Comments by "doveton sturdee" (@dovetonsturdee7033) on "Battle of Britain Big Wing | Was the Big Wing a bad idea?" video.

  1.  @jonsouth1545  I have always wondered if the Air Ministry regarded the British Army and Navy as greater enemies than the Germans, Japanese, and Italians. Certainly, in the years between the wars, when the AM had control of naval aviation, it systematically destroyed the Fleet Air Arm and reduced Coastal Command to virtual impotence.
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  2. The Air Ministry insistence in keeping vast numbers of fighters and fighter-bombers in Britain, when air support was desperately needed in the Mediterranean, was little short of criminal. At times, it is difficult to determine whose side the Air Ministry was actually on!
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  3.  @richardvernon317  Whether Blackburn built junk or not, it was the Air Ministry who placed the orders. On 12 April, 1918, the RNAS had 2949 aircraft and 103 airships. After the systematic evisceration inflicted upon it by the Air Ministry, it had, in September, 1939, 232 front line aircraft, at least half of which were obsolete.
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  4.  @fus149hammer5  Very few people actually assume that. Most assume that the barges could expect the Luftwaffe to attempt to protect them. This, however, would be the same Luftwaffe which had not received any training in anti-shipping techniques, and had just failed badly at Dunkirk. The same Luftwaffe which, in the whole of the war, sank 31 RN destroyers, and no RN warship larger than a light cruiser. Just for your information, in September, 1940, the RN had over 110 destroyers in Home Waters, of which 64 were in bases within five hours of Dover. You can forget torpedo attacks by this Luftwaffe, by the way. The Luftwaffe didn't even have an operational torpedo bomber until mid 1942, so Prince of Wales & Repulse, both sunk by high performance torpedo bombers flown by highly trained crews, do not come to mind at all. Minefields? Really? The Kriegsmarine had seven auxiliary minelayers. The Royal Navy had around four hundred fleet & auxiliary minesweepers. Moreover, what happens to these minelayers, carefully laying their mines, when they encounter one of the nightly Royal Navy destroyers patrols operating out of Plymouth and Sheerness.
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  5.  @thosdot6497  My mistake for a typing error. I should have put 1 not 12 April, as the figures were those which applied to the RNAS on the last day it existed. On 1 April, 1918, the RFC had 4000 combat aircraft. On 1 September, 1939 the RAF had 2600. A contraction of 35% On 1 April 1918, the RNAS had 2949 combat aircraft, on 1 September, 1939, the FAA had 232 aircraft of all types. A contraction of 92%. You did ask. The unedifying spectacle of inter-service rivalry in the 1920s and 1930s is distressing in view of what happened as a result. Both the Navy & the RAF were fighting over a declining defence budget, with the result that, as someone once wrote, 'The RAF spent most of the funding on bombers (which, according to the Air Ministry fantasists, would 'always get through.' These people saw Douhet's theories as a means of justifying their existence, after all), some on fighters, a few spare quid on Coastal Command, and the contents of Trenchard's jacket pocket after a night out at his club on the Fleet Air Arm.' The United States seemed to manage very well in WW2 with an Army Air Force, a Naval Air Service, and Marine Corps, all independent of each other.
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  6. No, Operation Sealion was wargamed in 1974 at Sandhurst, the senior commanders being experienced WW2 commanders such as, on the German side, Galland & Ruge. In order to allow some level of fighting on land, the Germans were (falsely) given a landing window of opportunity when the actual dispositions of the Royal Navy were artificially adjusted, moving them further away than had been the reality. The result? The German first wave landed on 22 September, at dawn. Two days later, the RN anti-invasion forces arrived (17 cruisers and 57 destroyers, with smaller support vessels, which was actually reasonably accurate), annihilating German transports in the Channel. The last pockets of German resistance, out of ammunition and supplies, surrendered on 28 September. Apart from the fact that the RN anti-invasions forces were, in the main, based at the Nore, Portsmouth, & Plymouth, rather than further away as in the game, no-one seriously quibbled about the result.
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  7. 'With the RAF reduced to nothing invasion was a certainty.' Rather, an invasion ATTEMPT, might have been made. At which point, the towed German barges would encounter the concentrated forces of the Royal Navy as they plodded down the Channel.
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