Comments by "doveton sturdee" (@dovetonsturdee7033) on "Possible History"
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The first challenge would have been the German inability to land meaningful forces in the first place. When your enemy has around 70 destroyers and light cruisers based within 5 hours steaming of Dover, as evidenced by the RN Pink List of 16 September, 1940, and can call up around 500 or so smaller warships, such as sloops, corvettes, fleet & auxiliary minesweepers, gunboats, torpedo boats & armed trawlers in support, then trying to land troops from converted river & canal barges, towed by tugs and trawlers at little more than walking pace, and almost unescorted, is really not a good idea.
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The skill of the German leadership in the early months of the war was demonstrated by their army commanders. The navy was a different matter. It had been badly mauled during the Norwegian campaign, and by September 1940 was reduced to one operational heavy cruiser, three light cruisers, seven operational destroyers, a similar number of Wolf/Mowe class torpedo boats, around 27 operational U-boats and 13 S boats.
Moreover, the German navy had no assault craft, and was hoping that troops could be conveyed across the Channel in converted barges towed by tugs. All the British had to stop these were 70 destroyers & light cruisers based within five hours steaming of Dover, supported by around 500 smaller warships!
Do you seriously think that the Germans could plan and execute in two months something it took the Royal & US Navies almost two years to organise? Really?
As to Evans, Tsouras, & Macksey, if you think that they represent serious historians, you need to think again.
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@blick5815 'Thats good, now talk about the German aircraft and their demonstrated effectiveness. Most of the British losses in the Norwegian campaign had been to aircraft and that was in open seas.' Actually, they weren't. The RN's losses off Norway were mainly to surface action, being HMS Glorious, HMS Ardent, & HMS Acasta to Scharnhorst & Gneisenau, HMS Glowworm sunk by Hipper, HMS Hunter & HMS Hardy, both sunk by surface action at Narvik. In addition, HMS Effingham was wrecked on rocks. RN losses to air attack were one AA cruiser (HMS Curlew), one destroyer (HMS Afridi), and one sloop (HMS Bittern). Two French & Polish destroyers were also lost to air attack.
The facts of the comparatively small number of RN destroyer losses to German air attack might annoy you, but, nevertheless, they are facts. Please feel free to check them.
'In the confined area of the English Channel AirPower would have have provided a decisive advantage. That is considering that the British themselves refused to send warships into the channel for that very reason.'
You mean, presumably, apart from the regular RN destroyer patrols from Plymouth and the Nore, often accompanied by a light cruiser or two, which sailed the Channel in both directions throughout the period of the invasion threat, I assume. Often actually pausing to shell invasion ports when there were targets of opportunity. Certainly, the RN never intended to use their heavy ships, on the grounds that 3 inch, 4 inch, 4.7 inch, and 6 inch guns were far more effective than 8 inch, 15 inch, or 16 inch guns against barges. Each destroyer, by the way, carried around 600 such shells.
'In the confined area of the English Channel AirPower would have have provided a decisive advantage.' Really? Then what happened, or rather didn't, at Dunkirk. The allied ships were stopped, or moving at slow speed in restricted waters with decks and below decks crowded with troops. Exactly how was that less advantageous than many of those same ships, moving at speed with full freedom to manoeuvre, when they sortied to engage the barge trains? Look up Oskar Dinort, one of the commanders of one of the Ju87 units involved, and read what he said about the difficulty of hitting destroyers at sea. Off Calais on 25 May, when his unit of 40 aircraft failed to achieve a single hit on a Destroyer flotilla. Or Wolfram von Richtofen, commander of Fliegerkorps VIII ( the Ju87 force) who told any of his superiors who would listen that protecting the invasion was beyond the capabilities of his force/
Five hours steaming is hardly a long way when the German Navy required a minimum of two days to extracate the barges from their harbours, form them up into cumbersome box formations, and then send them, largely unescorted, into the Channel. You should read a proper historian, Peter Shenk, 'Operation Sealion - Te Invasion of England 1940' for details of the German preparation and planning, from the German viewpoint, before commenting from ignorance.
'They just did not want to and operationally were tired having achieved more in 8 months than any other army in history.' Again, read what Schenk wrote, and learn about exactly how much effort the Germans put in to their planning and preparation.
'Significant indication that a negotiated settlement could have ended the fighting, this is long before the days of Illregular warfare.' Don't be a fool. Haven't you heard of the Guerillas of the Peninsular War, the Boers during the Second Boer War, or the Spanish Civil War? Incidentally, by September, 1940, there were 34.5 operational divisions in Britain.
'You’re dismissal of Evans, Tsouras & MacKsey appears to put you into that catagory.' I dismiss them because I have read them. It seems that you have read little else and, unlike you, I have a vast amount of archive material and actual, accurate, historical facts at my disposal.
I really would like to spend further time educating you myself, but instead I would be happy to recommend a few books to you which might be of assistance in dismantling your fantasy.
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@palious13 The best that the Luftwaffe might have managed was forcing Fighter Command to temporarily withdraw to bases north of London. The British had been outbuilding the Germans in aircraft, and especially in fighters, since June 1940. In the event of an invasion attempt, Fighter Command would have returned.
Moreover, it wouldn't really have mattered. The Luftwaffe at Dunkirk failed badly. Four of forty-one British destroyers were sunk by air attack, and all but three of the damaged ships had returned to duty within three weeks.
As to concentrating on civilian ships and transports, of 45 personnel ships, nine were sunk, of 40 schuits, one was sunk, of 21 cargo & hospital ships, four were sunk. Your reference to over 200 allied ships sunk is simply wrong. The actual total was 235, of which 72 were lost to enemy action. Of these, 18 were small vessels, such as tugs and barges, whilst 135 were 'little ships' simply abandoned at the end of the evacuation.
The German coastal batteries actulally totalled over 150 medium, heavy, and super heavy guns by the end of August. These fired at British coastal convoys for the rest of the war. No British or Allied freighters were sunk, no allied freighters were damaged, and seven British freighters (totalling 8,000 tons) were damaged. On 29 September, the old Monitor HMS Erebus shelled Calais. She was capable of only around 8 knots. The guns at Gris Nez fired on her, but missed.
On 11/12 October, the battleships Revenge, supported by seven destroyers and six gunboats shelled Cherbourg, firing some 500x 4.7 inch and 120 x 15 inch shells. The Cherbourg batteries fired at the force, but again hit nothing.
If you think that those same guns were likely to hit destroyers and cruisers steaming at 30+ knots, think again.
THe few U-boats were not held back. In fact in September 1940 the Germans had only 27 operational boats, of which only 13 were at sea on any one day. You should read the actual statistics before claiming that anything was 'held back.'
Which 'fast torpedo boats?' There were 13 operational in September, 1940.
What Kriegsmarine? In September, 1940, the German navy consisted, in terms ofd operational warships, one heavy cruiser, three light cruisers, seven destroyers, seven Wolf/Mowe escort destroyers, and around a dozen minesweepers. Good luck trying to close the Channel with those when, excluding the heavies of the Home Fleet at Rosyth, the RN had 70 or so destroyers and light cruisers within five hours steaming of Dover, and around 500 or so auxiliary warships available in immediate support.
'Sea mines' Which Sea mines?
By the way, in the whole of WW2, the Luftwaffe sank 31 RN destroyers, and no RN warship larger than a light cruiser.
'Everything you have' in German terms was virtually nothing, whatever you might do in your 'game.'
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@palious13 As I tried to explain to you, the worst that would have happened to Fighter Command would have been the temporary withdrawal of 11 Group to bases north of the Thames. In an emergency such as an attempted invasion, they would, together with 12 Group, return.
Similarly, it was not vital anyway, where any invasion was concerned, as the Luftwaffe's ability to hit ships at sea was low, as Luftwaffe commanders such as Wolfram von Richtofen and Oskar Dinort both stated, at the time. Moreover, the Luftwaffe could not operate in support of any attempted invasion at night, whilst the Royal Navy could certainly operate against it.
'And my statement of over 200 sunk was not wrong. You yourself said 235, which is more than 200.' Good to see that the efforts of your maths. teacher were not wasted. Don''t you understand the information I gave you earlier, about the actual losses? that 135 of the losses were abandoned 'little ships' such as Thames barges, motor launches, etc? Vessels of no relevance at all to anu future defence of Britain? I am sorry to confuse you with mere facts, but the RN Pink List of 16 September, 1940, effectively the RN's order of battle, shows, of destroyers alone, 64 in anti-invasion ports, 8 on escort duties, 21 in escort ports, and 23 with the Home Fleet. That does not include, of course, a further 8 light cruisers in anti-invasion ports, the more than 500 smaller vessels in the area, and nor does it include the battleship, battlecruisers, and heavy cruiser of the Home Fleet, which were largely based in Rosyth, as the Admiralty did not believe their intervention would be necessary.
'I dont think those guns are likely to hit cruisers or destroyers, but shells will be landing amongst the ships causing disruption.' Oh dear! Those guns couldn't hit small coasters and colliers moving through the Channel at 8 to 10 knots in straight lines, but could 'distrupt' destroyers and cruisers moving at 30+ knots on zig-zig courses. Nonsense.
'Actually, in September, 1940, there were over 80 E-boats in operation. And with these ships had already proved their use at Dunkirk sinking 2 destroyers.' Absolute nonsense. Up to 1 September, 1940, the Kriegsmarine had commissioned 37 S boats. 1 was an experimental prototype, and 4 had been sold to Spain before the war.
By mid September, a futher 5 had been rebuilt as fast anti-submarine boats, 1 scrapped due to extensive storm damage, and 1 decommissioned due to her poor mechanical condition.
3 had been sunk in action, and a further 2 (S28 & S55) were still working up and not yet allocated to flotillas. 1 had been damaged by a mine on 28 August and was under repair, and 3 were repairing from collision damage. A further 3 had received bomb damage in Ostend on 8 September.
As your Maths. teacher taught you well, calculate the number for yourself, and then compare it with Kriegsmarine records from the period, which identify the following boats as operational in late September :-
S11, S12, S13, S18, S19, S20, S22, S 25, S27, S30, S31, S34, & S54.
You are, of course, perfectly free to prove me wrong. Or to try to do so.
'And when I said I threw everything I had, that means U-Boats also.' Which U-Boats? Presumably the 27 Frontboote which were all that were available in September, 1940, of which on average 13 were at sea on any one day? You seem utterly unaware of how dangerous the Channel is for U-Boats. In October, 1939, three Type IIs, U12, U16, & U40, were sent to operate there. All three were sunk within days. Moreover, U-boats throughout WW2 generally sought to avoid contact with destroyers. Now you suggest that they should actively seek them out? Good luck with that. Such boats were not called 'Iron Coffins' by their own crews without reason.
'The planes of the Luftwaffe, with the exception of the FW-200 Condor and the HE-111, were not good anti-ship planes. German bombs simply weren't designed for antiship warfare.' The Condor was useful on occasion against unarmed merchantmen, but attacks ceased as such ships received defensive armament. There were very few FW200s, and they were simply too valuabe as maritime reconnaissance aircraft. The problem with the other two engined German medium bombers was not the aircraft themselves, but the lack of training, at least until the end of 1940, of their crews in anti shipping techniques. Moreover, the lack of a torpedo bomber, until mid 1942, might have been something of a disadvantage, don't you think?
Oh, and why sahould there be a need for a specidic anti-shipping bomb in any case? You are simply inventing excuses for failure.
'Hitler didn't understand naval matters. If he did, he would have been using his light forces and aircraft to whittle away at the British fleet during the phony war and he would have had a completely different naval building plan. I have gone to great lengths to educate you in the reasons why that was not possible.
If I were you, I would stick to your games, and leave accurate analysis to academics & historians.
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The Luftwaffe tried, and failed, to destroy Fighter Command.
What German naval forces?
How would the Germans get significant ground forces to the Middle East.
Far from rebelling, 2.5 million Indians joined the Allied forces, without conscription. The Indians knew all about Japanese behaviour in China, and especially about the rape of Nanking.
'England' (I assume you mean 'Great Britain'? and France did not go to war to protect Poland. The agreement was simply that, if Germany invaded Poland, they would declare war on Germany. Which, of course, they did.
No-one 'gave' Poland to the Soviet Union. The Red Army simply occupied it as the Germans were driven out. After years of praising Genial Joe and his gallant lads, do you really think that British & Canadian politicians could have convinced their populations that a new war against the Soviets was justified?
I see that you exclude the United States from your criticism. Do you think that either FDR or Harry Truman thought a war against the Soviet Union over Poland was a good idea, either?
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The Royal Navy's heavy ships (battleships, battlecruisers, and heavy cruisers) were mainly based at Rosyth, rather than Scapa Flow. From there, they could intercept any German heavy ships seeking to support Sealion, whilst still being able to move against a potential sortie into the Atlantic.
In mid September, 1940, the Royal Navy had some 70 destroyers and light cruisers within 5 hours steaming of the Straits of Dover, supported by some 500 other smaller warships.
In the battle of Crete, the task of the RN was to prevent axis reinforcements landing by sea. The Germans sent two convoys. The first, for Maleme, was largely annihilated, whilst the second, for Heraklion, turned back to Greece to avoid the same fate.
'They (the RN) were run out of the channel twice in 1940 by air attacks.' Really? When? The Luftwaffe failed to prevent the RN undertaking Dynamo successfully, and RN destroyers patrolled the Channel almost daily during the period of the invasion threat, from the Nore & Portsmouth.
'Any counterattack would be a week at the eariest and with few tanks and weak aged artillery.' In fact, the army had been re-equipped to such an extent that, by September, 1940, there were 34.5 active divisions in Britain. So confident was the British Government that a large troop convoy, including three armoured brigades with full supporting artillery, had been sent to North Africa in mid August, 1940.
I fear that your 'would haves' dissolve into irrelevance in the face of actual, historical, facts.
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@brucewilson77 Nonsense. The Royal Navy's Pink List (in effect, the order of battle) for 16 September, 1940, shows some 70 destroyers and light cruisers within five hours of Dover. As an example, there were 24 destroyers and two light cruisers at the Nore, and 16 destroyers with one light cruiser Portsmouth, as well as 16 destroyers and two light cruisers in Plymouth.
'Germans would have had almost two full days to do whatever they wanted.' No, they would not.
'The British will run out of the channel on two separate occasions during this period and that was before they would have gotten the full attention of the Luftwaffe.' I asked you earlier for details of this, without response.
In fact, you have simply blindly repeated your first post, without even attempting to try to justify it.
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'Just a scenario to think about.' But not a credible one. The Luftwaffe of 1940 was untrained in anti-shipping operations, hence the failure at Dunkirk. By September, 1940, the RN had around 70 light cruisers and destroyers stationed within 5 hours steaming of Dover, with around 500 or so smaller warships in support, without involving the heavier ships of the Home Fleet based at Scapa & Rosyth, or even the 40 or so other destroyers in Home Waters. In fact, in the whole of the war, the Luftwaffe managed to sink 31 RN destroyers, and no RN warship larger than a light cruiser. Yet you seriously believe that they could 'obliterate' the Royal Navy in a few days? I suggest you read up on precisely how large the RN of 1940 really was.
The RN prevented any Axis reinforcements reaching Crete by sea, annihilating one convoy which tried, and the losses off Malaya were caused by torpedo bombers, which the Luftwaffe lacked until mid 1942, or strong naval forces which, again, the Germans totally lacked.
At Dunkirk, the '240 ships' is, frankly, nonsensical. The losses involved, overwhelmingly, small boats simply abandoned at the end of the operation. In fact, of 235 vessels recorded as lost, 169 were small ships, of which 151 were abandoned, rather than lost due to enemy action.
In terms of losses to larger vessel, the total figures, including French and Belgian vessels, were as follows. The first figure is ships involved, and the bracketed one ships lost:-
Cruisers 1 (0)
Destroyers & Torpedo Boats 56 (9)
Sloops. patrol Vessels, & Gunboats 15 (1)
Corvettes 11 (0)
Minesweepers, Trawlers, & Drifters 268 (28)
Special Service Vessels, Boarding Vessels, & MTBs 15 (0)
Schuits & Yachts 67 (2)
Personnel Vessels, Hospital Ships, & cargo Ships 66 (13)
So, unless you hide behind meaningless totals, the hugely successful operation was executed without serious hindrance by the Luftwaffe. For reference, in September, 1940, the Royal Navy had 182 destroyers on strength, compared to the number of 193 on 3 September, 1939.
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You have already received a more than adequate reply, but please consider one simple fact. In early September, 1940, the Luftwaffe's order of battle listed around 220 operational transport aircraft. Do you seriously believe that large land forces could be maintained by such a small number of aircraft?
You can, by the way, forget the idea of a 700,000 strong 'motorised' army. The actual forces planned for the First Wave consisted of elements of nine divisions, all infantry or mountain, without their mechanised transport oand much of their divisional artillery. In reality, what might be called 'the first wave of the First Wave' consisted of around 6,700 men from each division.
Assuming, of course, that this first wave, in their towed barges, managed to evade the 70 or so cruisers and destroyers, supported by around 500 smaller warships, which comprised the forces the Admiralty had allocated to their anti-invasion forces, that is.
'4 tank armies includes 2000 tanks.' As a great British military strategist, George Mainwaring, often said, 'I think we are entering the realms of fantasy here.'
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@websystema 'I still think, that Sea Lion in 1941 was more realistic for nazis.' Then you haven't read the sources. To give one simple example. By May, 1941, the RAF had 56 fighter & fighter bomber squadrons based in SE England, carrying out regular sweeps over northern France. In fact, the British had been outproducing the Germans in aircraft, and particularly in fighter aircraft, since June 1940.
As to warship production, the British, supported by Canada, had vastly greater resources where shipyards were concerned, and by late 1940 and early 1941 these were churning out destroyers, corvettes, and sloops in large numbers. Certainly, the Germans had access to Belgian, Dutch, and French yards, but how many warships did these actually build? None. Czechoslovakia was useless, for the obvious reason that it was landlocked, which is something of a problem where shipyards are concerned.
It really doesn't matter how huge the German army might have been, as it was never remotely able to cross an English Channel totally dominated by the Royal Navy.
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A 'redoubled' U-boat effort? When, on any one day in September, 1940, the Germans had only 13 boats at sea?
'Sinking Royal Navy ships in the Channel?' Like the Luftwaffe did, or actually didn't, at Dunkirk?
By September, 1940, the RN was already concentrated in the Mediterranean and Home Waters in any case. There were already over 100 destroyers in Home Wates alone, of which over 60 were based within 5 hours steaming of Dover, supported by several light cruisers, and around 500 auxiliary warships.
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@mystikmind2005 'Effective against the Navy?' Like at Dunkirk, when it totally failed to prevent the evacuation, despite the ships being either stopped, or moving slowly in restricted waters whilst hampered by the number of troops aboard?
Or, not even having a torpedo bomber until mid 1942. Out of interest, in the whole of the war, the Luftwaffe managed to sink 31 RN destroyers, and no RN warship larger than a light cruiser.
Churchill's 'fight them on the beaches' was simply a device to raise British morale and to 'stiffen the sinews' after the collapse of France. As Ed Murrow said of Churchill, "He mobilized the English language and sent it into battle."
Churchill's real assessment of the situation can be more accurately demonstrated by the Apology convoy, which took reinforcements to North Africa, and enabled General O'Connor to carry out Operation Compass, the total defeat of Italian forces in Libya. The convoy included half of the total number of operational Matilda II tanks, the best British tank at the time,, in the British arsenal.
When did it sail? 22 August, 1940, less that three weeks after the Churchill speech, when the outcome of the Battle of Britain, according to conventional wisdom, was on a knife-edge, and a potential invasion imminent.
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@confederatenationalist7283 It actually took three small cruisers to corner Graf Spee, although certainly the Allies did deploy a number of Hunting Groups to search for her. Largely, of course, because they had the resources to do precisely that.
Both Scharnhorst & Gneisenau were on such good form that they fled from a twenty years old battlecruiser. Certainly, they were fortunate enough to encounter HMS Glorious, but, as both were damaged by torpedo hits, one from one of Glorious' escorts and one from a RN submarine, and were not back at sea until November, they were irrelevant where Sealion was concerned in any case. By the way, you haven't mentioned the fact that, during the Norwegian campaign, the Kriegsmarine lost 50% of the total destroyer force available to it. Slip your mind, did it?
The U-boat fleet consisted of 27 operational boats, of which 13 were, on average, at sea on any one day in September, 1940. Moreover, you are perhaps unaware that throughout the war U-boats were eager to avoid contact with destroyers, corvettes, or sloops, yet here you suggest that they should actively seek them out?
S Boats? There were precisely 13 operational at the time of Sealion. Again, they were invariably used to attack freighters or transport ships. Here, you suggest that they should deliberately seek out destroyers and cruisers?
HMS Exeter, by the way, was not sunk by air attack. Moreover, the Germans totally lacked the anti-shipping skills which the Japanese possessed. The Kriegsmarine, in fact, didn't have an operational torpedo bomber until mid 1942, and their failure during Dunkirk rather demonstrated how ill-equipped they really were to attack shipping.
'If the Germans could supply it's forces in Greece and North Africa and Norway they obviously could have supplied their Channel beach head operations.' Perhaps you might buy a map in order to wotk out where Greece is, and why supply from the sea might be unnecessary. The axis, in fact mainly the Italians, always struggled to maintain the comparatively small forces that the operated in North Africa, in the face of constant attacks by the Royal Navy & the RAF/Fleet AIr Arm.
Again, look at a map of Europe, and work out why it is easier to transport men & materials to Norway, as opposed to carrying out an assault landing on an island defended by the largest navy on earth.
I could recommend a book or two to you, as your knowledge seems not to be so much incomplete, more totally lacking, but I doubt you would read them. Feel free to ask, however.
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@confederatenationalist7283 'So mistook the Exeter for Prince of Wales and Repulse.So not exactly a ringing endorsement for large naval assets v air attack.' 'If you mean not a ringing endorsement for large naval assets against well trained torpedo bomber crews,' then you might perhaps consider that, at the time of the Sealion threat, the Luftwaffe had neither well trained torpedo bomber crews, nor even a torpedo bomber, until mid 1942. In fact, in the whole of WW2, the Luftwaffe sank 31 RN destroyers, and no RN warship at all larger than a light cruiser.
'We couldn't have resisted a 'combined' attack by everything that they had.' How then, would you explain the 'Apology' convoy? On 22 August 1940, the British sent a large troop convoy to North Africa to reinforce the Western Desert force, and bring about the shattering Italian defeat that was Operation Compass. The convoy included three armoured regiments, and it carried half of the total number of Matilda II tanks, the best British tank of the time, in existence.
Everything they had? One heavy cruiser, three light cruisers, seven destroyers, seven smaller escort destroyers, 27 operational submarines, 13 operational S boats, and around a dozen minesweepers. Oh, and a powerful but tactical air force, unable to operate at night with any hope of accuracy, and untrained in anti-shipping operations.
Oh, and several hundred barges towed by tugs into the Channel at barely above walking pace, and largely unprotected. All the British had to stop this formidable armada was 70 destroyers and light cruisers within five hours of Dover, supported by some five hundred smaller warships, and a further forty or so destroyers also in Home Waters. That, by the way, does not include the heavies of the Home Fleet, as the Admiralty did not believe that they would be needed.
As I suggested earlier. Buy a book.
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@confederatenationalist7283 What no book tells me is that a warship called HMS Wakefield ever existed. What do you mean 'The Germans obviously couldn't sink British naval assets that weren't there.' Presumably you mean apart from the AA cruiser, 41 destroyers, 6 sloops, 7 patrol vessels, 13 corvettes & gunboats, 38 minesweepers, and 230 armed trawlers, as well as numerous other vessels, which did take part in Sealion?
Kanalkampf was an attempt to draw out Fighter Command over the Channel. Fighter Command refused. The Royal Navy took the obvious and sensible action of sending the Channel convoys (the CW & CE series) through at night. As a result of 33 convoys and 550 ships of these convoys in 1940, 13 were lost in convoy. In fact, between 1940 & 1945, there were 531 such convoys, involving 9097 ships. There were 24 sunk in convoy, and 7 out of convoy. Aren't mere facts a nuisance?
Graf Spee was otherwise occupied on the bottom of Montevideo harbour, and as I think I noted earlier, Gneisenau & Scharnhorst were under repair in Kiel until November. The best the Germans could muster in terms of heavy ships was a single heavy cruiser, Hipper. That was why the Admiralty did not feel the Home Fleet was needed. Had it been, however, at the time it consisted of a battlecruiser, an aircraft carrier, two heavy cruisers & two light cruisers at Scapa Flow, with a battlecruiser, two battleships, & three light cruisers at Rosyth. How long do you suggest Hipper would have lasted?
Your screen of 8 U-boats and 13 S boats, even with seven destroyers and a similar number of smaller escort destroyers, would need to cope with 70 RN destroyers and light cruisers, and several hundred smaller warships. How do you suggest that that might have worked out, and why do you think that the RAF would even be drawn into a large scale air battle over the Channel in the first place? Oh, and good luck trying to screen anything with U-boats!
You seem to be some sort of odd fantasist, unable to understand the actual facts of 1940 in pursuit of your Germany Triumphant delusion.
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@confederatenationalist7283 You are increasingly coming across as a strange simpleton. The only HMS Wakefield ever to appear in the Royal Navy's order of battle was a 26 gun ship built in Portsmouth and renamed HMS Richmond in 1660. She was sold in August, 1698. To put you out of your misery, you are thinking of HMS Wakeful, a V & W Class destroyer sunk off Dunkirk, actually by an S Boat, S30.
'The Luftwaffe and Kreigsmarine obviously couldn't sink any heavier naval assets that we never committed to Dunkirk operation.' But the Luftwaffe in particular didn't manage to sink any RN warship larger than a light cruiser in the whole of WW2, and the Luftwaffe had plenty of opportunities in the Mediterranean.
Why would any larger naval assets be committed to Dynamo? Try to think, however painful it might be. Exactly how useful would a 35,000 ton battleship, or come to that a 10,000 ton heavy cruiser, have been in attempting to lift men from open beaches, or even the Mole? Put simply, such ships at Dunkirk would have been an embarrassment, and the Royal Navy managed to lift 338,000 men without them anyway.
'While your delusional ideas actually degrade the level of resistance shown by everyone involved in the knowledge that they were probably going to lose this fight but fight we will.' 'Delusional?' Then prove any one of my facts to be incorrect. After of course, you have managed to get the name of HMS Wakeful correct, instead of insulting her memory by misnaming her.
You are out of your depth, and would be well advised to give up now.
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@confederatenationalist7283 Tigris I was an 80 feet long motor launch. If you think that the Royal Navy intended to attack any invasion convoy with unarmed 80' launches displacing 50 tons, then you are even dafter than I feared you were. By the way, Tigris I, commanded by Harry Hastings, was not sunk, but was disabled by a near miss and a collision, and was abandoned. Even more remarkably, a group of French sailors patched up her damage sufficiently to enable her to be towed back to Ramsgate by a tug. After the war, she became a houseboat, before being broken up in 1985. During her trips to and from Dunkirk, she brought about 900 men to Britain. If I were you, which thankfully I am not, I think I would try again.
If typing Wakefield instead of Wakeful was a simple 'typo' why did you do it twice. It was actually a result of ignorance, even if you lack the integrity to admit it.
What do you think Kanalkampf proved? I have given you the statistics for the CW/CE convoys. They speak for themselves.
'How does the sinking of the listed ships and exactly what sank them and the example of the RAF rightly viewing the Kanalkampf as a problem, supposedly fit your narrative of an ineffective combined invasion force had it been tried.'
Quite easily. The RAF simply chose not to drawn into an unnecessary battle over the Channel, resulting in the Luftwaffe deeming Kanalkampf a failure, and the Royal Navy simply rescheduled the convoys to minimise the exposure to risk of the small coasters and colliers which comprised them.
Perhaps you are unaware of actual losses at Dunkirk, given the success of the naval operation. To help you understand, the following are the numbers of British vessels involved. The bracketed number is those lost :-
Cruisers. 1 (0)
Destroyers. 41 (6)
Sloops, & Patrol Vessels. 13 (0)
Corvettes & Gunboats. 13 (1)
Minesweepers. 38 (6)
Trawlers & Drifters. 230 (23)
Special Service Vessels, Boarding Vessels, & MTBs. 21 (1)
Schuits & Yachts. 76 (7)
Oh, and the civilian vessels :-
Personnel Ships 45 (9)
Hospital Ships 8 (1)
Cargo Ships & Tugs. 53 (10
'Little Ships' 303 (12, but a further 150 simply abandoned at the end of the operation).
Thus, I can give you the names of the cruiser, and the 35 destroyers, which were not sunk by your magnificent Luftwaffe. Unlike you, I can even spell their names correctly.
I can also give you the names of every British destroyer & light cruiser deployed on anti-invasion duties in September, 1940, and their bases.
I would also be happy list the names of German warships involved, which wouldn't take anywhere near as long.
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@confederatenationalist7283 You don't seem able to answer any of the facts I have presented to you. I will try again, though I am not sure why I am bothering. I observe that you haven't challenged me about the launch Tigris I. Very sensible of you!
The fact is that at Dunkirk, 41 RN destroyers were, together with other warships and merchant vessels, more or less stationary offshore, and were seriously disadvantaged by numbers of troops aboard hindering their operations. During the course of a week, the Luftwaffe managed to sink four destroyers, a U-boat one, and an S boat one. The same german forces failed to sink the other 35 destroyers, which together evacuated around a third of the total number of troops lifted.
Now try to explain how Sealion might have unfolded. Several hundred towed barges, moving at little above walking pace, and with an escort of seven destroyers, a similar number of escort destroyers, and a handful of minesweepers, would find themselves attacked by :-
From Harwich, 6 destroyers & 11 MTBs.
Portsmouth, 1 light cruiser, 16 destroyers, 5 escort destroyers & 6 MTBs.
The Nore, 2 light cruisers & 18 destroyers.
Plymouth, 3 light cruisers & 11 destroyers.
The Humber, 3 light cruisers, 5 destroyers, and 11 MTBs.
All of which were free to operate at speeds of 25-30+ knots, of course.
I have not bothered to list the smaller warships available in immediate support, by the way, as it would take too long.
'You seem to think the whole thing was impossible to deliver fiction.' Well spotted. Iam certain that Sealion had no chance of success. In that I have the support of Wolfram von Richtofen, commander of Fliegerkorps VIII, Oskar Dinort, commander of StukaGeschwader 2, and of course Admiral Erich Raeder, the head of the Kreigsmarine.
Dinort's account of an attack by some 40 Ju87s, led by him personally, on a RN destroyer force operating off Calais on 25 May, which ended in complete failure, and his subsequent assessment that attacks on warships would need a much greater level of training and expertise than his pilots currently possessed, makes interesting reading, by the way.
'As opposed to a deranged high command v the likes of Rommel, Guderian and Galland.Luckily for us.' Who in the British High Command was actually 'deranged?' Certainly, Rommel & Guderian were competent commander, though neither would have commanded the Invasion Operation, but the whole point was that German forces needed to get ashore in large numbers first, and that id precisely where the idea simply falls apart.
Galland is in a different category. A fine fighter pilot and a devoted nazi, but hardly senior command material. Basically someone good in a punch up, but not fit to command large forces and make strategic decisions.
'I was told by those who were there in the day that finishing us off after Dunkirk was Germany's to lose rather than ours to win.' You keep chanting this mindless mantra. Who told you that, and how would they know? Did you speak to any naval officers from the time? I did as part of my degree, and their opinion was hugely different. One, indeed, quote the words of John Jervis, Earl St Vincent, as expressed to the House of Lords at the time of the Napoleonic invasion threat, to me :-
'I do not say they cannot come, my Lords. I only say, they cannot come by sea.'
Finally, Churchill's speeches were intended to unify and motivate the British people, and as an attempt to generate greater support for Britain in the United States. As Ed Murrow wrote of Churchill, 'He mobilised the English language and sent it into battle.' Didn't you even know that?
Finally, why do you keep referring to the British as 'us' when you openly display your contempt for them?
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@confederatenationalist7283 Consistency isn't your strong suit, is it? :-
'I actually stated that deliberately understating that threat is what I call contempt.' Yet you said earlier 'Surely the speech ( Churchill's ) would have been more confidence inspiring if it had said our military intelligence is certain that Germany doesn't have the capabilities to invade us and won't have for the foreseeable future.' Isn't that potentially understating the danger? Make your mind, or what passes for it, up.
'Are you seriously suggesting that Goering was a better head of the Luftwaffe than Galland would have been.' When did I suggest, or even imply that? Neither were remotely capable of, or fit for, high command.
'It's equally clear that the German level of success in stopping the Dunkirk operation was directly proportional to the level of its high command's commitment to doing so.' Clear to whom? Obviously, you are unaware of Goering's remark to Hitler on 23 May, 1940, about the elimination of the surrounded Allied forces in what became the Dunkirk pocket? 'This is a special job for the Luftwaffe.'
'At that point it no longer saw the BEF or even England as being a threat to its wider aims.For Germany Dunkirk was a sideshow.' Based upon what source? Actually, the Germans simply viewed the Dunkirk pocket in a different light, as troops trapped with their backs to the sea, which their High Command, traditional European soldiers, saw as an impassible barrier. The British, however, with long experience of the flexibility of sea power, saw the sea as a wide open escape route, and were proven right. You cannot seriously suggest that the opportunity to capture the entire BEF, and probably force Britain to discuss peace terms, was a 'sideshow' can you?
'The Kanalkampf was a far more representative guide to how the German defence of an invasion force would have gone for us.' How do you think Kanalkampf actually went? Put simply, the Germans sought to draw Fighter Command into battle over the Channel, and failed. Or to give you more details which you will either simply not grasp, or merely ignore, :
'In the British official history, The Defence of the United Kingdom, (1957) Basil Collier called the German operations a failure, sinking only 30,000 GRT of shipping from the near 1,000,000 tons of weekly coastal shipping in the Channel. In 34 days, Fighter Command flew more than 18,000 day sorties, an average of 530 per day. Collier speculated that the daily sortie rate of the Luftwaffe was lower and that many flights were not connected with the Channel operations.
The Luftwaffe still managed to outnumber the British fighters, which suffered 148 losses, almost half of these in three days in the second week in August. Collier put Luftwaffe losses at 286, most in operations over the Channel. The German loss of single- or twin-engined fighters was 105 and on the three days of high British losses in August, the Luftwaffe lost 100 aircraft. Collier wrote that German losses were nearly double the Fighter Command loss, for very few ships sunk. The British derived other unquantifiable benefits in lessons learned and German strategy did not benefit "in any discoverable way" '
Does that make it clearer?
Moreover, how does air fighting over the Channel, involving a small number of British coastal convoys, have the slightest relevance to any theoretical Operation Sealion?
' 'If' Germany had implemented Sealion with the required commitment.' You could have put anyone you liked in charge, and it wouldn't make up for the lack of escort ships, landing craft, tank landing ships, etc., which would have been needed to get past the massive resources available to the Admiralty at the time.
'If anything Churchill certainly wasn't showboating to gain American support he was just way overestimating his German adversary.' Make your mind up. Was he understating it, or overstating it? You seem to change your mind from minute to minute.
I am not sure precisely what is wrong with you, but there have now been almost 20 posts on this subject, almost entirely from either you or I. In view of that, I will not reply again unless someone else posts something worthy of comment, because your posts are becoming increasingly strange.
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@confederatenationalist7283 I will reply one more time, although I really do not know why. I will try to make it simple, although probably not simple enough for you to grasp.
'By YOUR logic Churchill obviously had no need to alarm the public with his speech regarding invasion.' I'm not sure how many times I need to say this before it sinks in. Churchill never believed an invasion was possible. Why else would he have sent a major troop convoy to North Africa in August?
He did, however, seek to unify the British people behind the struggle ahead, and he wanted the support of the industrial & (potentially) military giant that was the United States. He could simply have said that 'The Germans can never invade. We have the largest navy on earth, and the German navy is tiny' but that would hardly have achieved either objective, would it?
'The relevance of the Kanalkampf was that the RAF chose/had to disengage, from the type of disadvantageous operations, which it would have had to engage in if Sealion went ahead. Didn't you even read Collier's account of Kanalkampf? Are you really ignorant enough to believe that bomber strikes on small convoys and attempts to defend large numbers of towed barges have any similarity at all?
'Germany didn't commit anything like its available resources to the defeat of Britain.' You mean apart from the whole of their navy and almost all of their Air Force? What else was there, given that the army was stuck on the wrong side of the Channel?
'So you've never heard anyone who was actually there say thank God they chose to forget about invading us and chose to invade Russia instead.'
Actually, I have never heard anyone even link the events of July-September, 1940, with the events of June, 1941. Largely because they were unrelated.
The British were outproducing the Germans in aircraft, and in particular in fighter aircraft, from June 1940 onwards. By May, 1941, there were 56 squadrons of RAF fighter and fighter-bomber squadrons carrying out regular sweeps over Northern France. Even if you believe that air power was the only reason that Sealion wasn't attempted, and I don't, by the way, then perhaps you might explain how, if an invasion was deemed, correctly, to be impossible in September, 1940, it could suddenly have become more possible later than that?
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'he really would have just preferred England to sign a treaty.' Certainly true that hitler's ambitions were primarily in the East, but the level of preparations for Sealion in the latter half of 1940 demonstrates that preparations were serious. Requisitioning 2000+ barges and converting them, as well as almost 200 freighters, 400+ tugs, and 1100+ motor boats, then moving them to Channel ports, represented rather more than something simply 'on paper.' As, of course, was the loss of over 1,500 German aircraft, and most of their crews.
It seems that hitler came belatedly to realise what Boney had learned during the Napoleonic wars, and what he expressed as 'Can an Elephant fight a whale?' Yes, hitler would have preferred a treaty, but only because he had realised that he had no military means of imposing his will.
By the way, when Sealion was being planned, there was no 'real war in the east.' Genial Uncle Joe and hitler were enjoying a non-aggression pact, with the Soviets supplying Germany with raw materials.
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@websystema British, Australian, & Indian losses during the whole of the Malayan campaign, which ended with the fall of Singapore (note the correct spelling, little chap) were 138,000 killed, wounded, and captured. The US defeat in the Phillipines resulted in 146,000 killed, wounded, or captured. These figures are from your adored Wikipedia, apparently your source of choice.
You state that this was a disaster for the British, which it undoubtedly was, yet you are silent about the campaign in the Phillipines. I wonder why that might be?
The reality is that Japan had been planning both campaigns for some time. The British had been fighting more or less alone, for some 22 months, until Operation Barbarossa began. Inevitably, almost all British resources had been concentrated in the war against Germany & Italy. What excuse would you give for US unpreparedness?
After the attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States Navy was extremely fortunate that the Royal Navy continued to carry the burden of the war in the west. I will, of course, leave you to explain Ernie King's response, or rather lack of it, to Operation Paukenschlag, which resulted in the loss of around 600 or more allied merchantmen off the US east coast.
As a result of the Royal Navy's efforts, the US Navy was able to concentrate almost entirely in the Pacific.If you doubt that, simply look at the US Atlantic Fleet's Order of Battle for late 1941, and work out where the vast majority of these ships were, or were heading, by the early months of 1942. You will, I fear, need a better, more academic, source than Wikipedia in order to do this.
Not that it really matters, because however desperately you seem determined to change the subject, this video is about Operation Sealion.
This will be my last response to you, as I prefer corresponding with people who have rather more than a tenuous grasp on the events of WW2.
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Blocked which Canal? If you mean the Channel, the Germans did indeed send three U-Boats into the Channel in late 1939. They are still there, as all were sunk within days. By the way, in September 1940, there were only 27 operational U-Boats.
You can allocate as many troops as you like to an invasion, but when you have no navy worth talking about, your enemy has the protection of the largest navy in the world, and you seek to transport your troops in converted barges towed by tugs, without divisional artillery, mechanised transport, or armoured support, then it would be wise to think again.
As, of course, the Germans, rather belatedly, did.
'H!tlet wanted the germans to live in small villages there as farmers.' But only after exterminating or enslaving the 'sub-humans' who already lived there. Unsurprisingly, those 'sub-humans' were not impressed by the idea.
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Getting 90,000 troops across the Channel would have required the construction of a hell of a lot of Montgolfier balloons, because there was no other way of doing it.
Good luck with trying to mine the Channel with six auxiliary minelayers, at a time when the Royal Navy were carrying out regular nightly destroyer patrols through the Channel from Plymouth & the Nore, and had around four hundred fleet and auxiliary minesweepers in service.
Entire U-boat fleet? Do you mean every one of the 27 operational boats in service, of which on average 13 were at sea on any one day in September. If you discount the large Type IXs, sent out into the Atlantic to monitor weather conditions in support of Sealion, that leaves around eight. By the way, the Kriegsmarine had already sent three Type IIs into the Channel in October, 1939. All three were immediately sunk.
You have already had an answer, so I will not repeat much of it. I could recommend a book or two on the subject, as it seems that your knowledge is somewhat lacking, if it would help?
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@sebping7205 I hadn't realised that you were a neo. Had you mentioned it, I would have ignored you.
By the way, you haven't discussed my original comment, which was :-
'If 'International Law' is the topic under discussion, then some might argue that invading Czechoslovakia, Poland, Denmark, Norway, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, & Belgium, all without declarations of war, was hardly in accordance with it?
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@websystema Air superiority did become superior, but not as early as 1940, and to a far lesser extent in the west than in the wider expanses of the Pacific. Air superiority did not, for example, prevent the successful evacuation of 323,000 men out of Dunkirk in June, 1940, did it?
I don't recall ever suggesting than Germany needed carriers, but the lack of surface escorts for their towed Sealion barges certainly ensured that Sealion, in the face of British naval supremacy, was never a realistic option. You do appear to have rather simplistic views.
Thank you for educating me about the English Channel, however!
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@websystema Many members of the German army staff planning Sealion thought of the Channel in your terms, until the Naval staff managed to get them to understand that crossing it was far more than an 'extended river crossing.' How many rivers, for example, have massive tidal changes and strong currents, or are subject to the kind of heavy weather common in the Channel?
Battleships could, and did on occasion, operate in the Channel. You might read about Operation Medium in October, for a start. Not that the Admiralty had any intention of sending battleships or heavy cruisers against Sealion. Where towed barges were concerned, quick-firing 3 inch, 4 inch, 4.7 inch and 6 inch guns were likely to have been far more effective than 8 inch, 15 inch, or 16 inch ordnance.
By September, 1940, the Germans had over 150 medium, heavy, and super-heavy guns lining the Channel coast. They fired regularly at targets of opportunity.' In the whole of WW2, these batteries hit only seven merchant ships, but sank none.
By the way, when the Allies planned Overlord, what they primarily choose to use to silence those German batteries? Why, battleships of course.
Own up. Either you are a wind-up merchant, simply remarkably ignorant of historical, or a kiddie excited by having played a game or two on your lap top. Time to come clean.
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@websystema Indeed, I know about Wikipedia. I also know about a wide range of credible, academic, sources. Something which could never be claimed of wikipedia. What you appear to be claiming is akin to saying that the War on the Russian front, and the Italian campaign, were the same thing simply because they were on the same Continent.
Still, at least you have given up on your inanely absurd comments about Sealion, and wandered off into equally ignorant comments about events further away.
IIf you feel able to prove that my original comment, that 'British and Commonwealth land forces were very busy in Burma, but the Pacific was the domain of the US Navy. The Royal Navy was at that time fighting, and winning, campaigns in the Arctic, the Atlantic, & the Mediterranean,' was in any way inaccurate, then please try. Otherwise, I am done with you.
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@websystema 'in the next 1941 y, Germans had more than 6K aircrafts operational.' Have you ever thought of actually looking at Luftwaffe archives, ot do you simply make things up? Just for information, the following represents Luftwaffe Operational Strength in late August, 1940, with the figure in brackets that of late June, 1941 :-
Single engined fighters : 787 (898)
Twin engined fighters : 219 (105)
Fighter bombers : 119 (124)
Dive bombers : 294 (260)
Twin engined bombers : 960 (931)
Transport aircraft : 226 (212)
There are other types, but not relevant to the point at issue.
The RAF had 520 operational fighters in July, 1940, By May, 1941, the RAF had 53 fighter and fighter-bomber squadrons based in SE England alone, carrying out regular sweeps over NE France.
In terms of overall aircraft production, the figures are as follows, with 1940 first and 1941 in brackets :
Britain : 15,049 (20,094)
Germany : 10,826 (11,776)
In fact, Britain had been outproducing Germany in aircraft steadily since June 1940.
Good luck using the Luftwaffe, which in reality during the whole of WW2 sank 31 RN destroyers, and no RN warship larger than a light cruiser, in your attempts to clear the Channel of the Royal Navy, by the way.
Sorry to quote actual statistics from actual archives to you. I wouldn't want to disturb your charming fantasies for a moment.
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'But what if the Germans did plan for it already in 1936? With more focus on naval bombers, minelayers, and landing crafts.' In 1936 the Germans did not know that they would have access to Dutch, Belgian, and French ports. For all they knew, they would face a repeat of the WW1 grinder that was the Western Front.
In such circumstances, their naval resources would be trapped in the North Sea. What good would minelayers and landing craft be then?
Even after June 1940, they still had no landing craft, only a ramshackle collection of barges towed by tugs or trawlers, with almost no operational surface ships to provide any escort.
As for mines. The Germans had seven converted minelayers. The Royal Navy had, in addition to the fleet minesweepers of the Hunt & Halcyon clases, Grimsby class sloops, and most of the A-I class destroyers, also fitted for sweeping. This does not, of course, mention the large number of auxiliary minesweepers, converted from trawlers, drifters, and paddle steamers. Moreover, any German minelaying attempts would be made at night. Throughout September, the RN operated nightly destroyer patrols. Consider what is like to have happened when one of these patrols met any German minelayer.
Forget aerial mines, by the way. They could only be laid in shallow water, and the Royal Navy had already found a method of neutralising any aircraft-dropped magnetic mines.
What did happen, by the way, when the Luftwaffe did attack? A repeat of the German failure that was the attempt to prevent Operation Dynamo, almost certainly. Aside from the fact that the Luftwaffe could not operate at night, when the RN certainly could, the fact is that, in the whole of WW2, the Luftwaffe managed to sink 31 RN destroyers, and no RN warship at all larger than a light cruiser. To put that into perspective, in September, the RN had 70 destroyers and light cruisers, supported by some 400 or so smaller warships, within five hours steaming of Dover.
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@niklaso1113 So, you seriously suggest that the Germans concentrate entirely on an invasion of Britain, to the exclusion of, for example, France? Have you the faintest idea exactly how large the Royal Navy was at the time? Or, rather, how small the Kriegsmarine was?
'Could the luftwaffe hinder the RN to attack the german minelaying ships during daytime? I think so.' You think s? Oh good! Based upon what? Moreover, you clearly do not know precisely how many minesweepers the RN had available in 1940, and you haven't allowed for the obvious problem that daytime minelaying causes, which is that your enemy knows where your minefields are. Take, for example, the large defensive fields the Germans eventually managed to lay in the approaches to Normandy. In advance of Overlord, the Royal & Royal Canadian Navies were able to sweep them almost entirely in advance of the approaching assault ships.
'If stronger naval forces where on the way they could warn the minelaying ships to get away.' Brilliant! The minelayers available to the Germans, all seven of them, were capable of around 15 knots at best. A typical RN destroyer could manage at least 34, and a light cruiser 32. How would the minelayers escape from an enemy force capable of twice their speed?
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@BatMan-oe2gh 'Operation Barbossa started in June 1941.Finland and Romania both joined the Invasion in June 1941. Yugoslavia was Invaded by Germany in April 1941 so German troops could cross Yugoslavia into Russia.' Poland was invaded in September, 1939, more than 18 months earlier, so your comment is meaningless. Whether those states would have become involved had Poland not been invaded is improbable, to say the least. As it was, most only did under duress, or after a coup. Finland simply latched their wagon onto Germany after the Winter War, and came to regret it. As, of course did Italy.
Czechoslovakia did not exist after March, 1939. Guess what the Germans did with the Czech. armaments industry? They used many of the weapons it produced to invade Poland, and then Western Europe.
Moreover, the invasion of Poland was part of a deal with the Soviet Union to divide the territory. Had Germany simply marched into the eastern European states you mention, don't you think that, just possibly, Uncle Joe might have been, ever so slightly, alarmed?
'Germany didn't Invade Russia till June 1941, not before.' Very good, well spotted. Only then, of course, because Germany was able to concentrate the bulk of her army & air force on the borders of Soviet territory.
Where might that have been? Good heavens, in the part of Poland they had invaded in September, 1939, of course!
If you really are 'just wondering' then perhaps you should wonder about something that was vaguely credible?
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