Comments by "doveton sturdee" (@dovetonsturdee7033) on "Malaya 1941: The Sinking of Repulse and Prince of Wales" video.

  1. Happily, Bill Tennant survived, played an important role in Overlord, and retired as a Vice-Admiral.
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  2. In point of fact, a 20 year old fast battleship was sunk by a brand new battleship, which was itself destroyed by a 15 year old battleship three days later. To quote General Heinrici of Army Group Vistula in 1945., 'I have learned not to praise the day until the evening comes.' The evening, for Bismarck, came on 27 May, 1941.
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  3.  @netrolancer1061  Well, not according to Bob Ballard or David Mearns, who both stated that 'the British' sank Bismarck. In point of fact, by the time she sank, she had lost her main armament, her bridge superstructure and command staff, and her internal communications. She was extensively on fire, listing heavily, and settling by the stern. Hardly scratched, in your mind, I suppose? In fact, she had been reduced to little more than a practice target after around 20 minutes on 27 May. Still, if you wish to believe that, had she been scuttled, it made her slightly less sunk, then enjoy your delusion.
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  4. You haven't heard of Dynamo, Aerial, the Battle of the Atlantic, the Arctic Convoys, the Naval War in the Mediterranean, or the defence of the Indian Ocean then? Nor of the various assault landings (Torch, Husky, Avalanche, Overlord, etc) largely planned and executed by the Royal Navy? Certainly, there was a colossal struggle in the Pacific between the IJN & the US Navy. The US Navy could afford to devote the level of resources that it did to the Pacific precisely because the Royal Navy was everywhere else.
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  5.  @mephisto5856  No one underestimated Bismarck. The British had four capital ships in Home Waters capable of catching and engaging Bismarck, and there were two exit points into the wider Atlantic, these being the Denmark Strait & the Iceland-Faroes Gap. The British placed two capital ships at each point. The second and third best ships went to the Denmark Strait, and the first & fourth to the Gap. Both battlegroups were expected to be capable of dealing with Bismarck. Only with the benefit of hindsight can people make smug judgements about the outcome. As to Market Garden, Ike apparently didn't consider Market Garden unnecessary. He was Supreme Commander, and had the final decision. Montgomery could complain as much as he liked, but couldn't initiate such an operation without Ike's blessing.
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  6. I suppose it would be useless to point out that, whilst Churchill proposed Gallipoli as an alternative to what was unfolding on the Western Front, he neither authorised the operation (Herbert Asquith did) nor planned it.
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  7. How many battleships were sunk by aircraft in western waters?
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  8.  @padurarulcriticsicinic4846  That is because there weren't any others. In point of fact, the largest British warship sunk by air attack was a light cruiser.
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  9. No. Why should they?
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  10. Up to that time, no Battleship had been sunk by aircraft.
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  11.  @kms_scharnhorst  'Queen Elizabeth class were not valuable and more a liability then an asset.' Perhaps you had better inform the German destroyers in Narvik, or the Italian Navy in general.
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  12.  @kms_scharnhorst  Well, you say that the QEs were a liability. Your view is that of a minority. Perhaps you aren't aware that Renown was modernised, by the way. 'The loss of Prince of Wales and Repulse is equal to 3-4 Queen Elizabeth Class BB.' On what do you base that remark? Personal prejudice? So, the Italian Navy wasn't a liability, despite refusing to risk engaging the QEs, which were? Perhaps you are the one lacking objectivity? 'The Narvik were as much of a liability as the Queen Elizabeth class.' What does that even mean?
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  13.  @shivmalik9405  The difference being that the British (or French) didn't embark on a policy of mass extermination based on the use of gas chambers. Nor, unlike the Japanese, did they use Chinese civilians for bayonet or sword practice.
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  14.  @adamtruong1759  Moreover, the carrier was never more than a supporting vessel in western waters.
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  15.  @adamtruong1759  Where do you think? The Atlantic, the Mediterranean, and the Arctic.
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  16.  @adamtruong1759  Why? isn't the term obvious?
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  17.  @terryhannis2500  Nothing of the sort. Phillips put too much faith in the competence of his Chief of Staff in Singapore. As an experienced staff officer himself, Phillips expected that, once Palliser had been informed of Force Z's intentions, he would have asked for 453 Squadron, RAAF, to be sent out to provide air support. Unfortunately, Palliser did not act as Phillips assumed he would.
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  18.  @alessiodecarolis  But the facts of 1941 were that, so far, no Royal Navy ship bigger than a light cruiser had been lost to air attack.
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  19.  @veronicabalaga7008  There were no Zeros anywhere near at the time Force Z was sunk. They were attacked by twin engined bombers. The cruisers at the Java Sea were a mix of older, worn out ships without even a common signal code, and which had little experience of working together, faced by a well-trained cohesive, force of Japanese warships. The playing field was rather uneven, to say the least.
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  20. The U.S. War Department provided an estimate that the entire Downfall operations would cause between 1.7 to 4 million U.S. casualties, including 400-800,000 U.S. dead, and 5 to 10 million Japanese dead. Would you suggest that that was preferable?
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  21. Imagine having the utter temerity to sail a ship in International Waters!
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  22. Germany ably demonstrated that she did not want WW1 by invading Belgium, and that she did not want WW2 by invading Poland. Demonstrating you don't want a war by starting one. Is it a uniquely German approach?
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  23. 2. 453 Squadron, RAAF, was allocated. Phillips, an experienced staff officer himself, probably assumed that his own chief-of-staff in Singapore would have arranged the necessary cover once Phillips had made him aware of his intentions.
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  24. @michael boultinghouse Presumably you have never heard of the Burma campaign, Kohima, etc? Certainly, in terms strictly of the Pacific, Britain was a secondary player. Just as the United States Navy played a secondary role in the Indian Ocean, the Mediterranean, the Arctic, and the Atlantic. On land, the US did become the senior partner, but only in the last 6-9 months of the war.
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  25. What was incompetent, except in retrospect, about attempting to deter a Japanese attack?
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  26. 1). Bismarck had been damaged and was listing. Her speed was probably insufficient to catch PoW. 2). Lutjens could not be sure that PoW and Hood were not supported by other British capital ship. 3). Lutjens was on a commerce-raiding mission, and had orders to avoid action with British capital ships. 4). Lutjens was more concerned with getting Bismarck to St. Nazaire for repair, rather than to expose her to the risk of further damage.
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  27. What was a suicide mission?
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  28.  @TayebMC  Why do you consider that Kit Cradock was sent on a suicide mission? He chose to give battle.
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  29.  @kms_scharnhorst  Renown had a major modernisation between 1936 & 1939, and emerged, to all intents and purposes, as a new ship. As, indeed, did three of the QEs. The fact is that, however excellent the Regia Marina's ships were, their commanders chose to avoid battle with the 'liabilities' that were the Queen Elizabeths. I still haven't quite worked out where the Narviks come into this.
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  30.  @kms_scharnhorst  1). Obviously. 2). Why? Hood was, apart from the Nelsons, the most modern capital ship in the fleet, and certainly the fastest. 3). What, for example? 4). On the rare occasions that they did encounter the Mediterranean Fleet, they invariably came off second best, or avoided action completely.
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  31.  @kms_scharnhorst  You don't need to attempt to tell me anything about the material state of Hood by 1939, as I am far better informed about it than you. She was still capable of 28 knots, and had a heavier broadside than any German warship ever built. Your excuses about the Italian navy are interesting, but irrelevant in terms of your claim that the QEs were a liability. You still haven't explained what the RN should have done had they not modernised the QEs.
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  32.  @kms_scharnhorst  I was actually referring to the Hood of 1939. After her Special Large Repair of 1939, she achieved 31 knots on trials. The 28 knot reference was to her state in 1941, after 18 months of hard work. Perhaps I should have made this clearer. After her modernisation, Renown was measured at 29.9 knots in July, 1939, and would indeed have had the edge by 1941. Repulse, with her older machinery, almost certainly wouldn't, although there are no records of any trail speeds from the relevant period. I wasn't 'focusing' on German warships. I simply give them as an example. The Littorios, by the way, only appeared in late August, 1940, about the same time as the British KGVs, of course. If you wish to discuss the Japanese fleet, perhaps you might wish to reconsider your 'laughable' reference to Hood's deck armour, by comparing it to the thinner deck (and belt) armour of pre- Yamato Japanese capital ships? The Royal Navy actually launched 141 destroyers between the end of WW1 & the start of WW2, most of which (apart from 20 or so) were less than ten years old in September, 1939. The older boats, the V & Ws, Ss, Scotts, and Shakespeares had been mothballed, and were still effective warships. You do understand that there were several different categories of destroyers in the RN, and that the fleet boats, the Tribals, J & K, classes and the later A-I classes were generally less than five years old, I suppose? In terms of cruisers, there were only 17 vessels launched during WW1, plus a further 8 of WW1 design. still in service. Of these, nine had been rebuilt as AA cruisers. The RN had launched 49 cruisers of post WW1 designs by September, 1939, of which 27 were less than ten years old. Again, you don't seem to have much understanding of the difference between the RN concept of the 'Fleet' and the 'Trade Protection' cruiser. You keep making dogmatic statements such as :- 'The main problem with the Queen Elizabeth class BB is the fact that UK could've spent the resources which it did historically on other projects and ships which would have helped them a lot more in ww2' without explaining what these projects and ships might have been.
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  33.  @kms_scharnhorst  I assume it hasn't occurred to you that the US, Japanese, & Italian navies all modernised their older capital ships, most of which were inferior to the QEs, and you haven't criticised them, yet you criticise the RN for doing exactly the same thing? The 16 older RN cruisers were not 'lying around' but were used in secondary theatres, just as the US navy did with their Omahas. You seem to assume that the Admiralty of the mid 1930s ought to have been aware that France would collapse in 1940, and should have planned accordingly. In point of fact, the Admiralty worst case scenario, that of war against Germany, Japan, & Italy at the same time, made no such assumption. The expectation was that the Western Front would remain much as it was in 1914-1918, and that the Royal Navy would fight a new Battle of the Atlantic, provide a battle fleet for the Far East, and re-impose the Northern Blockade, whilst the French navy would play a major role in the Mediterranean. Moreover, as any German U-Boat force would only be able to reach the Atlantic via the north of Scotland, it would be much less capable than, with the use of French Atlantic bases, it historically turned out to be. I accept that there was a shortage of ASW ships, but because the RN was obliged to fight a war for which no planning had prepared it. In point of fact, as Doenitz based his calculations on those that von Holtzendorff had reached in 1917, that 600,000 tons of Allied shipping per month needed to be sunk to bring Britain to her knees, and as up to January 1942, sinking had only achieved more than half of this target on three occasions, the argument about the U-Boat peril is overstated. Finally, 'Navalised Spitfires & Hurricanes.' The first Hurricanes only reached the RAF on 25 December, 1937, and the first Spitfires in August, 1938, whereas the modernisation of Malaya began in 1930, of Warspite in 1934, of Renown in 1936, and of Queen Elizabeth & Valiant in 1937. You appear to be saying that the Admiralty ought to have held off modernising the Battle Fleet because, just possibly, a modern high performance fighter might be able to fly off a carrier in a few years time, with a bit of luck, without explaining precisely how this would have been a better option. By the way, I suppose you know that procurement of aircraft for the Royal Navy was, until May, 1939, in the hands of the RN's most intransigent and implacable of enemies, the British Air Ministry? Moreover, would high performance fighters have been all that much use at Matapan? Finally, instead of explaining exactly why, you still persist with your dogmatic 'refitting HMS Hood instead of Queen Elizabeth, Valiant or Warspite' fixation.
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  34.  @kms_scharnhorst  You 'don't think the Royal Navy was bothered much by the fact that their aircraft procurement was managed by the British Air Ministry?' Actually, they were appalled, and spent much of the inter-war period trying to recover control. The result of this foolishness was that Naval Air Service, which on 1 April, 1918, operated 2949 aircraft & 103 airships, had been reduced by September, 1939 to 232 aircraft, of which around 30 could be considered modern. oh, and I didn't say that the ASW capabilities wouldn't have been as important. I said that there would not have been a shortage of ASW vessels. Finally, 'No I am not saying the admiralty shouldn't modernise its battle fleet, I am saying that the admiralty shouldn't have been bothered to modernise ww1 era super dreadnoughts' The British battlefleet was restricted by treaty to fifteen capital ships. In the British case Five 'R' Class, Five 'QE' Class, two 'Nelson' class, two 'Repulse' class battlecruisers, and a fast Battleship, Hood. As they shouldn't, in your view, modernise the QEs, that really wouldn't leave much else, would it? Again, I didn't say anything as absurd as your suggestion that the QEs were modernised in order to fight Matapan. I asked what benefit would have accrued if the RN had high performance carrier fighters at Matapan, but had not modernised the ships which fought it? You don't think the radar on the modernised QEs played a role, then? Please don't bother to reply, I think this nonsense has gone on long enough, and I have more constructive things to do than fill in the gaps in your knowledge of between the wars British naval policy.
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  35.  @kms_scharnhorst  Well, mon brave, I wasn't going to bother to respond, but I am quite happy to let anyone reading these posts form their own opinions. Perhaps you might consider doing the same?
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  36.  @mephisto5856  Force Z was sent as a deterrent, not to a war zone. By the way, as you have mentioned Market Garden, would you consider the Hurtgen Forest to have been a sample of American arrogance?
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  37.  @alessiodecarolis  You mean how Bismarck had been sunk by heavy surface warships? That lesson? Force Z was not sent to a war zone, but in the hope that it would act as a deterrent. The fact was that, if Japan did attack it would attack Malaya, and not Ceylon or Australia.
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  38.  @mephisto5856  You shouldn't believe that the 1970 movie about Patton was fact, as it wasn't. You might also read up on Patton's shambolic campaign in the Lorraine, even though it wasn't mentioned in the movie.
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  39. In the middle of a war, he was trying to deter a Japanese attack on Malaya. He wasn't playing politics.
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  40.  @devimead750  No, of course it failed, but isn't it easy to make sage judgements with the benefit of hindsight? Why do you claim that Churchill was playing politics? What would you have done, in the context of late 1941, to try to deter the Japanese from attacking Malaya?
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  41.  @devimead750  Who was playing 'Gunboat Diplomacy?' The whole idea of sending Force Z was to attempt to avoid Japanese aggression in French Indo-China & Malaya. Incidentally, are all your judgements based on hindsight? Would you please provide a list of the heavy warships ( by which I mean heavy cruiser and upwards ) which had succumbed to air power at the time Force Z sailed.
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  42. How many battleships actually did survive four torpedo hits?
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  43. Force Z had much to offer tactically. They were within minutes of locating a major Japanese assault convoy, with nothing better than heavy cruisers to protect it. The allies' did not know the range and capabilities of Japanese aircraft at the time, by the way. How could they have done?
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  44.  @apothecarymaybe3402  What arrogance? The British sent Force Z not to a war zone, but to an area still at peace, in an attempt to deter Japanese aggression. They failed, but, as with the sinking of Hood, this was only obvious with the benefit of hindsight.
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  45.  @tonyp2865  The ship was in International waters. Moscow claims that the waters are Russian territory, but this claim is not accepted by the international community. Ignoring your perverse belief that RAF Typhoons are 'outdated,' they are simply sent to meet Russian aircraft when these approach British airspace.
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  46. You should read more. At one time Force Z was within a few miles of intercepting a Japanese invasion force protected by nothing bigger than heavy cruisers. Moreover, at the time of the sinkings, no major warship had been sunk at sea by air attack. Hindsight is wonderful, isn't it?
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  47. Force Z was not sent to a war zone, but as an attempt to deter future Japanese aggression. Isn't it easy to be wise after the event?
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  48. Do you think so? Read about the Battle of the Atlantic, the Arctic Convoys, and the naval war in the Mediterranean.
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  49. Doolittle proved that, given enough time and enough attempts, an old battleship without a crew to carry out damage control or operate AA weapons, sitting motionless and with internal security measures disabled, could indeed be sunk by aircraft, over a period of two days and requiring several attacks. A propaganda exercise which proved precisely nothing.
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  50.  @jttraina4516  The Doolittle demonstration was wholly artificial. Naval officers of the time would argue, convincingly, that Doolittle would not have been able to achieve these results against a ship at sea, fully armed, with a full crew and moving at 20 knots. The fleet at Pearl Harbor was caught in an update of Nelson's Copenhagen.
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  51. Imagine! An island nation building ships. Astonishing!
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