Comments by "doveton sturdee" (@dovetonsturdee7033) on "Armistice Day and the Battle of Casablanca" video.

  1. The circumstances at Alexandria were entirely different from those at Mers-el-Kebir. Alexandria was a main RN base, and the small French squadron was entirely surrounded by RN heavy ships. Mers-el-Kebir, was a major French base, containing four battleships, including the new, fast, Dunkerque & Strasbourg. Somerville knew what was at stake, delayed firing for as long as he could, but with the French fleet raising steam, and night approaching, without any agreement being reached, he really had no choice. The fact is that every pre-war assumption the British had made had vanished in the previous five weeks, and the risk that the French navy could end up under German command simply could not be countenanced. I agree that Admiral Darlan was a man who placed great importance on the honour of his navy, and would have opposed such a development, but he was, apparently, out of contact with his headquarters during the whole of the day. For all the British knew a new head of the navy, appointed by Laval, might have given completely different orders. What happened was appalling, and viewed as such by the Royal Navy, but in the circumstances of the time it is understandable.
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  2.  @FredericGaillot  Which facts do you believe I have got wrong? The small French squadron under Godfroy was certainly armed (I don't recall suggesting that it wasn't) but it was, in effect, trapped in a major British naval base, and surrounded by the bulk of Cunningham's Mediterranean Fleet. Godfroy was certainly an anglophile, who spoke English well. He was a widower, by the way, whose late wife had been a Scotswoman. He was not, by the way, Cunningham's brother-in-law, as you oddly claim. Cunningham's family came from Dublin, and his wife from Sussex. Neither was the French Fleet at Mers el Kebir disarmed, or even intending to disarm, by the way. Indeed, after the British opened fire, at 1755, the French, although at a hopeless disadvantage, replied, and Force H was briefly subjected to the sight of colourful shell spashes of red, blue yellow, and green from the dyes inserted in the noses of French shells in order to enable French gunnery officers to determine the fall of shot from each battleship. Gensoul had already ordered his ships to come to action stations, steam had been raised, awnings had been folded, and by the time the British opened fire five French destroyers, and the Strasbourg, were under way and approaching the harbour mouth. The fact is, by the way, that Darlan could not be contacted on the day of Catapult. More significant, however, was the fact that he had been appointed Minister of Marine on 27 June, by Petain, thus changing his role from that of the head of the French Navy to that of a senior minister in a collaborationist government. Churchill had already stated in Cabinet that 'In a matter so vital to the safety of the whole British Empire, we could not rely on the word of Admiral Darlan.' Harry Hinsley, in 'British Intelligence in the Second World War' states that 'Intelligence sources, including Sigint, proposed the disturbing possibility that the Germans were signalling instructions to the French Navy in Darlan's name.' I am not claiming this as fact; I am simply trying to make you understand what information was available to the British Government at the time. Of course Somerville stuck to his orders and, after delaying for as long as he could, obeyed the instructions of his political masters. Cunningham would, however reluctantly, have done the same had it become necessary. The rest of your post is emotional rather than rational. The fact is that France was no longer an ally of Great Britain, and a British Government suddenly facing a situation totally changed made hard and unpleasant decisions because it believed them to be necessary for the maintenance of the defence of the United Kingdom. Of course Somerville protested about his orders. I doubt you would have found an officer in the Royal Navy who didn't detest the idea of firing on French warships, but the fact is that it is politicians, not the military, who make the final judgement. Franklin Roosevelt, by the way, had the United States' Navy making similar plans for a strike against the Royal Navy had the British ever been reduced to a similar situation. You might try to get hold of an old book called 'The Deadly Stroke' by Warren Tute, who was Private Secretary to Churchill in June 1940, and interviewed a large number of British & French naval officers when composing his account.
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