Comments by "doveton sturdee" (@dovetonsturdee7033) on "Battle: Taranto Raid - Italian Pearl Harbor" video.
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@thecommentaryking Sorry, I suspect you are quoting from O'Hara. That explains a lot.
As I said earlier, there is no reference to Operation White in Cunningham's autobiography.
As to 'the British didn't start moving troops to Greece until Spring of 1941,' odd that, considering that on 15 November, 1940, Berwick, York, Glasgow, and Sydney transported 3400 troops and their stores to Piraeus.
It does, however, seem that, indeed, the Italians were not willing to face the British, as Campioni, at Spartivento, failed to commit to decisive action against Force H, thus allowing the fast convoy for Malta & Alexandria, Operation Collar, to proceed to both destinations unmolested.
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@thecommentaryking Aren't you actually agreeing with Cunningham here? After Taranto, the Italian navy did not challenge the British in open battles. At Spartivento, a superior Italian fleet failed to press home this advantage against Force H, at Matapan, in March 41, it was ambushed, losing three heavy cruisers and two destroyers in a night, as well as a battleship damaged.
Subsequently, the Italian fleet made no attempt to hinder the transfer of Allied troops to Greece, and made no attempt (apart from individual gallant efforts by light units such as Lupo) to escort Axis troops by sea to Crete, with the result that no such troops arrived until the Allied evacuation had more or less completed.
Similarly, at First Sirte, a force of 4 battleships, 2 heavy cruisers, 3 light cruisers and 13 destroyers, failed to press home an attack on a British force of 5 light cruisers and 14 destroyers. Subsequently, Italian heavy ships were notable only by their absence during a number of convoy actions, including Pedestal.
Finally, I would suggest that a philosophy which refuses to risk a battle because of the possibility of losses does rather reflect a significant degree of 'unwillingness.'
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@thecommentaryking Isn't it interesting how, when losing an argument, many people resort to insults and abuse. In this case that I am 'anti-Italian?'
Let us look at the posts again. Initially, you claimed that the Italians defeated the British only five days after Taranto. My response was that the loss of nine aircraft could hardly be compared with the loss/disablement of three battleships. I could have said that Operation White was not really an Italian victory at all, as the respective forces never engaged. It was much more a self-inflicted defeat caused by launching the aircraft too far from Malta. Your next comment was that Cunningham was wrong in suggesting that the Italians would be unwilling to use their heavy units. I, having read what Cunningham's actual views were, simply stated that he really believed that the Italians would use their heavy units more conservatively. You then claimed that the British only started moving troops to Greece in Spring 1941. I proved you wrong. Does correcting your false claim prove me 'anti-Italian? I then pointed out that Campioni failed to press home an attack by a stronger force at Spartivento. You claimed that the forces were equal, but that the British had the advantage of a carrier. Actually, the forces were not equal, and the Italians had the considerable advantage of shore-based air power. I then made a number of factual statements about the subsequent use of Italian heavy units. Apparently, you consider that I was 'using Matapan as an excuse for bashing the Italian' when all I wrote was 'at Matapan, in March 41, it (the Italian fleet) was ambushed, losing three heavy cruisers and two destroyers in a night, as well as a battleship damaged. Are you claiming that the Italian fleet was not ambushed, or that it did not lose three heavy cruisers and two destroyers? Why is a simple, factual statement, proof of 'anti-Italian bias?' Certainly, the British had a number of advantages at Matapan, but the statement I made was, unambiguously, completely accurate. You then sought to expand the debate by making a number of statements about the use of smaller Italian units later in the war. As the discussion had hitherto been about the activities of Italian capital ships, these were irrelevant. Again, nothing I wrote about Sirte was inaccurate. Iachino had an opportunity to inflict a heavy defeat on a weaker British force, without in any way risking M42, which was under no threat at all, but chose not to press home his advantage. I didn't make any mistake in my comments about Crete. I merely said that Italian heavy ships made no attempt to escort surface convoys to the island. Did they? You seem to think that this was all the fault of the Germans. Are you suggesting that in May, 1941, Supermarina had no authority over the Italian fleet? If so, it rather sounds like you are the anti-Italian one. Finally, I made no reference to British activity in the Mediterranean because that was not the matter under debate. In short, I submit that none of my comments show anything in the way of anti-Italian bias. If the Italian naval command chose to apply a policy that could best be described as 'timid' to the use of their heavy ships in WW2, that can hardly be considered my fault!!!
Seriously, if you can't post without using insults rather than arguments, why not simply stop posting?
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@thecommentaryking I suggest that we let anyone who reads this increasingly tedious correspondence decide for themselves who is having the better of the argument, and who seems to find it necessary to resort to inappropriate allegations of nationalist bias. A rather tenuous claim, considering that the subject under discussion is events which took place three quarters of a century ago.
However, to return to your last post. Do I detect a degree of anti-British bias on your part? Surely not, yet you refer to 'fear' in the mind of Admiral Somerville when he withdrew his force. In point of fact, once he became aware of an Italian force of two battleships, two heavy cruisers and sixteen destroyers, just south of Sardinia, he would have been foolish to have continued, as, with one modernised battlecruiser, one modern and one elderly light cruiser, seven destroyers, and two carriers (one of which was for ferry purposes only) he was completely outmatched. He had been advised by his air staff that the aircraft from Argus were within range of Malta and therefore, launched them. Argus herself was capable of only nineteen knots, and it was Somerville's duty to protect her. His only mistake, I submit, was in trusting the advice given him. Had he simply withdrawn his force without launching, this operation would have been lost to history. Still, if you choose to regard it as a wonderful victory, then so be it.
The fact that Cunningham's cruisers transported 'only' 4000 or so men, plus stores, to Piraeus in November, 1940, is irrelevant. In your earlier post you claimed that such operations did not take place until 1941. You were, put simply, WRONG. I assume that you simply did not know about the 1940 troop movement, but cannot now bring yourself to admit it.
At Spartivento, Italian shore based aircraft did attack the British force. How, by the way, you can suggest that a force consisting of a modern battleship, a modernised older battleship, six heavy cruisers, and fourteen destroyers is not superior to one modernised battlecruiser, one heavy cruiser, five light cruisers, fourteen destroyers, an elderly, unmodernised battleship too slow to keep up with the main force, and a carrier defeats me, especially since at the time no aircraft carrier had ever launched a successful air strike against an enemy warship at sea. However, let that pass, as well, and kindly explain to me why, after acting so, apparently, wisely and courageously in refusing to press home his advantage and destroy the British convoy on 27 November, Admiral Campioni was removed from command on 8 December, 1940. Was Supermarina as riddled with anti-Italian bias as, apparently, I am?
So, Iachino was obliged to call off his action at First Sirte in order to protect M42 from Force K? Force K consisted of two light cruisers and two destroyers. The close escort of M42, even without the twenty two warships with which Iachino failed to press home his attack on Vian's small cruiser/destroyer force, consisted of seven destroyers and a torpedo boat. Was the four ship M42, with eight escorts to protect it, really in such peril? I'm sorry that Breconshire was mis-identified as a battleship, but won't comment further on this particular matter.
As to attacks on the British troop convoys of Operation 'Lustre' apparently made by 'smaller units' what exactly did they attack, as between March 6 & April, 1941, Cunningham's fleet transported 68000 men, together with their supporting equipment, without the loss of a single man?
Incidentally, the Germans didn't have any 'landing crafts' for their seaborne transport of troops to Crete, but used requisitioned caiques. One convoy, heading for Maleme, and escorted by a single, gallant, torpedo boat, was more or less wiped out by a Royal Navy cruiser & destroyer force; the other, heading for Heraklion, wisely turned back. Frankly, I neither know nor care who made the decision not to provide heavy naval support for the invasion of Crete. I only know that it was not supplied.
Finally, as the initial post concerned the role played by the heavy ships of the Italian navy in WW2, I don't feel inclined to discuss wider matters of strategy. If you feel inclined to post on such matters, why not do it elsewhere?
Oh, and how exactly is calling someone 'anti-Italian' an argument, in any sense of the term?
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@thecommentaryking Interesting double standards here. You previously suggested that the Italian navy was right to avoid action unless it had odds in it's favour, yet when Somerville does exactly the same this is due to fear of losing. Oh well.
I did not ascribe the comment '"wisely and courageously" to you. Read the post again it you wish. I merely included this throw away comment to see it it would elicit exactly the kind of response that it did!
I haven't made any specific comments about the competence or otherwise of Supermarina. If you have determined that the series of facts I have presented have led you to this conclusion, then that is your conclusion, not mine.
As to the use of smaller forces against Royal Navy forces and convoys, there were precisely two in the Aegean, which you have described. On 14.01.41, Neghelli did indeed damage a freighter, which returned to Pireus, Neghelli herself being sunk by the convoy escorts, whilst on 31.01.41, two torpedo boats damaged a tanker, which was towed to Suda Bay, where the fuel was transferred to another tanker. Neither of these attacks, by the way, were in any way relevant yo Operation 'Lusture.'
You previously posted that 'In the Aegean the Italians knew that their smaller vessels were more capable than the larger units to hinder the British convoys.' If the Italians knew this, why was the sum total of their success against freighters the damaging of a mere two in January?
Certainly, once Operation Lustre began the British used the Antikithera Strait (not canal, by the way,) but are you sure this was in response to the presence of Italian surface ships in the area, and not in order to move their shipping further away from the Dodecanese airfields? Indeed, during Operation Lustre, there were no successes at all by Italian warships against British merchantmen, and no losses at all from the 68000 troops transported. Losses, either of empty transports in port or convoys returning empty, were entirely the result of air attack. Was a small force of Torpedo Boats really the best the Italian Navy could manage in support of their German ally, especially since I understand that it began WW2 with 6 battleships, 21 cruisers, 106 submarines, and over 110 destroyers and torpedo boats?
Doesn't it rather make you question exactly how 'capable' these smaller units actually were, or, indeed, why the Italian navy did not heed a request from the German Naval Attache to the Italian Naval Staff on 19 March, 1941, to the effect that 'the appearance of Italian naval units in the area south of Crete would seriously interfere with British shipping and might even lead to the complete interruption of the transport of troops, especially as these transports are at the moment inadequately protected.'
A caique is a small Aegean fishing vessel, with a timber keel and carvel planking. A landing craft is a small, lightly armoured flat bottomed vessel with a drop down bow ramp, used for delivering assault troops onto open beaches. The fact is that caiques needed a port into which to land their troops, whereas landing craft didn't. Therefore, caiques were rather more vulnerable than landing craft would have been, and needed (but didn't get) a naval escort. That is why the Maleme caique convoy was destroyed, and the Heraklion convoy turned back.
Finally, I didn't realise that it was only permissible to post on here by request.
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@thecommentaryking 'You implied it, don't lie on that.' What did I imply?
When GA8 was attacked by three boats, how many merchantmen were sunk? Certainly, sinking Bonaventure was a feather in Ambra's cap, but largely irrelevant to the balance of naval power in the Mediterranean, especially when you consider what happened a few days later.
'It weren't "a mere two" other happened but you don't care about trying to search those.' As you are the one making the claim, isn't it rather up to you to present the evidence?
'The Italians did send their submarines in search of those convoys, but unfortunately, everytime they did the British didn't launch any convoy operation.' How unfortunate, and damned unsporting of the Royal Navy. Absolutely not cricket, what? As we were supposed to be talking about the use (or, mor properly, lack of use) of Italian heavy ships, then I really fail to see the relevance anyway.
'The majority of the Italian navy operated in the Central Mediterranean, with only submarines, torpedo boats and two destroyers that operated in the Aegean.' As at the time the main effort of the Royal Navy was involved in the transport of troops and equipment to Greece, even if this were true wasn't it an inappropriate use of resources, especially since the Germans had specifically for Italian naval support?
'They were capable enough and there were attacks south of Crete on British convoys' Then provide me with a list of British transports lost to naval attack during Operation Lustre. I research in the naval section of the British National Archives at Kew, and they don't seem to have recorded any. What a curious oversight!
Whether caiques were really caiques, landing craft, canoes, or paddle steamers doesn't really matter anyway, does it? The two convoys desperately needed protection and what did they get? One torpedo boat each. No wonder one convoy was annilhilated and the other didn't try to make the trip.
Instead of making vague, generalised, comments, why not reply with proper facts? You could begin with details of successful operations by Italian heavy ships after Matapan, and end with a moving description of that never to be forgotten day in September, 1943, when the Italian fleet arrived at Malta to accept the surrender of the British garrison there. That was what happened, wasn't it?
I'm sure that the 'Times of Malta' was completely wrong when it wrote 'The arrival of the Italian battle fleet in Maltese waters escorted by British warships was a denouement undreamed of by even the most optimistic Maltese during the previous three harrowing years of the war.'
Alternatively, you could simply stop posting here and find a more gullible site upon which to spout your bizarre delusions.
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@thecommentaryking I did not imply that you used the phrase 'wisely & courageously.' The phrase was used by me, and it you intend to reply to 'implications' then that rather suggests that you lack real arguments.
Actually, I prefer to refer to Allied naval records, and Allied naval records clearly state that no merchantmen transporting troops to Greece during Operation Lustre were lost. Some were sunk in port, or returning from Greece, but by air attack.
You stated 'why the Italians didn't sunk many troopships.' Don't you really mean 'didn't sink, or even damage, ANY troopships?' You then ramble on about the Italians preferring to use smaller vessels. Clearly, with a total lack of success.
The Italian fleet had little to do with the siege of Malta. Malta was under intensive attack from Italian & German aircraft, but the role played by the Italian navy was minimal. Tell me of successful attacks by Italian heavy ships against British convoys to Malta. The convoys, like Malta, faced considerable danger from the air, but the Italian surface fleet was rarely, if ever, a factor. Even the Pedestal convoy in August, 1942, was entirely unmolested by Italian surface ships.
Malta, by the way, is only around 100 miles from Sicily. That the Italian navy lacked the ability to organize a seaborne invasion is quite remarkable. Rather on a par with the Royal Navy in WW2 being unable to capture the Isle of Man, don't you think?
So the Germans didn't ask for help? What about the Tarigo convoy of 16 April, 1941. The Germans sent four troopships, together with an Italian ammunition ship, to North Africa. The best the Italian navy could do was to supply an escort of three destroyers. The result was an attack by four British destroyers, one of which was sunk. However, all five transports and all three destroyers were sunk or, in one case, beached. This, by the way, gives some idea of what a well-handled destroyer force can do to a small convoy. Something similar happened to the Maleme caique convoy off Crete.
As the Italian navy never tried anything similar, of course, they were never able to find this out for themselves.
Actually, you never reply with facts, only excuses. Nothing is ever the Italians' fault. It is always down to lack of radar, lack of nightfighting skills, not having sufficient superiority of numbers, the British having an aircraft carrier, not being kept informed by the Germans, the British not sending their convoys at the right time, and smaller vessels being better for operations against the British off Crete.
Whatever. The facts are that the Italian navy contributed virtually nothing to the Axis campaign in Greece & Crete, and their heavy ships achieved nothing against British convoys even when, after Crete, Cunningham's resources were reduced to a handful of light cruisers and destroyers. Even then, Supermarina insisted upon pursuing a policy of masterly inactivity.
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@thecommentaryking Do you not remember me posting this, only about a day ago? 'Indeed, during Operation Lustre, there were no successes at all by Italian warships against British merchantmen, and no losses at all from the 68000 troops transported. Losses, either of empty transports in port or convoys returning empty, were entirely the result of air attack.'
Therefore, when you posted this :- ' the British lost 25 ships, while in "The Royal Navy in the Mediterranean, vol II" of David Brown the total amount of merchantman lost during Operation Lustre was 12.
So it is clearly you who are wrong.'
You are, in reality, only proving that I am right (as I habitually am.) For your information, 25 merchant ships, totalling 115,026 tons, were lost during Lustre, 18 whilst in port and 7 in convoys returning to Alexandria. All were lost to air attack, and none to attacks by Italian warships. Therefore, once again, I am right, and I am sure your apology when it comes will be gracious.
'Making plans' to invade Malta is hardly impressive, is it? and the reference to insufficient vehicles and equipment hardly passes muster. For heaven's sake, Malta is only about 300 square kilometers in area. Furthermore, who declared war in the first place? I don't think it was the British, was it? As to the British reinforcing their defences, what does this say about the mighty Italian battle fleet, which it seems you now confirm couldn't do much to stop this happening?
You clearly don't know much about the action off Sfax. Firstly, it took place when the convoy was negotiating the shallows around the Kerkennah Islands, secondly there was no bad weather so the convoy had not been scattered, thirdly it took place at night, so your imaginary loss of air support was irrelevant, and fourthly, if you think a Navigatori and two Folgores could have coped with a Tribal and three JKNs, especially when the British force was commanded by Philip Mack, then you really are in Wolkenkuckucksheim.
As to 'Also why should they have risked their heavier units in a area that was controlled by British ships, submarines and aircraft, for few convoys that they might have not even engaged?' Well, the area was hardly controlled by British aircraft, as there were very few in the whole Middle-East and Mediterranean area. Furthermore, Italy had a powerful, modern navy, and an effective, though aging, air force, and was at war with a country which for much of the time was unsupported by any allies other than the Commonwealth, and which generally had a fleet significantly smaller than the Italian.
You seem keen to produce an unending series of reasons for not taking action. Why not provide a description of the circumstances under which you believe it would have been appropriate to 'risk' the Italian fleet.
Tell you what. I have just received a payment into my bank of the royalties from my latest publication. As it is a substantial amount, I am in a very good mood, so don't feel you have to apologise about wrongly accusing me of having made a mistake about Operation Lustre if you don't want to.
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@thecommentaryking 'You are partly right' No, I am completely correct.
'Regia Marina alone couldn't have taken Malta, it needed the Army troops.' Yes, I know. Odd that the Italian armed forces lacked the ability to co-operate effectively.
Mussolini declaring the the war is not the point here. - Yes it is, you can hardly use lack of preparedness as an excuse, although I suppose you can add it to your long list of other excuses.
I didn't say that the Italian Navy was ""mighty"" No, I did, and theoretically it was, had it been used effectively, but it wasn't.
As to the convoy, perhaps you might consider Edward Gibbon's maxim that 'The winds and the waves are always on the side of the ablest navigators.' Odd, by the way, that Italian recon. aircraft couldn't operate, but a Glen Martin Maryland could, wasn't it? Perhaps you might also consider that the weather didn't seem to impede Mack's flotilla. Perhaps, the British & Italian navies had different ideas about what constituted rough weather? Certainly, in the Channel in 1940 the British auxiliary patrol regularly operated when German units considered conditions too rough to venture to sea.
Actually it was, the aircraft carriers operated in the Eastern Mediterranean so yes there were aircrafts. Which 'carriers' were these then? Formidable wasn't involved in the Crete evacuation because of a lack of aircraft, and was damaged by German air attack on 26 May, anyway.
While Italy had a powerful navy it wasn't helped by its allies unlike Britain. So the Germans didn't send 60 U Boats into the Mediterranean, didn't send troops to help Italy in Greece, and didn't send the Afrika Korps to North Africa after Beda Fomm, then?
I wonder if the refusal to supply fuel might have been a chicken & egg situation, in that the Germans weren't willing to supply such fuel to a navy which had shown little sign of acting offensively in the common Axis cause? Perhaps it might make a subject suitable for my next article?
then Regia Marina would have used its fleet more offensively, without the fear of loosing too many units. - But they never actually did, did they? You don't seem to understand what the British call 'The Price Of Admiralty' which, put simply, states that losses must be accepted so long as the ultimate objective is achieved. Or in Cunningham's words when urged by Wavell to abandon the evacuation of Crete following heavy losses to air attack ' It takes the Navy three years to build a ship, but three hundred years to build a tradition. The evacuation will continue.' Rather more inspiring than your endless catalogue of reasons/excuses for inaction and failure, don't you think?
Finally, -several articles and books over a number of years. After leaving University with a First in Modern History, specialising in the European & Atlantic Naval War, I have been a naval historian for a number of years. you might even have read some of my works, although I doubt it. Too much accurate use of facts, and conclusions based on those facts which might not appeal to your world view.
Anyway, I am away now for a while attending a History Conference chaired by a couple of American naval historians on the twin subjects of Sealion and Dynamo, and am to speak on both, so I don't feel inclined to waste further time on this pointless exercise.
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@thecommentaryking I wasn't going to bother again, but you really do have a habit of leaving yourself wide open. Just for your information, Eagle was released from the Mediterranean Fleet on 9 April, 1941, and by 18 April, was at Port Tewfik. Do you consider Port Tewfik to be in the Mediterranean, or is correcting another of your errors simply more proof of my anti-Italianism?
She did not return to the Med. until 23 February, 1942, when she joined Force H, by the way.
Whether you believe me to be a naval historian or not is, frankly, of sublime indifference to me, because it is clear beyond doubt that you aren't.
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@thecommentaryking Very good. However, Eagle could not operate in the Eastern Mediterranean because her unarmoured flight deck left her desperately vulnerable to German dive bombers. At least, that is what Andrew Cunningham said.
Therefore, after 3 March, when she carried out deck landing trials with Brewster Buffalo fighters, she remained in port in Alexandria, repairing faults, boiler cleaning, and waiting for the Suez Canal to be cleared. Later in the month, her air group was transferred to the Port Sudan area in order to attack an Italian destroyer force based at Massawa. She recovered her aircraft after she passed through the canal. Sources, by the way, are 'A Sailor's Odyssey' by ABC, and 'Eagle's War' by Peter C. Smith. Obviously, both are biased.
As to your other comment, as I said I don't really care what you think, but I would be happy for anyone to read through these posts in their entirety to reach his/her own conclusion.
That's it. I am making an early start in the morning, so don't feel inclined to waste more time. I will take a full copy of this correspondence to let my two American colleagues have a read. Hope you don't mind.
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