Comments by "doveton sturdee" (@dovetonsturdee7033) on "When Britain Blew Up the French Fleet - Mers El Kebir 1940" video.

@damienpeladan481 Shameful, isn't it? Over 100 French and Belgian divisions collapsed, yet the British didn't carry on alone in France with their ten divisions. In point of fact, one in every three men lifted from Dunkirk was French, and the British attempted to land three new divisions in Cherbourg after Dunkirk had ended, until told by General Weygand that the French army was no longer able to offer organised resistance, which cheering information he vouchsafed to General Alan Brooke on 14 June, 1940. I don't think anyone is saying the the British were winning at that point. Indeed, the very fact that they weren't made it imperative that the problem of the powerful French fleet be resolved.
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@hetrodoxlysonov-wh9oo But Operation Sealion didn't fail, because it was never attempted. The Royal Navy was overwhelmingly superior in the Channel.
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@hetrodoxlysonov-wh9oo Failing to defeat the RAF in the Battle of Britain is not the same as claiming that Germany attempted to invade, but failed. Certainly, the Germans did convert a large (about 1900) number of barges, which they intended to tow across the Channel using tugs and small coasting vessels, although after their heavy naval losses during the Norwegian campaign they had no navy worthy of the name with which to provide an escort. Their plan, if it could be so-called, involved using every available towing vessel (there were, literally, no reserves to replace losses) to tow two barges each, carrying in total nine divisions, across the Channel, over a period of eleven days. The divisions would lack most of their wheeled transport, most of their artillery, and would have no tank support, by the way. Absurdly, the Kreigsmarine plan assumed that, whilst this ramshackle ferry operation was in progress, the Royal Navy would not intervene! The reality is that, if so ordered, the Luftwaffe could have maintained control of the air space over the Channel in September, 1940. What they could not do was prevent the Royal Navy from destroying the invasion fleet en route. The story of the Battle of Britain, and the heroic Few, is a noble myth, designed by Churchill to win support for Britain in the United States, with the image of a David versus Goliath struggle. The reality is that a seaborne invasion was unthinkable unless the Germans were able to secure the support of the French fleet. Even then, the possibility of success was remote. Indeed, as early as mid-August, 1940, when the legend would have people believe that Britain's survival was on a knife edge, Churchill sent major reinforcements, including three armoured regiments, to North Africa. Look up The Apology Convoy for proof.
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Not really.
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@hetrodoxlysonov-wh9oo Nonsense! By September 1940 the British had seventy cruisers and destroyers within five hours' steaming of Dover, together with several hundred smaller warships. Defeat of a seaborne invasion did not depend upon the RAF, despite the myth which is still believed by less well informed people to this day. In any case, nothing was attempted, therefore nothing failed.
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Why? Taking action to ensure the survival of your nation is hardly a war crime.
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What possible non-aggressive solution? Gensoul had rejected the ultimatum, failed to give full details to his government, and had ordered his ships to raise steam and prepare for sea.
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@hetrodoxlysonov-wh9oo Germany didn't try to invade Britain. Without a navy, it isn't easy to plan, let alone carry out, a successful amphibious landing.
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Indeed. Taking unpleasant action on order to protect their country.
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@hetrodoxlysonov-wh9oo They were trying to secure air superiority over the Home Counties, in accordance with the theories of air power expounded by Guilio Douhet. Put simply, he argued that the air force that could achieve command of the air by bombing the enemy air arm into extinction would doom its enemy to perpetual bombardment. Command of the air meant victory, because civilian populations faced with this would rise up against their governments and impose new ones which would negotiate a surrender. He stated that 'the bomber will always get through.' His writings identified five basic target types: industry, transport infrastructure, communications, government and "the will of the people". WW2 proved this to be a false dogma, of course, but people such as Billy Mitchell, Arthur Harris (indeed, the whole British Air Ministry) and Hermann Goering were enthusiastic supporters, probably because they could use it to argue for greater spending on their respective air forces. As to the ramshackle invasion fleet, on simple terms the Kriegsmarine assembled it because, on 16 July, 1940, Hitler issued Directive 16, for the invasion of Great Britain, and it was unwise, in the Germany of 1940, for Raeder or, indeed anyone in authority, to ignore a führerbefehl. Quite possibly, Raeder hoped that Goering's faith in Douhet was well founded, that Britain would come to terms, and that his barges would be used for a ceremonial landing only, akin to the American landings on mainland Japan after the Japanese surrender. Whether on not this was true, Hitler had given the order, and he was obliged to obey it.
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@DK-ig8zi Can you not grasp that there is a difference between a small French squadron in a major British naval base (Alexandria) and a large French fleet in a major French naval base (Mers-el Kebir)? In any case, the attack on Mers el Kebir took place on 3 July, 1940, and Godfroy's agreement with Cunningham didn't happen until 4 July.
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@gringologie9302 Imagine the British Government not knowing in July 1940 what the French navy would do in November, 1942, when the war situation had changed beyond recognition.
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@Matt.71 He could have passed on the full text of the British ultimatum to his government. If he had, the probability would have been that the French West Indies or United States option would have been accepted.
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