Comments by "doveton sturdee" (@dovetonsturdee7033) on "The Armchair Historian" channel.

  1. 69
  2. 16
  3. 16
  4. 8
  5. 6
  6. 5
  7. 4
  8. 4
  9. 4
  10. 4
  11. 4
  12. 4
  13. 4
  14. 4
  15. 3
  16. 3
  17. 3
  18. 3
  19. 3
  20. 3
  21. 3
  22. 3
  23. 3
  24. 3
  25. 3
  26. 3
  27. 3
  28. 3
  29. 3
  30. 3
  31. 3
  32. 3
  33. 3
  34. 3
  35. 3
  36. 2
  37. 2
  38. 2
  39. 2
  40. 2
  41. 2
  42. 2
  43. 2
  44. 2
  45. 2
  46. 2
  47. 2
  48. 2
  49. 2
  50. 2
  51. 2
  52. 2
  53. 2
  54. 2
  55. 2
  56. 2
  57. 2
  58. 2
  59. 2
  60. 2
  61. 2
  62. 2
  63. 2
  64. 2
  65. 2
  66. 2
  67. 2
  68. 2
  69. 2
  70. 2
  71. 2
  72. 2
  73. 2
  74. 2
  75. 2
  76. 2
  77. 2
  78.  @tot0m  You haven't heard of the Battle of Arras then? Oh well. You don't know about the air support the British did provide. The problem was that, however many squadrons the British sent, the French asked for more. You don't know how many ships of each nationality were at Dunkirk. Oh well. British, of all types, from cruisers to small vessels, 764. French of all types from destroyers to MFVs, 120, Belgian 45 trawlers, Polish, 1 destroyer, Norwegian, 1 freighter, Dutch, 1 yacht and 1 (British manned) motor boat. The agreement was that French ships would evacuate French troops, and British ships British troops. When it became clear that there were not enough French ships, the British began taking French troops as well. The rearguard, by the way, included both British & French troops. The British subsequently attempted to land troops in Cherbourg, only to be told by General Weygand that the French army was no longer capable of organised resistance. As to France and Belgian being puppets to British diplomacy since 1934, in point of fact France was the dominant military power in the Anglo-French alliance, and Belgian sought to remain neutral, for all the good it did the Belgians. France was the driving force behind the support for Poland. As to the attacks on the French fleet. The British government had no idea how the new, collaborationist, government in France might behave, and had no intention of risking allowing the French fleet to support a German invasion attempt. What subsequently happened in late 1942, when the outlook for the war was markedly different, was irrelevant to what might have happened in Summer 1940. Please do some reading instead of simply posting blind prejudice, for heaven's sake!
    2
  79. 2
  80. 2
  81. 2
  82. 2
  83. 2
  84. 2
  85. 2
  86. 2
  87. 2
  88. 2
  89. 2
  90. 2
  91. 2
  92. 2
  93. 2
  94. 2
  95. 2
  96. 2
  97. 2
  98.  @tomk3732  Oh well. It is clear you have no idea about what Operation Peking was about. Read up on the Romanian Bridgehead. It was hoped by the Polish government, or, more precisely, by Smigly- Rydz, that Polish forces could hold out in the southeast of the country, near the common border with Romania, until relieved by a Franco-British offensive. Munitions and arms could be delivered from the west via Romanian ports and railways. The Polish Navy would then be able to escort the ships delivering the supplies to Romanian ports. There was never going to be British military support for Poland, other than by air or at sea. How could there be, when the British army was only ten divisions in all. Moreover, the Polish government were well aware of this. You would need to ask a French historian why their 100+ divisions failed to act. The Polish destroyers which took part in Operation Peking became part of the Royal Navy when their own country ceased to exist, just as Polish airmen and soldiers became part of the RAF & the British army, but if you believe that their primary ambition when they arrived in Britain was to defend Britain you are sadly deluded. They fought throughout for Poland, and with, of course, justification. The British, by continuing to resist, gave them the opportunity (and the weapons) to do this. Incidentally, you wrote initially that 'Before operation MG Polish commander told his British superiors that this is madness.' You are wrong, because he said that about an earlier plan, Operation Comet, and the same comments had been expressed already by several British commanders. He was, in fact, much less critical of Market-Garden. You really should take no notice of 'A Bridge Too Far,' as much of it is inaccurate.
    2
  99. 2
  100. 2
  101. 1
  102. 1
  103. 1
  104. 1
  105. 1
  106. 1
  107. 1
  108. 1
  109. 1
  110. 1
  111. 1
  112. 1
  113. 1
  114. 1
  115. 1
  116. 1
  117. 1
  118. 1
  119. 1
  120. 1
  121. 1
  122. 1
  123. 1
  124. 1
  125. 1
  126. 1
  127. 1
  128. 1
  129. 1
  130. 1
  131. 1
  132. 1
  133. 1
  134. 1
  135. 1
  136. 1
  137. 1
  138. 1
  139. 1
  140. 1
  141. 1
  142. 1
  143. 1
  144. 1
  145. 1
  146. 1
  147. 1
  148. 1
  149. 1
  150. 1
  151. 1
  152. 1
  153. 1
  154. 1
  155. 1
  156. 1
  157. 1
  158. 1
  159. 1
  160. 1
  161. 1
  162. 1
  163. 1
  164. 1
  165. 1
  166. 1
  167. 1
  168. 1
  169. 1
  170. 1
  171. 1
  172. 1
  173. 1
  174. 1
  175. 1
  176. 1
  177. 1
  178. 1
  179. 1
  180. 1
  181. 1
  182. 1
  183. 1
  184. 1
  185. 1
  186. 1
  187. 1
  188. 1
  189. 1
  190. 1
  191. 1
  192. 1
  193. 1
  194. 1
  195. 1
  196. 1
  197. 1
  198. 1
  199. 1
  200. 1
  201. 1
  202. 1
  203. Simply not true. The full text of the British Ultimatum was as follows: "It is impossible for us, your comrades up to now, to allow your fine ships to fall into the power of the German enemy. We are determined to fight on until the end, and if we win, as we think we shall, we shall never forget that France was our Ally, that our interests are the same as hers, and that our common enemy is Germany. Should we conquer we solemnly declare that we shall restore the greatness and territory of France. For this purpose we must make sure that the best ships of the French Navy are not used against us by the common foe. In these circumstances, His Majesty’s Government have instructed me to demand that the French Fleet now at Mers el Kebir and Oran shall act in accordance with one of the following alternatives; (a) Sail with us and continue the fight until victory against the Germans. (b) Sail with reduced crews under our control to a British port. The reduced crews would be repatriated at the earliest moment. If either of these courses is adopted by you we will restore your ships to France at the conclusion of the war or pay full compensation if they are damaged meanwhile. (c) Alternatively if you feel bound to stipulate that your ships should not be used against the Germans unless they break the Armistice, then sail them with us with reduced crews to some French port in the West Indies — Martinique for instance — where they can be demilitarised to our satisfaction, or perhaps be entrusted to the United States and remain safe until the end of the war, the crews being repatriated. If you refuse these fair offers, I must with profound regret, require you to sink your ships within 6 hours. Finally, failing the above, I have the orders from His Majesty’s Government to use whatever force may be necessary to prevent your ships from falling into German hands." Unfortunately for his crews and his reputation, Admiral Gensoul chose not to pass the full text on the his government. m. Pierre. Either you simply have not read the ultimatum in full before, or you are a liar. I would prefer to believe the former.
    1
  204. 1
  205. 1
  206. 1
  207. 1
  208. 1
  209. 1
  210. 1
  211. 1
  212. 1
  213. 1
  214. 1
  215. 1
  216. 1
  217. 1
  218. 1
  219. 1
  220.  @jonesalex565  So, no explanation of the reasons for the exile of the BEF to Scotland, or indeed answers to any of my other questions. No reference to any contemporary German, French, or British documents either. Just your conversation with a sapper. Presumably, if this man went to Scotland, then you simply assume that the other nearly 200,000 did as well, despite what the regimental diaries from the time all say. You refer to :- Running out of petrol Shiney water 2 weeks of sudden miscommunication with Hitler without explaining what you think you mean. Perhaps you might enlighten people? Or there again, perhaps not! Incidentally, if the British thought that they had been 'let go' why did they immediately begin landing a Second REF in Cherbourg, and only withdrew it after General Weygand, on 14 June, told the commander, Alan Brooke, that the French army was no longer capable of organised resistance? Were they really so confident that the amiable Germans would let them go a second time? What 'debates' are these, to which you refer? I know of no such arguments being put forward by any credible historian working in this area, and I correspond regularly with many, now that regular face to face conversation is not possible. I admit that I do not normally read the extremist nonsense which appears from time to time (like yours, with no supporting evidence at all) from the neo-nazis and hitler lovers, but if you would care to recommend a recent presentation 'proving' that the British were 'let go' I would be happy to read it. Like you, I know that I will be waiting for a long time for such a document. What is the relevance of Hess to Dunkirk, by the way? Although I doubt it, I would be happy to believe that other people are reading this, although your amusing refusal to answer any question put to you might have deterred a few.
    1
  221.  @jonesalex565  You clearly cannot remember your earlier posts. You said that 200,000 men were sent to Scotland, although it now seems to have increased to 300,000. I said that, after a brief period of leave, all clearly documented in Regimental diaries, the men rejoined their regiments. I don't doubt that a number of Scots. went to Scotland, just as the Welsh went to Wales, or the Lancastrians to Lancashire, during their leave period, but to argue that they were all sent to Scotland as you seem to is simply ludicrous, and there is no evidence to support it. Yes, as I said earlier, the men I interviewed were surprised to find that they were regarded as heroes, when they had expected to be vilified, but there is no evidence to suggest a systematic effort to keep them away from the press. Unless you can produce some, and of course, as with the rest of your posts, you cannot. Just as you said Churchill's reference to evacuation did not appear in the newspapers, until I showed you that it did. 'Why did we invade again? Why don't you answer that?' If you mean the Second BEF, which wasn't an invasion, I didn't answer because I hadn't been asked. I suspect that you had never previously heard of the Second BEF. However, the reason was to show continued support for France, in the hope that France would continue to resist. When Weygand told Brooke of the hopelessness of the French situation, the force was withdrawn. The rest of your nonsense (two weeks on beaches, Luftwaffe bombers deliberately missing, (even though around 200 German aircraft were destroyed during Dynamo) irrelevant references to Hess & now to Sicily, and strange, meaningless references to 'shiny water' are unworthy of response.
    1
  222. 1
  223. 1
  224. 1
  225. 1
  226. 1
  227. 1
  228. 1
  229. 1
  230. 1
  231. 1
  232. 1
  233. 1
  234. 1
  235. 1
  236. 1
  237. 1
  238. 1
  239. 1
  240. 1
  241. 1
  242. 1
  243. 1
  244. 1
  245. 1
  246. 1
  247. 1
  248. 1
  249. 1
  250. 1
  251. 1
  252. 1
  253. 1
  254. 1
  255. 1
  256. 1
  257. 1
  258. 1
  259. 1
  260. 1
  261. 1
  262. 1
  263. 1
  264. 1
  265. 1
  266. 1
  267.  @tot0m  'You seems to deny that French, Belgian and British officer were in very bad terms on may/june 1940.' When have I ever expressed such a view? 'You seems to deny that British command didn't trust French army were able to perform, so they preferred to flee without referring to french command, and make french and belgian armies in worse position to defend.' When have I ever expressed such a view? Moreover, when, historically, did this happen? When Belgium capitulated, the British 3rd Division was obliged to plug a 20 mile gap between the BEF and French forces by conducting a 25 mile night march of 13000 men, which they did on 27/28 May, in order to link up with French forces at Nieuport. Was that fleeing without telling the French? 'You seems to deny that french troops and french officiers mostly wanted to try to defend while british troops and officers mostly abandonned their lines, or doesnt wanted to concert with french command.' When have I said that? 'You seems to be trash against french command who asked for more help.' I have simply stated what actually happened. I don't think anything in my earlier comment can be regarded as 'trashing.' 'On what purpose ? You didn't even gave fact, you just deny facts without proof. So that I bet you maybe english patriot, keen on propaganda and myth about glorious british army.' You facts seem to consist of vague nonsense such as claiming that the British ran away, or were willing to fight to the last Frenchman, or abandoned their allies at Dunkirk. None of these 'facts' of yours have any connection with what actually happened. Where I have made counter-arguments, I have provided supporting evidence. Comments about what 'The British' thought (or, despite your claims, actually didn't think) in the 1920s & 1930s are irrelevant. In March, 1933, Churchill said in Parliament : "there are a good many people who have said to themselves, as I have been saying for several years: “Thank God for the French Army”. 'And so do the British, they doesnt wanted any casualties to defend french soil anymore like in ww1.' Of course they didn't, but they were willing to send a 'Reconstituted BEF' under Alan Brooke, to Cherbourg, and were willing to continue the fight, until General Weygand told him that the French army was no longer able to provide organised resistance. By the way, there were 78000 British troops killed, wounded, or captured during the campaign in France, excluding losses among naval personnel. What was that about fighting to the last Frenchman again? Seriously, if you aren't able to post credible arguments, supported by evidence, but insist instead on chanting outdated nationalistic prejudices, then why do you bother?
    1
  268. 1
  269. 1
  270. 1
  271. 1
  272. 1
  273. 1
  274. 1
  275. 1
  276. 1
  277. 1
  278. 1
  279. 1
  280. 1
  281. 1
  282. 1
  283. 1
  284. 1
  285. 1
  286. 1
  287. 1
  288. 1
  289. 1
  290. 1
  291. 1
  292. 1
  293. 1
  294. 1
  295. 1
  296. 1
  297. 1
  298. 1
  299. 1
  300. 1
  301. 1
  302. 1
  303. 1
  304. 1
  305. 1
  306. 1
  307.  Peter  Well, try this. The Scharnhorsts & Bismarcks had incremental armour, which hadn't been used in American capital ships since the Nevadas, and in British ones since the Nelsons, but had been superceded by the superior All-or-Nothing pattern. The Scharnhorst and Bismarcks had outdated low angle secondary armament, which had been discarded by the US navy since the Washingtons, and in the British navy since the King George Vs, in favour of a dual purpose system. The Scharnhorsts were desperately undergunned, with a weight of broadside of 6552 lbs. By comparision, the US Washingtons had a broadside weight of 24300 lbs, the British Nelsons 18432 lbs, and the British King George Vs 15900 lbs. Bismarck had a weight of broadside of 14112 lbs, but achieved it by the outdated use of four twin turrets, when the British & Americans were using the three multiple gunned turret design, saving both weight & space. The Scharnhorsts had 13.8 inch armoured belts, and 4.1 inch decks. The Bismarcks 12.6 inch belts and 4.7 inch decks. The Washingtons, by comparison 12 inch belts & 3.6 inch decks, the Nelsons 14 inch belts and 6.25 inch decks, and the King George Vs 14 inch belts and 6 inch decks. All the Scharnhorsts (32 knots) and the Bismarcks (29 knots) had was speed. The Washingtons (28 knots) and the KGVs (27.5 knots) were slightly slower, and the Nelsons (23 knots) much slower. Thus, the German ships could avoid action, but once forced into it were utterly outclassed. I don't supposed you even know that internal communications in both the Scharnhorsts & the Bismarcks ran between the incremental layers of armour, when resulted in Bismarck losing these, and most of her main armament, within about 20 minutes when engaged on 27 May? I don't need a 'sense of bullshit entitlement,' just knowledge of the facts. A pity you don't have the same level of understanding.
    1
  308. 1
  309. 1
  310. 1
  311. 1
  312. 1
  313. 1
  314. 1
  315. 1
  316. 1
  317. 1
  318. 1
  319. 1
  320. 1
  321. 1
  322. 1
  323. 1
  324. 1
  325.  @Glynnwilliamson  You mean like in early 1942, when the British and Canadians had to send 34 escorts to the American East Coast, because Ernie King chose to ignore British Admiralty warnings and allow American merchant shipping to be slaughtered within sight of the (brightly illuminated) US coast. Or mid 1942, when there were 12 Escort Groups protecting SC, HX, & ON convoys? Of these, seven (B1 B7) were British, four (C1 C4) Canadian, and one (A3) theoretically American. I say 'theoretically' because it consisted of British & Canadian destroyers, and two US Coastguard cutters. The cutters were soon withdrawn to other duties, and the Group redesignated C5. There were, once the cutters left, no American warships on North Atlantic escort duty. The British & Canadians managed to win the battle all by themselves. The US Navy never really 'arrived' in the North Atlantic. As to D-Day, the naval plan was drawn up by a team led by Vice-Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay, who was also Naval Forces Commander on 6 June. Of 4127 landing craft, 3261 were British & Canadian crewed. There were 1213 warships at D-Day; 892 were British or Canadian. There were 11600 Allied aircraft; two thirds were RAF, and the combined force was commanded by Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory. Two of every three men who landed on 6 June were British or Canadian, and I leave you to guess who the Ground Forces Commander was. The pre-invasion minesweeping was carried out entirely by British & Canadian sweepers, and the Mulberry artificial harbours, without which the whole thing would have been impossible anyway, were a British invention.
    1
  326. 1
  327. 1
  328. 1
  329. 1
  330. 1
  331. 1