Comments by "doveton sturdee" (@dovetonsturdee7033) on "Timeline - World History Documentaries"
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'Control the Skies, control the grounds and the seas.' Not in 1940. The Luftwaffe controlled the skies over Dunkirk, apart from a few brief periods when RAF Squadron Patrols appeared, and totally failed to prevent the evacuation. In 1940, the Luftwaffe had had no training in anti-shipping operations, and were, consequently, poor at them, not even acquiring a high performance torpedo bomber until early-mid 1942.
The Royal Navy in September 1940 had around 70 light cruisers and destroyers within close range of the Channel, backed up by around 500 smaller warships, and over 100 destroyers in total in Home Waters. In the whole of the war, the Luftwaffe managed to sink just 31 RN destroyers.
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@mikedimarco3008 I think you mean the Anglo-French Purchasing Board, which became the British Purchasing Commission after the fall of France? The one which purchased military equipment from the US at market rates. By December 1940 British cash orders for aircraft had exceeded $1,200,000,000 with deliveries of 300-350 per month and were expected to reach 500 per month by "early in 1941." The aircraft were supplied unarmed.
The Neutrality Acts actually restricted US equipment being sold to Britain, by the way. What, out of interest, did you think they did?
British survival was never in doubt after, firstly, the failure to attempt Sealion, even though it was likely to have been a German disaster, and secondly, Operation Barbarossa.
The US, in point of fact, was reluctantly dragged into the war after Pearl Harbor and the German declaration of war. Please don't try to imply that there was anything altruistic about it.
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@pacificostudios You are assuming that the RAF has gone, which is not an assumption which has any credibility, and one which I do not accept. The title, in point of fact, refers to defeat, not annihilation. The Battle of Britain was not a battle of annihilation, akin to Stalingrad, and the worst that might have happened to Fighter Command was likely to have been the withdrawal of 11 Group to bases north of the Thames, out of range of German fighters, in order to rest, re-equip, and reform, taking advantage of the high fighter construction figures which British industry had been generating since June, 1940.
What do you think strafing and mines might have done? The Germans had precisely seven minelayers, mainly converted merchant ships, supported perhaps by a similar number of destroyers. The British, with immediate access to a huge fishing fleet, had around 400 or so fleet and auxiliary minesweepers operational in September. Moreover, the RN patrolled the Channel from Plymouth and the Nore on a nightly basis. What was likely to happen when a destroyer flotilla encountered a German minelaying operation?
Destroyers had splinter protection, not armour as such. However, they were fast and highly manoeuvrable. Perhaps you might explain how it was that, in the whole of the war, the Luftwaffe managed to sink just 31 of these, as you call them, 'tin cans? '
You might also wish to address another problem. The actual German plan for Sealion, which I have read, anticipated some 11 days & nights to get the first wave of nine divisions ashore. What happens at night, when the Luftwaffe could not supply even notional support, but when the RN could operate against the barges largely unhindered?
The Sealion planners had managed to assemble plenty of barges, some 1,900 in fact, but such was their shortage of tugs for these barges, which were to be towed into and across the Channel in pairs, that the planners could, using every available tug, trawler, and coaster, only include 844 barges in the first wave. There were, literally, no reserves of towing vessels. What happens when these numbers are seriously reduced when RN destroyers, cruisers, and supporting smaller warships arrive from the Nore, Portsmouth, and Plymouth?
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@pacificostudios A defeat is something like Kasserine, where a defeated force is able to regroup and, subsequently, successfully respond. It should be obvious. The worst Fighter Command might have suffered was much more akin to that than to Stalingrad, which is, I assume, why the video refers simply to 'lost'.
British ground forces in September were not 'weak.' The British had 34.5 divisions by then, 20 of which were deployed on anti-invasion duties. Indeed, in August the British felt so secure that they were able to send a large troop convoy to North Africa, which led to the defeat of the Italian army in Operation Compass. Perhaps you might look up the efforts made by British industry to re-equip their army during the course of the summer.
Not that it really mattered, of course, because however you may wish to either deny, or ignore, it, the Royal Navy held the Channel secure beyond challenge.
"What was the state of British land defence in September 1940?" Already done and included in one of my books about 'Sealion.' I suggest that I know rather more about the subject than you think you do.
'We can also presume the Germans would have landed the same airborne troops they used against the Netherlands.' You might, probably because you don't know that, precisely because of fallschirmlager losses in Norway & the Netherlands, only some 4,500 such troops were still available in September. What was called 7th Parachute Division by the Germans at the time was, actually, only the strength of a weak brigade. Moreover, there were only 220 or so transport aircraft still in operation at the same time.
You think that such numbers could 'seize airfields and even smaller ports on Day 1?' Absurd! A small force of lightly armed soldiers, with no hope of relief by more heavily equipped ground troops? As one of the actual German Generals of the time remarked, when the plan for Sealion as a whole was expounded to him, 'It would be like feeding my men into a meat grinder.'
As my old Professor, M. R. D. Foot, was wont to say, the one thing more tedious than someone who doesn't know his subject is someone who doesn't know that he doesn't know his subject. You appear to fall into the latter category. At least, you consistently ignore every fact or statistic with which I present you.
Thus, I will no longer respond to any of your nonsense. Go away and do some reading. You may be fortunate enough to pick up one of my books or articles on Sealion, Dynamo, or, even WW2 naval matters in general.
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How would the Luftwaffe have 'eliminated' the RAF? The worst case scenario would be that Fighter Command temporarily withdrew out of range of German fighters. The British were already outbuilding the Germans in terms of fighter production, and the Luftwaffe in 1940 (and, in fact, never) was nothing more than a tactical air force.
Do you really think a 1941 invasion was even a remote possibility? Historically, by May, 1941, Fighter Command had 56 squadrons of fighters and fighter bombers carrying out regular sweeps over Northern France. As to where convoys would unload in the UK, actually where they historically did, in Liverpool and in Scotland, well out of the range of German fighter cover. Incidentally, what American bases and what American fighter cover, before mid 1942? The British at the time were not helpless victims, dependant on the United States for their very survival.
As to U-Boats, in May 1941, there were precisely 33 operational front line boats, of which 24 were at sea on any one day, which was an increase on September 1940 ( 27 & 13, by the way), but hardly a force capable of challenging the Royal Navy in Home Waters. Moreover, historically, U-Boats tried to avoid destroyers or frigates, for obvious reasons.
Certainly, by January, 1941, the Luftwaffe was better trained in anti-shipping techniques than it had been in 1940, when it had failed comprehensively at Dunkirk, leading to comments by senior commanders, most notably Oskar Dinort & Wolfram von Richtofen, that it was not capable of protecting convoys of invasion barges from the Royal Navy. As to U-Boats, to send them into the Channel is most unwise. The three which were sent in late 1939 are still there, with the result that no more were sent until 1944, and only then in desperation and with minimal effect.
As to the coastal guns, by the end of August, 1940, the Germans had over 150 batteries of medium, heavy, and super heavy guns in place, and the first firings, at coastal convoys, took place on 12 August. These convoys were coded CE & CW, and consisted of small coasters & colliers. In the whole of the war, there were 531 such convoys, all proceeding up and down the Channel at slow speed. The total number of ships was 9097. Would you care to guess how many were sunk? Thirty one. Would you care to guess how many of these thirty one were sunk by coastal gunfire? NONE.
In the whole of the war, your wonderful coastal batteries which would beat the Royal Navy back, actually managed to hit, but not sink, a grand total of 7 small merchantmen. Would you care to estimate how many destroyers and light cruisers were likely to succumb to these weapons?
In September, 1940, by the way, the RN had around 70 light cruisers and destroyers within five hours steaming of Dover, and a further 50 or so such vessels within 24 hours. In addition, there were over 500 smaller warships in the immediate vicinity.
I appreciate that Sealion 'would haves' always pontificate about what the mighty Luftwaffe 'would have' done, but are less able to demonstrate occasions when it actually 'did' it, but perhaps you should spend a little time looking at what, had slow moving trains of barges towed by tugs and trawlers, actually approached the Channel, the RN 'would have' done to them.
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@vanmust Force Z's two capital ships were sunk by torpedo aircraft flown by crews trained in anti-shipping operations. I point of fact, both ships were each hit by one bomb as well, but suffered minimal damage for the hits.
By contrast, the Luftwaffe had not been trained in anti-shipping operations, and didn't even have an operational torpedo bomber until mid 1942. The Luftwaffe had just failed badly at Dunkirk, of course.
Moreover, in the whole of the war, the Luftwaffe sank 31 RN destroyers, and no RN warship larger than a light cruiser.
Sealion enthusiasts always make terrifying claims about what the mighty Luftwaffe 'would have' done to the Royal Navy, but are never able to explain why, in the actual events of WW2, they never actually managed to do it.
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@MasterWooten German supplies for their forces in an occupied Britain did not need to come from any distance. Only from occupied France, or indeed from Britain herself. Unlike Britain, Germany had no large overseas empire, and did not need imported goods on anything like the same scale as Britain did.
Thank you for making my argument for me. The campaigns in North Africa and were fought & won by the allies precisely because there was a secure base in the UK. Supply and military convoys were sailed regularly to the Middle East round the Cape, and most of the troops who fought this campaign were British & Commonwealth/Empire.
Moreover, where did the troops which landed in North Africa come from? One convoy from the US, and two from the UK, with overwhelmingly Brirtish naval escorts. In your fantasy, none of the British part of this is available.
In addition, the naval control of the Mediterranean, which made Husky even possible, was almost entirely British.
Finally, how is any of this even vaguely relevant to the liberation of occupied Britain by forces based in Newfoundland or even Greenland?
I can understand why you have dropped that nonsensical idea.
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