Comments by "doveton sturdee" (@dovetonsturdee7033) on "The History Guy: History Deserves to Be Remembered"
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@nickdanger3802 Hughes, Terry and Costello, John. The Battle of the Atlantic, Terraine, John. Business in Great Waters: The U-Boat Wars, 1916-1945, Miller, Nathan. War at Sea - A Naval History of World War II, Hitler's U-Boat War: The Hunters, 1939-1942, Clay Blair, Hitler's U-Boat War: The Hunted. 1942-1945, Clay Blair. The U-Boat Offensive, 1914 - 1945. Tarrant, V. E.
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In point of fact, unrestricted submarine warfare commenced on 18 February, 1915. The first Q ship was introduced in June, 1915, and the arming of merchant ships later than that. Both were responses to the German campaign, and did not create it.
UB110 was depth charged, rammed & sunk by HMS Garry on 19 July, 1918. Allegations by her captain, Kapitänleutnant Werner Fürbringer, were made after the war, in his memoirs, published in 1933. Apparently, he witnessed one of his crew killed when a member of Garry's crew threw a lump of coal at him, and Garry's crew also, allegedly, fired at the survivors with pistols, revolvers, and rifles. Furbringer also claimed that there were no independent witnesses of the massacre because Lightoller ordered his men to stop when the convoy his ship was escorting arrived on the scene. As far as I know, none of the other survivors from UB110 ever made any such claims.
L19 landed in the North Sea on 1 March, 1916, returning from a bombing raid on Burton on Trent. She was observed in the sea by the trawler 'King Stephen.' The German commander of the airship spoke English, and asked the trawler's skipper, William Martin, to take the 13 man crew of the airship aboard. Martin refused, because his nine man crew were unarmed civilians, whereas the Germans were armed members of the German military. Martin undertook to report the downed airship to any British warship he might meet (King Stephen had no wireless) but didn't encounter any, and therefore was only able to report the encounter when he docked in Grimsby. The Royal Navy did send out destroyers to search for L19, but in poor weather no trace was ever found.
Certainly, the cruiser prize rules benefited surface ships and had not been written with submersibles in mind, but your apparent conviction that the Germans were the victims is difficult to substantiate, despite your rather biased references to two alleged atrocities.
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The circumstances at Alexandria were entirely different from those at Mers-el-Kebir. Alexandria was a main RN base, and the small French squadron was entirely surrounded by RN heavy ships. Mers-el-Kebir, was a major French base, containing four battleships, including the new, fast, Dunkerque & Strasbourg.
Somerville knew what was at stake, delayed firing for as long as he could, but with the French fleet raising steam, and night approaching, without any agreement being reached, he really had no choice.
The fact is that every pre-war assumption the British had made had vanished in the previous five weeks, and the risk that the French navy could end up under German command simply could not be countenanced. I agree that Admiral Darlan was a man who placed great importance on the honour of his navy, and would have opposed such a development, but he was, apparently, out of contact with his headquarters during the whole of the day. For all the British knew a new head of the navy, appointed by Laval, might have given completely different orders.
What happened was appalling, and viewed as such by the Royal Navy, but in the circumstances of the time it is understandable.
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@FredericGaillot Which facts do you believe I have got wrong? The small French squadron under Godfroy was certainly armed (I don't recall suggesting that it wasn't) but it was, in effect, trapped in a major British naval base, and surrounded by the bulk of Cunningham's Mediterranean Fleet. Godfroy was certainly an anglophile, who spoke English well. He was a widower, by the way, whose late wife had been a Scotswoman. He was not, by the way, Cunningham's brother-in-law, as you oddly claim. Cunningham's family came from Dublin, and his wife from Sussex.
Neither was the French Fleet at Mers el Kebir disarmed, or even intending to disarm, by the way. Indeed, after the British opened fire, at 1755, the French, although at a hopeless disadvantage, replied, and Force H was briefly subjected to the sight of colourful shell spashes of red, blue yellow, and green from the dyes inserted in the noses of French shells in order to enable French gunnery officers to determine the fall of shot from each battleship. Gensoul had already ordered his ships to come to action stations, steam had been raised, awnings had been folded, and by the time the British opened fire five French destroyers, and the Strasbourg, were under way and approaching the harbour mouth.
The fact is, by the way, that Darlan could not be contacted on the day of Catapult. More significant, however, was the fact that he had been appointed Minister of Marine on 27 June, by Petain, thus changing his role from that of the head of the French Navy to that of a senior minister in a collaborationist government. Churchill had already stated in Cabinet that 'In a matter so vital to the safety of the whole British Empire, we could not rely on the word of Admiral Darlan.' Harry Hinsley, in 'British Intelligence in the Second World War' states that 'Intelligence sources, including Sigint, proposed the disturbing possibility that the Germans were signalling instructions to the French Navy in Darlan's name.'
I am not claiming this as fact; I am simply trying to make you understand what information was available to the British Government at the time. Of course Somerville stuck to his orders and, after delaying for as long as he could, obeyed the instructions of his political masters. Cunningham would, however reluctantly, have done the same had it become necessary.
The rest of your post is emotional rather than rational. The fact is that France was no longer an ally of Great Britain, and a British Government suddenly facing a situation totally changed made hard and unpleasant decisions because it believed them to be necessary for the maintenance of the defence of the United Kingdom. Of course Somerville protested about his orders. I doubt you would have found an officer in the Royal Navy who didn't detest the idea of firing on French warships, but the fact is that it is politicians, not the military, who make the final judgement.
Franklin Roosevelt, by the way, had the United States' Navy making similar plans for a strike against the Royal Navy had the British ever been reduced to a similar situation.
You might try to get hold of an old book called 'The Deadly Stroke' by Warren Tute, who was Private Secretary to Churchill in June 1940, and interviewed a large number of British & French naval officers when composing his account.
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USS Hughes was a Sims class destroyer, DD 410. I hope that what follows is of interest :-
Hughes was laid down on 15 September 1937 by Bath Iron Works, Bath, Maine; launched on 17 June 1939; sponsored by Mrs. Edward M. Hughes, widow of Commander Hughes; and commissioned at Boston Navy Yard, on 21 September 1939, Lieutenant Commander Donald J. Ramsey in command.
Following shakedown in the Gulf of Mexico, Hughes joined the Atlantic Fleet. From July 1940 to December 1941, Hughes served in the Atlantic, first on patrol off Martinique to watch Vichy French Forces there and then on Neutrality patrol off Iceland. During this time, she became the first American destroyer to escort a British convoy all the way to England.
Following the attack on Pearl Harbor, US warships were urgently needed in the Pacific and Hughes sailed from Norfolk, Virginia on 18 December 1941, arriving San Diego, California in company with Yorktown, on 30 December. She departed San Diego on 12 January 1942 as an escort for ships bringing reinforcements to Samoa. Hughes then sailed from Samoa as part of a carrier striking force built around carrier Yorktown. She screened the carrier in strikes on Jaluit, Makin, Mili, and Canton Islands, then supported the combined Lexington–Yorktown Task Force 17 (TF17), as it attacked Japanese bases at Lae and Salamaua on 10 March 1942. Missing the Battle of the Coral Sea while escorting a tanker carrying fuel to Nouméa, Hughes reached Pearl Harbor in time to participate in the Battle of Midway.
Hughes, while protecting Yorktown during this action, shot down two torpedo planes and assisted in shooting down two others. After Yorktown was hit on 4 June, Hughes continued an all-night vigil to prevent her capture. When the carrier was torpedoed by a submarine on 6 June, Hughes helped damage the attacker with depth charges, and rescued the survivors when Yorktown sank the next day.
After a brief time as convoy escort, she joined American Forces at Guadalcanal, where she screened Hornet throughout the campaign. During the Battle of Santa Cruz. Hughes splashed one Japanese plane and assisted in downing two more. Despite her valiant efforts, Hornet was hit and sunk on 27 October 1942. Joining TF 16 on 10 November 1942, Hughes participated in the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal by screening Enterprise. Hughes continued screening operations until the end of February 1943.
Following a refit and brief convoy duty, Hughes was detached from the South Pacific and sailed to Pearl Harbor, departing on 18 April for the Aleutian Islands and arrived on the 24. Bombardments of Kiska from 6–22 July were high points of her months in northern waters. After Kiska was occupied, Hughes departed the Aleutians for overhaul on 25 August in San Francisco, California.
Following overhaul, Hughes sailed for Pearl Harbor on 26 October to prepare for the invasion of the Gilbert Islands. She sailed on 10 November as part of the screen for the escort carriers covering the invasion of Makin Atoll. When Liscome Bay was sunk on 24 November, Hughes rescued 152 of the survivors. She began screening the transport group on 27 November, and 2 days later departed for Pearl Harbor, and arrived there on 7 December 1943. On 13 January 1944, Hughes joined TF 53 for the invasion of the Marshall Islands. She joined in the preinvasion from 3–11 February 1944. The destroyer continued to support the escort carriers during the strikes against Palaus on 31 March.
Hughes took part in the invasion of Hollandia, New Guinea on 23 April, acting as a screen for the escort carrier group which provided air cover for the landings at Aitape and Tanahmerah Bay. Hughes remained off New Guinea as a convoy escort and fire-support ship of the 7th Fleet until 25 September, when she departed for the invasion of the Philippines. During this time, Hughes participated in the invasions of Biak, Noemfoor, Cape Sensapor, and Morotai, serving as flagship of Rear Admiral William M. Fechteler during the latter campaign.
During the invasion of Leyte, Hughes was the flagship of Rear Admiral Arthur Dewey Struble commanding the tiny task group detailed to capture the small islands of Dinigat and Homohon guarding the entrance to Leyte Gulf. Following the successful conclusion of this operation, Hughes screened Philippine bound convoys, making frequent trips to and from New Guinea until 6 December 1944, when she reembarked Admiral Struble and departed for the invasion of Ormoc Bay, Leyte. Following this operation, Hughes was serving as a picket destroyer off the southern tip of Leyte when she was hit by a G4M kamikaze on 10 December 1944. Her dead and wounded totalled twenty three.[3] Badly damaged with one engine room demolished and much of her other machinery destroyed, Hughes was towed to San Pedro Bay, Leyte, where, after temporary repairs, she departed for Humboldt Bay, New Guinea on 19 December en route to Pearl Harbor, where she arrived on 23 January 1945. Following more repairs, she sailed for San Francisco, arriving San Francisco Naval Shipyard on 2 February. Hughes remained there for the next 3 months undergoing extensive overhaul.
After a long testing period, Hughes was declared combat ready and departed for Adak Island in the Aleutians on 4 June 1945. Assigned to the Northern Pacific Force, she remained in the Aleutians until the end of the war, harassing enemy shipping and bombarding Japanese bases. Hughes then served as part of the patrol force off Northern Honshū until relieved on 20 October. She sailed for the United States 10 days later with Destroyer Squadron 2. She was decommissioned on 28 August 1946, and was used as a target ship in the Operation Crossroads atomic bomb test. Following the test she was towed to sea and sunk off Kwajalein on 16 October 1948, and struck from the Naval Vessel Register on 26 November 1948.
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@Citizenfitz1 Fryatt wasn't commanding a Q ship, in any case.
Germany had, by the way, announced the imminent commencement of unrestricted submarine warfare on 4 February, 1915, in the 'Deutscher Reichsanzeiger' as follows :-
(1) The waters around Great Britain and Ireland, including the whole of the English Channel, are hereby declared to be a War Zone. From February 18 onwards every enemy merchant vessel encountered in this zone will be destroyed, nor will it always be possible to avert the danger thereby threatened to the crew and passengers.
(2) Neutral vessels also will run a risk in the War Zone, because in view of the hazards of sea warfare and the British authorization of January 31 of the misuse of neutral flags, it may not always be possible to prevent attacks on enemy ships from harming neutral ships.
(3) Navigation to the north of Shetland, in the eastern parts of the North Sea and through a zone at least thirty nautical miles wide along the Dutch coast is not exposed to danger.
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