Comments by "doveton sturdee" (@dovetonsturdee7033) on "History Hustle"
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@archlittle6067 Perhaps you weren't aware that Prince of Wales & Repulse were sunk by torpedo bombers? The Luftwaffe didn't have any torpedo bombers until mid 1942. Perhaps you weren't aware that the 1940 Luftwaffe had not been trained in anti-shipping operations, which is why they failed at Dunkirk? Perhaps you weren't aware that, even after receiving such training, the Luftwaffe, in the whole of the war, sank 31 British destroyers? Just to put that into perspective, the British had 193 destroyers in September, 1939, over 400 by August, 1945, and had over 100 in Home Waters alone by September, 1940. Perhaps you weren't aware that, in the whole of the war, the largest British warship sunk by the Luftwaffe was a light cruiser?
Oh, and you are missing the part where the British were outproducing the Germans in aircraft, particularly fighters, from mid 1940 onwards. You are also missing the part that German fighters lacked the range to accompany their bombers over most of Britain.
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@archlittle6067 Admiral von Holtzendorff, Chief of Staff of the Kaiser's navy, estimated that his boats needed to sink 600,000 tons of Allied shipping per month to starve Britain into submission. Doenitz used the same figure in WW2. Historically, even when the German U-boat fleet had expanded from the 57 boats of December 1939, to 250 in December, 1941, the tonnage sunk was actually 93,226. In fact, between September 1939 & December 1941, tonnage only achieved 300,000, half of the target, on four occasions.
Moreover, should the Germans begin to build a large submarine fleet from, for example, 1936 onwards, the British would conclude that it was directed against them. In such circumstances, does it not occur to you that Britain would accelerated the production of anti-submarine vessels even more rapidly than was actually the case?
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@archlittle6067 It is always interesting to read the opinions of people who are so sure of everything that they see no necessity to check their facts.
1). Quite simply, German fighters had enough fuel to operate for around 10-15 minutes as far north as London. Further north, bombers either operate unescorted and suffer heavy losses (which historically they did, for a while) or operate at night, when they can only bomb areas rather than specific targets. All this time, by the way, British aircraft production grossly exceeds that of the Germans.
2). Which aircraft, U Boats, and patrol boats? Aircraft can only lay magnetic mines in shallow estuaries, not in deeper tidal areas. U-Boats? In September, 1940, the Germans had, on average, 13 at sea on any one day in September 1940. Moreover, in October, 1939, they sent three boats to operate in the Channel. They are still there, with the remains of their crews inside. The heavily (by the British) mined Channel was a death trap for U-boats, which is why the Germans kept well clear of it until after D-Day, when most of the boats they sent were promptly sunk. Patrol Boats? Which patrol boats? There were 13 operational S Boats, and about a dozen destroyers and escort destroyers. There were also seven converted merchantmen intended to lay mines at night. However, the RN had, by September, 1940, several hundred fleet & auxiliary minesweepers. Moreover, the RN carried out nightly destroyer patrols through the Channel, from Plymouth & Sheerness. What happens to the slow-moving minelayers when they encounter a destroyer flotilla?
3). 'Also, you are saying that 300+ Stukas would not stop the Royal fleet?' Yes. The Luftwaffe of 1940 hadn't been trained in anti-shipping operations, which is why it failed to prevent Operation Dynamo. Moreover, it didn't even have an operational torpedo bomber until mid 1942. The anti-invasion fleet didn't need to remain on station. At the time, the RN had around 70 or so light cruisers and destroyers in bases within 5 hours' steaming of Dover, backed up by around 500 smaller warships. In the whole of WW2, by the way, the Luftwaffe, even after the lack of training had been remedied, managed to sink 31 RN destroyers, and no RN warship bigger than a light cruiser.
4). 'The enormous British navy was stationed around the world, not just in England.' No, it wasn't. There was a flotilla of small WW1 destroyers on the China Station, and the Mediterranean Fleet. Other than that, the RN had, operationally, in Home Waters in September, 1940., :- 3 battleships, 2 battlecruisers, 1 carrier, 2 heavy cruisers, 11 light cruisers, & 116 destroyers, together with several hundred smaller warships. A further potential asset, Force H, was four days away at Gibraltar. This consisted of one battleship, 1 battlecruiser, 1 aircraft carrier, and 15 destroyers.
5). U-Boat war. Even though the RN had withdrawn almost all of the available escorts to strengthen the anti-invasion forces, between June & October, 1940 (after which the escorts were released back to Western Approaches Command) the Germans only managed to exceed 50% of their 600,000 tons per month twice, with 356.000 tons in June, & 363,000 in October. In July, the tonnage was below 200,000. They were far from winning the U-Boat war in 1940, despite myths to the contrary.
In fact, the suggestion that " the Luftwaffe failed to use simple external fuel tanks on the Bf 109s that could extend their range over England. This probably cost them the war" is simply not in accordance with the facts. There was far move required to achieve a successful invasion than simply success, temporary or otherwise, against Fighter Command, and the Germans were never in a position to meet any of these conditions.
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@archlittle6067 I don't recall suggesting that British Aircraft Production was all Spitfires. In point of fact, in 1940 the British produced 1252 Spitfires and 2515 Hurricanes. The Germans produced 1667 Bf109s. Perhaps you haven't considered the complaints of people like Galland, which are well documented, and were that, when escorting bombers, the performance of the Bf109 was seriously compromised. Furthermore, you don't seem aware of the British network of Shadow Factories, unless you are able to explain how your mighty Luftwaffe 'would have' successfully attacked factories which they didn't even know existed.
You don't seem to know much about the forces the Admiralty had assembled to counter Sealion, either. Unless of course you can explain how your 10% of Stuka hits on Capital Ships would secure the invasion? I don't recall mentioning capital ships, by the way, because the Admiralty had the Home Fleet based at Rosyth, in order to intercept any (actually, non existent) German Heavy Ships should they emerge. The Admiralty planning provided for a forward striking force of around 70 light cruisers and destroyers, supported by 500 or so smaller warships. The striking force vessels, by the way, were within 5 hours steaming of Dover. There were, also, a further 40 or so destroyers also available in Home Waters, in the unlikely event that reinforcements might be required. Presumably, you believe that each of your 30 Stukas could sink or disable three RN light cruisers or destroyers each? Remarkable, when in the real world the Luftwaffe only managed to sink 31 RN destroyers in the whole of the war. Moreover, what had just happened at Dunkirk, when the Luftwaffe utterly failed to prevent Operation Dynamo.
Why shouldn't the Army build coastal defences? As Shakespeare wrote, it was simply to 'Make assurance doubly sure.'
How does the German navy sweep the RN minefields, with their huge number of 22 Fleet Minmesweepers, when they are not sure where the fields, and can only carry out the operations at night. Moreover, how will these slow, lightly armed vessels avoid the regular RN destroyer patrols which operated from Plymouth & Sheerness? Much the same applied to laying German fields, with their seven converted merchantmen available to carry out the operation. As to Coastal Batteries, the Germans had around 150 heavy, super-heavy, and medium batteries in place by the end of August, and these began firing at British coastal convoys passing through the Channel from 12 August, 1940. From August to December, 1940, 1880 rounds were fired, with no hits achieved. Indeed, in the whole of the war, only seven merchantmen were damaged, and none sunk. The batteries couldn't hit small coasters moving at 8 - 10 knots. Tell me how they would hit destroyers moving at 25+ knots? Moreover, tell me how they would hit these destroyers at night, when they could operate unhindered during the eleven days that the Kriegsmarine required to land the first invasion wave. With the proviso, as Raeder stated to Hitler, that adverse weather or the Royal Navy did not intervene?
I know what the German plan involved. I also know, like Raeder, von Richthoven, and Dinort, that it was not remotely based upon reality.
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@archlittle6067 What is this supposed agreement about the 'numbers game?' Why do you disregard Hurricanes completely, and ignore Galland's legitimate concerns? I notice that you have also ignored the reference to Shadow Factories, as well.
Churchill's ministers said nothing of the sort. Lord Halifax did, supported briefly by Chamberlain, who subsequently backed Churchill's stance. After the success of Dynamo, Halifax was in a tiny minority, and was an irrelevance.
The Battle of Midway was almost two years later, and not relevant to Sealion, in that the Luftwaffe were untrained in the necessary techniques, and lacked to necessary equipment, to have a hope of holding back the Royal Navy's anti-invasion forces. even Von Richthoven & Dinort, the commanders of the dive bomber forces, openly said as much at the time.
Where do 'Kamikaze attacks' which began in 1944 have any relevance to Sealion in 1940? Your reference to me apparently 'proving' anything about them is meaningless.
Finally, Crete. I presume you mean the Crete where no reinforcements reach the German paratroop units by sea until after the decision to evacuate had been taken (by Wavell, the army commander in North Africa, by the way)? Crete where two German troop convoys were sent? Crete where the first convoy, heading for Maleme, was annihilated by a Royal Navy cruiser squadron, and the second, heading for Heraklion, returned to Greece as a result of what happened to the first/
Thanks for making my point about the relevance of sea power at that stage of the war. It saved me from the need to do it.
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@reginaldmcnab3265 So, you haven't an answer then? Actually, the empire came about as a direct result of Sea Power. Places like North America, New Zealand, & Australia were, to the 17th century mind, unoccupied, and ideal areas for settlers to be placed or in terms of Australia, convicts to be dumped. Africa was similar, with the British successfully competing with Belgium, France, The Netherlands and, to a lesser extent, Germany.
India was the end product of the expansion of trade. The East India Company was skilled in playing off one Indian state against another, and the rulers of those states came to realise that their interests were best served by co-operating with the Company. Even when the British government finally took direct control of the governance of India after the mutiny, the actual administration of the country remained almost entirely in the hands of Indians. In 1800, the population of India was 169 million. 100 years later, it was around 240 million. After the mutiny, there were only ever a tiny number of British officials and troops,about 20,000 in all, in India.
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