Comments by "doveton sturdee" (@dovetonsturdee7033) on "The biggest convoy disaster of WW2 | Convoy PQ-17" video.

23 vessels were lost in PQ17. When Admiral King refused to introduce convoys on the American East Coast after the German declaration of war, over 600 merchant ships were lost to U - Boat attacks in Operation Paukenschlag, and around 5,000 merchant seamen killed. That, without doubt, was the worst naval decision of WW2.
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@Mondo762 Thank you. A US historian once told me that Ernie King was unusual in that he seemed to hate everyone and everything. As far as I can gather, FDR & George Marshall more or less forced him to introduce a convoy system because the major losses, especially of fast tankers needed for the Pacific, was seriously harming the US/Allied war effort. Of course, once a proper convoy system was introduced, sinkings were reduced almost immediately, and the German campaign on the US East Coast was quickly abandoned. As a mere foreigner, I have never quite understood why King did not lose his job!
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A small correction. Prinz Eugen never reached Norway. She sailed for Norway with Scheer and five destroyers on 21 February, 1942, but was torpedoed by HMS Trident, causing serious damage to her stern. After completing repairs in Kiel by January 1943, she spent the rest of the war in the Baltic. You would expect the IWM to know this, I suggest?
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@Simon_Nonymous The US Merchant Marine came under the control of the US War Shipping Administration in early February, 1942. Where and when US merchantmen came under military control immediation, just as the British Merchant Marine had in September, 1939. The commander of the US Naval Coastal Frontier, which later becam the Eastern Sea Frontier, Adolphus Andrews, begged King for destroyers from the US Atlantic Fleet to support the grossly inadequate resources available to him to protect the Eastern Coast. King, at a time when the US Atlantic Fleet's order of battle showed over 70 destroyers on strength, refused to act. In short, the US Navy did indeed have the authority to issue orders to US merchantmen.
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@Simon_Nonymous My pleasure. Ernie has always escaped criticism for his actions, which appear to have been based upon his anglophobia rather than any actual alternative strategy. To give some idea of how catastrophic his behaviour was, in November, 1941, 7 merchant ships were lost in convoy, and 6 lost when sailing independently. For December, the figures were 6 & 17. After Paukenschlag began, and King refused to institute convoys, the losses in convoy from January to June 1942 were 6, 10, 3, 3, 14, and 14, yet the losses of independents, almost all off the East Coast of the US, were, for the same months, 43, 61, 89, 78, 115, and 122.
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@nickdanger3802 Perhaps you think this comment has some meaning, but the relevance escapes me.
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@kemarisite I thought that you were more knowledgeable than you turned out to be. The point about convoys are that they have escorts, whereas independents are unescorted. You don't seriously believe that a submerged U-boat is vulnerable to gunfire, do you? You are simply wrong about Federal control of the US merchant marine. Moreover, King was the head of the US Navy at the time. Again, do you really believe that owners of merchant fleets were able to act independently of government in time of war? Please don't be silly. Kentucky and Ohio were transferred to British management because of the need to send fuel supplies to Malta (in the case of Ohio, as part of Operation Pedestal, which also involved three US registered merchantmen), and the ships were handled exactly as I wrote earlier. Ohio had sailed IN CONVOY, from Houston to the Clyde, at which point Texaco received a telegram from the War Shipping Administration confirming what was to happen to her.
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Except Tirpitz was never torpedoed by anyone.
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@Purvis-dw4qf I know, and I agree about not scattering the convoy. The concern was that the Distant Covering Force, of two battleships, two cruisers, and twelve destroyers was too far away. The Cruiser Covering Force, of four heavy cruisers three destroyers, was close enough to intervene, however, especially after Broome ordered those destroyers from the close escort armed with torpedoes to join Hamilton's cruisers.
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@jeep146 During the period known as the 'Second Happy Tiime', Axis submarines sank 609 ships totalling 3.1 million tons, against a loss of only 22 U-boats. That was largely down to King's refusal to release destroyers from the US Atlantic Fleet for escort duties.
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@kemarisite Read about the US War Shipping Administration, established in early February, 1942, for your answer.
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@kemarisite Firstly, destroyers, US or otherwise, were not obliged to steam at 30 knots. The modern RN vessels which accompanied Arctic convoys, for example, had no problems when operating at reduced speed. Nor had those US boats which had briefly accompanied North Atlantic convoys in early 1942. Moreover, what actions did the US Atlantic Fleet undertake in early 1942 which required massive destroyer escort numbers? Yes, Coast Guard cutters, DEs, or corvettes and sloops were more suited, but as these were not available, did that really justify allowing the mass slaughter of freighters in large numbers? Armed merchantmen had very little hope of protecting themselves from U-boats. Generally, the first warning the merchant ship had was went a torpedo exploded. 'Note that the Royal Canadian Navy immediately organized convoys, despite the lack of escorts, and this appears to have cut sinkings of the Canadian coast from 37 in January and February to 11 in March and April.' Indeed. Isn't that the point I am making? The RCN itself noted that U-Boats preferred to hunt further south, in a convoy free environment. In April, the RN & RCN detached 24 escorts from their own resources to support US efforts, but still convoys were not established. The British then set up their own convoys between Halifax & Trinidad, later Aruba. Between May and August, they escorted 14 convoys, totalling 76 tankers, withouit a single loss. Incidentally, if I am wrong about the authority of the US War Shipping Administration, how was it the Kentucky and Ohio, two fast tankers, were transferred to the British Ministry of War Transport for service in the Mediterranean in early-mid 1942?
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Because Pedestal was a naval operation intended to force through sufficient supplies to enable Malta to continue as an operational Allied base. It could be argued that, whilst a tactical success for the axis, it was a major strategic victory for the allies.
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Sadly, he didn't. His staff were almost unanimous in their opinion that Tirpitz and her squadron were not at sea. The probability is that his judgement was clouded by the brain tumour which eventually killed him.
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'My enemy's enemy is my friend.'
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The German Task Force ( Operation Rosselsprung ) was actually intended to consist of Tirpitz, three heavy cruisers (Lutzow, Scheer, & Hipper) and twelve destroyers.
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Not without the Distant Covering force, which might have been too far away to intervene. That said, the scatter order based on inadequate information was a mistake. What was right for an Altantic convoy scattering to avoid a lone raider, with no U-boats in contact and far from enemy aircraft, was wrong for a convoy threatened by, potentially, a whole task force, supported by U-boats and aircraft. My view is that the convoy should have stayed united, and Hamilton's cruisers sent in support. However, I have, as we all do, the considerable benefit of hindsight.
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How is it that videos of this sort always attract people like this? Cosmic, old chap, would you care to express your opinion about Patton's shambolic campaign in Lorraine, the triumph of Bradley & Hodges in the Hurtgen Forest, or the 600+ merchant ships lost off the us East Coast in early 1942 when Ernie King failed to respond to Paukenschlag?
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@nickdanger3802 How sad. You have degenerated into nothing more than a troll. Unless of course, you can explain the relevance of any of this to the subject under discussion. I will not bother to reply again unless, by some miracle, you are able to reverse your sad recent decline, and manage to up your game.
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Then perhaps the same sanction should have been applied to Ernie King after his (lack of) response tro Paukenschlag?
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@drinksnapple8997 Roger Hill received a DSO and a DSC, both well-deserved. However, his actions hardly justified a VC.
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Admiral Pound died from a Brain Tumour. This was probably what warped his judgements where PQ17 was concerned. There were 78 Russian convoys, involving around 1,400 freighters, of which 85, or 6%, were lost.
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He commanded HMS Colossus at Jutland. She helped to sink the cruiser Wiesbaden, and hit the battlecruiser Derfflinger five times. She was the only Grand Fleet battleship to be hit by German shellfire, receiving two hits. What 'risk averse cowardice?' and how was Pound protecting himself? He was in the Admiralty building in LONDON, for heaven's sake.
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@CityRedesigner1945 Partly right, but don't forget the RCN's role. You might, however, also mention that the RN also won their campaigns in the Mediterranean and the Arctic, as well as planning and successfully executing every assault landing in the west from Torch to Overlord.
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@nickdanger3802 Never a good idea to accept uncritically an RAF source where the Battle of the Atlantic is concerned. To use an accurate, Naval, source :- 'Total shipping losses of the Allied and neutral nations were about 456,000 gross tons a month during the period July 1940 to March, 1941, more than 60 per cent higher than during the first period. Meanwhile the building rate had increased only slightly to about 114,000 gross tons a month, making the net loss of shipping about 342,000 gross tons a month. Total shipping available had decreased from about 38,000,000 gross tons at the start of the second period to about 35,000,000 gross tons at the end of the second period. Of the 456,000 gross tons of shipping lost monthly, about 404,000 gross tons were lost by enemy action. U-boats accounted for 42 ships of 224,000 gross tons a month (55 per cent of the total tonnage lost by enemy action), more than twice the monthly tonnage sunk by U-boats during the first period. Monthly shipping losses due to enemy surface craft jumped to 87,000 gross tons (22 per cent) and those due to enemy aircraft increased to 61,000 gross tons (15 per cent). Monthly losses due to mines dropped from second place in the first period to only 27,000 gross tons (7 per cent), with other and unknown causes accounting for the other 1 per cent of the total losses due to enemy action. There is no doubt that the U-boats had inflicted a serious defeat on the Allies in the Battle of the Atlantic during the second period, but the situation was beginning to look more promising toward the end of this period. One favorable element was the increasing number of antisubmarine ships and aircraft becoming available for convoy escorts as the threat of the invasion of England was decreasing. The number of antisubmarine ships suitable for ocean escort (i.e., destroyers and patrol craft such as sloops, frigates, corvettes) had increased from about 235 at the start of this period to about 375 (includes 240 destroyers) at the end of the period. Important factors in this increase were the coming into service of the new corvette and also the transfer of the 50 old Town class destroyers from the United States to England from September 1940. These destroyers were equipped with U. S. echo-ranging gear, called sonar, which was similar in principle to the British Asdic.' Thus, although the figures are largely accurate, the conclusions are incomplete, in that, losses in terms of gross tonnage available had decreased by less than 8%, at a time when the first 'Happy Time' was in full swing. Evasive, or Diversionary, Routing didn't apply during the period June-December, 1940. It relied upon widespread use of HF/DF sites on ships and shore bases, combined with successes in breaking German Naval Enigma, both of which post-dated that period. How, by the way, is any of this relevant to PQ17 or Paukenschlag?
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