Comments by "doveton sturdee" (@dovetonsturdee7033) on "Operation Sealion: Actually a Bad Idea" video.
-
16
-
10
-
Precisely, Prince of Wales (and Repulse) were both sunk by TORPEDO BOMBERS. The Luftwaffe didn't even have an operational torpedo bomber until mid 1942. Similarly, the 1940 Luftwaffe had not been trained in anti-shipping techniques, hence their failure at Dunkirk.
The Germans only had a small number of operational U-Boats in September, 1940. In point of fact, 27, of which, historically, 13 were actually at sea on any one day in September. Moreover, in October, 1940, the Germans sent three U-Boats into the Channel. All three were immediately sunk. The allies had laid a series of defensive minefields, similar to those which had been so successful against German submarines in WW1.
Condors were long-range search aircraft, and had some initial success against unarmed merchantmen. I do not recall reading of any attempt by a Condor to attack a warship, and historically, once merchantmen received defensive armament, Condor crews were forbidden to attempt attacks, because Condors were too valuable, and there were only ever a few of them.
10
-
9
-
9
-
9
-
8
-
By June, 1941, the idea of a German invasion was a distant memory if, indeed, it had ever been much more than a fantasy in the first place, given the naval supremacy of the Royal Navy at the time.
By the way, neither the US nor the Soviets 'came to the rescue.' The Soviet Union was invaded by Germany in June 1941, and the US was attacked by Japan in December, 1941, after which Germany declared war. Stop pretending altruism where none existed.
Incidentally, there are many good books which explain the actual facts in some detail. Perhaps you might read one or two some day?
8
-
8
-
7
-
7
-
1). Good luck trying to lay mines with your seven minelayers, when the Royal Navy carried our nightly destroyer patrols during the invasion threat period. The Germans did install some 150 medium, heavy & super-heavy guns along the Channel Coast. In the whole of the war, these weapons successfully damaged seven merchant ships, totalling 8,000 tons. They even managed not to hit HMS Erebus when she shelled Calais on 29 September, and HMS Revenge when she bombarded Cherbourg on 10/11 October. You think those same guns would deter fast moving cruisers & destroyers? Think again.
2). You don't think that any invasion force needed resupplying, then?
3). That presupposes that you manage to get an invasion force ashore. Moreover, how long do you think Fighter Command, from bases north of the Thames, would take to react?
4). 'Sitting ducks?' Like the evacuation fleet was at Dunkirk, when the Luftwaffe totally failed to prevent Dynamo? Do you not realise how inept the Luftwaffe was at hitting ships at sea in 1940? Or that it didn't even have an operational torpedo bomber until mid 1942? Or that in the whole of the war it sank 31 RN destroyers, and no RN warship larger than a light cruiser?
5). Nonsense. The only German parachute division had around 4,500 men left in September, 1940, and the Luftwaffe had only around 220 transport aircraft still operational. With no hope of relief by ground troops, exactly how long do you think lightly armed paratroopers might last?
6). Simply not true. Moreover, what happens to your supply vessels and towed barges at night, when the RN can operate unhindered? Even if not actively transporting supplies, thewy would remain helpless.
7). You have to get your troops ashore first, don't you?
8). See 7). above.
9). See 7).above. Moreover, had you actually seen the final German plan, you would know that the first wave was intended to be around 6,700 men from each of nine divisions. These divisions would lackmotor transport, and most of their divisional artillery. As to Panzer Divisions, these were not included in the first wave, as the Germans lacked anything remotely resembling tank landing craft.
10). Aee 7). above. Moreover, other than your fevered imagination, what evidence you have that Churchill would have fled anywhere.
note: Launching Sealion in July. Good idea. At a meeting on 20 June, Raeder ( I assume you know who he was) stated that the Kriegsmarine had no suitable assault vessels, but hoped to have assembled some 45 barges within the next two weeks. Perhaps you should have added?
11). If all else fails, the invasion force could always cross using Montgolfier balloons.
I don't really know why I bothered to debunk your bizarre wish-fulfilment fantasy at such length, when three words would have been sufficient. Perhaps when you grow up, you will learn this?
THE ROYAL NAVY.
7
-
@gregmackenzie5822 What U-boats? In Septermber 1940, the Germans had 27 operational boats, of which 13 on average were at sea on any one day. Moreover, they avoided the Channel, which was heavily mined and defended, after three boats sent there in late 1939 were promptly sunk. Generally, in WW2, U-boats tried to avoid escorts. Seeking them out as you suggest was unlikely to end well for the Germans.
Which S-boats? The Germans had 13 in September, 1940.
Which other naval forces? In September, 1940, the largest operational German warship was a single heavy cruiser. There were also three light cruisers, five destroyers (based in Cherbourg) two destroyers, based in Brest, and seven Wolf/Mowe class torpedo boats.
The actual probability, once the Invasion barges were detected at sea, moving slowly towards the Channel in unwieldy box formations, would be the arrival of Halsey's combined DF 16 & DF 18 from the Nore (9 destroyers), and Pizey's DF21 (8 boats) supplemented by 8 destroyers, of the Rosyth Escort Force, and of 23 Destroyer Division also based at the Nore, from the North. From the West (Portsmouth) the boats of Creasy's DF1 and Stevens' DF8 ( 12 boats), and the 5 French boats of DF23, would arrive slightly later. After that, boats from Plymouth (DF3, DF11, and DF17, 13 boats) could be expected, and a few hours later the Harwich destroyer and light cruiser force would appear. In total, around 70 destroyers and light cruisers, and this doesn't include the five hundred or so smaller vessels, such as fleet minsweepers, gunboats, sloops, frigates, corvettes, MLs, MTBs, MGBs, and auxiliary minesweepers arriving more slowly.
What did the Germans have available to fight these off? A handful of ships as listed above, and a few R boats, akin to British MGBS.
In all probability an action the naval equivalent of the US 'Marianas Turkey Shoot' of the Pacific war.
7
-
7
-
7
-
7
-
6
-
Yes indeed. Germany had to strike to eliminate those hotbeds of brutal communism :- Denmark, Norway, The Netherlands, Belgium, & Luxembourg.
Of course Britain (not England) and France declared war in 1914 and again in 1939. Your sainted adolf invaded Czechoslovakia & Poland, as well as those listed above, without the courtesy of a declaration of war, as did Kaiser Bill to Belgium in 1914. Usually, large numbers of armed troops crossing a border gives a people a good idea what is happening, don't you think?
In the normal world (you might have read of the concept) if in 1941 hitler wished to make peace, couldn't he have approached the British embassies in Sweden, Switzerland, or Spain? Indeed, couldn't he have approached the neutral United States? Even if hitler knew what Hess was planning, was flying to Scotland, then bailing out near what was believed to be the estate of a minor Scots. aristocrat who might or might not have had some connection with the Westminster government really the best that he & Rudolf could conceive.
You are wrong about hitler, by the way. He was a very fine painter. He could do a whole apartment in a week-end. Two coats! I hope you know the reference.
6
-
Your level of ignorance is quite stunning. The nearest the Germans might have got to any form of air superiority ove SE England was likely to have been the withdrawal of 11 Group to bases north of the Thames, for a period of regrouping & re-equipping. As the British were outproducing the Germans in fighter aircraft from June 1940 onwards, this was likely to have been completed swiftly, and did not preclude an RAF return to SE England in the event of any Sealion attempt.
'Then eliminating the royal navy BEFORE the mainland invasion with hith altitude carpet bombing the bigger ships and using u-boats against the smaller ones plus using the Italian and german navy' As a famous tennis player used to say 'You cannot be serious!' The 1940 Luftwaffe had not been trained in anti-shipping techniques, hence the humiliating failure at Dunkirk, and it didn't even acquire a torpedo bomber until mid 1942.
In fact, in the whole of WW2, the Luftwaffe sank 31 RN destroyers, and no RN warship larger that a light cruiser. To put that into perspective, in September, 1940, the RN had 70 light cruisers & destroyers within five hours steaming of the Dover Straits, supported by around 500 or so smaller warships, and a further 40 or so destroyers further away but still in Home Waters. That does not include Force H, or the Home Fleet, as the Admiralty had no plans to deploy the heavy ships (5 battleships & battlecruisers, and seven cruisers) against the Sealion barges.
German navy? - You mean, I assume, the one heavy cruiser, three light cruisers, and seven destroyers which were all the Kriegsmarine had operational at the time?
Italian navy? - You have a cunning plan for getting it through the Straits of Gibraltar's gun batteries, past Force H, whilst finding a method of persuading the Mediterranean Fleet not to get involved?
U- Boats? On average, there were 13 boats at sea on any one day in September, 1940. Moreover, throughout WW2 U-boats tried very hard indeed to avoid close encounters with escorts and/or destroyers. Now you suggest that they should actively seek them out? That would not end well for your U-boats.
Mines? The RN carried out nightly destroyer patrols through the Channel. The Germans had seven converted minelayers, possibly supplemented by some of their seven destroyers. Do you know what effect the explosion of a 4 inch or 4.7 inch HE shell has on a laden mine deck? Quite spectacular, I believe.
In short, why not read a book or two about the reality of Sealion, before resorting to fantasy?
6
-
6
-
6
-
6
-
6
-
Preventing 200,000 or so British troops from evacuating from Dunkirk (the 130,000 or so French troops largely returned shortly afterwards) or a further 192,000 evacuating from west coast ports (Operation Aerial) might have forced Britain to come to terms. If, however, Britain continued to resist (as she historically did) then the Royal Navy still held absolute naval supremacy. How do you suggest large German forces would actually reach Britain?
In late 1940, after heavy losses in Norway and the Netherlands, the Germans only had around 4,000 to 5,000 trained paratroopers left, and the Luftwaffe only had just over 220 operational transport aircraft, for the same reason. Assuming that these paratroopers land, where do they get heavy weapons support, or even supplies from, and what use is an airfield without transport aircraft to land on it?
You don't seem to understand exactly how large the Royal Navy was at the time. Moreover, surely you know how badly the Luftwaffe had failed at Dunkirk? You must do, as you mentioned Dunkirk in your post. In 1940, the Luftwaffe had been trained in air support for ground troops. They were good at it. However, they had not been trained in anti-shipping operations, and they were poor at them. THey did get better in 1941, but even then, in the whole of WW2, they sank 31 RN destroyers, and no RN warship larger than a light cruiser.
Just to explain this point, in September 1940, the RN had 120 destroyers in Home Waters. Of these, over sixty were at bases within fours hours steaming of Dover, supported by several light cruisers, and around five hundred smaller warships.
How long do you think the barges full of troops, even troops with wonderful MP43s, towed at little more than walking pace by tugs and trawlers, and more or less unescorted, would have lasted? By the way, do you know why the MP43 was so called? Because it was introduced in 1943. Something of a problem here!
I do enjoy the posts of Sealion 'would haves,' always pontificating about what the mighty Luftwaffe 'would have' done to the poor old Royal Navy, but never able to explain how it was that, when the opportunity arose, they never managed to do it.
6
-
6
-
6
-
6
-
6
-
The Home Fleet was based in Rosyth & Scapa Flow. It would only have entered the southern part of the North Sea if any German heavy ships did, and we now know that the Germans in September, 1940, only had one operational heavy ship, Hipper. The remainder were either under repair, or refitting.
You really don't need battleships, battlecruisers, and heavy cruisers to sink barges. Light cruisers, destroyers, and smaller auxiliaries are much more effective, which is why the RN had around 70 destroyers & cruisers within four hours' sailing time of Dover, together with several hundred smaller vessels, ranging from sloops, minesweepers, gunboats, armed trawlers and drifters to armed yachts. As to 'sitting ducks' the most obvious sitting ducks would have been the invasion barges attempting to cross with minimal protection during the day, and no protection at all at night.
6
-
6
-
6
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
The Luftwaffe had failed badly at Dunkirk. It had not been trained in anti-shipping operations, and in the whole of the war sank 31 RN destroyers, and no RN ship bigger than a light cruiser. Attempting to attack warships, and in particular destroyers, is the opposite of what U-Boats actually did in WW2. Moreover, the Channel is a death trap where U-Boats were concerned. Three were sent to operate there in late 1939, and were promptly sunk.
When the RN had around 70 destroyers and light cruisers within 4 hours steaming of the Channel, and the Germans were, potentially, trying to cross it by means of Rhine barges towed by tugs and trawlers, and needed eleven days simply to get the first wave ashore, then in all honesty what was happening (or, at night, not happening) was more or less irrelevant.
5
-
Hitler was trying to get Britain to make peace in July, 1940? Really? Why not provide some examples of his efforts? Oh, the 'Appeal to Reason' speech (Surrender or we bomb you) is not a credible one, by the way.
The Luftwaffe lost 1700 aircraft & 2700 aircrew not being 'serious', whilst more than 2000 barges were taken out of the European canal network, crudely converted into landing craft, and sent to Channel ports, together with around 200 freighters, over 400 tugs, and around 1200 motor boats.
Over 20 divisions were allocated to the operation and undertook the necessary training, and a large amount of senior officer & staff time and resources was spent on planning & preparations.
You might ask the people of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Denmark, Norway, Luxembourg, Belgium, & The Netherlands what their opinions of whether the war was necessary or not were, perhaps?
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
'The Royal Navy stood no chance against the Luftwaffe.' Oh please! The Luftwaffe had just failed badly at Dunkirk, hadn't been trained in anti-shipping techniques, and didn't even acquire a high performance torpedo bomber until mid 1942.
If you were to look at statistics rather than myths, you would find that, in the whole of WW2, the Luftwaffe sank 31 RN destroyers, and no RN warship at all larger than a light cruiser. To put that into perspective, the RN Pink List shows, for mid September, 1940, some 70 RN destroyers and light cruisers within five hours' steaming of the Straits, with a further 500 or so smaller warships available in support.
That doesn't include the additional 40 destroyers further away but still in Home Waters, or the heavy ships of the Home Fleet at Rosyth and Scapa Flow available to intercept any German surface ships which might have been sent to support an invasion fleet, which consisted, by the way, of converted barges towed at little more than walking pace by tugs and trawlers.
Do you seriously wish to maintain that, having been largely unable to hit RN destroyers either stopped or moving slowly in restricted waters off Dunkirk, the Luftwaffe would have been effective against similar ships, free to manoeuve at speeds of 28 + knots, as they appproached those virtually unprotected barges.
I wonder whether you would have been able to convince Oskar Dinort, the commander of Stuka-Geschwader 3? Dinort had been a leading competition flyer in pre-war Germany, and his unit had had considerable success attacking ground targets in Poland. On 25 May, he led a flight of 40 Ju87s against a Destroyer Flotilla off Calais?. His own bomb exploded over 300 feet from his target, and no hits were achieved by any of his aircraft. His report, which may still be read, concluded that attacks on warships required 'a greater degree of expertise than his aircraft had previously needed to demonstrate.'
Or Wolfram von Richtofen, commander of Fliegerkorps VIII, whose dive bombers would have been expected to protect the barges from the Royal Navy, and who reported to Goering that such a task was utterly beyond the capablities of his crews?
5
-
Sealion, at least from the naval viewpoint, might well have been another Crete, in the sense that ground forces sent to support the invasion would never arrive. One convoy, heading for Maleme, was annihilated by a British cruiser squadron, and the second, heading for Heraklion, returned to Greece to avoid a probable similar fate.
There were not 'a lot of soldiers' available. Because of a lack of towing vessels for the hastily converted barges, the first wave was intended to consist of around 6,700 men from each of nine divisions. This first wave would be lacking motor transport and divisional artillery.
The passage would not have been short. The time needed to extracate these towed barges from their ports, form them up into cumbersome box formations, and set off down the Channel to their beaches meant that in some cases, the voyage would require three days. These formations would be almost devoid of escort vessels, and would sail at little more than walking pace.
Would this air force 'protection' have been supplied by the Luftwaffe, which, untrained in anti-shipping operations, had failed totally to prevent the Dunkirk evacuation?
You need to read a book or two on the subject before embarrassing yourself further.
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
4
-
@jddallas7274 Congratulations on getting so many facts wrong in so short a post. Quite an achievement.
The Germans had 27 operational U-boats by September, 1940, of which an average of 13 were at sea on any one day. At the same time, they had only seven operational destroyers. For comparative purposes, at the same time the RN had 70 or so destroyers and cruisers based within five hours steaming of Dover, and a further 40 or so destroyers in Home Waters if needed.
Magnetic mines might have caused problems in shallow waters, had the Luftwaffe not managed to drop a couple on mud flats near Shoeburyness in November, 1939. A team from HMS Vernon recovered them and determined how they worked. As early as 27 November, tests (successful ones) were carried out on HMS Manchester, and degaussing methods were rapidly introduced. By 9 March, 1940, over 600 vessels had been successfully treated, and the procedure was quickly gathering pace.
The RN didn't seem to have been 'afraid of getting shot to bits by the Luftwaffe in the channel' at Dunkirk when they evacuated over 323,000 men of the BEF & French 1st Army without serious losses. Nor did they seem deterred as they undertook daily destroyer, cruiser, and MTB patrols through the Channel for the rest of the summer. Out of interest, and because it is clearly another fact of which you are ignorant, in the whole of WW2 your mighty Luftwaffe sank 31 RN destroyers, and no RN warship at all larger than a light cruiser.
'The Germans would have conducted the landing at night and the Royal Navy would not have responded till the day that is a head start. Every amphibious operation of WW2 succeeded and the British destroyers did not have the guns to shoot the German landing craft till 1942' This is idiocy on a masterful level. The Germans did not have any landing craft. They intended to transport their troops in barges towed in pairs by tugs or trawlers. The barges were to be towed in cumbersome block formations. For example, Barge Convoy 1, from Rotterdam, Ostend & Dunkirk heading for the area between Folkestone & New Romney consisted of 150 barges from Dunkirk & 50 from Ostend, together with a further 114 barges & 57 transports from Rotterdam.
Have you even considered how long it would take to extricate these barges from their ports, assemble them into some sort of formation, and then set sail? The quickest convoy required two days, and the largest three.
'The British destroyers did not have the guns to shoot the German landing craft till 1942 the Germans conducted a successful landing without control of the sea in Crete and they were intercepted by the Royal Navy and still all made so just saying your argument is weak not my.' What do you think that the 6 inch and 4 inch guns aboard British light cruisers, or the 4.7 inch, and 4 inch guns aboard British destroyers in 1940 were? Wooden mock ups? Or,of course, the 4 inch & 3 inch guns aboard supporting vessels, such as minesweepers, gunboats, sloops, and corvettes?
The salient point about Crete was that the Axis were not able be land troops from the sea, at least not until the British had decided to withdraw. Two convoys sailed from Greece, one bound for Maleme & one for Heraklion. The Maleme convoy was annihilated by a RN cruiser squadron, and as a result the Heraklion convoy turned back to Greece.
One of your comments, however, is correct, that 'Every amphibious operation of WW2 succeded.' Do you know why that was? Because those in Europe & North Africa were planned and executed by the Royal Navy, and those in the Pacific by the United States' Navy.
I assume from your post that you are just an immature child. The other possibility, that you are a remarkably stupid or ignorant adult, does also exist, however.
Would you like me to recommend a few book for you to read, or have read to you?
4
-
4
-
@jddallas7274 Oh dear. Has no-one ever told you that, when you are in a hole, you should stop digging? Oh well.
The RAF not lose the Battle of France. The Allied ground forces did. The RAF was outnumbered by the Luftwaffe throughout the campaign. As, of course, it was during the Battle of Britain, although a combination of the ability to operate on interior lines, and the use of a brilliant use of resources to produce a unique air defence plan, enabled it to achieve victory.
The Germans were able to take Crete by means of their paratroop and air landing capabilities, against Allied forces still disorganised by their evacuation from Greece. Precisely because the Germans did not have naval 'sumperacy' (whatever that is) the Italian navy was not able to deliver additional ground troops to the island.
As a result, the numbers of operational German transport aircraft were severely reduced, and their airborne forces greatly weakened, to the extent that Hitler lost faith in them, and they were only thereafter used as ground troops.
Have you actually read anything at all?
4
-
Bypassed by which paratroopers? The 4.500 which were all that still remained after their losses in Norway and the Netherlands? Transported, presumably, in the 225 or so surviving operational transport aircraft which still survived after similar heavy losses during the campaigns in Norway, the Low Countries, and France?
Oh, and those paratroops were equipped with light arms only, as would be any reinforcements flown in by the non-existent transport aircraft. Moreover, should such a force have landed, then ipso facto the British would know where they were, and would be able to concentrate troops, artillery, and armour against them, as well as deploying fighters to intercept and destroy the (imaginary) transport aircraft bringing supposed reinforcements.
4
-
4
-
@TechnologieGlobeOculaire 'even after I explained plainly how to totally circumvent it.' No, you haven't. You simply postulated an idea which, as I explained, had no conceivable basis in reality.
I have already explained to you the number of paratroopers available to Germany, and the number of transport aircraft available.
I have also explained the helplessness of paratroop units which have no hope of relief from more heavily armed and equipped ground troops. In the case of Germany, these could only be delivered by sea. Unless, of course, you have worked out some magical way of transporting Pz IVs using Ju52s, even non existent ones?
You appear to think that shipyards can simply switch to building aircraft, which idea can best be described as 'interesting.'
The fact is that, as I wrote earlier, the British were able to outproduce Germany in aircraft.
In terms of fighter aircraft, the actual totals per year were:-
1940. Britain 4283 Germany 2735
1941. Britain 7064 Germany 3744
1942. Britain 9859 Germany 5358
1943. Britain 10722 Germany 10059
Bear in mind, also, that the figures from 1941 onwards do not include fighters either supplied by or purchased from the United States. Nor do they include, from 1942, aircraft of the USAAF based in Britain.
If you seek to make any sort of credible case, mon vieux, perhaps you sjould check your facts first before indulging in fantasies?
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
People who use 'lol' in their posts have already discredited anything they have to say, but just to correct you, the Anglo-French alliance ended with the fall of Paul Reynaud and the subsequent signing of the Armistice on 22 June. One of the terms of the armistice, in case you didn't know, was that the French fleet was to be returned to French Atlantic ports and placed under German supervision. The Head of the French navy, Admiral Darlan, sought to reject this clause, until told by Weygand that 'we aren't going to scupper the armistice for the sake of your little boats.'
This was, obviously, something the British could not permit to happen. Accordingly, at Mers-el-Kebir, the British gave Gensoul a series of options as part of an ultimatum, among which was the transfer of the French fleet to the French West Indies, where it could be placed under the supervision of the neutral United States. Darlan might well have accepted this, but unfortunately Gensoul failed to pass on the full text of the British ultimatum, claiming only that the offer said that he must join with the British or his ships would be sunk.
4
-
4
-
In September 1940 the Germans had, on average, 13 U-boats at sea on each day. They had attempted to send three boats into the Channel in October, 1939, and all were promptly sunk. The Channel was heavily mined (by the British) and unsafe for submarines. Moreover, your suggestions that these boats would 'ravage' the Royal Navy is directly contrary to the manner in which U-boats operated in WW2, when they attempted to keep clear of destroyers or escort vessels, as such encounters generally ended badly for the U-boat concerned.
As to mines, how were these to be laid? At Gallipoli, the Turks had had plenty of time to lay mines in their own waters, much as the British had in the Channel. To lay mines in hostile waters, the Germans needed a large fleet of minelayers, but in fact only had seven converted merchant ships. By contrast, the British had several hundred fleet & auxiliary minesweepers. Furthermore, the mines would need to be laid at night, and the British carried out nightly destroyer patrols every night, from Plymouth & Sheerness.
The Luftwaffe had had no training in anti-shipping operations at the time of Sealion, and as a result had failed badly at Dunkirk. Neither could they operate at night against ships, and they didn't even have any torpedo bombers until mid 1942. In fact, in the whole of the war, the Luftwaffe sank 31 RN destroyers. In September 1940, the British had around 100 destroyers in Home Waters, supported by several hundred smaller warships.
Sorry, but an utterly implausible scenario, and one which has been discredited and disproven for some time.
4
-
By September, 1940, the British had re-armed and re-equipped. There were 34.5 operational divisions by then, the vast majority in the South East.
What paratroopers? After losses during the Spring & Summer, the Germans only had around 4,500 left. Moreover, in early September, there were only just over 220 operational transport aircraft in Luftwaffe service. So, how do you suggest a small number of lightly armed troops, with no hope of reinforcement or re-supply, would fare?
As the Kriegsmarine had no tank landing craft, how do you suggest that tanks could have got across the Channel, still less to 'Salisbury Plain?' Especially in view of the following:-
The bulk of the RN's anti-invasion forces were at the Nore, Portsmouth, & Plymouth. Some 70 destroyers and light cruisers in all, supported by around 500 smaller warships. The Home Fleet was mainly at Rosyth, but not intended to steam south unless German heavy warships appeared, which was unlikely as there were none in service until November, 1940.
Which U-boats? In September, 1940, there were, on any one day, only some 13 at sea. Moreover, U-boats throughout the war tried to avoid encounters with smaller warships such as destroyers, sloops, or corvettes, yet here you suggest that they would seek them out?
Luftwaffe? You mean the Luftwaffe which had just failed badly at Dunkirk? Which had received little or no training in anti-shipping operations, which was still almost two years away from acquiring a torpedo bomber, and which could not operate at night? That Luftwaffe?
4
-
4
-
4
-
@bottcherimmobilien4864 Of course the idea of a successful invasion is nonsense. Actually, the Allies used 4127 landing craft on D-Day, just to be precise.
Oh, yes. The Appeal to Reason, which basically said 'Stop resisting or we bomb you.' As to the lunatic Hess mission (or should that read 'The Lunatic Hess's Mission?). Reason would suggest that, if Hitler sought a peace, he would have cautiously approached the British government via Embassies in Sweden, Switzerland, or Spain. Even, perhaps, asking the neutral USA to act as a peace broker. Reason would not suggest that a lone flight to Scotland, which ended by mad Rudolf bailing out near the estate of a minor Scots. aristocrat who might or might not have had a tenuous connection with the Westminster government, was a credible course of action.
Hitler, by the way, didn't stop the tanks. Von Rundstedt did, as the war diary of Army Group A states. The reason was to service the armour and rest the crews before beginning the second stage of the campaign, and because he feared a repeat of the Miracle of the Marne. Hitler had been told on the previous day, by Goering, that the elimination of the BEF & First Army was a 'special task for the Luftwaffe,' and chose to believe him. Seriously, if you want your enemy to come to terms, do you :-
1). Capture his entire field army and put it into prison camps? or,
2). Allow him to lift that army back to Britain, where it can be re-armed and re-equipped behind the impenetrable barrier of the English Channel & the Royal Navy?
Send your answer to anyone except me. I already know the answer.
There was a brief period when, had Dynamo failed, Halifax might have won a power struggle and, effectively, surrendered. After Dynamo, Halifax was a busted flush, abandoned in Parliament even by his own supporters.
The rest of your post is irrelevant. I thought the subject was Sealion?
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
Actually, it takes 23 hours for a destroyer to steam from Scapa Flow to Dover. HMS Codrington did precisely that earlier in the war. Not that this matters, firstly because the bulk of the Home Fleet was at Rosyth anyway, and secondly because by September 1940 the Admiralty had already positioned around 70 light cruisers and destroyers within five hours' steaming of the Straits anyway, at bases such as Portsmouth/Southampton and the Nore. These were, by the way supported by around 500 smaller warships, such as fleet minesweepers, sloops, corvettes, gunboats, and armed trawlers.
If it takes 'five minutes to sink a battleship when you have air superiority' please reinforce this point by replying with details of which British battleship was sunk in such a manner by the Luftwaffe in WW2.
'People who think a landing was impossible are just imbeciles with zero idea of military matters and this opinion is a recent one not something taken seriously back then.' Oh? If this opinion is a recent one, why did Churchill send a troop convoy to North Africa, including three full armoured regiments, on 22 August, 1940, when myth would have us believe that Britain's fate was on a knife edge? Look up the 'Apology' convoy for yourself. Why, furthermore, did the C-in-C Home Fleet, Admiral Sir Charles Forbes argue with Churchill & the Admiralty (correctly, in my assessment) that too much emphasis had been placed on naval anti-invasion resources, when many of the lighter vessels could have remained on convoy duty throughout, only being recalled when (if) they were needed? Being right isn't always wise, by the way, as Forbes found when he subsequently lost his job!
Right after the fall of France, on 20 June, by the way, Admiral Raeder, head of the Kreigsmarine, attended a meeting with Hitler, Keitel, & Jodl, informing them that his navy had no landing craft, but hoped to have assembled 45 seaworthy barges within a fortnight. I hope that your German assault were excellent long distance swimmers or, alternatively, had access to Montgolfier balloons!
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
@ablethreefourbravo You should read 'Invasion of England, 1940' by the German author Peter Schenk, for full details of the German plan.
'It's a mistake to think the Germans would drive their boats straight to the beach and run directly into machine gun fire like we did.' True enough, because the German troops were to be landed from (mainly unpowered) barges, which were to be pushed slowly onto the landing beaches by small motor boats. Assuming, of course, that they could find a way past the RN anti-invasion forces in the first place.
You seem to have a charmingly naive idea that Sealion, or some form of alternative Sealion, would have been successful, without having the faintest idea about how it might overcome the vast number of problems it, in reality, faced.
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
'Germany could afford to sustain vast losses of all kinds and still win a direct conflict with England. If the entire first wave of 150,000 men were lost it wouldn't mean anything.' Aside from the fact that the first wave was likely to have been around 60,000 men, I suggest that winning a war against and island when your own country has no fleet would be more than a little difficult.
Sealion was, at best, a one shot weapon, hamstrung by the inability of the Kriegsmarine to assemble sufficient barges.All 400 were to be committed to the first wave. Once they, or most of them, were lost, there could be no second attempt. The Admiralty had no intention of committing the heavy ships (battleships, battlecruisers, & heavy cruisers) to anti-invasion operations in any case, asd they deemed it unnecessary unless German heavy ships appeared.The only operational German heavy ship at the time, of course, was a single heavy cruiser.
'attacked by U-Boats and E-Boats and aircraft the whole time.' Oh dear. In September, 1940, the Kriegsmarine had 27 operational U-boats, of which 13 were at sea on any one day. The last attempt to operate any boats in the Channel had been in October 1939 when three Type IIs were sent there, and were promptly sunk. Moreover, U-boats in WW2 tried to avoid contact with destroyers or escorts. Now you suggest that they would actively seek them out? 'S Boats?' You presumably mean the 13 the Germans had in service in 1940?
'Aircraft?' The Luftwaffe had little experience of attacking shipping, hence their failure at Dunkirk. In the whole of WW2, they sank 31 RN destroyers, and no RN warship larger than a light cruiser. They did not, by the way, even have an operational torpedo bomber until mid 1942.
'And once the Germans had a foothold on the coast, they can recover downed pilots, put every airfield within 20 miles of the coast out of action, all the RADAR and early warning posts are gone.' The key word here is 'once.' When is that? After the loss of the first wave of tugs and barges, what is left? Plenty of barges, certainly, but nothing to tow them, and nothing to escort them.
'It's airpower and land power that decides the fight for the Germans.' No, it isn't. At least, not in 1940. Land power is irrelevant unless it can be magicked across the Channel, which it cannot. The Luftwaffe was a tactical airforce, intended to support advancing troops. It is more or less irrelevant when there are no troops to support.
I really wish you Sealion 'would haves' would do a little reading before pronouncing so apparently sagely about what your mighty Germans 'would have' done in 1940. Oddly, you then struggle to explain why they didn't (actually, couldn't) do it.
4
-
4
-
@julianmarsh8384 Actually, if you had bothered to read a German historian, Peter Schenk ('Invasion of England, 1940 - The Planning of Operation Sealion) you could have answered your own questions.
The landings between Folkestone & New Romney involved 150 barges from Dunkirk and 50 from Ostend. These had to be towed out of the ports in pairs, and formed up into a cumbersome box formation. This was a particularly difficult task where Dunkirk was concerned, as the harbour facilities had been largely destroyed during Dynamo.
Those between Rye & Hasting required a further 200 barges from Calais, which again needed to be extricated from the port and formed up, but this time in full view of observers at Dover.
Those for Bexhill & Eastbourne involved 330 barges from Boulogne & a further 50 from Le Havre.
The final force, in 300 motor boats, was to sail from Le Havre to Beachy Head & Brighton.
You ask how long? From the first barge leaving Boulogne harbour, forming up, being towed to, and arriving at, Folkestone/New Romney, the Kriegsmarine estimated three days. The other barge convoys required two days. The barges were to be towed in pairs, at approximately five to six knots.
'The Germam Air Force would have had a field day' You mean like during Operation Dynamo, when it failed totally to prevent the evacuation?
I hope you took in my details about RN forces within five hours of Dover. In point of fact, in the whole of WW2, your mighty Luftwaffe sank 31 RN destroyers, and no RN warship at all larger than a light cruiser. Indeed, the Luftwaffe, untrained in anti-shipping techniques in 1940, didn't even acquire a torpedo bomber until mid 1942.
'A screen of U-Boats?' Like the three which were sent to operate in the Channel in late 1939? The ones (U12, 8 October, U14, 13 October, & U40, 24 October) which are still there, encasing the bodies of their crews after promptly being sunk?
If you had any actual knowledge of Sealion, you would know that the Channel was a deathtrap for a WW2 submersible. By the way, in September, 1940, the Germans had 27 frontboote (Operational boats) of which, on average, 13 were at sea on any one day. Is that your wonderful U-boat screen? Moreover, normal U-boat operating procedure involved trying to avoid close encounters with escorts, and especially fleet destroyers. Do you suggest that on this occasion they should actively seek them out? It would not end well. For the U-boats, that is.
I do enjoy reading the poorly informed nonsense you Sealion 'Would Haves' post, by which I mean your amusing certainty about what the wonderful Luftwaffe & the mighty Kriegsmarine 'would have' done.
Odd, then, that you are never actually able to explain why, in reality, they never managed to get remotely near to achieving any of it, isn't it?
You should read Schenk's book. You might, even if belatedly, actually learn soimething.
4
-
4
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
@nikolajkristensen5960 The bulk of the RN's anti-invasion forces, as I said before, were not in Rosyth, but much further south. The Admiralty didn't intend to use their heavy ships, because there was no need. The small, fast, destroyers and light cruisers were far better suited to the task.
'Germany still had a lot of destroyer u-boats bismarck, tirpitz.' Sorry, that is nonsense. Bismarck was undergoing trials in the Baltic, and was not declared fit for service until May, 1941. Tirpitz was declared operational in January, 1942. The Kriegsmarine had ten destroyers, of which four were refitting in September, 1940, and twenty seven operational U- boats, of which thirteen were at sea on any one day in September, 1940. It really wouldn't have been a good idea to send submarines into the Channel, by the way. The Kriegsmarine sent three in October, 1939, and all three were promptly sunk.
As to the invasion barges, you clearly haven't considered how much time it would take to get large numbers of towed barges out of a port, form them up into some sort of order, and set off for the Channel. The Kriegsmarine estimated that the largest of their convoys would require three days.
3
-
3
-
@jddallas7274 Congratulations on getting so many facts wrong in so short a post. Quite an achievement.
The Germans had 27 operational U-boats by September, 1940, of which an average of 13 were at sea on any one day. At the same time, they had only seven operational destroyers. For comparative purposes, at the same time the RN had 70 or so destroyers and cruisers based within five hours steaming of Dover, and a further 40 or so destroyers in Home Waters if needed.
Magnetic mines might have caused problems in shallow waters, had the Luftwaffe not managed to drop a couple on mud flats near Shoeburyness in November, 1939. A team from HMS Vernon recovered them and determined how they worked. As early as 27 November, tests (successful ones) were carried out on HMS Manchester, and degaussing methods were rapidly introduced. By 9 March, 1940, over 600 vessels had been successfully treated, and the procedure was quickly gathering pace.
The RN didn't seem to have been 'afraid of getting shot to bits by the Luftwaffe in the channel' at Dunkirk when they evacuated over 323,000 men of the BEF & French 1st Army without serious losses. Nor did they seem deterred as they undertook daily destroyer, cruiser, and MTB patrols through the Channel for the rest of the summer. Out of interest, and because it is clearly another fact of which you are ignorant, in the whole of WW2 your mighty Luftwaffe sank 31 RN destroyers, and no RN warship at all larger than a light cruiser.
'The Germans would have conducted the landing at night and the Royal Navy would not have responded till the day that is a head start. Every amphibious operation of WW2 succeeded and the British destroyers did not have the guns to shoot the German landing craft till 1942' This is idiocy on a masterful level. The Germans did not have any landing craft. They intended to transport their troops in barges towed in pairs by tugs or trawlers. The barges were to be towed in cumbersome block formations. For example, Barge Convoy 1, from Rotterdam, Ostend & Dunkirk heading for the area between Folkestone & New Romney consisted of 150 barges from Dunkirk & 50 from Ostend, together with a further 114 barges & 57 transports from Rotterdam.
Have you even considered how long it would take to extricate these barges from their ports, assemble them into some sort of formation, and then set sail? The quickest convoy required two days, and the largest three.
'The British destroyers did not have the guns to shoot the German landing craft till 1942 the Germans conducted a successful landing without control of the sea in Crete and they were intercepted by the Royal Navy and still all made so just saying your argument is weak not my.' What do you think that the 6 inch and 4 inch guns aboard British light cruisers, or the 4.7 inch, and 4 inch guns aboard British destroyers in 1940 were? Wooden mock ups? Or,of course, the 4 inch & 3 inch guns aboard supporting vessels, such as minesweepers, gunboats, sloops, and corvettes?
The salient point about Crete was that the Axis were not able be land troops from the sea, at least not until the British had decided to withdraw. Two convoys sailed from Greece, one bound for Maleme & one for Heraklion. The Maleme convoy was annihilated by a RN cruiser squadron, and as a result the Heraklion convoy turned back to Greece.
One of your comments, however, is correct, that 'Every amphibious operation of WW2 succeded.' Do you know why that was? Because those in Europe & North Africa were planned and executed by the Royal Navy, and those in the Pacific by the United States' Navy.
I assume from your post that you are just an immature child. The other possibility, that you are a remarkably stupid or ignorant adult, does also exist, however.
Would you like me to recommend a few book for you to read, or have read to you?
3
-
@jddallas7274 I presume you mean 'the book' on Sealion?
As I write this reply, the ones on the shelf immediately facing me, above my desk, are, in no particular order :-
Dunkirk. By John Harris.
Hitler's Naval War ( English edition) Cajus Bekker.
Churchill's Moat. The Channel War, 1939 -1945.
Invasion 1940. Derek Robinson.
Hitler's Armada. Geoff. Hewitt.
We Shall Fight on the Beaches. Defying Napoleon & Hitler. Brian Lavery.
Dunkirk The British Evacuation, 1940. Robert Jackson.
Operation Sea Lion. Peter Fleming.
The Evacuation From Dunkirk' Royal Navy Staff History.
Invasion of England 1940. (English edition) Peter Schenk .
The Miracle of Dunkirk. Walter Lord.
Crete 1941 David Thomas.
Silent Victory. Duncan Grinnell-Milne.
Operation Sealion. Leo McInstry.
Hitler Confronts England. Walter Ansel.
The Second World War, Vols. 1 & 2. Winston Churchill.
British & Empire Warships of the Second World War. H. T. Lenton.
Those are a selection, dealing primarily with the topic under discussion, but largely excluding associated topics such as Norway or even the Battle of Britain. Nor do I include documents and archives available to me, which are not readily accessible in book or electronic form.
Tell you what. Instead of simply posting insults, why don't you simply explain to me which parts of my original reply to you were, in your erudite opinion, either wrong, or even inaccurate?
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
In point of fact, Admiral Drax, C-in-C at the Nore, where most of the anti-invasion destroyer flotillas were based, had an agreement with the Air Ministry that the RAF would not attempt to bomb German vessels at sea, but would leave the field clear for the Royal Navy.
Bomber Command began bombing barge ports from 5 September, and by the end of September had destroyed 21 transports, 214 barges, and 8 small boats. There were still 159 transports, 1859 barges, 397 tugs, and over 1100 motor boats available. Bomber Harris' post war claims that Sealion was prevented by Bomber Command did not stand up to scrutiny.
3
-
3
-
The German plan anticipated that 9 divisions, plus a weak Paratroop Division (actually only about one third strength) would land, but that it would take ELEVEN DAYS to transport these across, using towed barges and small motor boats. Interestingly, the naval plan assumed that there would be no losses of towing vessels (because they had literally no reserves) and that, believe it or not, the Royal Navy would not intervene. This was at a time, by the way, (September, 1940) when the RN had over 70 destroyers and cruisers specifically allocated to anti-invasion duties, together with over five hundred smaller vessels such as sloops, minesweepers, gunboats, and armed trawlers, etc.
Supply by air would have been out of the question, because in late August, 1940, Luftwaffe archives show that there were precisely 226 operational transport aircraft.
Oh, and because of a lack of suitable shipping space, the divisions (all infantry or mountain divisions) would land without their divisional artillery or motor transport, although apparently some horses would have been included.
At the time, by the way, 'the stupidity of Hitler fighting the USSR ' making it possible for the British to hold on, is nonsense, as Hitler wasn't fighting the USSR in September, 1940. Therefore what, apparently, 'we all know' isn't true.
Try changing 'May have been risky' in your post to ''Would have been suicidal' for greater accuracy.
3
-
@georgegonzalez-rivas3787 There was never any suggestion that the Home Fleet would 'rush down' to intercept an invasion. The Home Fleet was at Rosyth, and would only be sent further south if any (actually non-existent) German heavy ships were detected heading towards the Channel. Home Fleet heavy ships were not intended to operate against a ramshackle invasion fleet of towed barges for the same reason that duck hunters generally do not use field guns. The rapid firing 4 & 4.7 inch destroyer guns, backed up by the 6 inch of the cruisers, were far more suited to the task.
There were 61 U-boats in commission in September, 1940. 34 were older training boats, or new boats working up. Of the remaining 27, only 13 were operational on any one day. The rest were either en route to, or returning from, patrol areas, or refitting/repairing after completing patrols.
Prince of Wales and Repulse were sunk by torpedo bombers, flown by crews who had been trained in anti-shipping techniques. In September, 1940, the Luftwaffe had had no such training, and until mid 1942, didn't even have torpedo bombers. Why do you think the Luftwaffe failed so badly at Dunkirk. Furthermore, on what basis do you think they would do any better against fast moving warships, when three months earlier they had proved themselves largely ineffective against ships stopped close inshore? In the whole of the war, the Luftwaffe managed to sink 31 RN destroyers, and no RN warship larger than a light cruiser. In September, 1940 the RN had around 70 light cruisers and destroyers within 5 hours of Dover, and a further 40 or so more destroyers in Home Waters.
The status of the German navy in September, 1940 :- Scharnhorst & Gneisenau were both under repair, which wasn't completed until November 1940. Bismarck was completing trials in the Baltic, followed by modifications in Hamburg until early 1941. Tirpitz did not even commission and commence trials until early 1941. Prinz Eugen's construction only completed in December, 1940. The only heavy ship available at the time was a single heavy cruiser, with three light cruisers and six destroyers also operational at the time.
Finally, I don't do war games, but I did do a degree in Modern History, specialising in WW2 Naval History, and came away with a first.
3
-
@myclearwater1471 America wasn't 'holding back' the destroyers at all. As early as 15 May, the US Ambassador in Paris had spoken to the French Admiralty concerning the supply of twelve such vessels to France. At the same time an approach was made, on the initiative of the US, to Britain, concerning the provision of '50 or 100 such ships' to the RN.
On 1 August, FDR, via the British Ambassador in Washington, suggested that 50 such ships could be sold to Canada, or in exchange for British bases. Churchill rejected the first option, but described the second as 'undesirable but acceptable.' The first destroyers began arriving in Canada on 1 September. The British saw them as useful stop-gaps for convoy escorts until their own new construction of better equipped escorts began to appear in early-mid 1941, but the initiative for the transfer was from the US, not Britain.
Britain was not 'getting ready' for invasion in August, 1940, unless you consider sending a troop convoy including three armoured regiments with full supporting artillery & transport an appropriate preparation. This was the 'Apology' convoy, which left the UK on 22 August.
The Italian 'invasion' of Egypt began in September, 1940. Far from attempting to take the Suez Canal, 10th Army advanced about 65 miles, then stopped, setting up a series of fortified camps. In December, 1940 the British, using the reinforcements from the 'Apology' convoy, counter-attacked, totally destroying 10th Army and for losses of 1900 men killed & wounded, took over 133,000 prisoners, and captured over 400 tanks and 800 artillery pieces.
Put simply, the Vichy French & 'the Arabs' were hardly close friends, and there was no threat to the oil fields at the time.
Air fields in Britain at the time generally had grass strips. Certainly, attacks did temporarily reduce their efficiency, but for brief periods only. A far more serious problem might have been a determined attempt to destroy the Chain Home radar stations, but no such concerted effort was made. Of course, if the RAF had been temporarily withdrawn from the Home Counties, all the towed canal barges of the Sealion invasion fleet needed to do was find a way past the seventy of so destroyers and light cruisers, with the support of five hundred or so smaller warships, which represented the force the Admiralty could deploy to meet them in the Channel!
The RAF was never short of pilots. Post-War studies of RAF records actually demonstrate that there were more qualified pilots in non-flying roles during the battle than were actually in aircraft.
Finally, there was a shortage neither of food nor of fuel at the time.
3
-
@myclearwater1471 Indeed, Churchill worked with Stalin, just as FDR did. Both regarded Soviet Russia as the lesser of two evils, and the British worked on the principle that 'My enemy's enemy is my friend' or, as Churchill put it himself, 'If Hitler invaded hell, I would make at least one favourable comment about the devil in the House of Commons.'
Of course Churchill sought help from the U.S. Who wouldn't want the support of a great industrial power, and FDR give that support because it was in the interests of the U.S. to assist the last surviving democracy in Europe.
As to 'nothing to stop an invasion.' Are you aware that, in the whole of WW2, the mighty Luftwaffe sank 31 British destroyers, and no British warship larger than a light cruiser. In September, 1940, there were over 100 RN destroyers in Home Waters alone, of which over 60 were within five hours steaming of the Channel. The Luftwaffe, by the way, had had no training in anti-shipping operations at the time, had no operational high performance torpedo bombers (in fact, didn't get any until early 1942) and had just failed badly to prevent the Dunkirk evacuation. Even senior commanders like von Richtofen & Dinort were outspoken in their beliefs that the Luftwaffe could not protect an invasion 'fleet' of canal barges towed at walking pace by tugs.
Of course, as a Sealion 'would have' (i.e., an enthusiast full of what the Luftwaffe 'would have' done, but utterly unable to explain why it never actually 'did' it) I suspect that you didn't previously know any of this.
3
-
@fdumbass As the German plan (Read 'Invasion of England, 1940' by Peter Schenck, for full details) required eleven days to land the first nine divisions of the invasion force, and as one of the barge convoys required three days to form up, proceed down Channel, and land the leading elements of that force, a few hours of fog would not help much. Furthermore, as, for example, the initial landings between Bexhill & Eastbourne involved 380 barges being towed in pairs by 190 tugs and trawlers, the chaos likely to have occurred as these vessels, with inexperienced crews without radar or even wireless, proceeding down the Channel in thick fog at 6 knots can only be imagined.
The Germans only ever, until 1944, sent three submarines into the Channel. All three were immediately sunk by the British mine defences.
The British had around 70 destroyers and light cruisers, supported by around 500 smaller warships, in the immediate vicinity of the Channel. The Luftwaffe, untrained in anti-shipping operations, and having just failed at Dunkirk, didn't even have torpedo bombers until mid-1942. In fact, in the whole of the war, even after receiving the necessary training, the Luftwaffe sank 31 RN destroyers, and no RN ship larger than a light cruiser.
The only way the Germans could fake an invasion would be by sending their barges to sea, risking running into the regular RN patrols from Plymouth & Sheerness. Frankly, the RN didn't really much care whether barges they sank were laden or empty. Moreover, the Germans only managed to assemble around 400 tugs, and had no reserves at all.
By the way, in September, 1940, the operational German navy consisted of 1 heavy & 3 light cruisers, 7 destroyers, 7 escort destroyers, 13 S boats, and less than 20 fleet minesweepers.
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
@LordZontar The Kriegsmarine had, by September, 1940, converted around 2,000 barges, and moved them into French & Belgian ports. They had also assembled around 550 coasters, tugs, & trawlers, together with almost 1200 motor boats, in the same ports.
In the meantime, the army had ten divisions set aside for the initial assault, with a second wave of nine divisions and a third wave of six divisions, allocated to the operation. They had also positioned around 150 coastal batteries in the belief that these would be capable of protecting the barges from the Royal Navy as they attempted to cross.
Certainly, Raeder had massive and justified misgivings about the chances of success, but his doubts alone were insufficient, in the face of a degree of confidence within the army that, after the simple 'extended river crossing' had been completed, the British land defences would be wholly inadequate.
With the strength of the Royal Navy, there was, in reality, no likelihood that Sealion would succeed, but the order might still have been given, and the German army & navy did far more than simply go through the motions.
3
-
Oh dear, once again the old 'The Germans didn't attempt Sealion because they chose not to attempt it, not because they couldn't.'
By September, 1940, the European canal network had been largely stripped of boats, because some 2100 had been commandeered, modified, and sent to Channel ports, along with 170 freighters, just over 400 tugs, and almost 1200 motor boats.
23 divisions had been earmarked for the landing, in three waves.
The Luftwaffe used 2500 aircraft for Barbarossa. Have lost 1700, and 2700 trained aircrew, during what your apparently believe was part of the bluff, the Battle of Britain.
If you want to know whether Sealion was 'real' or not, you should read the manner in which an amateur author condemned Kaiser Bill for trying to wage a war on two fronts, in a book called 'Mein Kampf.'
3
-
3
-
@jimmiller5600 'Slow to detect an invasion?' The time taken to extract the towed barges from harbour, form them up into some sort of box formation, and send them down the Channel at little more than walking pace meant that the sailing time, from the extrication of the first barge to arrival off the landing beach was three days, in the case of the largest convoy. 'Slow to detect an invasion?' As the barges supposedly passed down Channel, Admiral Ramsay would be able to see the things from Dover Castle, for Heaven's sake!
The Royal Navy sailed regular destroyer patrols every night through the Channel from Plymouth and Sheerness, often pausing to shell a barge port or two. Moreover, the Germans had seven minelayers, mainly converted merchantmen, available to them, possibly supported by a small number of minelaying destroyers. The British had, by contrast, several hundred fleet & auxiliary minesweepers, largely courtesy of their huge fishing fleet. Finally, the minelaying could only take place at night, when the destroyer patrols were active. The effect of a 4.7 inch high explosive shell landing on a laden mine deck was likely to be quite dramatic.
The Germans sent three U-Boats into the Channel in late 1939. They, and their crews, are still there. The Channel was a death trap for such boats, which is why the Germans avoided sending any there until after D-Day when, of course, the British & Canadian Escort Groups inflicted heavy losses on them.
The German plan for Sealion envisaged that 11 days would be required to land the first wave. Cerberus involved three heavily protected fast modern warships fleeing west to east through the Channel in a matter of a few hours, at a time when the invasion threat had long passed, and the concentrated RN forces of late 1940 had long dispersed to other duties. Can you really not understand the difference between the two?
3
-
3
-
@koookeee How is a 'stalemate' a success? The Germans either land successfully, or they fail.
If I recall correctly, he refers to Admiral Forbes not wishing to commit the Home Fleet. Unfortunately, the Home Fleet was never part of the Admiralty's anti-invasion planning in any case, for the sensible reason that small fast warships with quick firing 4 & 4.7 inch guns are much better equipped to sink barges and tugs than heavier warships.
The RN effectiveness in sinking small convoys. Like the annihilation of one small troop convoy making for Maleme (Crete), and the German recall of the second, Heraklion, convoy? Or the destruction of the 'Duisburg' convoy, or the 'Tarigo' convoy? Those convoys?
The RAF was never intended to attack invasion barges at sea in any case, but was used to bomb barges in the invasion ports, which they began doing from 5 September.
I haven't read the book for years, largely because of the many flaws within it and the basic lack of research, which I am now recalling to mind.
3
-
3
-
You make the common mistake of all Sealion enthusiasts, in that you apparently believe that the Luftwaffe was on a par with the Imperial Japanese Air Force. Just to correct you, please note that Prince of Wales and Repulse were sunk by torpedo bombers, whereas the Luftwaffe didn't acquire similar aircraft until mid 1942. The Luftwaffe had just failed to prevent the evacuation from Dunkirk, largely because it had had no training in anti-shipping operations. In fact, in the whole of the war, the Luftwaffe sank no RN warship larger than a light cruiser, and a total of 'only' 31 RN destroyers. To put that into perspective, the RN started the war with 193 destroyers (ending it with over 400) and in September 1940 had around 70 light cruisers & destroyers within five hours steaming of Dover, over 100 in total in Home Waters, and supporting forces of around 500 smaller warships.
Good luck, by the way, with the U-Boats. Generally, U-Boats sought to avoid attacking fleet destroyers, as it tended to end badly for them. In any case, in September, 1940, the average number of boats at sea on any one day was 13. The Germans did try to operate U-Boats in the Channel in October, 1939. The three they sent were promptly sunk.
Finally, surface attack. What with? The German navy had, in September, 1940, one heavy & three light cruisers, seven operational destroyers, and precisely thirteen S Boats.
The probability is, indeed, of slaughter in the Channel, but of towed German barges, not of the (huge) Royal Navy.
3
-
The German fleet was built as part of the Franco- German naval race, and not as a challenge to the Royal Navy. Put simply, the Weimar Republic came up with the panzerships to intercept French troop convoys. The French responded with the Strasbourgs. The Germans responded with the Scharnhorsts, the French with the Richelieus, and the Germans with the Bismarcks.
If Germany started building U-boats, then these could only be aimed at Britain. The British response would be to commence an enhanced programme of escort vessel construction. Should the Germans focus on anti-ship capability for the Luftwaffe, then firstly, how do these aircraft even approach the Royal Navy, and secondly how does the invasion of France succeed without the airborne artillery close support that was the Luftwaffe. Serious planning against Britain could only commence after a successful invasion and conquest of France.
The Germans had no choice other than to pause after Dunkirk? How could they possibly consider an invasion of Britain with no assault ships, or landing craft. Indeed, without even the towed barges they later assembled. Moreover, the completion of the invasion of France required another two weeks.
Mine the Channel? With the seven auxiliary minelayers they actually had available? Mining in daylight was not a realistic option, if for no other reason than minefields are of limited use if your enemy (with over 400 available sweepers) knows where they are. At night, of course, what happens when the layers run into one or other of the regular RN destroyer patrols through the Channel?
Fix Enigma? First, they need to know that it wasn't totally secure.
Win the Battle of Britain. Didn't they try?
In short, none of the 'creative' ways have any basis in reality.
3
-
@bobcougar77 There is rather more evidence that the Halt Order on the Aa Canal was issued by von Rundstedt. Indeed, Army Group A's War Diary confirms as much. In common with a number of other senior commanders, von Rundstedt feared a repeat of the Miracle of the Marne. He wished to rest & service his armour before getting into the next stage of the campaign. Hitler, who knew the country around Dunkirk from WW1, agreed with the order, especially since on the previous day Goering had told him that the elimination of the Allied forces trapped around Dunkirk was 'a special job for the Luftwaffe.'
More generally, there was a general difference in attitude between the Germans and the British. Von Rundstedt and his peers viewed an army backed against the sea as trapped, whereas the British, with their history of naval superiority, saw the sea as an available open door.
Certainly, Hitler did not want to attempt an invasion, but his assumption that Britain would come to terms was a major strategic blunder.
As to Sealion, no amount of creativity could make it work. Napoleon had expressed the issue neatly when he referred to his own invasion problems with the question 'can an elephant fight a whale?'
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
@Andy-ub3ub 'Minutiae?' Since when have accurate historical facts been so described?
Your observations simply do not stand. On the one hand you come up with a whole series of 'would haves' ranging from questionable to impossible, and then you blithely assume that all subsequent events of WW2 still proceed as they historically did.
You take the same approach as those who merrily claim that, if Germany had built vast numbers of U-boats in the lead up to WW2, then they 'would have' won the Battle of the Atlantic. Utterly ignoring the fact that, had this actually happened, then the British, understanding that such construction could only have been aimed directly at them, 'would have' accelerated construction of escorts to a vastly greater degree than, historically, they did.
Thank you for your 'very very small acknolegement.' I don't much care, as I am right, and you are wrong.
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
Except of course the British were not intending to order their military and their civilians to undertake massed suicide attacks, as the Japanese were. You might take Okinawa as an example. The US landing forces suffered 6,821 killed and 19,217 wounded. Although most in the 20,000-strong Japanese garrison were draftees, they refused to surrender, fighting tenaciously until only a few hundred remained alive to be taken prisoner.
By contrast, the British had a more credible approach, which involved the use of their overwhelming naval supremacy to intercept and destroy the towed barges which the Germans intended to use to transport their troops. Put simply, the British knew that they could defeat Sealion. The Japanese hope was that mass slaughter would so sicken the US leaders that they would eventually choose to come to a negotiated peace. As to the 'bloodbath' idea, look at the casualty levels that the planners of 'Olympic' expected.
Oh, and as to 'They had no interest in occupying Britain, and their real goals were always eastwards.' Certainly the Germans would have preferred the British to come to terms, but the fact that they requisitioned and converted around 200 transport ships, 2000 barges, 400 tugs, and over 1100 motor boats, and were willing to accept the loss of over 1700 aircraft and 2500 experienced aircrew in pursuit of air superiority over the Channel & the English south east coast, tells a rather different story about German intentions, I suggest.
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
2
-
@nikolajkristensen5960 It appears that revealing your errors and lack of knowledge has annoyed you. Indeed, the Kriegsmarine had a heavy cruiser. They also had three operational light cruisers. At the same time, the British had 1 battlecruiser, 1 carrier, 2 heavy cruisers and 2 light cruisers at Scapa Flow, 2 battleships, 1 battlecruiser, 3 light cruisers at Rosyth, 3 light cruisers in the Humber, 2 light cruisers at Chatham, 1 light cruiser in Portsmouth, 1 battleship, 2 light cruisers in Plymouth, and 1 light cruiser in the Firth of Clyde.
The British would not be under air attack 24/7 as you elegantly put it, because, whilst the RN could indeed operate 24/7, the Luftwaffe could only operate in daylight. This, by the way, is presumably the same Luftwaffe which had failed so badly to disrupt the Dunkirk evacuation, which had received no training whatsoever in anti-shipping operations, which didn't even develop a high performance torpedo bomber until early 1942, and which in the whole of the war sank 31 RN destroyers, and no RN vessel of any kind bigger than a light cruiser. That Luftwaffe?
The rest of your post is barely coherent gibberish, by the way. I don't feel inclined even to attempt to decipher it.
2
-
@nikolajkristensen5960 Tirpitz? Crew training? She hadn't even finished being built! Knickebein could guide an aircraft to a large, static, target such as a city, but was useless for targeting ships at sea. Surely you know that?
D- day was far from 'a bad idea.' It involved 4217 landing craft, 1213 warships, and 11,600 aircraft. The Germans in 1940 had no landing craft, about 30 warships, and around 2000 aircraft of all types.
You clearly haven't grasped the length of time needed to extricate large numbers of barges from ports and form them into so sort of order; still less have you grasped how many warships the British had within close range of the Channel, so I won't bother repeating the details.
In fact, I won't bother replying to you again, as there are numerous other people, with much greater knowledge and much more intelligent opinions, who make more interesting correspondents.
In the time that you could save by not replying to me, why not buy a book on the subject of Operation Sealion?
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
@nikolajkristensen5960 How would theoretical air superiority have meant that 'they' could get over without much trouble? Purely imagination on your part, in defiance of the actual performance of the Luftwaffe in 1940.
The difference between Sealion and D-Day should be obvious. The US troops involved were already in Britain, and the Allies had overwhelming naval and air superiority. Your idea of using the Italian navy to support Sealion is simply fantasy. You are grasping at non existent straws to support your obsessive delusions.
I agree that you cannot analyse a battle which didn't happen, but you can make deductions based on things which did. In this case, the heavy losses by the German fleet off Norway, the lack of training the Luftwaffe had received in anti-shipping operations, the poor performance of the Luftwaffe at Dunkirk, the vast resources of the RN in home waters, and the manner in which the RN subsequently prevented Crete being reinforced by sea, even when the Luftwaffe's earlier lack of training had been remedied. You can add to the the utter impossibility of your foolish suggestion that the Italian fleet could support anything.
What is this bizarre reference to Harry Potter, by the way?
2
-
2
-
@nikolajkristensen5960 The British had been the dominant naval power for over 200 years. If anyone had an understanding of the issue, going back to the Seven Years' War and earlier, the British did.
Delay the invasion by a year? Aren't you aware that, from June 1940 onwards, the British were outproducing Germany in aircraft? For example, by May, 1941, the RAF had 56 fighter and fighter-bomber squadrons carrying out regular sweeps over Northern France. If you are going to continue to fantasise about air cover, then how would delaying the invasion by a year possibly have helped? As to the production of warships, the comparison would be ludicrous. Between September 1940 and May 1941, the Germans had brought into service one battleship, one heavy cruiser, and four destroyers. Would you like me to list British & Canadian production during the same period?
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
@nikolajkristensen5960 Your ignorance astonishes me. During the Battle of Britain, Fighter Command rotated the squadrons in 11 & 12 Groups on a regular basis. After a period in the Front Line, a squadron would be sent to 13 Group, in the North of England & Scotland, to rest & recuperate, and a rested squadron would replace it. Similarly, experienced fighter pilots would be sent to training units to teach new pilots the tricks of the trade. Furthermore, many qualified pilots were actually in administrative positions, and not in the front line at all.
The Luftwaffe had no such policy. Their aircrew remained with their units throughout. As to your imaginary British 'shortage of pilots,' you obviously haven't heard of the 'British Commonwealth Air Training Plan,' which trained over 130,000 Allied pilots & aircrew in Canada alone.
Do you actually know anything at all about Sealion or the Battle of Britain?
2
-
2
-
2
-
@nikolajkristensen5960 You really shouldn't regard Wikipedia as the fount of all knowledge. Of the 'sea craft' lost, 162 were small motor boats or barges, of which 150 were not sunk but simply abandoned at the conclusion of the operation. Of the damaged destroyers, all except three were back in service by 18 June.
I would recommend the official Naval Staff History, 'Operation Dynamo, 26 May - 4 June, 1940' but it is out of print, and probably too complicated for you to grasp anyway. What you describe as 'stats' are more correctly described as 'facts.'
One fact in particular being that the Luftwaffe attempted to prevent the evacuation of 40,000 troops, yet in the end failed to prevent the evacuation of over 338,000.
2
-
2
-
@nikolajkristensen5960 'whats wrong with that.' Apart from it being in no known language, you mean? You have been posting things about Sealion (and the Battle of Britain) which show a stunning lack of knowledge and, as I have plenty of spare time, I am more than happy to amuse myself pointing out your almost inexhaustible store of mistakes and factual errors.
Incidentally, I notice that one or two of your comments are not actually reaching this site. Perhaps it is finding you too preposterous to stomach? However, in response to:-
1). 'wikipedia isn't knowlegde ?:) you jsut stated everything they said was true but when used against you not true ty for making me see your as you are, a guy from britain who woulnd't believe britain could lose nothing more.' I actually said that 'Wikipedia isn't the fount of all knowledge.' Largely because it isn't.
2). 'google it, if they wasn't short on pilots why did the polish and americans join the eagle squadron freely.' The Poles didn't join the Eagle Squadron, but seven Americans did take part in the Battle of Britain. Similarly, 147 Polish pilots also took part.
You appear to have some sort of idea that Fighter Command was some sort of exclusive club for English Gentlemen. It wasn't. The Poles ( and by the way, pilots from other non-English speaking countries such as Czechoslovakia, Belgium, & France) had arrived in Britain after enduring many privations. They were experienced & capable pilots, who wished to continue the fight against Nazi Germany. Once they had demonstrated sufficient command of English to work within the constraints of Fighter Command's control systems, why shouldn't they be given the opportunity?
Similarly, the American pilots, and a further ten from another non-Commonwealth country, Ireland, made the effort to get to Britain to fight against Fascism. Doubtless, had Fighter Command not accommodated them, someone as ignorant as you would have accused the British of being prejudiced, I assume.
Not, of course, that this is in any way relevant to your fantasy about an (imaginary) British shortage of pilots. For that, you need to look at the Luftwaffe records, old chap.
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
@nikolajkristensen5960 Very good. Now do you know how wide the Straits of Gibraltar are, and what there is there? Seriously, this is rather like pulling teeth, but fortunately not mine.
Mussolini went to war so that he could put, in his words, a few thousand Italian dead on the Peace Table. Like Hitler, he assumed that Britain would come to terms after France. When this didn't happen, like Hitler, he had few options, especially when his Armies in Africa were annihilated. Far from supporting Hitler in an attempted invasion of Britain, his surface fleet spent much of the war avoiding action, and by early 1941 he was begging for German support to shore up his troops in Libya.
'They shoulnd't meet britain there before the atlantic if they had some out there, would be very risky for britain to sail between gilraltar and marokko.'
Really? Odd then, that the RN and later USN sailed through the Straits will impunity throughout the war, wouldn't you say?
2
-
@nikolajkristensen5960 1). These perhaps?
Alexander Battery: (South Mole, sea level) Pom-pom and one Bofors to protect the south side of the harbour.
Bombproof Battery: (North side of the Rock part of 18th Century defence lines) 17 Pounder anti-tank gun, 25 Pounder Gun. Also had many Vickers emplacements, will show a photo later in the thread, and rifle ports.
Breakneck Battery: (Upper Ridge, top of the Rock) 1 9.2 inch gun.
Buena Vista Battery: (West Side, commanding views of entrance to anchorage) 4 inch naval gun.
Buffadero Battery: (South facing, field of fire to east (med), west (atlantic) and south (straits). 9.2 inch Battery and 2 Bofors.
Catalan Batteries: (North West Facing, covering harbour, airfield and landward approaches) 3-pdr QF Gun.
Couvre Port Battery: (Covering Landport Gate, only land entrance to Gibraltar at the time) 1940: One 4 inch naval gun and 6-pdr 7 cwt both in an anti-tank role.
Crutchett’s and Castle Batteries: (North facing running down the slope from castle) Searchlight emplacements still there.
Detached Mole Battery: (Mole running S-N at harbour mouth) One twin mounted 6-pdr at either end, 2 3inch 20-cwt and 2 Bofors.
Devil’s Gap Battery (Half way up the Rock, west facing covering harbour and Spanish hinterland) 2 6 inch Mk VII guns (guns still there).
Edward VII’s Battery ( 85 feet above sea level, south/west facing) 2 9.2 inch Mark X guns.
Engineer Battery: (Beside Alexander Battery) Searchlight emplacements.
Europa Advance Batteries: (Southern most point of Gibraltar) Two 4-inch BL Mark IX QF guns on CP Mk I mountings. 1 Bofors.
Farringdon’s Battery: (North Face, commanding views of Spain and airport) Fixed searchlight emplacement.
Forbe’s Battery: (North face, part of landport defences) 40mm Mark 3 gun on a mobile mounting.
Genista Battery: (South Facing) Two 6 inch Mark VII guns.
Half Way Battery: (East Facing) DEL equipped with a 90 cm Mark V Projector.
Harding’s Battery: (South Facing) 1 Bofors.
Hutment Battery: (South facing) 1 Bofors.
King’s Lines: (Part of Landport Defences covering land approaches. Most of these are cut into the Rock itself and you need to go through the Tunnels to get there) Many Vickers MG emplacements, two 6-pdr. 6cwt Hotchkiss anti-tank guns.
Levant Battery: (East/West Facing) Two 9.2 inch guns, one facing east the other west.
Lewis Battery: (West Facing) 1 DEL emplacement, 1 Bofors.
Lighthouse Battery: (South facing, beside lighthouse) 4 heavy 3.7 inch anti-aircraft guns.
Lord Airye’s Battery: (1,358 feet above sea level, south/west facing) One 9.2 inch Mk X gun.
Mediterranean Battery: (Just below Lord Airey’s. North/east facing) Two 4 inch naval guns.
Middle Hill Battery: (West facing) One Bofors.
Montagu Bastion (West facing covering northern side of anchorage) Two 3.7 inch AA guns.
Napier of Madgala Battery: (Beside Engineer/Alexander Batteries, west facing) Four 3.7 inch AA guns.
New Mole: (Southern side of harbour, west facing) 2 Bofors, one 4 inch QF gun, two twin mounted 6 inch guns.
O’Hara’s Battery: (1,400 feet above sea level, west/east facing) One 9.2 inch Mk X gun that last fired in 1976 (my father-in-law was part of the gun crew).
Orange Bastion: (Sea Level, west facing) One 40mm Bofors.
Orillion Battery: (Part of Landport defences cut into the Rock) 1940, one 6-pdr. 6 cwt anti-tank gun, replaced by a 17-pdr gun in 1943.
Parson’s Lodge Battery: (West facing covering Camp Bay) Disguised pill boxes and MG positions as well as DEL emplacements and one 40mm Bofors.
Princess Anne’s Battery: (West/north facing.) Four 5.25 inch high angle guns.
Queen Charlotte’s Battery: (NW facing) One 75mm anti-tank gun.
Rock Battery: (1,360 feet above sea level. 360 degree arc of fire. ‘Rock Gun’.) One 9.2 inch Mk IX gun.
Rooke Battery (West facing) DEL emplacements and location of Fire Command HQ.
Royal Battery: (1,256 feet above sea level) One 40mm Bofors.
Signal Hill Battery: (1,200 feet above sea level) Two 3 inch 30-cwt. AA guns and one 40mm Bofors.
South Batteries: (South Facing) Four 3.7 inch AA guns.
Spur Battery: (Just below O’Hara’s) One 9.2 inch.
Tovey Battery: (West Facing) Two six inch BL MK VII guns, one is still there.
Waterport Battery: (North facing and covering northern part of harbour and airfield) Two 3.7 inch AA guns.
West Battery: (West facing) Two 9.2 inch Mk X guns.
White Rock Batteries: (East facing covering possible invasion beaches) Two 3.7 inch mobile AA guns.
Windmill Hill Batteries: (West/South facing) Four 3.7 inch AA guns, two 9.2 inch guns.
Woodford’s Battery: (South facing) DEL emplacement.
Did you really not know that Gibraltar was the main British naval base in the Western Mediterranean. The above are 'only' the shore guns. You can add the warships of Force H & North Atlantic Command ( 1 battleship, 1 battlecruiser, one carrier, and 15 destroyers of the 8th & 15 destroyer flotillas, and probably a fair proportion of the Mediterranean Fleet itself. At the time, 4 battleships, 2 aircraft carriers, 3 heavy & 5 light cruisers, 22 destroyers, & 13 submarines. You can also add the aircraft based on Gibraltar, and the air groups of the carriers, whose torpedo bombers crews had had considerable training in anti-shipping operations. Gibraltar was, of course, out of range of all but a tiny number of Italian shore based aircraft.
The Straits, by the way, are 8 miles wide.
Actually, that was precisely the reason Mussolini went to war. He even said as much to Count Ciano, his Foreign Minister and Son in Law.
'His support to north african has nothing to do with sea lion, and yes they did sail trough there later it was a none battlefield so if they could italy could to.' Don't be obtuse, of course it does. The British would have unopposed freedom to attack the Italian army in North Africa, and to shell any Italian port, from the sea.
The difference between the British using the Straits, which they did right from the start of the war, and the Italians using them, is that the British coast defences would not be shelling British ships. Are you really this clueless?
2
-
@nikolajkristensen5960 You have demonstrated your cluelessness in a whole series of posts, culminating in your apparent ignorance of Gibraltar as a major British naval base. 'Clueless?' Of course you are. I am simply calling a spade a spade.
I notice that another post from you hasn't appeared on here. This one :-
'how do you figure they would have unopposed attack in north africa? how does sea lion make a diffents to italy war in north africa? I do know they have all that but they will have to launch some operations against that base first yes kinda says itself ty for information me I'm just information you about italy thats all nothing more you asked yourself I answer hard to get?, you really like calling me clueless when you have writen to me for over 100 messages xD I don't care what you think will stop it I said some of my plan quess the rest on the way because im done typing to you.'
As I derive considerable entertainment from replying to you, then, as a gift, here is my reply to that:
1). If a large proportion of the Italian navy was no longer in the Mediterranean, or at least above the surface in the Mediterranean, then Cunningham can use his ships to shell Italian positions all along the coast, to disrupt Italian supply lines along the coast, and to transport supplies to British forces near the front without the need to use valuable trucks and fuel carrying these supplies along the coast road.
2). The same answer. You wish to send most of the Italian fleet to the Channel. Ignoring the sheer impossibility of this, surely you can grasp that, if the bulk of the Italian fleet vanishes, point 1). above applies, and every Italian mainland port becomes a juicy target for an aggressive commander like Andrew Cunningham.
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
@myclearwater1471 There is no 'if true' about it. It is a fact. You may choose to question what motivated them, I will simply stick to the truth.
Your understanding, as seems to be a consistent thread, is wrong.
What has the nationality of the commanders to do with anything? In fact, unlike the US Army of the time, the British Armed Forces did not have a policy of racial segregation. A typical Indian division had a mixture of British & Indian units within it, and generally Indian units were commanded by Indian officers who, should the situation arise, also had authority over British units. Agreed, at the Corps and Army levels, the officers were mainly British, Australian, New Zealand, or Canadian, largely because that is where the career soldiers of the time came from.
Your prejudice, and your ignorance of the period, continues to amaze and amuse me. Just for your information, at the height of the Raj, around 320,000,000 Indians were administered (in your perverted view, oppressed) by 20,000 British administrators.
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
@youraveragescotsman7119 He was appointed to command of V Corps, responsible for the defence of Hampshire & Dorset, in July, 1940. His immediate superior was Auchinleck, who was C-in-C Southern Command. At about that time, Monty began a long-running feud with the Auk, which seems to have continued for the rest of his life, and even resulted in the publishers of his autobiography having to include an apology in them for certain claims made by Monty which might have resulted in legal action.
I believe part of his doubt concerned the one undeniable weakness suffered by the Home Guard, their lack of mobility arising from their lack of transport. I think the Auk envisaged a more static defence in the event of a German landing, which would allow the RN to cut their supply lines and starve them to defeat, whereas Monty had a more mobile defence in mind.
Clearly, Monty had not been told about Corporal Jones' van, or the strategic importance of the Novelty Rock Emporium!
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
@julianmhall I didn't say that they 'sat on their hands and did nothing,' only that the Admiralty regarded the interception and destruction of a ragged fleet of towed barges with minimal defensive support was a task best left to the surface fleet, which had overwhelming superiority in the Channel area.
The best aircraft available to the FAA at the time were the Fulmar, in service from March 1940 with 806 Squadron, operating from HMS Illustrious in the Mediterranean at the time, and the Swordfish, equipping both carriers and ground based FAA squadrons. The only carrier in home waters at the time, HMS Furious, with 18 Swordfish, 6 Sea Gladiators, and 12 Skuas, was based at Scapa Flow, with the battlecruiser Repulse, two heavy cruisers, Berwick & Norfolk, two light cruisers, Glasgow and Curacoa, and seven destroyers.
In short, there were no large enemy surface ships in the area which might have been targetted by Swordfish.
2
-
Had Sealion been attempted, September, 1940 was the likeliest date. So, here goes:-
Bismarck 6 months away from completion.
Tirpitz 8 months away from completion.
Gneisenau Repairing torpedo damage. Estimated completion November 1940.
Scharnhorst Repairing torpedo damage. Estimated completion late October.
Lutzow Repairing torpedo damage. Estimated completion April 1941.
Scheer Preparing for commerce raiding. Sailed 23 October, 1940.
Hipper Operational with care - defective engines.
There were two light cruisers (Koln & Nurnberg) operational, as was an older, training cruiser (Emden).
The German navy had lost 12 of 22 destroyers by September, 1940. Three of the remaining 10 were refitting.
There were also a number of Torpedo Boats, which were similar to the British escort destroyer or the US DEs. By some, I mean 9.
There was also a new class of Torpedo Boat, the Elbing class, which had unreliable high pressure boilers, and were armed with a single 105mm gun, facing aft. About 7 were available.
That is it, I am afraid. A rather one-sided sea battle at best, after which it is possible to deduce what would probably happen to the canal barges towed by tugs and trawlers when the 70 or so RN destroyers and cruisers on anti-invasion duties came across them.
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
@LordZontar You appear to think that I believe that Sealion was possible. I don't and never have. Indeed, my book on the subject was rather well received when published a few years ago. In short, I am certain that an attempt had no hope of success.
However, that does not mean anyone went through the motions. In point of fact the military archives at Freiburg detail a number of exercises carried out in 1940 involving loading troops onto barges, putting a short distance out to sea, and carrying out landings. The barges, by the way, were capable of withstanding normal Channel conditions. They, and their tugs, could not have withstood what the resources available to the Admiralty would have sent against them.
Would you like me to provide you with a list of the dates of the meetings held between Hitler and the naval and army staffs during the period, or details of the reports from Generals Busch & Strauss, of 9th & 16th Armies, that their preparations were complete, which reached Hitler on 13 September? Hitler, in response to a request from Raeder that the attempt be deferred until 8 or 24 October, when the moon & tides were favourable, informed him that a decision would be made on 17 September, which left open the possibility of D-Day being 27 September.
By 15 September, the transports were in position, and the troops of 9th & 16th armies ready to board. By then, von Richthofen, of Fliegerkorps VIII, had openly voiced his doubts, which supported those of Raeder. Coincidentally, on 14/15, 15/16, and 16/17 September, the regular RN destroyer patrols from Portsmouth & the Nore inspected the coastal barge ports as usual, and, with storms in the Channel on 17 September, Sealion was indefinitely postponed.
You don't need to try to lecture me on the shortcomings of the planning, or of the extreme improbability of success, but there is nothing, at least until mid-September at the earliest, in any German archive to suggest that it was merely a bluff.
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
RN bases were at the Nore (25 destroyers), Portsmouth (20 destroyers) and Plymouth (12 destroyers). Steaming at 20 knots, although even a 'Hunt' class could manage 25, and the rest were capable of 30+, this means that after receiving an invasion alert, boats from the Nore could reach Dover in 3.5 hours, from Portsmouth in 3.5 hours, and from Plymouth in 8 hours. Additionally, four light cruisers could accompany them.
As to mining the Channel, how would you suggest the Germans achieved that, with only seven converted freighters to use as minelayers? Certainly, the Germans did have an elaborate plan to undertake the laying of eleven mine barriers, which would commence nine days before Sealion was attempted. However, as the go-ahead was never given, neither did the minelaying commence. Probably just as well, as the Royal Navy carried out nightly destroyer patrols, and the effects of a 4.7 or 4 inch HE shell exploding on a laden mine deck could not be taken lightly.
Actually, the British mined the Channel heavily, sinking three U-Boats there as early as October, 1939.
2
-
@koookeee By 'sanguine' I mean his confidence that the Germans could actually achieve a landing at all. The source for the losses suffered by the Maleme convoy which Forczyk uses is questionable (Vincent O'Hara) and the vast majority of other sources do not agrees. Park, 'The Battle for Crete' Annapolis Naval Institute Press, as an American example, for one. There are several others.
'A handful of old destroyers between Harwich and Portsmouth.' Which is why I referred to the Pink List of 16 September, 1940. This shows 16 destroyers and a light cruiser at Portsmouth, and 24 destroyers and two light cruisers at Sheerness (both ports were 3.5 hours from Dover at 20 knots, by the way). He seems to have forgotten Plymouth, as well, by the way, where there were 16 destroyers and two light cruisers. Mr. Forczyk, if he thought this represents 'a handful' must have had large hands. I would be happy to list every one of these vessels, by the way. I DO have the Pink List for 16 September, 1940.
2
-
@koookeee As I understand it, Mr. Forzcyk questioned the ability of the RN to deal with convoys. I have simply corrected this misconception. As the earliest actions against axis convoys took place in the Mediterranean in early 1941, then upon what did Mr. Forzcyk base his claim?
Moreover, the Sealion vessels were actually towed barges, moving at little over walking pace, not convoys in any real sense at all. The Royal Navy by the way, was the best trained in the west in night operations. At the time, only the distant Japanese were their equals.
It appears that you prefer Mr. Forzcyk's alternative approach to that of most authors writing on the subject today. Fair enough, but please don't be so confident in his 'critical analysis,' as you describe it, when there are significant flaws in it.
2
-
2
-
@koookeee The Royal Navy already carried out patrols of the Channel from both ends on a nightly basis, usually involving four destroyers from Plymouth and four from Sheerness. During the day, any concentration of barges heading into the Channel would actually be visible from Admiral Ramsay' headquarters at Dover Castle.
What German shipping did pass through the Channel at the time was usually comprised of small groups of ships keeping close to the French coast, and able to retire into any of the many ports in the event of any perceived threat. In point of fact, barge concentrations in French & Belgian ports only really began in early September. In September, the Royal Navy began attacks as opposed to patrols. Such attacks took place on 7/8 September (4 MTBs attacked shipping in Calais, supported by four destroyers from DF1 out of Portsmouth), 8/9 September ( 3 MTBs attacked a small group of ships near Ostend, before entering Ostend harbour and attacking shipping with torpedoes and machine guns, whilst 2 cruisers & 6 destroyers entered Boulogne & shelled the inner harbour, and four destroyers supported an attack by MTBs on Dunkirk harbour), 9/10 September (6 destroyers shelled Calais & Boulogne harbours, supporting attacks by 4 MTBs) 10/11 September (3 destroyers of DF 16 engaged and sank a number of tugs & barges off Ostend) 11/12 September (destroyers from Plymouth, Portsmouth, and Sheerness swept the coast from the mouth of the Meuse to Cherbourg, shelling shipping in several of the ports) 12/13 September ( 3 destroyers of DF 16 swept from Boulogne to Cap Gris Nez, but found nothing at sea) and 13/14 September ( the same destroyers of DF 16 sank or damaged a number of German patrol trawlers). That is a summary of the operations for the first half of September. I haven't listed patrols where nothing was detected.
Of the destroyers in Plymouth, Portsmouth, and Sheerness, there were 4 V&Ws at Plymouth, 4 V&Ws and old S class at Portsmouth, & 17 V&Ws at Sheerness. Of the remainder, the oldest were 3 ten years old B class, whilst 6 were brand new J/K class destroyers ( 6 x 4.7 inch guns, specifically moved to Plymouth to counter the German destroyers at Cherbourg) and the others six years old at most.
The V&Ws were mixed, by the way. Some, the Modified V & Ws, carried 4.7 inch mark 1 guns, capable of 5-6 rounds per minute, whilst the older V & Ws were fitted with 4 inch mark Vs. These, when introduced in 1918, did indeed have separate ammunition, but used fixed ammunition by 1939, and had rate of fire of 8-10 rounds per minute. Most V & Ws carried one or two x 0.5 inch pom poms, and a 3 inch AA gun (which could also be used as a low angle weapon) in place of one set of tubes.
I would agree that the old V & Ws were not suited to fight major fleet action by WW2, but in this case they were actually intended to be used against barges & tugs, where a rate of fire of 5 or 6 rounds per gun per minute for the modified V&Ws, and 8-10 rounds for the V&Ws, was probably more than adequate.
A pity Mr. Forczyk didn't do his research on the V & Ws (and the Scott and Shakespeare class leaders which accompanied them) as these are a particular interest of mine.
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
@Andy-ub3ub No you are totally missing the point. Your first post read 'If germany had invaded, Britain wouldve never gone to north africa.' However much you refuse to accept it, there were already British forces in North Africa before WW2 began. Why do you find this simple fact so difficult to grasp?
Your posts are riddled with 'would haves.' You assume that Germany had the resources to attempt an invasion (she didn't) and you assume no supplies 'would have' been sent to North Africa. Actually, supplies and reinforcements were being sent in August, 1940, when the possibility of an invasion attempt still existed.
Then you fantasise about convoys to Russia (only begun in August 1941), and Operation Pedestal (August, 1942). The British actually maintained Malta throughout the war. You might find it difficult to accept, but the British were fully aware of the importance of the middle eastern oilfields.
'Yes, the british army had escaped at dunkirk, but it had lost all of its heavy equipment.' Yet, by the time the Germans were even notionally able to attempt anything (September) the British had 34.5 operational divisions in the UK alone.
Had Sealion been attempted, and failed, the British could actually have been as well, if not better, placed to support the Soviet Union from June 1941.
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
Some people need to do a little more reading, then. Aside from the fact that the German army was still busy in France until after two weeks after Dunkirk had ended, the German paratroop force, following heavy losses in Norway & the Low Countries, was down to around 4,000 effectives at the most. Furthermore, the Luftwaffes' stock of operational transport aircraft at the time was less than 230.
Landing a small force of lightly armed paratroopers, with neither artillery nor armour to support them, and with no hope of being relieved by better armed ground troops, would simply have been to throw them away, although it would have given the British an important victory at a critical time.
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
@Litany_of_Fury No, it wasn't. The Admiralty had no intention of using anything bigger than light cruisers. The capital ships & carriers (actually, just one carrier) were at Rosyth & Scapa Flow, along with 24 destroyers, 5 light and 2 heavy cruisers. There was one old battleship at Plymouth, but there was no plan to use her for anything other than night bombardment of barge concentration ports anyway (which she duly did, on 10 October.).
Given that the invasion forces consisted of barges towed by coasters, tugs or trawlers, supported by a tiny number of destroyers and torpedo boats, the heavy ships were not needed, and it was far easier to destroy such targets with quick firing 4 inch, 4.7 inch, or 6 inch guns than with the bigger guns fitted to heavy cruisers and above. In short, the big ships would have got in the way!
The actual whereabouts of all RN warships can be ascertained from the RN 'Pink List.' My information is from the List of 16 September, 1940 (ADM 187/9).
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
1
-
1
-
@HerrMau The Fleet Air Arm had trained in torpedo attacks on warships for years before the war. The Germans in 1940 had a handful of obsolete seaplanes capable of launching torpedoes. Certainly, pilots can be trained, but this takes time, and the pilots could not have been retrained in time for an invasion attempt in September, 1940. Even then, this would have been in the use of bombs only, not torpedoes. Furthermore, the Kriegsmarine estimated that eleven days would be required to get the first wave across, and even then it would have been lacking motor transport and divisional artillery. Every night, the invasion barges would be exposed to attack by RN destroyers and smaller warships, with virtually no surface protection, and no air protection at all.
The date of the invasion was absolutely critical, given the likely weather conditions in the Channel from late September onwards. Similar constraints did not apply to the attack on France.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@spankthatdonkey Indeed, think of Prince of Wales & Repulse. Both were sunk by high performance torpedo aircraft, which the Luftwaffe didn't have. The bombs used by the Japanese against them were ineffective. Both were hit by one bomb, which didn't penetrate the deck armour of either ship. There was no reason for the British to bring the Rosyth based Home Fleet south anyway, unless German heavy ships supported an invasion attempt, and as there was only one operational German heavy ship at the time (Hipper) that wasn't going to happen. Heavy cruisers and battleships are not particularly useful at sinking towed barges; more agile destroyers and small supporting vessels are far superior at the task. Oh, and the largest RN warship sunk by the Luftwaffe in WW2 was a light cruiser.
In September 1940, the British had their older, Queen Elizabeth class, battleships, supported by six cruisers and twenty two destroyers, in the Mediterranean, but, as Japan was neutral, only a half flotilla of WW1 destroyers in the Far East, and almost nothing in the Indian Ocean. By contrast. in Home Waters & at Gibraltar, there were 116 destroyers, plus 17 undergoing refits & repairs, of which 64 were on anti-invasion duties. At the time, the RN was not particularly stretched, especially since destroyers which could have been used as convoy escorts were held in Home Waters.
Your suggestion that German forces in Britain could have crippled the British radar network, is something of a chicken and egg.
They have to get there first, and such was the strength of the RN's resources that, as Raeder knew, that was a virtual impossibility
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@persimmon93 Actually, I got the information from the Parachute Regiment's own website, which claims this :- 'Impressed by the success of German airborne operations, during the Battle of France, the British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, directed the War Office to investigate the possibility of creating a corps of 5,000 parachute troops.
On 22 June 1940, No. 2 Commando was turned over to parachute duties and on 21 November, re-designated the 11th Special Air Service Battalion, with a parachute and glider wing. It was these men who took part in the first British airborne operation, Operation Colossus, on 10 February 1941.'
Even it it isn't true, I'm not going to argue with them. The ones I have met are all bigger than me!
Didn't know that about the Japanese, but will look it up out of interest.
1
-
1
-
1
-
You can add the length of time it took the two biggest navies on the planet, one of which had been carrying out amphibious operations for almost 300 years, to put the plan together. The idea that the Germans, with minimal experience of amphibious assaults, and no fleet worthy of the name, could put together a workable plan, using barges towed by tugs, trawlers, and coasters, in a matter of weeks, is too ludicrous to contemplate.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@FLORATOSOTHON No axis surface troops landed until the decision had been made to evacuate, and the Royal Navy transferred from anti-invasion duties north of Crete to evacuation operations south of Crete.
Good to see the old chestnut about Force Z being aired once again. Force Z was sunk by Japanese torpedo bombers flown by crews who had been trained in the skills needed to attack warships. In September 1940 the Luftwaffe had had no such training, and didn't even, until mid 1942 at least, have an operational torpedo bomber. Their failure at Dunkirk rather demonstrated their shortcomings in 1940, by the way.
It is always pleasant to read another Sealion 'Would Have' post, explaining in detail what the mighty Luftwaffe 'would have' done. Odd then, that in the whole of the war, the Luftwaffe managed to sink 31 RN destroyers, and no RN warship larger than a light cruiser.
Just to put that into perspective, in September 1940, the RN had around 70 light cruisers and destroyers within five hours of Dover, supported by around five hundred or so smaller warships. There were around 100 destroyers in Home Waters at the time. I haven't, by the way, even mentioned the heavy ships of the Home Fleet, because they weren't needed to dispose of large numbers of river barges being towed by tugs and trawlers.
Your use of the word 'disastrous' is certainly apposite, however. It can readily be applied to any German attempt to carry out a surface invasion with unescorted barge trains, in the face of total RN supremacy in the Channel.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@cliveengel5744 'The Soviet Invasion was priority you know that so why pretend - what could Germany gain from an UK Invasion, nothing.'
'But you know this and keep on arguing the point!'
The problem is that many of us base our judgements upon actual historical evidence rather than upon political prejudice. The evidence that Sealion was a serious plan is clear and unambiguous, from both German archives and what, in the latter half of 1940, the Germans actually did.
If they took the time to read “My Beliefs” then they would have understood it was about the “Living Space in the East”
" If they took the time to read “My Beliefs” then they would have understood it was about the “Living Space in the East” Presumably, the latter phrase is your euphemism for 'mass extermination of whole populations?'
'They spent most of the Great Patriotic War defending their Trade Routes in the Med and North Africa than fighting the German Wehrmacht in Europe, they only became active once the Americans arrived.'
Which 'Trade Routes in the Med. & North Africa' might these have been? The British were fighting in North Africa because that was the only place they could bring axis forces to battle on land, and because they had been attacked by Italy in June, 1940.
'The Soviets paid the price and carried the victory towards Berlin!' True, they did indeed pay the price for agreeing a cynical pact with Germany in 1939, and then supplying much of the raw materials upon which Germany depended, until Genial Uncle Joe was surprised by events in June, 1941. Your use of 'liberated' by the way, is open to question.
'Enough said.' Congratulations. At last you have got something correct.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@thomaswirkkala7230 Your 'evidence' is somewhat at odds with the facts.
Assuming merchant vessels only, British losses between September 1939 and the end of December, 1939, were actually as follows:-
Mines:- 32, U-boats :- 66, Aircraft :- 9, Surface Craft :- 10, Other Causes:- 4
This information is from 'British Vessels Lost At Sea, 1939 - 1945' a document originally published by HMSO in 1947. The document lists every vessel by date, name, tonnage, location, and cause. There is a separate list for RN crewed vessels.
1
-
@RomanHistoryFan476AD It is always entertaining to read such posts. A few accurate facts. In late August, 1940, the Luftwaffe's actual records show, for 17 August, 1940, 1186 operational fighters and fighter bombers of all types, 294 dive bombers, 960 twin engined bombers, and 226 transport aircraft. The Germans did place a number of heavy gun batteries on the French coast, and they fired on British coastal convoys throughout the war, scoring precisely no hits. The British used the full resources of the Royal Navy and Mercantile Marine in Home Waters to lift 338000 men from Dunkirk, mainly at night. The small civilian boats ferried men from the beaches to the larger ships offshore. Civilian boats such as these actually brought around 6000 men back to Britain. In September, 1940, the Germans had around half a division of Paratroopers available, and only just over 220 transport aircraft operational in any case. The Kriegsmarine plan estimated that nine divisions of the first wave would be landed from barges towed by tugs and small coasters, but this would take eleven days, and, absurdly, assumed no losses among the towing vessels, of which the Germans were seriously short. The biggest warship available to the Germans was a single heavy cruiser, supported by twelve or so destroyers and escort destroyers, and around 16 minesweepers. The Royal Navy had 70 cruisers and destroyers within 5 hours' steaming of Dover, supported by around 500 smaller warships. This doesn't, by the way, include the Home Fleet, based at Rosyth.
I think that covers it, not that the 'what the Germans would have done if...' clowns would take any notice anyway.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@cliveengel5744 I don't use wikipedia, as I have access to a whole host of primary sources. You do understand that the Germans did indeed practice loading troops onto the converted barges, I suppose? Why would you think that, once the exercise was completed, the troops wouldn't simply disembark again?
You do know that the Germans didn't use tanks against the Channel Islands, I suppose? Clearly not.
You do know why the Germans stopped on the Aa canal, I suppose? Again, clearly not. The order was given by von Rundstedt, in order to rest & service his armour for the remainder of the campaign against France. Hitler could have rescinded the order, but chose not to, firstly because of his doubts about the use of tanks in the Dunkirk area from his WW1 experience of conditions, but mainly because Goering had told him that the Luftwaffe alone could destroy the pocket and sink the invasion fleet.
Seriously, surely even someone with your lack of knowledge and understanding should be able to grasp that, if you want someone to come to terms, you are more likely to achieve that with 200,000 of their soldiers in prison camps, rather than by letting them evacuate them from under your nose?
1
-
@cliveengel5744 I don't recall ever claiming that the Sealion campaign ever took place, only that it was never, despite your absurd statement, nothing more than a myth. The rest of your post has no bearing on this point, and I am well aware of the important role of the Soviet Union.
You, however, obviously have neither knowledge nor understanding of German planning between June & September, 1940 (when of course, the Soviet Union had a non-aggression pact with Germany, and Stalin was still indulging his hobby of butchering Soviet citizens), so further exposition of this ignorance would be superfluous on my part.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@cliveengel5744 There was no meeting of 23 July. On 25 July, Raeder met Hitler, when he asked for, and was given, permission to requisition shipping from ports throughout western Europe, and authority to carry out the necessary modifications in various shipyards. No date for the operation was set in the Directive, only the duties allotted to each branch of the military. On 22 July, the army had stated that preparations could not be completed by 15 August. At a further meeting on 31 July, two suitable periods when tide & moon were suitable were determined, these being 20 - 26 August (too soon) or 19 - 26 September. On 1 August, hitler issued Directive 17, and by 15 September, the barges were ready, and the coastal batteries had been installed.
I appreciate that you don't know, or don't want to know, much about that period of the war before Barbarossa, but inventing false 'facts' does nothing for your credibility.
That, by the way, is it. I am done with you.
1
-
' 'Overlord". That hadn't happened in 1940, it happened in the future.' Your depth of research is admirable'
Has it, however, explained why, in 1940, the Kriegsmarine commandeered and converted almpst 2,000 barges, almost 200 freighters, around 400 tugs, and over 1,100 motor boats?
Moreover, the 'merciless application of air power' only began in early September, 1940, when it had become clear even to Hitler that a seaborne invasion was an impossibility. Additionally, any such use of air power required a substantial force of strategic bombers, which, of course, the Luftwaffe never possessed.
You have concisely described Douhet's theory of Air Power, believed by Goering, the British Air Ministry, and many US air strategists. Of course, the theory was proven to be a false one.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
There was no need to 'lure' the RN into the Channel. In September 1940 the RN had around 70 light cruisers and destroyers within five hours steaming of Dover, over 500 small warships available in support, and around 100 destroyers in all in Home Waters. The Germans had seven auxiliary minesweepers. The British had literally hundreds of fleet & auxiliary minesweepers. The Germans could only lay their fields at night, which would be something of a problem at the RN sent destroyer patrols through the Channel from Sheerness and Plymouth every night. I suggest that the results of a 4.7 inch shell exploding on a laden mine deck would be quite noticeable.
U-Boats. In September, 1940, the Germans had, on average, 13 boats at sea on any one day. Moreover, the three they sent into the Channel late in 1939 are still there, as are their crews. The Channel, heavily protected by British minefields, was a deathtrap for U-Boats. Furthermore, the idea of U-Boats seeking out destroyers is utterly contrary to the use of U-Boats at the time, when they sought to avoid escorts in order to attack merchantmen. Attacking a destroyer flotilla usually ended badly for the U-Boat, which is why it rarely happened.
Luftwaffe. The same one which had failed at Dunkirk, couldn't operate effectively at night, hadn't had any training in anti-shipping operations, didn't have a torpedo bomber until mid 1942, and which, in the whole of the war, sank 31 RN destroyers, and no RN warship bigger than a light cruiser? That Luftwaffe?
Naval superiority. With, in September, 1940, one heavy cruiser, three light cruisers, six or seven destroyers, a similar number of smaller torpedo boats, 13 S Boats, and about a dozen fleet minesweepers. Naval superiority? Hardly!
1
-
@Litany_of_Fury What is a 'misleading under-representation of the situation at the time?' The Home Fleet was mainly at Rosyth because, from there, it could be called upon to challenge any attempt by German heavy ships to venture into the southern part of the North Sea in support of Sealion, but was also available for use against a sortie into the Atlantic.
The battlecruiser & carrier were at Scapa Flow in order to be able to operate against a potential sortie by a panzerschiff. The British at the time did not know that virtually every German heavy ship was out of action for one reason or another, but Forbes, C-in-C Home Fleet, was already complaining (correctly, in my view) that there were too many resources tied up on anti-invasion duties, when they could have been more profitably assigned to convoy duty, with the proviso that they remain within 24 hours of the Channel. In other words, three days out, one day back.
Incidentally, only an hour ago, you wrote ' the plan was to floor the channel with everything they had available.' Now, you say that ' British Battleships were on call to repel Sea Lion, but only if they were needed.
' Aren't you rather contradicting yourself here?
Battleships & heavy cruisers were neither designed nor intended to sink barges. Isn't this rather like going duck-shooting with a field gun? Which is why Pound & the Admiralty had neither the need nor the intention to do it.
Seriously, simply read any Staff History on Sealion defence preparations. There is absolutely no suggestion in any that that the Home Fleet was going to charge into the Channel trying to depress 15 & 16 inch guns low enough to hit towed barges.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@shanemcdowall In mid September, 1940, of 10 surviving destroyers in the Kreigsmarine, five were operational, based in Cherbourg. Four were refitting in Wilhelmshaven, one of which transferred to Brest on 22/3 September. The tenth destroyer transferred from Wilhelmshaven to Brest on the same date.
There were also a number of Wolf/Mowe class torpedo boats, ships built in the mid 1920s and comparable to the British 'Hunt' class or the later USN DEs, although they were also torpedo armed. There were five based at Den Helder, one at Le Havre, and one at Cherbourg.
At the same time, the British had around 70 destroyers and light cruisers within five hours steaming of Dover.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1