Comments by "doveton sturdee" (@dovetonsturdee7033) on "Military History Visualized"
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@MoneyIsSilver 'The Royal Navy was already getting picked apart by the Luftwaffe, though, even before Dunkirke.' Really? In the whole of WW2, the Luftwaffe sank 31 RN destroyers, and no RN warship larger than a light cruiser. Indeed, the Luftwaffe only managed to put a torpedo bomber into to service in mid 1942. By September 1940, the RN had been 'picked apart' in your words, to the extent that, entering the war with 193 destroyers, there were 'only' some 182 destroyers listed as operational or refitting in the RN Pink List for 16 September.
The Luftwaffe, untrained in anti-shipping techniques, had failed spectacularly at Dunkirk, managing to sink only four of the 41 destroyers which were the backbone of the evacuation fleet, whilst the RN, ordered to evacuate 40,000 specialist troops, brought out 323,000 men.
Actually, whilst the Luftwaffe did have air superiority over the Channel, largely because Fighter Command pilots were ordered to stay over the mainland to maximise their chances of survival, Germany never had the remotest hope of transporting an invasion force across it, given their almost total lack of escort vessels and assault ships.
By the way, whilst U-Boats did achieve a degree of success in the wider Atlantic, this was because RN escorts had been temporarily withdrawn to form the Admiralty's massive anti-invasion forces, and had precisely nothing to do with the Luftwaffe. U-Boats did not operate either in, or through, the Channel, because it was something of a death trap. Three boats were sent to operate there in late 1939. They, and their crews, are still there.
'Churchill - thought the Brits were fucked.' You think so? How was it then that, in August 1940, he was confident enough to send a large troop convoy to North Africa? Look up Operation Apology for further information.
In short, stop believing in myths and buy a proper book on the subject.
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No. The real reason was that the Royal Navy had, and retained, total control of Home Waters, and in particular of the Channel. The Germans did convert around 2,000 barges into rudimentary troop transports. These were to be towed, in pairs and at little more than walking pace, across the Channel by tugs and trawlers.
At the time, the German navy had six operational destroyers and a similar number of large torpedo boats to escort them, with around thirteen operational S Boats. All that the Royal Navy had within five hours steaming of the Channel was around seventy light cruisers and destroyers, supported by some five hundred smaller warships.
'I hear the argument a lot that they didn't have enough landing ships to effectively transport troops.' If that is the only argument you hear against Sealion, then you obviously haven't been listening hard enough!
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@MoneyIsSilver Nonsense. That didn't happen at Dunkirk, it didn't happen in the latter half of 1940, it didn't happen to the East Coast convoys, and it didn''t even happen in the Battle of Crete in May, 1941 where, despite total air supremacy, the axis were unable to land ground troops on the island, and one troop convoy, heading for Maleme, was annihilated.
Air power became crucial later in the war, but not as early as 1940.
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Operation Mercury? That was the one where the Royal Navy prevented any axis reinforcements reaching Crete by sea until the ships were diverted to evacuation duties, wasn't it? The one where one convoy was annihilated, and the second returned to Crete.
Dunkirk? 'Ran them off?' Do you mean when the Royal Navy was ordered to evacuate 40,000 technical specialists, and actually lifted 338,000 troops? When, of 40 RN destroyers involved, four only were lost to air attack? Where, in fact, 235 vessels were lost, of which 142 were small boats simply abandoned at the end of the operation, and 27 were vessels smaller than tugs? Where, of 373 allied warships ranging from MTBs to a cruiser, 39 were lost, 7 of which were to collision or grounding? Simply quoting inaccurate figures out of context merely discredits any argument you may think you have.
As usual for a Sealion fan, you then indulge in all the 'would haves' about the mighty Luftwaffe. In 1940, the Luftwaffe had not been trained in anti-shipping operations, hence the failure (contrary to your view, of course) at Dunkirk. Moreover, the Luftwaffe lacked an operational torpedo bomber until mid 1942. Indeed, in the whole of the war, the Luftwaffe sank 31 RN destroyers, and no RN warship larger than a light cruiser.
Even their own commanders, Wolfram von Richthoven & Oskar Dinort, believed that protecting an invasion force was beyond their capabilities. To put your absurd nonsense about sinking 'half the Home Fleet' into perspective, the RN in September, 1940, had around 70 destroyers and light cruisers in bases within five hours' steaming of Dover, backed up by around five hundred smaller warships. There were a further 40 or so destroyers also in Home Waters. I haven't, of course, mentioned the Home Fleet, as most of it was at Rosyth, guarding against a potential sortie by (actually, non-existent) German heavy ships.
The Admiralty, of course, had concluded that faster, smaller, vessels with quick firing weapons were better equipped to deal with the Rhine barges towed by tugs which passed for the German invasion fleet, and which the Kriegsmarine estimated would require eleven days, and nights, to land the first nine divisions. Nights, by the way, are when the RN could operate, and when your mighty Luftwaffe couldn't. So, your 'after the Luftwaffe sank half of the home fleet the rest WOULD HAVE withdrawn' is wide of the mark as well.
Ju52? You mean the 220 or so which was all the Luftwaffe had operational in late August, 1940, after they had not replaced their heavy losses in the Low Countries? You must account for further losses during the paratroop dropping stage of the invasion, although possibly not that many as the Germans only had just under 4000 paratroopers available at the time. Supplying the 800 tons per division that was the minimum a German infantry division required when in action would be a further challenge, of course, but not much of one as it presupposes that any of these formations managed to land in the first place, although I assume you will say that they 'would have.'
Resupply by ships during the day? Which ships? The Germans had a small number of coasters which were to be used to tow barges, but few proper supply ships, and where would these supplies be landed from these non-existent ships in any case?
'The Luftwaffe even this early in the war was very effective against ships , especially this close to their bases.' Actually, close to their bases or not, quite the opposite is the case. How else do you explain their failure during 'Dynamo?'
Instead of indulging your wish fulfilment fantasies about what the Luftwaffe 'would have' done, perhaps you might read up about what the Luftwaffe actually did, or more precisely, didn't/couldn't do, in 1940? Then, instead of talking about 'sinking half the Home Fleet' you might read up on precisely how large the Royal Navy in Home Waters was at the time.
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Which 'boats' might they have been? The British had taken almost all the available boats. As one single example, when it became clear that Antwerp was about to fall, the destroyer HMS Brilliant removed 26 merchant ships, 50 tugs, and 600 barges from the port.
Immediately after Dunkirk, the Germans were no more equipped to attempt an invasion than the British army was to oppose one. Moreover, the war in France did not end on 4 June. The rest of France was still unconquered, and the British were still evacuating troops from western ports (over 192,000 of them) until 25 June. The very reason von Rundstedt stopped the tanks on the Aa canal was to have them serviced and repaired to be ready for the second stage of the campaign.
In short, there were no ships or boats available. Why do you think the eventual German plan involved, almost entirely, converted river barges towed by tugs?
Finally, of course, whilst the post-Dunkirk British army was, briefly, in disarray, the Royal Navy was certainly not. Any invading force needed to find a credible way past it, and the Germans never came remotely close to determining one.
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Then explain the fact that, by September, 1940, the Germans had assembled 200 transports, 2100 converted barges, 400 tugs, and over 1100 motor boats in French, Dutch, & Belgian ports. Add to that the nine infantry divisions assembled to form the first wave, supported by a weak parachute division, the eight divisions assembled for the second wave, and the six divisions alloted to the third wave.
Then explain the numbers of planning meetings held during the summer, involving Hitler, Keitel, Jodl, Halder, & Raeder.
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@sebclot9478 Actually, I probably am as good, or at least as knowledgeable, as I think I am. Happily, my publishers and readers do rather seem to agree.
1) My reference to Compass and Beda Fomm was simply to educate you concerning what actually happened to the (largely infantry, and badly equipped) Italian army in Libya.
2). The US never assumed convoy escort duties from the British, least of all from 1942. In January, 1942, the US Navy proposed a Mid Ocean Escort Force of 14 Groups. These were to consist of 15 US destroyers, 27 RN/RCN destroyers, and 101 RN/RCN Flower Class corvettes. Initially, there were 5 US Groups, made up of US destroyers and RN/RCN corvettes, 5 British, and 4 Canadian groups.By winter 1942-3, the US had withdrawn from the Allied Mid-Ocean Escort Groups almost entirely. Two US Groups, A1 & A2, were disbanded when their destroyers were re-assigned, and A4 & A5 had their US destroyers replaced by RN ones, at which point they became British Groups B6 & B7. The one remaining US Group, A3, actually consisted of two US coastguard cutters, with RN/RCN Flowers. When the cutters were reassigned, A3 became the Canadian Group C5. Thus, by early 1943, there were 12 Mid Ocean Escort Groups, B1-B7 and C1-C5. US vessels operating in the Atlantic by then were working between the US and the Mediterranean, not in the North Atlantic.
3). I did ask you to provide details of convoys which sailed to Britain from the Far East via the Suez Canal and the Mediterranean. Where are those details?
4). Have you actually read Mein Kampf? The Soviet Union was, first and last, Hitler's main target. You might perhaps read the reasons for this in 'The Last Days of Adolf Hitler' by Trevor-Roper.
5). Perhaps you might explain how, having marched through Spain, captured Gibraltar, and then withdrawn, what presumably would an isolated German garrison do to maintain itself? Eat the Barbary Apes, perhaps?
6). That is your opinion of Bismarck. The flaws I have described earlier still existed. Bismarck's only advantage over the RN's Nelsons and KGVs was her speed. In a situation where she was obliged to engage, she was outclassed.
7). Do you not remember posting 'The fact that I mentioned ONLY the Bismark by name doesn't mean that it would have been the only German ship to participate in such an operation. I can't believe I actually have to explain that to you.' I merely responded by telling you exactly what naval resources were available to the Germans at the time, as clearly you didn't know for yourself. I chose September, 1940 as even you could look it up without much problem, as the resources available to both sides are well documented. You can choose any month in WW2 to suit yourself, as things hardly got better for the Kriegsmarine, after the punishment it received during the Norwegian campaign. Are you even aware how totally outmatched the German surface fleet was, throughout the war?
8). & 9).Of course the British weren't responding to German provocation, as there was no such major U-Boat construction programme. My contention is that, had there been such a programme, the British would have responded, just as they had to the Kaiser's actual fleet expansion before WW1. By the way, if you think there was a 'scaling back' explain these figures :-
U-Boat Construction by Month :-
1939, Sept. 1, Oct. 0, Nov. 2, Dec 3.
1940, Jan. 1, Feb, 1, March, 2, April, 3, May, 3, June, 3, July, 3, Aug, 5, Sept, 7, Oct, 8, Nov, 9, Dec. 9.
1941, Jan. 11, Feb. 9, March, 11, April, 14, May, 19, June, 15, July, 19, Aug, 19, Sept. 15, Oct. 24, Nov. 24, Dec. 22.
1942, Jan. 15, Feb. 16, Mar, 18, April, 17, May, 20, June, 21, July, 21, Aug. 21, Sept. 19, Oct, 23, Nov. 24, Dec. 23.
1943, Jan, 22, Feb, 21, Mar, 27, April, 18, May, 26, June 25, July, 26, Aug. 21, Sept, 21, Oct. 27. Nov. 25, Dec. 31.
1944, Jan. 20, Feb. 19, Mar. 23, April, 23, May 19, June, 11, July 15, Aug. 15, Sept. 20, Oct. 16, Nov. 22, Dec, 27.
1945, Jan, 37, Feb, 21. Mar. 26.
Where exactly is your imaginary 'scaling back?'
10). Oh, so now Gibraltar is not to be attacked until AFTER North Africa, Suez, and Malta have been conquered? By the way, Suez is in North Africa.
There are many excellent academic studies on the subject of WW2, and in particular of the period leading up to Barbarossa. Have you ever thought of reading one or two, before you wander off into further silliness?
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@sebclot9478 Whether I am arrogant or not is irrelevant. The specialists (usually retired military men, in the most recent case a Rear-Admiral & a Major General) examine my submissions, ask questions if they have them, and only after that are the proofs passed on to the publisher. All I would say is that reviews by academics and military historians have been overwhelmingly position. Clearly, such people lack your enormous breadth of wisdom and understanding. Either that, or my views are credible, and yours are somewhat lacking.
You were the one who brought Suez convoys up, but now you choose to disregard them. Very wise, as there is nothing there to support you.
Of course Hitler's primary enemy was the Soviet Union. Clearly you haven't read Trevor-Roper's analysis of the reasons for the initial preventative attack on France. You should, as it explains how, despite Hitler's contempt for Kaiser Bill's two front war, he subsequently placed Germany into a worse situation from 1941 onwards.
Explain to me why, when Germany was seeking to defeat the largest maritime power on earth, :-
'It doesn’t matter if the German surface fleet was outclassed. Again, raw data with no understanding of what any of it means to the overall picture.'
By 'raw data,' I assume you mean 'facts and figures?' I can well understand from the nature of your argument, such as it is, your urgent need to disregard facts and figures. Explain to me what the raw data does actually mean, if you would be so kind.
'Maybe the British would have responded to U-boat building program. Maybe not. I guess we will never know for sure. And what exactly do you think a scaling back would look like?' No. You explain to me why, when the British had responded strenuously to the Kaiser's naval expansion before WW1, they would simply have ignored a similar U-boat expansion programme in the 1930s?
In short, nothing that you write has any grounding in the real military, and particularly the naval, situation of 1939-1940. As I said, you are wise to ignore facts, as they dismantle your musings even more effectively than I have.
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Small problem here. The Kriegsmarine had no suitable vessels anything like the Landing Ships & Landing Craft that the allies were subsequently to use for their many successful assault landings in Europe & the Pacific. Even to plan a crossing of the Channel, they were reduced to using converted Rhine barges towed by tugs, trawlers or coasters. Moreover, aside from having no suitable transports, the Kriegsmarine was also lacking in surface warships. By September, 1940, they had been reduced, in terms of operational warships, to one heavy cruiser, three light cruisers, seven destroyers, seven torpedo boats (similar in size to British escort destroyers), and about a dozen fleet minesweepers.
Furthermore, the main British naval bases at the time for the Home Fleet were at Rosyth & Scapa Flow, with a number of modern cruisers and destroyers in the Humber.
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If the British had 'no equipped army left' how did they manage to send a troop convoy (The 'Apology' Convoy) to North Africa to reinforce the Western Desert Force, in August?
In September, 1940, the Germans had, after their losses during the summer, 3500-4000 paratroops, at most.
'Without air cover, the Royal Navy would have not been able to conduct operations in the south.' Why not? The RN had successfully carried out the Dunkirk evacuation, when the Luftwaffe demonstrated how unprepared it was for operations against shipping, and especially against warships. In the whole of the war, the Luftwaffe sank 31 RN destroyers. In September, 1940, the RN had twice that number within five hours of the Straits, supported by light cruisers and around 500 smaller warships.
As with all Sealion enthusiasts, you place heavy reliance on 'would haves' rather than facts.
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Would you suggest that the Germans in June 1944 had anything like the naval resources available to them that the British had had in September, 1940? Moreover, are you aware of the overwhelming strength of the Allied navies in 1944, and the almost total irrelevance of the tiny German Navy in 1940?
The leadership of the British army in 1940 hardly matters, as the most they were likely to have needed to do would have been to organise the herding up from the beaches of any half-drowned German soldiers who managed to struggle ashore from their barges, give them a warm drink, and send them off to prison camps.
Halifax, by the way, had a brief period of significance in the early days of the Churchill premiership, but declined significantly after the successful Dynamo, Cycle, & Aerial evacuations. He was shunted off to the United States as British Ambassador in December, 1940, by the way.
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How exactly would that have been 'better way to go?' Historically, the axis struggled to maintain the forces they actually had in North Africa, firstly because of the RN & RAF, and secondly because of the lack of harbour facilities.
The Germans did increase U-Boat production, from an average of four per month between Sept 1939 and December, 1940, to an average of around 22 per month thereafter, leading to 37 in January, 1945. Attempts to prefabricate boats, as the US yards did with escort carriers and freighters, came to nothing. The Type XXIs, when the parts arrived at the construction yards, were found to have gaps between sections built at different locations, and the boats required to be more or less re-built from scratch.
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Very few historians would agree with you. Doenitz regarded the calculations of von Holtzendorff, Kaiser Bill's Chief of Naval Staff in 1917, that in order to starve Britain into submission, 600,000 tons of shipping per month needed to be sunk, as still appropriate. After December, 1941, of course, this figure needed to be increased significantly. Between September, 1939 and December, 1941, would you care to estimate how many times this figure was achieved? Actually, none. the average monthly figure for the period was 211718. In four of the months, the tonnage total was below 100,000 and only twice (June & October, 1940) did it exceed (just) 350,000 In point of fact, the Kriegsmarine never came anywhere near to success in WW2. Certainly, not as near as the Kaiser's navy did in 1917.
What is your source for your absurd claim that 'Britain at one point was down to less than a weeks worth of fuel' by the way?
The rest of your post is simply foolish or, at best, ill-informed, as you seem to be unaware of the absolute supremacy of the Royal Navy in Home Waters at the time.
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They were to be towed into the Channel by tugs or trawlers. The towing vessel would be attached to a powered barge, which would have a second, unpowered, barge behind it. These three vessel units were to be grouped in cumbersome box formations, and would proceed at five knots or so. When (if?) they reached their landing beaches, small motor launches would push the unpowered barges onto them.
Whilst this was happening, the Royal Navy had, by mid-late September, 1940, seventy destroyers and light cruisers within five hours of Dover, with around five hundred smaller warships following up in support.
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@sebclot9478 The Italians had possessions in Libya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia. Other than Libya, these were cut off entirely from re-supply, and eliminated completely by November, 1941, after the Battle of Gondar, with 230,000 Italian and colonial troops surrendering.
1). The main Italian forces in Libya were annihilated by Operation Compass, ending with the Battle of Beda Fomm on 6-7 February, 1941. That was, of course, why Hitler was obliged to send a small German force to shore up what was left of Italian Libya.
2). The US only even appeared in North Africa in November, 1942. Italian losses during the period to the end of the campaign were 2.1 million tons of merchant shipping, 83 warships, totalling 195,100 tons, and 83 submarines. Of the surface ship losses, 161,000 were sunk by British & Commonwealth forces, and 33,900 by US forces. Would you care to re-assess your opinion of the extent of the American role?
3). The Suez Canal was simply not used by the British to a significant extent in the early part of WW2. Merchant shipping went by the Cape route, which was longer but safer. The axis had significant aerial forces in the Mediterranean area, which made the passage of merchantmen dangerous. Simply read any academic study of the campaign. Better still, tell me the identity of a single British convoy which sailed to Britain through the Suez Canal during that period. Good luck with that!
4). Perhaps, but the fact is that they didn't, and certainly weren't willing to after June, 1941.
5). I have already explained the situation of Spain in 1939-1940. I suggest you read up on the immediate aftermath of the Civil War to educate yourself. Do you seriously think that Germany could invade Spain in order to capture Gibraltar, then simply pack up and go home? Seriously? I always find the entertaining opinions of those who think German resources were inexhaustible quite fascinating.
6). Good luck with using Bismarck in late 1940 or early 1941, as she wasn't even declared operational until May, 1941. In point of fact, Bismarck was very conservative in design. Three major obsolete features being her four main turrets, resulting in excessive length and therefore displacement, her more or less useless 5.9 inch low angle secondary armament, and most important of all her long outdated incremental armour, when other navies had moved to the superior US conceived all or nothing pattern. Still, you can't expect much more of what was essentially an improved Baden, I suppose.
7). You need to explain it to me. In September, 1940, the Germans had only one operational heavy cruiser, three light cruisers, and ten or so operational destroyers or large torpedo boats. Scharnhorst and Gneisenau had been damaged during the Norwegian campaign, and weren't even operational again until November, 1940. Please tell me which other ships, again?
8).& 9). I actually wrote, 'Build more U-Boats? I assume that, as these are being built, presumably in the pre-war period, you expect the British to sit back, say 'I wonder why the Germans are building U-Boats?' and not expand their own escort production programme?' I know exactly the nature of the German U-Boat programme between 1939 & 1945. As you would have grasped had you actually read the above, I was referring to earlier reference to a 'scaling back' of the U-Boat war, which didn't actually happen by the way. The point you seem unable to grasp here is that U-Boat construction could only be aimed at one target, and the British, dependent on imports for survival, would act accordingly.
10). Sorry, I had rather lost interest by that stage, so fantastical was your post. Please look up the full extent of the shore batteries which existed on Gibraltar at that time, and then read up on Force H and DF13, both based on Gibraltar. In September, 1940, these consisted of one battleship, one battlecruiser, one carrier, and fifteen destroyers. When you have done that, tell me which forces were available across the Straits which could successfully have overcome these defences.
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The British were not, and never (except for a short period in WW1) have been, a major military power on land. The BEF, though the only fully mechanised army in the world at the time, was tiny, as the other reply has already explained.
The difference between the Soviet Union and Britain should be obvious. If you have any serious intentions of invading an island nation protected by the largest navy in existence, you really need a significant navy of your own to have even a ghost of a chance of succeeding.
Churchill wasn't 'insistent on the United States joining the war' by the way, as he had no authority to insist that the USA do anything. He was, however, quite rightly trying to secure the support of the world's greatest industrial power. Fortunately, President Roosevelt was wise enough to realise that supporting support for the only European democracy still in arms against nazi Germany was in the long term interests of the United States.
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@sebclot9478 The British weren't in South Africa. In 1941, they had substantial forces in NORTH Africa. Moreover, historically, the Italian Navy struggled to maintain supply levels to the smallish axis forces in North Africa, because of the inconvenient presence of the RN & RAF in the Mediterranean, combined with the serious lack of port facilities in the region.
The Suez Canal was of little importance in the first half of WW2, largely because British convoys went round the Cape. Supplies for 8th Army were landed at the southern end of the canal and moved by rail. The Canal itself was used almost entirely by warships sailing to join or to leave the Mediterranean Fleet, although often these used the Mediterranean via Gibraltar, as did Malta supply convoys.
As the Italian navy was, historically, seriously hamstrung by lack of fuel, and rarely, in the case of the heavy ships, risked action, your Gibraltar option is not credible. Moreover, Franco was never in a position to join the Axis, as Spain relied on US food aid to stave off mass starvation, and FDR had already made el Caudillo well aware that the day Spain did join the Axis was the day this aid stopped. Furthermore, have you actually considered the logistics problems facing a German force passing through Spain even to get to Gibraltar? Bismarck was sunk, by the way, in May, 1941, so is irrelevant to the issue, even if one warship built to a semi-obsolete design could make any meaningful contribution to anything.
Build more U-Boats? I assume that, as these are being built, presumably in the pre-war period, you expect the British to sit back, say 'I wonder why the Germans are building U-Boats?' and not expand their own escort production programme?
Sorry, what you propose is far from 'easy.' It is fantasy based on a lack of knowledge.
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There wasn't really much of a Kreigsmarine left after the Norwegian campaign, where RN submarines had achieved considerable success. Gneisenau was torpedoed on 20 June by HMS Clyde, and under repair until November. On her way back to Germany, one of her escorts, the torpedo boat Luchs, was sunk by HMS Swordfish. Deutchland was torpedoed by HMS Spearfish on 11 April, 1940, and under repair until April, 1941. Karlsruhe was sunk by HMS Truant on 9 April, 1940. Before Norway, Leipzig had been damaged by HMS Salmon in December, 1939, and was never fully repaired, and Nurnberg was damaged at the same time, although repaired by August, 1940.
Add to that further losses: Graf Spee, Konigsberg, Blucher, ten destroyers sunk at Narvik, and a further two bombed and sunk by (German) aircraft, and the German naval cupboard was alarmingly bare.
One thing, though. Don't try sending submarines into the Channel. The Germans sent three in late 1939, and they are still there.
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@markkover8040 The accident rate of Wasp's pilots, using aircraft designed for carrier operations, should tell you something. As for carrying out trials in the Norwegian sea, would that really have been possible, in an area regularly patrolled by RN submarines and surface vessels?
By the way, only 7 carrier capable 109ts were built. The remainder were built without the necessary carrier modifications. Even the seven built didn't have folding wings, by the way.
Incidentally, when the project was re-activated, the 109t was considered to be obsolete, and major modifications would have been required to the carrier's lifts, catapults, hangar floors, and arrestor gear to accommodate the new aircraft briefly considered.
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@markkover8040 Certainly, ore did continue to be shipped via Narvik, but in greatly reduced quantities. Rolk Karlbom, in the 'Scandinavian Economic History Review' published a whole host of statistics. For example, between 1937 & 1944, the figures were as follows. These are in thousands of tons, and are for shipments via Narvik :-
1937, 4919. 1938, 4771. 1939, 4027. 1940, 504. 1941. 725. 1942, 1140. 1943, 1936. 1944, 1106. Thus, shipments did continue, but at a much reduced level. Furthermore, in 1937, total German ore imports from Sweden, again, in thousands of tons, were 9084, of which 54.2% was via Narvik. In 1941, the total was 9260, of which 7.83% was via Narvik.
Not that this is particularly relevant, by the way. Navigating small groups of ore ships through coastal waters is rather different from carrying out sea trials of a large warship. To give you a comparison, between 1940 & 1944 the British ran a regular series of convoys from Southend to Methil, and the reverse. These convoys followed closely restricted routes down the East Coast. There were 531 convoys, mainly of small colliers, involving 9097 vessels in total. They were under regular attack by the Luftwaffe and by S boats. Total losses? 31 vessels, of which 24 were in convoy and the rest stragglers.
As Graf Zeppelin never carried out any trials of any sort, the activity of RN warships in the Norwegian Sea is, similarly, irrelevant. However, Alastair Mars' account of RN submarine activity in WW2 assures me that RN boats did carry out regular patrols. These increased once German naval forces had been transferred to the 'Zone of Destiny' and the probability is that the prospect of encountering a large target such as Graf Zeppelin would have resulted in augmented numbers of boats.
70 Bf109T1s were ordered from Fieseler, but only 7 completed with carrier capability. The remainder were built as T2s, without carrier capability, and sent to Norway until the end of 1941. The conclusion that they were obsolete when the project was briefly re-activated was not mine, but that of the Luftwaffe & Kriegsmarine. An alternative, the Me 155, based on the Me109G, was designed, but subsequently abandoned.
A version of the Ju52 with folding wings? Really? A naval version of a three engined transport aircraft?
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@Losantiville No. To control the eastern end of the Mediterranean you need a naval base at Alexandria, which the British had, and maintained, throughout WW2. To take Suez, it would be necessary to take Alexandria first, in which case, assuming that the British maintained a presence in the Middle East east of the Canal, supplies could still be delivered via the Gulf of Aqaba. In such circumstances, the British would no longer have a naval presence in the eastern Mediterranean, although Malta could still be maintained via Gibraltar, as it was historically, and communications with India would continue via the Cape, again as happened historically. The loss of Alexandria would certainly be a major setback, but not necessarily a terminal one.
Certainly, if Gibraltar fell as well, the Mediterranean and Malta would fall, but the capture of Gibraltar would require the support of Spain. As Spain at the time depended to a large extent on food convoys from the United States, and as FDR had informed Franco that such convoys would cease if Spain joined the axis, it is unlikely that such support would be forthcoming.
The other problem from the German point of view would be the ability to maintain supplies to a larger axis force in North Africa. Certainly Italy had a large navy, but historically seemed oddly reluctant to use it.
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@cybereus836 Clearly, Mr. Forcyzk didn't examine the Royal Navy 'Pink List' for 16 September, 1940. This, effectively the RN 'Order of Battle' states the location and operational state of every warship of destroyer size and upwards. There were 25 destroyers at the Nore, 20 at Portsmouth and Southampton, and 12 at Plymouth, for a start, backed by several light cruisers.
The 'enemy invasion flotilla' consisted of 894 converted barges, towed in pairs by tugs, trawlers, and small coasters, from ports from Flushing to Boulogne, together with 300 motor boats from Le Havre. To defend this force, the German navy had five destroyers from Cherbourg, and two destroyers from Zeebrugge.
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@cybereus836 Actually, I said 'I merely stated a whole series of facts' which I did. The facts were taken from the Royal Navy Pink List, from 16 September, 1940. Look it up for yourself. It will prove that I am correct.
'The thing you discount which Forcyzk mentioned is: having boats in the general body of water encompassing England does not discount that those Boats now have to FIND that invasion flotilla.' Oh, please! The Royal Navy patrolled the Channel every night, with destroyer patrols from Plymouth & from The Nore. Occasionally, the destroyers would shell the invasion ports as they passed.
Moreover, the Kriegsmarine estimated that the time required to extract the barges from their ports, form them up into their box formations (with the barges being towed, in pairs, by tugs, trawlers, or small coasters, at just above walking pace), then proceed down the Channel, to the landing beaches between Folkestone and Brighton, would, in the case of the largest formation (380 barges from Boulogne & Le Havre) require THREE DAYS. Moreover, the formations from Ostend , Dunkirk, & Calais would pass through the Straits, which are 25 miles wide. Find them? Please don't be silly. The barge trains would have been clearly visible from Admiral Ramsay's HQ at Dover Castle. If Mr. Forcyzk didn't know that, then his research was sadly lacking. You might like to read 'Invasion of England, 1940' by Peter Schenck, for the German view, which actually agrees with mine, by the way, and provides details of the complete plan.
In point of fact, as a naval historian, I have not much concerned myself about the Battle of Britain, because the main defence against invasion was always the Royal Navy. As Admiral John Jervis, Earl St. Vincent, told Parliament during the Napoleonic invasion threat " "I do not say they cannot come, I only say they cannot come by sea".
Most modern historians, by the way, agree that Sealion was never a realistic operation. Didn't you know that?
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In September, 1940, there were 7 RN destroyers at Scapa Flow, 16 at Rosyth, 20 at Portsmouth, 12 at Plymouth, 25 at The Nore, 7 in the Humber, 21 in escort ports, and 8 at sea on escort duty.
However, the Germans had five operational destroyers at Cherbourg, so in the minds of the Sealion fantasists, the Royal Navy was seriously outnumbered.
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@dragilxcom4176 Another Sealion 'would have.' The Channel is a death trap for submarines, being shallow, subject to strong currents, and heavily mined. The Germans sent three boats into it in late 1939, and all were promptly sunk. Furthermore, the U-Boat fleet at the time was small, with only 27 operational front-line boats, of which 13 on average were at sea on any one day in September, 1940. Usually, boats tried to avoid going near fleet destroyers, as it tended to end badly for them. You suggest that, in order to satisfy your fantasy, they should actively seek them out? Oh well, ignorance is bliss, I suppose.
'If Germany had the air superiority, RN would have no chance.' You mean like at Dunkirk, when the Luftwaffe, with air superiority, failed to prevent Dynamo, when the rescue ships were sitting targets? This same Luftwaffe, untrained in anti-shipping operations and without even a torpedo bomber, 'would have' been able to sink or disable, in large numbers, RN warships moving at speed, when they previously hadn't been able to hit them when they were stopped close inshore?
This Luftwaffe you laud, which historically in WW2 sank 31 RN destroyers, and no RN warship larger than a light cruiser, 'would have' dealt with the 64 RN destroyers on anti-invasion duties within 5 hours steaming of Dover, supported by several light cruisers and over five hundred smaller warships, and after that 'would have' dealt with the further fifty or so RN destroyers further away, but still in Home Waters?
Instead of posting from ignorance about what the Luftwaffe 'would have' done, why not buy a book, read about what, historically, the Luftwaffe actually did (or rather didn't,) do, and then try to explain it?
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@xavierthorn1273 Nonsense! In September, 1940, the Kriegsmarine had one heavy cruiser (Hipper) in service. Prinz Eugen did not complete until early 1941. The two battleships (Scharnhorst & Gneisenau) had both been torpedoed during the Norwegian campaign, and didn't complete repairs until November, 1940, the eleven light cruisers were actually three (Emden, Koln, & Nurnberg) although you could add Leipzig, I suppose. She had been extensively damaged in December 1939, and was partially repaired for use as a training ship. 57 U-boats? In September, 1940 actually 61 in commission. However, 34 of these were older training boats or new boats working up in the Baltic. There were only 27 frontboote, of which 13 were at sea on any one day in September. You could add the armoured cruisers, except that Deutchland/Lutzow had been torpedoed off Norway, and repairs didn't complete until April, 1941, whilst Scheer didn't complete a refit in Danzig until late September.
As to destroyers, in September, 1939, there were 22. However 12 had been sunk mid 1940, and in September 1940 three were refitting, leaving seven operational. There were also six Wolf/Mowe class torpedo boats (similar to British escort destroyers or American DEs).
Don't believe me? Look them up for yourself.
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@PoliticalRiskPod Absolutely miles out. The RN Pink List for 16 September lists the following dispositions, of operational warships only, excluding vessels under repair or refit.:-
Scapa Flow :- 1 battlecruiser, 1 carrier, 2 heavy cruisers, 2 light cruisers, 7 destroyers.
Rosyth :- 2 battleships, 1 battlecruiser, 3 light cruisers, 17 destroyers.
Humber :- 3 light cruisers, 5 destroyers.
Harwich :- 6 destroyers. Sheerness :- 2 light cruisers, 18 destroyers.
Portsmouth/Southampton :- 1 light cruiser, 19 destroyers (including 5 French & 1 Dutch).
Plymouth :- 1 battleship, 2 light cruisers, 11 destroyers (including 3 Polish & 3 French).
Liverpool :- 3 destroyers. Firth of Clyde :- 1 light cruiser, 10 destroyers ( including 3 RCN).
Belfast/Londonderry :- 3 destroyers. At sea on escort duties :- 10 destroyers.
Halifax, Nova Scotia :- 3 RCN destroyers.
Gibraltar :- 1 battlecruiser, 8 destroyers. Freetown :- 2 battleships, 2 carriers, 3 heavy cruisers, 11 destroyers.
Mediterranean Fleet :- 4 battleships, 2 carriers, 2 heavy cruisers, 7 light cruisers, 22 destroyers.
These are for vessels of destroyer size and upwards, and don't include smaller vessels (sloops, fleet minesweepers, submarines, MTBs, etc) or ships on more distant stations (East Indies, China, Australia, South Atlantic, Red Sea, etc., as if I did I would be typing all day!
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Germany had no navy. In September 1940 they had one operational heavy cruiser, three light cruisers, and about 15 destroyers and torpedo boats. U-boats didn't last long in the Channel. The Germans tried to send three through in 1939. They are still there.
The Germans had heavy guns on the French coast. They fired at coastal convoys throughout the war, and hit precisely nothing.
By September, 1940, the Germans had managed to assemble/commandeer just under 400 tugs/fishing boats. All were required to tow invasion barges. There were no reserves.
The best the Germans could muster at the time was a small number (about a third of a division) of paratroopers. Not that this mattered, as they only had just over 200 Ju52 transport aircraft anyway.
What, by the way, do the Germans at night, when their invasion barges are completely unprotected, and the Royal Navy's cruisers, destroyers, and supporting auxiliary craft are running riot? As Andrew Cunningham said to his fleet later in the war 'sink, burn & destroy. Let nothing pass.'
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@gabrielm.942 Sorry, but it is true. Assuming that an invasion attempt was to be made in the latter half of September, 1940, then :-
Gneisenau : Torpedoed by HMS Clyde off Trondheim in June 1940. Repairing in Kiel. Repairs completed in December, 1940.
Scharnhorst : Torpedoed by HMS Acasta in June, 1940. Undergoing repairs in Kiel. Repairs completed in December.
Deutchland : Torpedoed by HMS Spearfish in April, 1940. Severely damaged, and undergoing repairs in Kiel. Repairs completed by April, 1941.
Admiral Scheer : Refitting in Danzig for a raiding sortie. Refit completed mid October, 1940.
Blucher : Sunk in April, 1940.
Bismarck : Commissioned in late August, 1940, then sent to the Baltic for sea trials and working up. Modifications completed in January, 1941, and working up completed in April, 1941.
Prinz Eugen :- Commissioned August, 1940. Baltic trials until December, after which modifications made in Kiel. Resumed working up in the Baltic, operating with Bismarck. Work up complete in April, 1941.
Schlesien. : Secondary armament removed to equip merchant raiders late in 1939. Used as an icebreaker in the Baltic thereafter, until laid up as an accommodation ship with a skeleton crew July - December, 1940.
Schleswig-Holstein : Supported the invasion of Denmark in April, 1940. Used as a training ship thereafter, with secondary armament removed for use on merchant raiders.
I submit that using these two hulks as troop transports would have been the height of folly. The British had 18 destroyers and 2 cruisers based at Sheerness, 6 destroyers at Harwich, 3 cruisers and 5 destroyers in the Humber. Not to mention 2 battleships, 1 battlecruiser, 3 cruisers and 17 destroyers at Rosyth.
That leaves Hipper, operational but with defective engines, the light cruisers Koln, Nurnberg & Emden, 7 operational destroyers (plus a further 3 refitting/repairing) and nine Wolf/Mowe torpedo boats.
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@gabrielm.942 Blucher was commissioned on 20 September, 1939, and sunk by Norwegian coastal defences on 9 April, 1940.
The situation wasn't different though, was it? The invasion of Norway, which resulted in the crippling or loss of most of the German navy, took place mainly before the fall of France. The earliest that the invasion could have taken place realistically was September, 1940, because the German navy only managed to put their ramshackle invasion force of towed barges together by then. Even re-writing everything that happened between September, 1939 and June 1940, as you seem to want to do, still doesn't give the German navy the landing craft and numbers of escorts available to make a serious invasion attempt.
Do you not understand the difference between a commissioned warship and an operational warship? Commissioning means that the navy has accepted the ship from the builders, but it then needs to undergo a long period of trials and working up.
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@stephenarbon2227 The British were outproducing the Germans in aircraft, and particularly fighter aircraft, by mid 1940. By Spring, 1941, the RAF had 56 squadrons of Fighters & Fighter-Bombers carrying out regular fighter sweeps over northern France. Furthermore, also by Spring 1941, the new warship construction which the British had begun in 1939 was coming into service, in particular large numbers of L, M, & N class destroyers, supported by Hunt class escort destroyers, sloops and corvettes for convoy escort, and the ex American four stackers also for convoy duties. In cruisers, the remainder of the first group of Didos, and many of the Colony class, were now with the fleet. If the RN was out of sight in September, 1940, superiority was on a different planet by Spring 1941.
As to U-Boats, firstly the Channel is a most unsuitable place for them. In 1939, the Kriegsmarine attempted to send three boats on operations in the Channel. They are still there. Furthermore, in May 1941, the Kriegsmarine had 33 operational front line boats, of which an average of 24 were at sea on any one day. Moreover, the usual role of a WW2 boat was to attack merchant shipping. The probability of success against large numbers of fleet destroyers and experienced convoy escort vessels was minimal.
Finally, if you think that the Royal Navy of mid 1941 could not have survived, then you simply have no grasp of precisely how huge the Royal Navy of that time really was. Moreover, why should the British send capital ships into the Channel in any case? What purpose would they serve there? The RN anti-invasion preparations of 1940 had been built around large numbers of light cruisers, destroyers, and supporting smaller warships, actually, over 500 of them. What do you think might have changed by May, 1941?
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There was an alarm given at 2007 on the evening of 7 September, 1940, when the codeword 'Cromwell' was issued to Home Guard, regular army, and RAF units, telling them to expect an invasion attempt within 24 hours.
The Royal Navy at the time carried out regular Channel patrols every night. On 7/8 September, the four destroyers from 1st Destroyer Flotilla, from Portsmouth, found precisely nothing. A MTB patrol entered Ostend harbour and torpedoed two freighters, and a patrol bound for Boulogne withdrew due to severe weather.
The Admiralty, it seems, was baffled as to the reason the alert was issued, although it appears that an exercise had been mistaken for the real thing.
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Easy to say, but much less clear cut, from Lutjens' point of view. Firstly, Bismarck was damaged, listing, and down by the bows. It was far from clear that she was still capable of catching Prince of Wales. If she could, Bismarck had no access to repair facilities, and one or two more hits could have left her more or less helpless.
Secondly, as far as Lutjens knew, The two capital ships he had just engaged might well have had further heavy units coming up in support. He might well have ended up in a repeat of Hipper's predicament at Jutland. In pursuing Beatty's battlecruisers, he walked right into Evan Thomas's 5th Battle Squadron.
I assume you know that Prince of Wales was barely damaged, by the way?
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@looinrims I am saying that at the time of Dunkirk, no one, French or British, had signed an armistice. That didn't happen until 22 June. The British, moreover, did not believe that the French military had been totally defeated, only that it had suffered a serious, but not irreparable, reversal. Indeed, after Dynamo the British intended to re-land the 100,000+ French troops back in France, together, with a 'Reconstituted BEF' under the command of Brooke. This began landing on 7 June, but was withdrawn from 14 June onwards, after Brooke was informed by Weygand that the French army was no longer able to offer organised resistance.
Only at that point did the British realise the true extent of the French defeat, and begin operation Aerial.
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user-wj6dt5bq3w In point of fact, I really don't care whether you take me seriously or not. However, if you think I have not read the book, you are mistaken, as there was a copy in my University library, years ago, translated by one F. A, Voigt. My tutor, Professor Foot, urged great caution on those of us who did read it, as he considered it somewhat unreliable.
Which is off the point. I asked you, and gave you details, of the efforts Germany went to to prepare for an invasion attempt. You haven't explained why so much effort was expended, if hitler never intended to undertake any invasion.
By the way, being close to Walther Hewel is hardly supportive of any claim to impartiality. Oh, & did you read the 'primary source' or simply an old article in the Guardian?
Which ever. I will not discuss this matter with you further.
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Bomber Command began attacking barge concentrations from 5 September. In total, they appear to have destroyed 214, but there were still 1859 available at the end of September. In fact, the German problem was not the number of barges, but the number of towing vessels. The barges were to be towed in pairs across the Channel, and the Germans in late September had only 397 such vessels. Even allowing for the fact that some barges could be towed by some of 159 small coasters being used as transports, the German plan for the first landing involved 844 barges, which required every towing vessel to be used. There were literally no reserves, and losses could not be replaced.
Interestingly, on 10/11 October, the Battleship Revenge, supported by seven destroyers, shelled barge concentrations in Cherbourg. In an 18 minute action, Revenge fired 120 fifteen inch High Explosive shells, and the destroyers 801 4.7 inch shells. On the following day Sealion was officially called off, and the remaining barges began to disperse. This action, Operation Medium, is totally forgotten today.
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@Edi_J The circumstances of Jutland were unique, in that the commanding admiral, David Beatty, regarded rate of fire as paramount, and unofficially encouraged his captains to stow cordite in unprotected areas. This policy was not followed by the battleships of the Grand Fleet, and was discontinued entirely after Jutland.
Hood had a 12 inch belt, compared to the 6 inch of the Invincibles, or the 9 inch of the Lions and Tiger, by the way. Therefore, your comment that 'Sending Hood against Bismarck, knowing what happened during Jutland battle, was a war crime' is simply silly.
The fact is, that the Royal Navy in May 1941 had only five capital ships with the speed and firepower necessary to challenge Bismarck. These were King George V, Prince of Wales, Hood, Repulse, and Renown.
Renown was with Force H, which left Tovey with two exit points into the wider Atlantic, and four ships with which to block them. Thus, he sent his second and third most capable ships (Hood & PoW) to the Denmark Strait, whilst placing his best and weakest (KGV & Repulse) in the Iceland-Faroes Gap'
The assumption was that either pairing would be able to prevent such a sortie into the wider Atlantic, where Lutjens' squadron would be harder to chase down.
It worked, by the way. The damage Bismarck received in the Denmark Strait was enough to cause Lutjens to abort his mission.
Had you been in Tovey's, or Pound's, situation in May, 1941, what would you have done differently to protect the convoy network?
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@manilajohn0182 Equally, people seem determined to impose classifications onto things which in reality do not fit easily into any obvious slot.
Hood was redesigned after Jutland and considerable extra armour added. As a result, she was far more of a fast battleship than a traditional lightly armoured battlecruiser. Earlier RN battlecruisers had armoured belts of 6 inches (the Invincibles, and the Renowns) or 9 inches (Lions & Tiger), whereas Hood's was 12 inches, the same as the King George V and Iron Duke classes from WW1.
Indeed, the US North Carolinas had 12 inch belts, and the belts of the South Dakotas & Iowas were 12.2 inches and 12.1 inches respectively. No one has ever called them battlecruisers.
Come to that, the proposed G3 battlecruisers, from which the Nelsons evolved, were called battlecruisers, despite being intended to have 14 inch belts and decks in parts 8 inches thick.
The term battlecruiser within the RN was based on speed, in that it was applied to any capital ship with a speed in excess of 25 knots, as the original concept of the fast, lightly armoured, cruiser killer became outdated.
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@LittleMacscorner I'm not getting upset, but I do know quite a lot about Dynamo & Sealion, as they formed the bulk of my modern history thesis.
Many of the German generals did actually believe that Sealion was nothing more than 'an extended river crossing' and Admiral Raeder spent much of the summer of 1940 desperately trying to get them to grasp that it was nothing of the sort.
Hitler's certainly didn't want to attempt an invasion; he assumed that Britain would accept a negotiated peace, and was near to being proved correct. A government led by Lord Halifax wouldn't have had a problem with the idea, and Hitler believed that a neutral Britain left him with a free hand to deal with his true enemy, the Soviet Union. The result of all this was, in Napoleon's words 'how can an elephant fight a whale?'
Certainly, a substantial German force on British soil was unlikely to have been defeated, but, even if a successful invasion was essential, without a navy or even suitable troop transports the possibility of carrying out a successful crossing against the kind of resources available to the Royal Navy was never even a remote possibility. Unlike a land battle, where a smaller force might overcome a larger one by a cunning strategy or as a result of incompetence on the part of the larger force, the Kreiegsmarine, following the mauling it suffered during the Norwegian campaign, knew exactly what the towed barges could expect once they entered the Channel.
It is a bit like the old joke about a motorist asking directions and being told by a local 'If I were you I wouldn't start from here.' In the summer of 1940, the Germans found themselves in exactly the same quandary.
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The Royal Navy operated nightly destroyer patrols through the Channel every night throughout the invasion period, out of Plymouth and the Nore. Fairly regularly, these patrols inspected the invasion ports, and often shelled them. Coastal convoys also operated through the Channel, mainly consisting of small colliers escorted by, usually, two destroyers and one or two armed trawlers. The convoys, of the CE & CW series, sailed between 1940 & 1944. There were 533 such convoys, totalling 9097 ship voyages. Of the 9097, 31 were sunk.
The Germans sent three small Type II boats into the Channel in late 1939. Together with the remains of their crews, all three are still there. The Channel was a death trap for a WW2 submarine.
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@johnburns4017 Rather more than that. The barge trains first had to form up in long columns outside their ports. For example, the train carrying the leading elements of 26 & 34 Infantry Divisions, heading for Bexhill - Eastbourne, consisted of 165 tugs and 330 barges from Boulogne, and 25 tugs with 50 barges from Le Havre. Each tug towed two barges, one powered and one unpowered. It would take more than a day to extricate this lot from port, and form them up into any sort of coherent formation. The formation heading for Folkestone-New Romney ( 75 tugs and 150 barges from Dunkirk & 25 tugs with 50 barges from Ostend) had greater problems, given the state these ports were still in.
The Kriegsmarine estimated that it would take three days to assemble the formations, move them westward down the Channel, turn them towards the English South Coast, and push the barges to shore, using the tugs and a number of smaller, pusher, boats. That was for the first part of the first wave, consisting of about a third of each division, without most of their wheeled transport or divisional artillery. The time needed to get the whole of the nine divisions ashore, still without wheeled transport or artillery, was estimated at eleven days.
This assumes, of course, that weather conditions in the Channel would remain benign (which was, I suppose, possible) and that 'external factors' would not come into play. I believe that the 'external factors' Raeder had in mind were hundreds of dark grey ships, each flying a white ensign.
The whole lunacy is described in considerable detail in a book written some years ago by a German author, Peter Schenck.
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@shb7772000if Why were they vulnerable? Didn't you notice the bit in my post where I pointed out that the Luftwaffe, in the whole of the war, sank no British warship larger than a light cruiser?
The reality is that, when dealing with large numbers of small, towed, barges, the most suitable warships are fast, agile ones able to bring large numbers of quick-firing guns to bear. In this case, the British were using ships armed with 6 inch, 4.7 inch, 4 inch, and 3 inch guns, all of which were perfectly capable of sinking small coasters, tugs, and converted barges in large numbers. The Home Fleet itself was based in Rosyth, from where it could counter any move by German heavy ships either to support an invasion, or to break out on an Atlantic raid.
To send capital ships against barges would have been akin, as an American friend of mine once remarked, to 'taking tanks on a duck shoot.'
Surely, this is obvious?
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@shb7772000if What do you think happened to British capital ships in the Mediterranean, where they were frequently under heavy air attack from Italian & German aircraft, usually with little or no air support of their own? How many were sunk by these air attacks? The same comment applies to British capital ships which operated in the Arctic. You do appreciate that British capital ships of WW2 were designed to withstand plunging fire from 15 inch AP shells. A typical such shell weighed around 800kgs. The best bomb the Luftwaffe had in 1940 was 500kgs.
Certainly, attacks by US naval aircraft in the Pacific were more successful, largely because they, like the British Fleet Air Arm, were naval fliers trained in the techniques and skills required to attack ships. By contrast, the Luftwaffe of 1940 had been trained as a tactical air force, to operate in support of ground forces. They had had no training at all in operations against warships, hence their failure at Dunkirk. Moreover, unlike the Japanese, the Luftwaffe had no torpedo aircraft at all until 1942.
Rommel in North Africa is not relevant. Firstly, Italian troops were already there, and he had friendly ports in which to disembark. He was never in a position where he was required to make an assault landing. Sealion would require an assault landing without assault ships with which to carry it out, in the face of a vast number of opposing warships, and land defences which, by September, had been largely restored.
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@shb7772000if October 10, 1940. HMS Revenge with destroyer escorts shelled the barge concentrations at Cherbourg. Revenge fired 120 high explosive 15 inch shells, supported by 801 4.7 inch shells from her escorts. Whilst returning to port, the heavy German gun batteries fired at her, but missed. In point of fact, by the end of August there were over 150 medium, heavy, and super heavy German batteries on the French coast, which began firing at British coastal convoys from 12 August. Between August & December, 1940, some 1880 rounds were fired at these convoys, often involving as many as 200 rounds. Number of hits? NONE. In fact, the batteries, during the whole of the war, achieved precisely no hits on any convoy. So, maybe German land artillery COULDN'T hit ships in the Channel.
Other than that, why exactly should British ships not go into the Channel? There was no actual prohibition, rather their presence there would have served no purpose, unless heavy German ships did the same. The right place for British capital ships in Home Waters was Rosyth, and later Scapa Flow, from where they could intercept a potential German sortie into the Atlantic. Incidentally, the Battleship Queen Elizabeth was in Portsmouth until December, 1940, undergoing modernisation. A sitting duck, perhaps? Not really. During the course of numerous Luftwaffe raids, she received no hits.
The fact that the Channel is not as wide as the Mediterranean is irrelevant, as Luftwaffe & Italian aircraft in the Med. had ample range to reach British ships. Moreover, in the Med. the British, unless they had a fleet carrier available, had no air support at all.
Indeed, the Japanese sank two British capital ships. WITH TORPEDO BOMBERS, a weapon not available to the Luftwaffe until 1942.
By the way, what relevance has any of this to Sealion. I have already told you that capital ships played little or no part in the Admiralty's anti-invasion dispositions, for blindingly obvious reasons.
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@shb7772000if Sinking the cruisers and destroyers off Crete during the evacuation is a different issue. Firstly, it was nine months later, during which time the Luftwaffe had had time to get the training in anti-shipping operations which they had lacked in September, 1940, and secondly, during the assault phase of the Crete landings, the axis sent two troop convoys to reinforce the paratroop landings. One convoy, for Maleme, was annihilated by a RN squadron, and the other one, for Heraklion, turned back. The RN actually prevented any seaborne landing.
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@stewartmckay9830 Really, the lack of equipment didn't matter, because in 1940 a fully equipped British army was not capable of defeating the Germans in the field. However, to bring this about the Germans needed to be able not only to land a large invasion force in England, but also to steadily reinforce it and re-supply it, something they were never even remotely capable of doing.
Ironically, and largely lost in the 1940 myth, Churchill was well aware of this, otherwise he would never have ordered the despatch of the Apology convoy on 22 August. This involved sending three Armoured Regiments, with 154 tanks, 48 anti-tank guns, 48 field guns, and 20 anti-aircraft guns, to North Africa to reinforce the Western Desert Force. The tanks included half of the total number of Matilda II Infantry Tanks (the most battleworthy British tank at that time) then available in the UK. This happened three weeks before 15 September, 1940, the date the Battle of Britain legend insists was the crucial day.
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@stewartmckay9830 Actually, the Singapore guns didn't 'face the ocean.' Certainly, their main purpose was to prevent an attack from the sea, but most of them were capable of 360 degree traverse. They could, and did, fire inland. The problem with them was that, as they were intended to engage warships, most of their ammunition was AP, not HE.
Incidentally, I am not trying to suggest that there was any 'heroic stand' in 1940. There was no need for one, because a navyless Germany, however strongly supplied with troops and aircraft, was never able to cross the Channel in the face of the largest navy on earth.
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@stewartmckay9830 No, of course the manner in which successive governments have systematically starved our armed forces of resources, and in particular reduced the Navy to a tiny local defence force saddled with two white elephant carriers which will forever lack any meaningful air groups because the F35cs belong to the RAF, not the Navy, is unacceptable, but what has that to do with Operation Sealion?
The reality is that the British expected to be the junior partners of the French on land, but would impose the same blockade on Germany at sea as they had in WW1, whilst the French navy would contribute to operations in the Mediterranean. Again, as in 1914-1918, the British would gradually build up their land forces on the Western Front. The collapse of France was totally unexpected.
However, Britain was never as close to defeat as has been suggested. There was simply no way that the Germans could ever land any significant ground forces on the UK, let alone find any means of re-supplying them. The RN was still the largest navy in the world, and by September, 1940, had already achieved a number of successes over the Kriegsmarine, the most important being the Battles of Narvik, which destroyed 50% of the total German destroyer force.
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@thecommentaryking Sorry, I suspect you are quoting from O'Hara. That explains a lot.
As I said earlier, there is no reference to Operation White in Cunningham's autobiography.
As to 'the British didn't start moving troops to Greece until Spring of 1941,' odd that, considering that on 15 November, 1940, Berwick, York, Glasgow, and Sydney transported 3400 troops and their stores to Piraeus.
It does, however, seem that, indeed, the Italians were not willing to face the British, as Campioni, at Spartivento, failed to commit to decisive action against Force H, thus allowing the fast convoy for Malta & Alexandria, Operation Collar, to proceed to both destinations unmolested.
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@thecommentaryking Aren't you actually agreeing with Cunningham here? After Taranto, the Italian navy did not challenge the British in open battles. At Spartivento, a superior Italian fleet failed to press home this advantage against Force H, at Matapan, in March 41, it was ambushed, losing three heavy cruisers and two destroyers in a night, as well as a battleship damaged.
Subsequently, the Italian fleet made no attempt to hinder the transfer of Allied troops to Greece, and made no attempt (apart from individual gallant efforts by light units such as Lupo) to escort Axis troops by sea to Crete, with the result that no such troops arrived until the Allied evacuation had more or less completed.
Similarly, at First Sirte, a force of 4 battleships, 2 heavy cruisers, 3 light cruisers and 13 destroyers, failed to press home an attack on a British force of 5 light cruisers and 14 destroyers. Subsequently, Italian heavy ships were notable only by their absence during a number of convoy actions, including Pedestal.
Finally, I would suggest that a philosophy which refuses to risk a battle because of the possibility of losses does rather reflect a significant degree of 'unwillingness.'
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@thecommentaryking Isn't it interesting how, when losing an argument, many people resort to insults and abuse. In this case that I am 'anti-Italian?'
Let us look at the posts again. Initially, you claimed that the Italians defeated the British only five days after Taranto. My response was that the loss of nine aircraft could hardly be compared with the loss/disablement of three battleships. I could have said that Operation White was not really an Italian victory at all, as the respective forces never engaged. It was much more a self-inflicted defeat caused by launching the aircraft too far from Malta. Your next comment was that Cunningham was wrong in suggesting that the Italians would be unwilling to use their heavy units. I, having read what Cunningham's actual views were, simply stated that he really believed that the Italians would use their heavy units more conservatively. You then claimed that the British only started moving troops to Greece in Spring 1941. I proved you wrong. Does correcting your false claim prove me 'anti-Italian? I then pointed out that Campioni failed to press home an attack by a stronger force at Spartivento. You claimed that the forces were equal, but that the British had the advantage of a carrier. Actually, the forces were not equal, and the Italians had the considerable advantage of shore-based air power. I then made a number of factual statements about the subsequent use of Italian heavy units. Apparently, you consider that I was 'using Matapan as an excuse for bashing the Italian' when all I wrote was 'at Matapan, in March 41, it (the Italian fleet) was ambushed, losing three heavy cruisers and two destroyers in a night, as well as a battleship damaged. Are you claiming that the Italian fleet was not ambushed, or that it did not lose three heavy cruisers and two destroyers? Why is a simple, factual statement, proof of 'anti-Italian bias?' Certainly, the British had a number of advantages at Matapan, but the statement I made was, unambiguously, completely accurate. You then sought to expand the debate by making a number of statements about the use of smaller Italian units later in the war. As the discussion had hitherto been about the activities of Italian capital ships, these were irrelevant. Again, nothing I wrote about Sirte was inaccurate. Iachino had an opportunity to inflict a heavy defeat on a weaker British force, without in any way risking M42, which was under no threat at all, but chose not to press home his advantage. I didn't make any mistake in my comments about Crete. I merely said that Italian heavy ships made no attempt to escort surface convoys to the island. Did they? You seem to think that this was all the fault of the Germans. Are you suggesting that in May, 1941, Supermarina had no authority over the Italian fleet? If so, it rather sounds like you are the anti-Italian one. Finally, I made no reference to British activity in the Mediterranean because that was not the matter under debate. In short, I submit that none of my comments show anything in the way of anti-Italian bias. If the Italian naval command chose to apply a policy that could best be described as 'timid' to the use of their heavy ships in WW2, that can hardly be considered my fault!!!
Seriously, if you can't post without using insults rather than arguments, why not simply stop posting?
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@thecommentaryking I suggest that we let anyone who reads this increasingly tedious correspondence decide for themselves who is having the better of the argument, and who seems to find it necessary to resort to inappropriate allegations of nationalist bias. A rather tenuous claim, considering that the subject under discussion is events which took place three quarters of a century ago.
However, to return to your last post. Do I detect a degree of anti-British bias on your part? Surely not, yet you refer to 'fear' in the mind of Admiral Somerville when he withdrew his force. In point of fact, once he became aware of an Italian force of two battleships, two heavy cruisers and sixteen destroyers, just south of Sardinia, he would have been foolish to have continued, as, with one modernised battlecruiser, one modern and one elderly light cruiser, seven destroyers, and two carriers (one of which was for ferry purposes only) he was completely outmatched. He had been advised by his air staff that the aircraft from Argus were within range of Malta and therefore, launched them. Argus herself was capable of only nineteen knots, and it was Somerville's duty to protect her. His only mistake, I submit, was in trusting the advice given him. Had he simply withdrawn his force without launching, this operation would have been lost to history. Still, if you choose to regard it as a wonderful victory, then so be it.
The fact that Cunningham's cruisers transported 'only' 4000 or so men, plus stores, to Piraeus in November, 1940, is irrelevant. In your earlier post you claimed that such operations did not take place until 1941. You were, put simply, WRONG. I assume that you simply did not know about the 1940 troop movement, but cannot now bring yourself to admit it.
At Spartivento, Italian shore based aircraft did attack the British force. How, by the way, you can suggest that a force consisting of a modern battleship, a modernised older battleship, six heavy cruisers, and fourteen destroyers is not superior to one modernised battlecruiser, one heavy cruiser, five light cruisers, fourteen destroyers, an elderly, unmodernised battleship too slow to keep up with the main force, and a carrier defeats me, especially since at the time no aircraft carrier had ever launched a successful air strike against an enemy warship at sea. However, let that pass, as well, and kindly explain to me why, after acting so, apparently, wisely and courageously in refusing to press home his advantage and destroy the British convoy on 27 November, Admiral Campioni was removed from command on 8 December, 1940. Was Supermarina as riddled with anti-Italian bias as, apparently, I am?
So, Iachino was obliged to call off his action at First Sirte in order to protect M42 from Force K? Force K consisted of two light cruisers and two destroyers. The close escort of M42, even without the twenty two warships with which Iachino failed to press home his attack on Vian's small cruiser/destroyer force, consisted of seven destroyers and a torpedo boat. Was the four ship M42, with eight escorts to protect it, really in such peril? I'm sorry that Breconshire was mis-identified as a battleship, but won't comment further on this particular matter.
As to attacks on the British troop convoys of Operation 'Lustre' apparently made by 'smaller units' what exactly did they attack, as between March 6 & April, 1941, Cunningham's fleet transported 68000 men, together with their supporting equipment, without the loss of a single man?
Incidentally, the Germans didn't have any 'landing crafts' for their seaborne transport of troops to Crete, but used requisitioned caiques. One convoy, heading for Maleme, and escorted by a single, gallant, torpedo boat, was more or less wiped out by a Royal Navy cruiser & destroyer force; the other, heading for Heraklion, wisely turned back. Frankly, I neither know nor care who made the decision not to provide heavy naval support for the invasion of Crete. I only know that it was not supplied.
Finally, as the initial post concerned the role played by the heavy ships of the Italian navy in WW2, I don't feel inclined to discuss wider matters of strategy. If you feel inclined to post on such matters, why not do it elsewhere?
Oh, and how exactly is calling someone 'anti-Italian' an argument, in any sense of the term?
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@thecommentaryking Interesting double standards here. You previously suggested that the Italian navy was right to avoid action unless it had odds in it's favour, yet when Somerville does exactly the same this is due to fear of losing. Oh well.
I did not ascribe the comment '"wisely and courageously" to you. Read the post again it you wish. I merely included this throw away comment to see it it would elicit exactly the kind of response that it did!
I haven't made any specific comments about the competence or otherwise of Supermarina. If you have determined that the series of facts I have presented have led you to this conclusion, then that is your conclusion, not mine.
As to the use of smaller forces against Royal Navy forces and convoys, there were precisely two in the Aegean, which you have described. On 14.01.41, Neghelli did indeed damage a freighter, which returned to Pireus, Neghelli herself being sunk by the convoy escorts, whilst on 31.01.41, two torpedo boats damaged a tanker, which was towed to Suda Bay, where the fuel was transferred to another tanker. Neither of these attacks, by the way, were in any way relevant yo Operation 'Lusture.'
You previously posted that 'In the Aegean the Italians knew that their smaller vessels were more capable than the larger units to hinder the British convoys.' If the Italians knew this, why was the sum total of their success against freighters the damaging of a mere two in January?
Certainly, once Operation Lustre began the British used the Antikithera Strait (not canal, by the way,) but are you sure this was in response to the presence of Italian surface ships in the area, and not in order to move their shipping further away from the Dodecanese airfields? Indeed, during Operation Lustre, there were no successes at all by Italian warships against British merchantmen, and no losses at all from the 68000 troops transported. Losses, either of empty transports in port or convoys returning empty, were entirely the result of air attack. Was a small force of Torpedo Boats really the best the Italian Navy could manage in support of their German ally, especially since I understand that it began WW2 with 6 battleships, 21 cruisers, 106 submarines, and over 110 destroyers and torpedo boats?
Doesn't it rather make you question exactly how 'capable' these smaller units actually were, or, indeed, why the Italian navy did not heed a request from the German Naval Attache to the Italian Naval Staff on 19 March, 1941, to the effect that 'the appearance of Italian naval units in the area south of Crete would seriously interfere with British shipping and might even lead to the complete interruption of the transport of troops, especially as these transports are at the moment inadequately protected.'
A caique is a small Aegean fishing vessel, with a timber keel and carvel planking. A landing craft is a small, lightly armoured flat bottomed vessel with a drop down bow ramp, used for delivering assault troops onto open beaches. The fact is that caiques needed a port into which to land their troops, whereas landing craft didn't. Therefore, caiques were rather more vulnerable than landing craft would have been, and needed (but didn't get) a naval escort. That is why the Maleme caique convoy was destroyed, and the Heraklion convoy turned back.
Finally, I didn't realise that it was only permissible to post on here by request.
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@thecommentaryking 'You implied it, don't lie on that.' What did I imply?
When GA8 was attacked by three boats, how many merchantmen were sunk? Certainly, sinking Bonaventure was a feather in Ambra's cap, but largely irrelevant to the balance of naval power in the Mediterranean, especially when you consider what happened a few days later.
'It weren't "a mere two" other happened but you don't care about trying to search those.' As you are the one making the claim, isn't it rather up to you to present the evidence?
'The Italians did send their submarines in search of those convoys, but unfortunately, everytime they did the British didn't launch any convoy operation.' How unfortunate, and damned unsporting of the Royal Navy. Absolutely not cricket, what? As we were supposed to be talking about the use (or, mor properly, lack of use) of Italian heavy ships, then I really fail to see the relevance anyway.
'The majority of the Italian navy operated in the Central Mediterranean, with only submarines, torpedo boats and two destroyers that operated in the Aegean.' As at the time the main effort of the Royal Navy was involved in the transport of troops and equipment to Greece, even if this were true wasn't it an inappropriate use of resources, especially since the Germans had specifically for Italian naval support?
'They were capable enough and there were attacks south of Crete on British convoys' Then provide me with a list of British transports lost to naval attack during Operation Lustre. I research in the naval section of the British National Archives at Kew, and they don't seem to have recorded any. What a curious oversight!
Whether caiques were really caiques, landing craft, canoes, or paddle steamers doesn't really matter anyway, does it? The two convoys desperately needed protection and what did they get? One torpedo boat each. No wonder one convoy was annilhilated and the other didn't try to make the trip.
Instead of making vague, generalised, comments, why not reply with proper facts? You could begin with details of successful operations by Italian heavy ships after Matapan, and end with a moving description of that never to be forgotten day in September, 1943, when the Italian fleet arrived at Malta to accept the surrender of the British garrison there. That was what happened, wasn't it?
I'm sure that the 'Times of Malta' was completely wrong when it wrote 'The arrival of the Italian battle fleet in Maltese waters escorted by British warships was a denouement undreamed of by even the most optimistic Maltese during the previous three harrowing years of the war.'
Alternatively, you could simply stop posting here and find a more gullible site upon which to spout your bizarre delusions.
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@thecommentaryking I did not imply that you used the phrase 'wisely & courageously.' The phrase was used by me, and it you intend to reply to 'implications' then that rather suggests that you lack real arguments.
Actually, I prefer to refer to Allied naval records, and Allied naval records clearly state that no merchantmen transporting troops to Greece during Operation Lustre were lost. Some were sunk in port, or returning from Greece, but by air attack.
You stated 'why the Italians didn't sunk many troopships.' Don't you really mean 'didn't sink, or even damage, ANY troopships?' You then ramble on about the Italians preferring to use smaller vessels. Clearly, with a total lack of success.
The Italian fleet had little to do with the siege of Malta. Malta was under intensive attack from Italian & German aircraft, but the role played by the Italian navy was minimal. Tell me of successful attacks by Italian heavy ships against British convoys to Malta. The convoys, like Malta, faced considerable danger from the air, but the Italian surface fleet was rarely, if ever, a factor. Even the Pedestal convoy in August, 1942, was entirely unmolested by Italian surface ships.
Malta, by the way, is only around 100 miles from Sicily. That the Italian navy lacked the ability to organize a seaborne invasion is quite remarkable. Rather on a par with the Royal Navy in WW2 being unable to capture the Isle of Man, don't you think?
So the Germans didn't ask for help? What about the Tarigo convoy of 16 April, 1941. The Germans sent four troopships, together with an Italian ammunition ship, to North Africa. The best the Italian navy could do was to supply an escort of three destroyers. The result was an attack by four British destroyers, one of which was sunk. However, all five transports and all three destroyers were sunk or, in one case, beached. This, by the way, gives some idea of what a well-handled destroyer force can do to a small convoy. Something similar happened to the Maleme caique convoy off Crete.
As the Italian navy never tried anything similar, of course, they were never able to find this out for themselves.
Actually, you never reply with facts, only excuses. Nothing is ever the Italians' fault. It is always down to lack of radar, lack of nightfighting skills, not having sufficient superiority of numbers, the British having an aircraft carrier, not being kept informed by the Germans, the British not sending their convoys at the right time, and smaller vessels being better for operations against the British off Crete.
Whatever. The facts are that the Italian navy contributed virtually nothing to the Axis campaign in Greece & Crete, and their heavy ships achieved nothing against British convoys even when, after Crete, Cunningham's resources were reduced to a handful of light cruisers and destroyers. Even then, Supermarina insisted upon pursuing a policy of masterly inactivity.
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@thecommentaryking Do you not remember me posting this, only about a day ago? 'Indeed, during Operation Lustre, there were no successes at all by Italian warships against British merchantmen, and no losses at all from the 68000 troops transported. Losses, either of empty transports in port or convoys returning empty, were entirely the result of air attack.'
Therefore, when you posted this :- ' the British lost 25 ships, while in "The Royal Navy in the Mediterranean, vol II" of David Brown the total amount of merchantman lost during Operation Lustre was 12.
So it is clearly you who are wrong.'
You are, in reality, only proving that I am right (as I habitually am.) For your information, 25 merchant ships, totalling 115,026 tons, were lost during Lustre, 18 whilst in port and 7 in convoys returning to Alexandria. All were lost to air attack, and none to attacks by Italian warships. Therefore, once again, I am right, and I am sure your apology when it comes will be gracious.
'Making plans' to invade Malta is hardly impressive, is it? and the reference to insufficient vehicles and equipment hardly passes muster. For heaven's sake, Malta is only about 300 square kilometers in area. Furthermore, who declared war in the first place? I don't think it was the British, was it? As to the British reinforcing their defences, what does this say about the mighty Italian battle fleet, which it seems you now confirm couldn't do much to stop this happening?
You clearly don't know much about the action off Sfax. Firstly, it took place when the convoy was negotiating the shallows around the Kerkennah Islands, secondly there was no bad weather so the convoy had not been scattered, thirdly it took place at night, so your imaginary loss of air support was irrelevant, and fourthly, if you think a Navigatori and two Folgores could have coped with a Tribal and three JKNs, especially when the British force was commanded by Philip Mack, then you really are in Wolkenkuckucksheim.
As to 'Also why should they have risked their heavier units in a area that was controlled by British ships, submarines and aircraft, for few convoys that they might have not even engaged?' Well, the area was hardly controlled by British aircraft, as there were very few in the whole Middle-East and Mediterranean area. Furthermore, Italy had a powerful, modern navy, and an effective, though aging, air force, and was at war with a country which for much of the time was unsupported by any allies other than the Commonwealth, and which generally had a fleet significantly smaller than the Italian.
You seem keen to produce an unending series of reasons for not taking action. Why not provide a description of the circumstances under which you believe it would have been appropriate to 'risk' the Italian fleet.
Tell you what. I have just received a payment into my bank of the royalties from my latest publication. As it is a substantial amount, I am in a very good mood, so don't feel you have to apologise about wrongly accusing me of having made a mistake about Operation Lustre if you don't want to.
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@thecommentaryking 'You are partly right' No, I am completely correct.
'Regia Marina alone couldn't have taken Malta, it needed the Army troops.' Yes, I know. Odd that the Italian armed forces lacked the ability to co-operate effectively.
Mussolini declaring the the war is not the point here. - Yes it is, you can hardly use lack of preparedness as an excuse, although I suppose you can add it to your long list of other excuses.
I didn't say that the Italian Navy was ""mighty"" No, I did, and theoretically it was, had it been used effectively, but it wasn't.
As to the convoy, perhaps you might consider Edward Gibbon's maxim that 'The winds and the waves are always on the side of the ablest navigators.' Odd, by the way, that Italian recon. aircraft couldn't operate, but a Glen Martin Maryland could, wasn't it? Perhaps you might also consider that the weather didn't seem to impede Mack's flotilla. Perhaps, the British & Italian navies had different ideas about what constituted rough weather? Certainly, in the Channel in 1940 the British auxiliary patrol regularly operated when German units considered conditions too rough to venture to sea.
Actually it was, the aircraft carriers operated in the Eastern Mediterranean so yes there were aircrafts. Which 'carriers' were these then? Formidable wasn't involved in the Crete evacuation because of a lack of aircraft, and was damaged by German air attack on 26 May, anyway.
While Italy had a powerful navy it wasn't helped by its allies unlike Britain. So the Germans didn't send 60 U Boats into the Mediterranean, didn't send troops to help Italy in Greece, and didn't send the Afrika Korps to North Africa after Beda Fomm, then?
I wonder if the refusal to supply fuel might have been a chicken & egg situation, in that the Germans weren't willing to supply such fuel to a navy which had shown little sign of acting offensively in the common Axis cause? Perhaps it might make a subject suitable for my next article?
then Regia Marina would have used its fleet more offensively, without the fear of loosing too many units. - But they never actually did, did they? You don't seem to understand what the British call 'The Price Of Admiralty' which, put simply, states that losses must be accepted so long as the ultimate objective is achieved. Or in Cunningham's words when urged by Wavell to abandon the evacuation of Crete following heavy losses to air attack ' It takes the Navy three years to build a ship, but three hundred years to build a tradition. The evacuation will continue.' Rather more inspiring than your endless catalogue of reasons/excuses for inaction and failure, don't you think?
Finally, -several articles and books over a number of years. After leaving University with a First in Modern History, specialising in the European & Atlantic Naval War, I have been a naval historian for a number of years. you might even have read some of my works, although I doubt it. Too much accurate use of facts, and conclusions based on those facts which might not appeal to your world view.
Anyway, I am away now for a while attending a History Conference chaired by a couple of American naval historians on the twin subjects of Sealion and Dynamo, and am to speak on both, so I don't feel inclined to waste further time on this pointless exercise.
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@thecommentaryking I wasn't going to bother again, but you really do have a habit of leaving yourself wide open. Just for your information, Eagle was released from the Mediterranean Fleet on 9 April, 1941, and by 18 April, was at Port Tewfik. Do you consider Port Tewfik to be in the Mediterranean, or is correcting another of your errors simply more proof of my anti-Italianism?
She did not return to the Med. until 23 February, 1942, when she joined Force H, by the way.
Whether you believe me to be a naval historian or not is, frankly, of sublime indifference to me, because it is clear beyond doubt that you aren't.
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@thecommentaryking Very good. However, Eagle could not operate in the Eastern Mediterranean because her unarmoured flight deck left her desperately vulnerable to German dive bombers. At least, that is what Andrew Cunningham said.
Therefore, after 3 March, when she carried out deck landing trials with Brewster Buffalo fighters, she remained in port in Alexandria, repairing faults, boiler cleaning, and waiting for the Suez Canal to be cleared. Later in the month, her air group was transferred to the Port Sudan area in order to attack an Italian destroyer force based at Massawa. She recovered her aircraft after she passed through the canal. Sources, by the way, are 'A Sailor's Odyssey' by ABC, and 'Eagle's War' by Peter C. Smith. Obviously, both are biased.
As to your other comment, as I said I don't really care what you think, but I would be happy for anyone to read through these posts in their entirety to reach his/her own conclusion.
That's it. I am making an early start in the morning, so don't feel inclined to waste more time. I will take a full copy of this correspondence to let my two American colleagues have a read. Hope you don't mind.
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Rather more than 24 hours. There were three different sets of Barge Trains, and each required that the barges (in pairs, each pair being towed by a tug, small coaster, or trawler) be extricated from the relevant port, formed up into a cumbersome, rectangular box formation, and then towed in this formation slowly down the Channel, at around five knots or so, to the landing beaches.
The Kriegsmarine estimated that the largest formation (330 barges from Boulogne together with a further 50 from Le Havre,) would be at sea, from first to last, for approximately three days.
Obviously, throughout this period, the Royal Navy's regular Channel patrols would be sporting enough to avert their collective gaze.
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@cybereus836 Clearly, the concept of sarcasm is utterly beyond your grasp.
I do enjoy, however, you insistence upon being rude, offensive, and insulting whilst at the same time accusing me of the same sins. I have encountered similar traits in your sort before; you haven't any effective arguments (or, if you do, you don't seem able to express them) so you replace them with abuse. I recall one of my Tutors saying, many years ago, that one of the few things more tedious than someone who didn't know a subject but insisted in expressing an opinion was someone who didn't know that he didn't know. Professor Foot would have been delighted to read your posts.
The discussion here, by the way, was about Sealion, not about the Battle of Britain. The Battle, by the way, was not the decisive factor where Sealion was concerned. The decisive factor was always the overwhelming naval supremacy held by the Royal Navy throughout the period of the invasion threat.
That you regard me as a liar and a cretin is fascinating. You have the opportunity to prove my errors by contradicting anything I have posted which isn't entirely in accordance with the known facts of the period.
Good luck with that.
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@cybereus836 You were the one who claimed that Mr. Forcyzk made some ' compelling arguments,' I have simply posted a whole series of facts proving that, in reality, that is not really the case.
Indeed, you referred to the need to 'find the invasion flotilla.' An ill-informed comment which I dismantled rather effectively by using facts.
My bruised ego? Oh, please! Nothing reinforces one's ego more than demonstrating the ignorance of someone who then posts a series of insults, yet at the same time insists upon bleating plaintively about allegedly 'aggressive' comments.
As I have said several times, I really don't care what someone like you thinks about me, nor, indeed about my reputation. I will leave the assessment of my arguments and my level of knowledge to those who have bought and read my books and articles, and to those of my peers who have reviewed my body of work.
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@donfarquhar6328 Churchill was a divisive figure within the Tory Party, certainly, but in June, 1939, George VI told Mackenzie King that he 'would never wish to appoint Churchill to any office unless it were absolutely necessary in time of war”.' I.e., precisely the circumstances which applied when he came to office. The vote of No Confidence actually came in May, 1940, and not, as you apparently think, immediately after war was declared. In any case, I did say 'in the country' which involves rather more people than the monarch and the grandees of the Tory Party.
Eden was far from heir apparent in 1939. Firstly, he was only just past 40 years old, and had very little ministerial experience, and secondly he, like MacMillian, was a strong supporter of Churchill. He was over ten years younger than either Halifax or Attlee, by the way. He was, certainly, seen as a 'coming man' but certainly not as a national leader in time of war. He was, however, definitely seen as Churchill's successor ten years later.
Of course he was voted out of office in 1945, when the general perception within the British population was of a desire for change, as expressed by the Labour party's brilliant manifesto slogan of 'Cheer Churchill - Vote Labour.' Incidentally, if he was so unpopular, how was it that he regained the Premiership in October, 1951?
Who would have succeeded Chamberlain later in 1940, assuming that an uncertain peace was still being maintained, is not clear, but Eden was not in the front rank of candidates. Moreover, the appeasement period had already ended ; both Britain & France were rearming, and Churchill's star was on the ascendant, as his concerns about nazi Germany had been proved justified.
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@MilitaryHistoryVisualized In the Mediterranean, carriers had been effective against capital ships. Taranto probably wasn't relevant here, in that the Italian fleet was attacked in port, but in March, 1941, Albacores from Formidable succeeded in crippling the Italian battleship Vittorio Veneto, bringing about the battle of Matapan.
At this point in WW2, the Fleet Air Arm did not see the role of carriers as being that of strike weapons, largely because the 18 inch torpedo, carried by the Swordfish, wasn't deemed capable of sinking enemy capital ships. Instead, their role was to scout for the main battlefleet, provide air cover against the long range enemy aircraft they were expected to encounter, and when opportunity permitted, to inflict sufficient damage on enemy heavy ships in order to slow them down and bring them within range of the RN battlefleet.
They achieved this twice, against Bismarck & at Matapan, and almost succeeded in doing the same to Tirpitz in the Arctic. Tirpitz escaped, but never sortied again.
Needless to say, the Bismarck enthusiasts, ignoring the fact that Fleet Air Arm pilots had trained for this for years, will claim that the damage to Bismarck was both lucky and, somehow, unsporting!
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@dragilxcom4176 'Could have' is actually defined as 'something was possible in the past, but it did not happen.' In other words, it embraces a possibility. Your 'Germany could have shrink Royal Navy with the U-Boats and Luftwaffe bombing' claim does not meet that definition, in that your blithe assumption, presumably based on a clear lack of actual knowledge, was not within the bounds of possibility.
Of course air superiority became dominant later in the war, but if the subject is Sealion then the time is 1940, or more precisely September, 1940, and the air force concerned is the Luftwaffe, then it was still far from attaining that pre-eminence.
The strength of the Luftwaffe in 1939-1940 was as a ground attack force, operating in support of the army. It did not receive any training in anti-shipping operations until Fliegerkorps X began receiving some later in 1940, after Sealion had been abandoned. You haven't challenged the facts I have stated about the Luftwaffe's lack of training, their failure at Dunkirk, or their 'successes' against RN destroyers, I notice. Oddly, you Sealion 'would haves' never do. Probably wise on your part.
Incidentally, although not particularly relevant to my argument, the British were outbuilding the Germans in aircraft, and in particular in fighter aircraft, by June 1940 at the latest.
Whether the Luftwaffe had or hadn't torpedo aircraft technology is irrelevant. The first use of such aircraft, apart from a handful of successes by seaplanes against unarmed merchantmen in the north, was against PQ15, en route to Russia, in May, 1942. Indeed, Goering, on 28 November, 1940, banned the use of the handful of available seaplanes on such operations, and cancelled the production of the LTF-5b, the Luftwaffe's aerial torpedo of which a tiny number existed in 1940.
Incidentally, Hitler did not allow the British to escape, as the decision was made by von Rundstedt, commander of Army Group A. He wished to rest his armour prior to commencement of the second phase of the invasion of France, and feared the possibility of a second 'Miracle of the Marne.'
Finally, I am sorry that you criticise the facts I have stated as 'historical innuendo,' and seek to hide behind your singular self-proclaimed definition of 'could have' rather than continue any discussion, although I appreciate that Sealion enthusiasts and historical facts do not work well together.
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