry, King's Own Scottish Borderers, Royal Ulster Rifles, Grenadier Guards, Berkshires, Suffolks, Bedfordshire and Herts, Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry, East Surreys, Royal Fusiliers, South Lancashires and the Black Watch. These were withdrawn to Dunkirk on 2/3 June to an inner perimeter, and evacuated. For the last day, the perimeter was held by French troops.
Your reference to St. Valery can only refer to 51HD. 7 & 8 Battalions of The Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders were part of 51HD's 154 Brigade, which formed part of Arkforce. Arkforce was detached from the division on 9/10 June in order to form a defensive position 19 miles east of Le Havre, to make possible the withdrawal of the rest of 51HD and French IX Corps. Heavily congested roads resulted in the late arrival of Arkforce, and enabled Rommel's 7 Panzer to get between it and the rest of IX Corps. As a result, and as it was not possible to reunite 154 Brigade with 51HD. it was ordered to withdraw to Le Havre., from where it was evacuated.
There is a detailed account of these events in 'The Last Act' by Basil Karslake.
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@ErichZornerzfun No, there weren't. On 18 August, 1916, a force of 2 battlecruisers (all that were operational after the damage the others had received) and 17 battleships sailed. At 2119 the British intercepted a signal that the fleet had sailed at 2100, and at 2256 the Grand Fleet sortied. At 0500 on 19 August, the British submarine E23 torpedoed SMS Westfalen, which returned to port. At 1233 the Admiralty informed Jellicoe that the HSF was about 60 miles away, and Jellicoe prepared for action.
However, Scheer had received warnings from both U boats and Zeppelins of the approach of Jellicoe's fleet, which he believed to be around 110 miles north west of his position. Upon receiving an updated report from U53 that the Grand Fleet was 65 miles away, and heading towards the HSF, Scheer abandoned his sortice and returned to the Jade. What did the Germans achieve by this mission, as you claim? The sinking of two light cruisers? Is that it?
On 18 October, 1916, the HSF sailed, but within a few hours the cruiser Munchen was torpedoed by HMS E38, and Scheer returned to the safety of the Jade. The Grand Fleet was brought to short notice, but didn't sail as the German sortie ended almost before it had begun. What did this German mission achieve?
If there were more sorties than these two damp squibs, tell me when.
In general terms, what did the HSF achieve post-Jutland?
Did it challenge the Northern Blockade, which was starving Germany into collapse? I refer you to the Turnip Winter. No, it didn't.
Did it challenge the constant movement of men and equipment between Britain & France? No, it didn't.
Did it try to send a fast raiding force into the Atlantic, using battlecruisers and light cruisers, perhaps? No, it didn't.
Did it even seek to bring Trywhitt's Harwich Force of light cruisers and destroyers to battle? No. it didn't.
What it did do was to swing peacefully on anchor chains and cables in the Jade, whilst crewmen heard of the suffering of their families. No wonder they mutinied, was it?
No wonder, also, that Hindenburg & Ludendorff fell for Scheer's and von Holtzendorff's assurances that unrestricted submarine warfare could bring Britain to her knees, forcing Kaiser Bill to accept that his cherished surface fleet was a broken reed, and there was no alternative. Of course, the minor by-product of this desperate decision was to bring the United States into the war on the allied side. Was that the mission that the post Jutland German fleet actually accomplished?
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@Boppy-B-B Only if you are a revisionist, with an axe to grind and an agenda to pursue. The Bengal Famine had a number of causes, among which were the number of refugees from Japanese held areas, the inability to import food from those same areas, stockpiling by hoarders and, perhaps worst of all, the Bengal administration, which tried to minimise the crisis. The worst that could be said of Churchill was that he should have known what was taking place, but didn't. After all, in 1943, he had little else to worry about.
You could also add the refusal of FDR to allow the transfer of merchant shipping, by the way. What is without dispute, except by those who choose to blame Churchill for everything since the Black Death, is that once he did find out, he transferred food distribution to the British Indian Army, and had grain convoys diverted from Australia to India.
I assume, of course, that you won't believe any of this, as it doesn't suit the agenda.
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Actually, the Bengal Famine had a number of causes, among which were the number of refugees from Japanese held areas, the inability to import food from those same areas, stockpiling by hoarders and, perhaps worst of all, the Bengal administration, which tried to minimise the crisis. The worst that could be said of Churchill was that he should have known what was taking place, but didn't. After all, in 1943, he had little else to worry about.
You could also add the refusal of FDR to allow the transfer of merchant shipping, by the way. What is without dispute, except by those who choose to blame Churchill for everything since the Black Death, is that once he did find out, he transferred food distribution to the British Indian Army, and had grain convoys diverted from Australia to India.
The Singapore disaster was a direct result of the fact that a situation existed in 1940-2 for which no pre-war planning could have prepared. The assumption was that a war with Germany would be fought with the support of France, who would take on the bulk of the fighting on land, whilst the French Fleet would play a significant role. Indeed, had France not collapsed, Italy may well have remained neutral.
As a result, the British, never a significant land power, were obliged to attempt, with insufficient military resources to meet the new situation, to find ships and men to defend Britain, protect the Atlantic supply lines, and prevent axis control of the Mediterranean. The Far East, not at war until December, 1941, was, inevitably, starved of resources.
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Actrually, construction was dictated by the limitations of the Washington Naval Treaties.
On 3 September, 1939, the RN had seven carriers, with six under construction, and fifteen battleships and battlecruisers, with five under construction.
The US Navy had six carriers, with one under construction, and fifteen battleships, with four under construction.
At the same time, Germany had 57 U-Boats. The Royal Navy had 63. U-Boat construction was a desperate wartime measure, brought about by the demands of a situation for which the Kriegsmarine had not planned.
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@nickdanger3802 Never a good idea to accept uncritically an RAF source where the Battle of the Atlantic is concerned.
To use an accurate, Naval, source :-
'Total shipping losses of the Allied and neutral nations were about 456,000 gross tons a month during the period July 1940 to March, 1941, more than 60 per cent higher than during the first period. Meanwhile the building rate had increased only slightly to about 114,000 gross tons a month, making the net loss of shipping about 342,000 gross tons a month. Total shipping available had decreased from about 38,000,000 gross tons at the start of the second period to about 35,000,000 gross tons at the end of the second period.
Of the 456,000 gross tons of shipping lost monthly, about 404,000 gross tons were lost by enemy action. U-boats accounted for 42 ships of 224,000 gross tons a month (55 per cent of the total tonnage lost by enemy action), more than twice the monthly tonnage sunk by U-boats during the first period. Monthly shipping losses due to enemy surface craft jumped to 87,000 gross tons (22 per cent) and those due to enemy aircraft increased to 61,000 gross tons (15 per cent). Monthly losses due to mines dropped from second place in the first period to only 27,000 gross tons (7 per cent), with other and unknown causes accounting for the other 1 per cent of the total losses due to enemy action.
There is no doubt that the U-boats had inflicted a serious defeat on the Allies in the Battle of the Atlantic during the second period, but the situation was beginning to look more promising toward the end of this period. One favorable element was the increasing number of antisubmarine ships and aircraft becoming available for convoy escorts as the threat of the invasion of England was decreasing.
The number of antisubmarine ships suitable for ocean escort (i.e., destroyers and patrol craft such as sloops, frigates, corvettes) had increased from about 235 at the start of this period to about 375 (includes 240 destroyers) at the end of the period. Important factors in this increase were the coming into service of the new corvette and also the transfer of the 50 old Town class destroyers from the United States to England from September 1940. These destroyers were equipped with U. S. echo-ranging gear, called sonar, which was similar in principle to the British Asdic.'
Thus, although the figures are largely accurate, the conclusions are incomplete, in that, losses in terms of gross tonnage available had decreased by less than 8%, at a time when the first 'Happy Time' was in full swing.
Evasive, or Diversionary, Routing didn't apply during the period June-December, 1940. It relied upon widespread use of HF/DF sites on ships and shore bases, combined with successes in breaking German Naval Enigma, both of which post-dated that period.
How, by the way, is any of this relevant to PQ17 or Paukenschlag?
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@davidtanslow3584 'If you have any logic to UK government dates and treaties and laws you will realise that the formalities normally come after the actual integration into the countries.' This doesn't make any sense.
What you 'insist ' is irrelevant, given that it has no basis in fact. You fairly clearly aren't aware that Dynamo was not a betrayal but an operation to remove a substantial number of trapped allied troops in order to re-land them elsewhere in France. In this case, some 120,000 French troops were re-landed further west, and British troops began landing in Cherbourg as early as 7 June. The British self-evidently did not 'capitulate' although the French did, when the government of Paul Reynaud collapsed, an Armistice was signed, and the Vichy regime installed.
Oh, and Hitler did not issue the Halt Order on the Aa Canal, von Rundstedt did, in order to rest his tank crews and service the vehicles before beginning the next phase of the campaign. Rundstedt was concerned that the French might yet be capable of a second 'Miracle of the Marne.' Hitler had already been told, by Goering, that the elimination of the Dunkirk pocket was 'a special job for the Luftwaffe,' and chose to believe him.
It really doesn't matter what you 'state' as it is totally lacking in any credibility.
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@davidtanslow3584 Actually, you are the one trying and failing to re-write history, by referring to an imaginary 1933 Anglo German Treaty, which apparently also involved the United States, then consistently failing either to produce any evidence to support your nonsense, or even explain how an enlarged German fleet, which is what the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935 actually involved, would threaten the Soviets. By sending Bismarck & Tirpitz to Stalingrad perhaps?!
As to the secret plotting with Germany? Ramsay MacDonald & Stanley Baldwin? Seriously?? Did the Appeasement policies of Stan &, later, Neville, completely pass you by?
You seem to use the term 'I say,' quite a lot. I suspect anyone reading your nonsense would give a damn what 'you say.'
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