Comments by "doveton sturdee" (@dovetonsturdee7033) on "Winning WW2's Most Important Battle - Battle of the Atlantic Full Documentary" video.

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  15. Hasn't it occurred to you that the Royal Navy of 1917 learned fairly quickly? Von Holtzendorff managed to get unrestricted submarine warfare introduced in February, 1917, and the Royal Navy began operating a convoy system from 24 May. As a result, ship losses were reduced from 413 in April to 285 in May, 286 in June, 224 in July, 186 in August, 158 in September, 159 in October, & 126 in November, despite the number of U-boats at sea actually increasing, from 40 in March, to 56 in October. This at a time when many of the refinements in anti-submarine techniques had not yet been created, asdic/sonar being the obvious one. Although depth charges did exist, the early ones were far more ineffective than those available by 1939. Nor, of course, was there anything like an HF/DF to warn of the locations of boats, or, of course, radar. This explains why the British introduced the convoy system from the first day of WW2. It does not explain why King, with all this evidence in front of him, and knowing from the British about the impending Operation Paukenschlag, chose not to allocate US Atlantic Fleet destroyers to convoy escort duties along the US East Coast in early 1942, despite Adolphus Andrews almost begging him for help. You really cannot compare the performance of the US Navy on the Eastern Seaboard in 1942, with that of the Royal Navy in 1917. For an obvious reason. As Shakespeare wrote of Hamlet, in the words of Fortinbras 'For he was likely, had he been put on, to have proved most royally.' The US Navy would, almost certainly, also have proved most royally against Paukenschlag. Had not Ernie King prevented it from so doing.
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