Comments by "doveton sturdee" (@dovetonsturdee7033) on "The worst naval decision of WW2? - The Destruction of PQ17" video.

  1. In the case of PQ17 Palomares & Pozarica were fast fruit carriers, owned by the MacAndrews Line, and used between Britain & Spain. Both ships were fast (for merchantmen), at 13.5 knots, displaced just under 2000 tons, and were quite manoeuvrable. In 1941, they were two (of nine) similar vessels selected by the Admiralty for conversion into AA Ships. These two were fitted with 4 x twin 4 inch guns, and 2 x 4 barrelled pom poms, which gave them more or less the same AA capabilities as a modern Town or Colony class kight cruiser. Later in the war, they were further converted into fighter direction ships
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  2. Nonsense, start to finish. Ohio was transferred to the British Eagle Oil Company specifically in order to have a large fast tanker available for Pedestal. The US War Shipping Administration notified her captain that she was to be requisitioned. Her crew was replaced with a British one because of the critical nature of the mission, and because the British at that time were more experienced in the demands of sailing in convoy. The captain and crew were unhappy at being replaced, but at no time were arrested. In the event, two of the ships which did sail had American crews. Five ships of the convoy arrived. Ohio was the only one under tow, actually being attached by cables to two destroyers, with a third close astern to help with the steering. There was no American carrier involved at any time, before or after Pedestal, in escorting Malta convoys, although USS Wasp did carry out two ferry trips, in order to fly RAF Spitfires into Malta, in April, 1942. The British carrier sunk during the Operation, HMS Eagle, was actually torpedoed by a U-Boat, not sunk by air attack. Might I ask why, when you obviously have little accurate knowledge of the circumstances of Operation Pedestal, you even bothered posting?
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  3. Actually, they have shown more appreciation than succeeding British governments. As one concrete example, around ten years ago, a number of Russian companies funded & carried out repairs to HMS Belfast's masts.
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  4. You consider that Pound's decision, which led to the loss of 24 merchantmen and 153 merchant seamen, was worse that Ernie King's refusal to institute American East Coast convoys, which led to the loss of 360 merchantmen and some 5000 merchant seamen? Oh well. It takes all sorts.
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  5. Not correct. Two Russian destroyers met the reformed remnants of the convoy on the morning of 10 July, which was not only well after the fact that Tirpitz had not sailed was well known, but also when the surviving ships, with their remaining escorts, were within 24 hours of docking. Read Richard Woodman 'Arctic Convoys' for a fuller account.
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  6. The decision to scatter the convoy had nothing to do with Tovey, or Hamilton or Broome for that matter. It came direct from the Admiralty, and was based, as far as anyone on the spot knew, on up-to-date intelligence.
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  7. The rotors were changed on a regular basis.
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  8. Andrew Cunningham was 60 in 1943. Chester Nimitz was 58 in 1943. Dwight Eisenhower was 54 in 1944. Georgi Zhukov was 49 in 1945. William Slim was 52 in 1943.
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  9. It wasn't treacherous, neither was it cowardly. It was a serious misjudgment made by a man who was dying of an undiagnosed brain tumour. Yes, he was wrong, yes, should have taken more notice of his intelligence staff, and yes, he should have left the final decision to the men on the spot (in this case, Hamilton and Broome), but the words you use are inappropriate.
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  10. How was that, pray?
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  11. Pound's entire staff opposed his decision. You don't perhaps think that the (undiagnosed) brain tumour from which he was suffering might have played a part?
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  12. There were 78 Arctic convoys between August 1941, and May 1945. The Germans managed to inflict serious losses on two, despite having most of their surface fleet, and substantial numbers of U-boats and aircraft, based in Norway. Would you care to re-assess who was afraid of whom?
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  13. The worst naval decision of the war was undoubtedly made by King, when he refused to set up a convoy system on the US East Coast, resulting in the loss of over 600 merchantmen.
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  14. The laughable scene in 'A Bridge Too Far' upon which you seem to base you comment is fictional. Pound was very concerned about Allied lives. He just made an error in judgement, at a time when he was already dying of a brain tumour.
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  15. The Soviet and later Russian governments have always acknowledged the role of the Arctic convoys. Veterans were even awarded Russian medals years before British Prime Minister David Cameron was shamed into doing the same by public pressure in the UK.
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  16. Churchill was wrong to send troops to Greece, but it was hardly an invasion. He had previously said that any state which opposed the axis would have Britain's support. This was the first test of that resolve. As to the Fall of Tobruk, that happened in June, 1942. Crete had ended thirteen months earlier.
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  17. the 'cowardly arse' at the Admiralty was suffering with a brain tumour which killed him shortly afterwards, and which probably affected his judgement.
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  18. Isn't it easy to make such profound judgements from a comfy chair eighty years after the event? At the time, Admiral Hamilton & Captain Broome thought that they were taking their ships into action against a superior German force. Only many hours later did the full extent of Pound's mistake become apparent.
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  19.  @benwilson6145  More cosy armchair judgements. Hamilton and Broome were ordered to withdraw to the west, and both believed that that was the position of the German Task Force. In other words, between the convoy and Iceland. They acted on the assumption that Pound had specific information. Unlike you, they didn't know that he had simply made a disastrous mistake. The relevant signals to CS1 were :- 2111 ADMY to CS1 :Cruiser Force withdraw to the westward at high speed. 2123 ADMY to CS1 Owing to threat from surface ships, convoy is to disperse and proceed to Russian ports. Based on those, Broome sent those PQ17 escorts with torpedoes to join Hamilton, in what both expected to be a desperate fight against odds to protect the merchantmen.
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  20. I think that was SC122, HX229, & HX229A.
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  21. Nothing of the sort. He wrongly ordered the convoy to scatter, in defiance of the best intelligence advice, because he had concluded that a Tirpitz led battlegroup was in the vicinity of the convoy.
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  22.  @Me-fm9zk  That pre-supposes a successful German invasion of Great Britain. By the time Germany attacked the Soviet Union, that possibility had long passed, and Britain was greatly outproducing Germany in war materials.
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  23.  @eifionjones559  You mean about all the times convoys were fought through by small escort groups in the face of U-Boat or aircraft attack, or the times destroyers repelled German heavy cruisers seeking to destroy Arctic convoys? I would be glad to.
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  24. Not correct. Dudley Pound, who made the wrong decision to scatter the convoy, was in the early stages of a brain tumour which first paralysed and then killed him, but he didn't resign until September, 1943. As to 'from that day forward US Navy warships escorted American cargo ships to allied countries under American Command' I presume you are, in view of this statement, unaware of the fact that there were twenty-three Arctic outward bound convoys after PQ 17, all with Royal Navy escorts. These convoys included at least 348 US flagged nerchantmen. Furthermore, from late 1942, there were eleven Atlantic Escort Groups protecting SC, HX, & ON convoys. Six groups were British, four Canadian, and one American, which consisted of a mixture of British, Canadian, and (two) American warships. After the two American coastguard cutters were withdrawn from this Group, it was redesignated as a Canadian group. By Mid 1943, there were seven British groups, and five Canadian ones. There were no American groups operating in support of SC, HX, & ON convoys. Would you care to re-consider your earlier claim?
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  25. Probably a fault in the gyro caused by the cold sea.
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  26. Perhaps you might give details of the many Russian tanker convoys which you believe transported this oil to the grateful Anglo-Americans?
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  27. The convoys weren't stopped. PQ 18 sailed after a delay of around two weeks, largely accounted for by the transfer of much of the Home Fleet to the Mediterranean in order to get Operation Pedestal through to Malta. Pedestal completed on 15 August, after which much of the fleet returned to home waters, and PQ18 sailed on 2 September.
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  28. This was not the 'worst naval decision of WW2.' For that, simply look at Admiral King's refusal to set up a convoy system for the East Coast of the United States, despite being warned that, after the German declaration of war, U-boats were on their way, as part of Operation Paukenschlag. The result? Over 600 merchant ships, mainly American, sunk, and around 5,000 merchant seamen killed, often within sight of the (still fully lit) lights of the US coast.
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  29.  @nickdanger3802  Oddly, enough, it didn't. My research only uncovered real facts. Such as how the 'little help' against the Japanese involved the campaign in Burma, culminating in the defeat of the U-Go offensive and the 55,000 casualties suffered by the Japanese army during that one battle. Or the fact that escorting North Atlantic supply convoys was almost entirely the responsibility of RN & RCN Escort Groups. From the winter of 1942, there were eleven Escort Groups responsible for SC, HX and ON convoys, of which six were British, four Canadian, and one American Look up 'Mid-Ocean Escort Force' and you will discover that, by the summer of 1943, United States Atlantic escorts had focused on the faster CU convoys and the UG convoys between Chesapeake Bay and the Mediterranean Sea; and only British and Canadian escorts remained on the HX, SC and ON convoys. Specifically, there were seven British, four Canadian, and one US Escort Groups, (B1-B7, C1-C4, and A3), after the Britsh B5 group had returned from detached service. Even then, this is misleading, as A3 consisted of two US Coastguard Cutters and a number of Canadian corvettes. Indeed, when the cutters were detached, the Group became a fully Canadian one, renumbered C5. The enormous contribution of US industry to the war effort has never been denied, but this fixation you and others seem to have for listing it is on a par with giving the credit for a Home Run to the bat, rather than the batter wielding it. Moreover, I notice that you neglect to refer to the range of technological advances which the British developed, and which were made available to their American allies. The trade, despite your evident fixation, was not one-sided. You write as if the British Commonwealth and Empire were mere bystanders, gratefully accepting the noble generosity of US largesse. This odd insistence by some that only the United States played any relevant role in WW2 is an odd and strangely perplexing one. National pride is one thing, but not when it degenerates into one-eyed jingoism. I correspond with a number of American historians as part of what could perhaps be considered my 'day job.' Most of them are equally puzzled. Oh, and how is any of this relevant to 'The Worst Naval Decision of WW2?'
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  30. No. Iceland was in too stragetically important a location to be left alone. The British & Americans oxxupied it.
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  31. The cruisers and destroyers of CS1 and PQ17 thought that they were heading into a battle with a German task force, not that they were abandoning the convoy. There are even accounts of Broome's destroyers, as they steamed through the convoy, being cheered by the crews of the merchantmen.
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  32. It wasn't a single German ship. The Germans intended to send Tirpitz, three heavy cruisers, and 12 destroyers. Pound ignored the advice of his staff, who were convinced that the squadron had not sailed. The reason seems to have been that, unknown to anyone at the time, he was in the early stages of a brain tumour which eventually killed him, and which was probably distorting his judgement.
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  33. No, they were not.
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  34. Really? The British ran 78 convoys to & from Russia in WW2. Only two suffered serious losses. Some 85 merchant ships never made it – nor did 16 Royal Navy warships. You should not listen to 'theories' put forward by cretins.
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  35.  @eifionjones559  Why was it 'cowardice' to detach from a convoy in order to engage with a superior foe? That was what Hamilton's cruiser squadron and Broome's destroyers believed that they were doing. The failure was Pound's, not theirs.
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  36. The 36 is correct, assuming that the two fleet oilers, Aldersdale & Grey Ranger, are counted separately, and not included as part of the convoy. 21 US registered ships, 13 British (including the rescue ships and the two oilers), 2 Russian, 1 Panamanian, & 1 Dutch. EG1, commanded by Jackie Broome, consisted of six destroyers, Keppel, Fury, Leamington, Ledbury, Offa & Wilton, four corvettes, La Malouine, Dianella, Lotus, & Poppy, three minesweepers, Halcyon, Salamender & Britomart, two AA ships, Palomares and Poizarica, two submarines, P614 & P615, (both boats building for Turkey in 1939, and taken over by the RN, incidentally), and four armed trawlers, Lord Austin, Northern Gem, Ayrshire, & Lord Middleton,
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  37. Presumably, not like the Hurtgen Forest at all, then?
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  38. Waziristan was part of India during the Raj.
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  39.  @immad9706  Not that it matters, but the British maintained a permanent garrison in Waziristan, after defeating an insurrection in 1919-20.
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  40. Actually, 'All escorts with torpedoes join the cruiser squadron in order to engage a powerful German battle squadron.'
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  41. Seriously, this does not compare with what really was the worst naval decision of WW2, which was Ernie King's refusal to institute a convoy system along the US East Coast, which made possible the Second Happy Time, and the loss of over 600 merchantmen.
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  42. Pound's intelligence staff could not give any reassurance to him that Tirpitz had not sailed, but told him that they would have expected to have received more definite information if she had. Pound chose to ignore this, and ordered the scattering of the convoy at 21.36 on 4 July. Tirpitz and her battlegroup did actually sail on 5 July, but returned to port almost immediately once it became clear that the convoy had scattered. Pound should have left the decisions to Hamilton, the commander of the cruiser covering force in the area, who had four heavy cruisers and supporting destroyers, and was joined by additional destroyers from the close escort once the scatter order had been given, in the mistaken belief that the Admiralty had more definite information, and that they were about to fight a desperate, against the odds, action. For some months thereafter Hamilton's cruiser, HMS London, was known within the Home Fleet as the 'Wop Flagship.' In December, 1942 protecting JW 51B, a British force of four fleet & one escort destroyers successfully fought off a German force of two heavy cruisers and six destroyers, before two supporting light cruisers engaged and damaged one of the heavy cruisers, which then returned to port at high speed. Possibly Pound's medical condition let to his misjudgment. I doubt his successor, Andrew Cunningham, would have made a similar decision.
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  43. Perhaps you don't understand that the tumour affected his judgement?
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  44. No one told the Poles to fight anyone. Poland was invaded without warning, rather like Denmark, Norway, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, & Belgium, and was obliged to resist. No one offered half of Europe to the Soviets. The Soviets simply took it, after themselves being attacked without warning. Perhaps you believe that the Western Allies should have themselves attacked the Soviets in 1945. After years of praising the gallant Uncle Joe and the noble Russian people, how would you have sold that to the citizens of the US, Britain, & Canada?
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  45. Rather more than one battleship. The German task force was intended to consist of Tirpitz, three heavy cruisers, ten destroyers and two torpedo boats.
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  46.  @touristguy87  I am not quite sure what you are talking about. I have simply corrected your misunderstanding that Tirpitz was intended to be on a lone mission. She was intended to lead a powerful Task Force, every ship of which was already based in Norway. Just to clarify, this was to consist of Tirpitz, the heavy cruisers (pocket battleships) Lutzow and Admiral Scheer, the heavy cruiser Admiral Hipper, the destroyers Friedrich Ihn, Hans Lody, Karl Galster, Theodor Reidel, Richard Beitzen, Z24, Z27, Z28, Z29 & Z30, and the torpedo boats T7 & T15. However, several ships ran aground when leaving their fjords, and the operation was abandoned when news of the scattering of PQ17 was received. I wouldn't have expected the RAF to have played much of a role in protecting the convoy, by the way.
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  47.  @touristguy87  You don't recall posting 'all because of one battleship, they expose the entire convoy to the Luftwaffe and to the U-boats. Schweet!' some four months ago? You have my sympathy. Memory loss can be very traumatic.
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  48.  @touristguy87  Evidently, you don't enjoy being corrected. Odd that, as with your attitude and lack of actual knowledge, it surely must happen on a fairly frequent basis. If you like, I would be happy to recommend a book or two which confirm my information?
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  49.  @touristguy87  All I have done is point out your error. Put in language simple enough for you to understand, I hope, the fact is that the Germans intended to send a substantial task force against PQ17, not, as you seem to believe, a single battleship. You have no idea what my opinions about Pound's action are. I have simply corrected the error in your original post, and it seems you have taken offence.
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  50.  @touristguy87  Perhaps you might explain the relevance of the Bernau Post Office to PQ17? I, and most people, I suspect, am struggling to understand it. Oh, and eight of the 24 merchantmen lost were sunk by aircraft, and several others sunk by U-boats after being damaged by aircraft. The losses were not 75%, and nor were they all the results of submarine attack. I wonder if you actually know any of the facts about PQ17 at all, frankly? Of course none of the convoy were sunk by surface action, because the task force never sailed. By the way, what is the reason for the speech marks, as in "heavy battlecruisers" Are you suggesting I made such a reference earlier. Rather unlikely as, evidently unlike you, I know that the German navy in WW2 never had any such vessels. What is the 'concept' which you think confuses me, by the way? Why are you getting increasing choleric about my simple correction of your original error, I have, of course, ignored your second paragraph about Chinese bombers and the 'Battle of Linconshire' as it seems to me to be irrelevant, demented, rambling.
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  51.  @touristguy87  How is explaining the facts to someone ignorant of them pedantry? Actually, the correct term is 'education'. If yours had been adequate, you would have known that Tirpitz was never intended to sail alone. Clearly, I haven't failed, as you would not be continually bleating because your ignorance was exposed.
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  52.  @touristguy87  It seems that there is something seriously wrong with your intellect, or rather lack of intellect. Normal people, when informed of facts of which they were previously unaware, tend to post a brief acknowledgment, or a note of thanks. They do not fly off the handle like a crazed prima donna, as you have done. In view of your obvious limitations and problems, I won't respond further. If you find being put right so painful to your ego, perhaps you might buy a book about PQ17? There are many available, all of which confirm the comments I have written.
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  53.  @touristguy87  Why do you now feel the need to insult blind people? Actually, as someone with a First in Modern History, and a number of books and articles about WW1 & WW2 naval history already published, I am lowering my standards by communicating with someone as ignorant and, frankly, stupid, as yourself. Therefore, I won't waste further time on such a lost soul.
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  54. Not really well informed about WW2, are you?
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  55. Except that, on this occasion, the Germans were more successful than the Japanese ever were.
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  56. Tovey's distant covering force was nowhere near close enough to intercept the Tirpitz force.
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  57.  @samulivainionpaa9338  I said 'one concrete example.' The Russians also presented medals to British seamen who had served in the Russian Convoys, years before Cameron was shamed into doing the same.
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  58. First, Tirpitz had to put to sea, and she almost never did. That is the problem when you seek to deal with a Fleet in Being.
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  59. But they weren't sent against aircraft.
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  60. Pound had a brain tumour, which led to his death. It might even have been the cause of his flawed judgement. Actually, warships with torpedoes joined Admiral Hamilton's squadron, as they fully expected to encounter the German Task Force.
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  61.  @nickdanger3802  In September, 1939, there were 57 U-boats, of which 39 were operational boats. By January, 1942, there were 250, of which 88 were operational. Between Sept. 39 and January, 42, 69 boats had been sunk. The U-boat arm reached it largest size in January, 1945, with 453 boats. What do you think any of this proves? Perhaps that boats under construction in shipyards are more difficult to destroy than boats actively in combat? During the Battle of the Atlantic, 808 boats were lost. Of these, 84 were destroyed in harbours or shipyards near the end of the war, and 86 to various causes (collision, accident, scuttling, internment, etc.) Of the remaining 638, 257.5 were lost to RN or RCN warships, 196 to Coastal Command, 86 to USAAF & USN aircraft, and 48.5 to US navy warships. The source is 'The U-boat Offensive, 1914-1945' by V.E.Tarrant, if you choose to doubt my word. I'm not sure why you feel the need to refer to WW1 when the subject is 'the worst naval decision of WW2,' but a few other facts of interest concerning Paukeschlag, and Ernie King's lack of response to it. Merchant ship losses :- Jan. 1942 Losses 56. In convoy 6. Stragglers 7. Independents 43 Feb. 1942 Losses 72. In convoy 10. Stragglers 1, Independents 61 Mar. 1942 Losses 93. In convoy 3, Stragglers 1, Independents 89 Apr. 1942 Losses 81. In convoy 3. Independents 78. May 1942 Losses 129 In convoy 14, Independents 115. Jun. 1942 Losses 136 In convoy 14. Independents 122. Just for comparison, losses for the last six months before the entry of the United States into the war :- July 1941 Losses 26. In convoy 10. Stragglers 2. Independents 14. Aug. 1941 Losses 27, In convoy 18 Independents 9. Sept.1941 Losses 57. In convoy 39. Stragglers 4. Independents 14. Oct. 1941 Losses 28. In convoy 17. Independents 11. Nov. 1941 Losses 15. In convoy 7. Stragglers 2. Independents 6. Dec. 1941 Losses 23. In convoy 6. Independents 17. Odd that the in convoys losses don't change significantly, but the independents do. Perhaps more detailed examination of the locations of the Independent losses might shed some light on the issue, I suggest? Don't bother. I did it some years ago as part of my degree.
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  62.  @nickdanger3802  Please refer me to any post of mine in which I have claimed that 'somehow the USA was obligated to aid Britain in the war Britain started.' Well, 'what causes me to get my ass on my shoulders is the attitude' commonly expressed that the United States won WW2 almost entirely unaided, and that Britain was a helpless bystander, contributing little or nothing to the Allied cause.
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  63.  @nickdanger3802  I know about WS12X. I thought that the issue on this thread was 'The worst naval decision of WW2?' or more generally the Battle of the Atlantic. To refer to the 'Office of the Historian,' of the United States' Department of State, :- 'Although British Prime Minister Winston Churchill later referred to the initiative (Lend Lease) as “the most unsordid act” one nation had ever done for another, Roosevelt’s primary motivation was not altruism or disinterested generosity. Rather, Lend-Lease was designed to serve America’s interest in defeating Nazi Germany without entering the war until the American military and public was prepared to fight. At a time when the majority of Americans opposed direct participation in the war, Lend-Lease represented a vital U.S. contribution to the fight against Nazi Germany.'
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  64.  @nickdanger3802  You seem consistently to misunderstand my posts. I challenge you to refer to any of them in which I deny the importance of the contribution of the United States in WW2. Where we appear to part company is my refusal to tolerate your persistent theme that the role of the British Commonwealth and Empire was a minor, largely irrelevant, one.
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  65.  @nickdanger3802  'Pound's Greatest Hits.' You are ranting, old chap. A shame, as I can remember a time when much of what you posted was rational. What has changed? Which of the above can be laid at the personal door of Dudley Pound, apart from PQ17? Perhaps the concept of 'The Price of Admiralty' is unknown to you? Do you seriously suggest, for example, that the failure of a captain to dispose of his confidential bags, a ship sunk in harbour by an audacious U-boat captain, or a successful German strategic retreat following RAF shortcomings, can be put down to failures on the part of Pound? Seriously? Oh well.
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  66.  @nickdanger3802  'Who gets to use the bat?' Note the date. At a time when Britain was actually fighting a war which the US Office of the Historian, in terms of the 'Altruistic' Lend-Lease, as 'Lend-Lease was designed to serve America’s interest in defeating Nazi Germany without entering the war until the American military and public was prepared to fight. At a time when the majority of Americans opposed direct participation in the war, Lend-Lease represented a vital U.S. contribution to the fight against Nazi Germany.'
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  67.  @nickdanger3802  'Since u r got smarter brains then me and is mor saner then me, splain how Britain andor the USSR was gonna win the war in Your Rope without the US of Merica.' I await a translation of this sentence into English with interest.
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  68.  @historigraph  Operation Pedestal? A movie? Unlikely. Not enough Americans involved, and it was a British success. Anathema!!!
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  69. What leads you to that conclusion about Churchill?
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  70.  @boatybear1013  1. On the basis that 'The enemy of my enemy is my friend.' He even said as much in Parliament. 2. So? He believed that a united Europe would be a means of preventing future wars. He did not, however, believe that Britain should be part of it. 3. How Hollywood interpreted or presented Churchill has no relevance to the reality. 4. As did many other people who were regarded as social reformers. Bertrand Russell for one. You really should not seek to back-project your personal opinions onto people from the past 5. He bears no responsibility for events after his time.
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  71. They were actually failed by one very sick old man who, unbeknown to anyone at the time, was in the early stages of a terminal illness.
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  72. Yes there is. It often features Valentines, but Shermans appear as well.
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  73. No, but he was terminally ill with a brain tumour.
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  74. I expect that those who sailed with PQ18 or JW51B would have expressed rather different views.
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  75. Or Ernie King's failure to institute a convoy system off the US East Coast, which led to the loss of over 600 merchantmen and the deaths of around 5000 seamen?
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  76.  @nickdanger3802  What does this post even mean?
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  77. How was Tirpitz, three heavy cruisers, and twelve destroyers (the intended Tirpitz Battlegroup) 'one ship?'
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  78. The convoys in the movie 'The Imitation Game' were supposed to be SC122, HX229, & HX229A, from March 1943. Nothing to do with PQ17. The story in the movie is false. There was a period between February & October, 1942 when the Germans had introduced a four rotor Enigma machine, which the British were unable to break. On 30 October, however, a machine and codebooks were captured from a sinking U Boat by HMS Petard, two of her crew being drowned aboard U559 when she sank. By March, 1943, using these documents and the captured books, the four rotor Enigma had been broken. It didn't happen as the rather disappointing movie suggested, and it had nothing to do with PQ17.
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  79.  @zenko247  I have. I have also attended lectures at Bletchley Park, and even met one or two of the last living Bletchley veterans.
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  80.  @frostedbutts4340  All the later convoys were as well. Of 78 Arctic convoys, two only suffered significant losses.
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