Comments by "doveton sturdee" (@dovetonsturdee7033) on "History Buffs" channel.

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  8. Where did you get this nonsense from? The 'token' force was actually the entire British field army of the time, including some partly-trained Territorial divisions. 'Pulling out of the line without telling the others?' On 26 May, Lord Gort and the commander of the French 1st Army Group, Blanchard had a meeting at Blanchard's HQ. Blanchard expressed the opinion that, in view of the impending collapse of the Belgian army, Weygand's proposals for a counter-attack were no longer realistic. The two agreed to withdraw the allied forces behind the line of the Lys. The allies held a line 128 miles long, 97 miles of which were British held. In accordance with the agreement with Blanchard, the decision was made to reduce the defensive line by 58 miles. On the evening of 26 May, Gort ordered Lt. General Adam, commander of the British 3rd Corps, to organise defences for a bridgehead at Dunkirk. This is actually all in the books, however much you may refuse to believe it. When Belgium capitulated, the hole left in the allied line was actually plugged by the British 3rd Division, which carried out a difficult night transfer in order to stave off disaster. The British sent more fighter squadrons to France than, in initial planning, they had intended . Additional squadrons also operated from French bases during the day, but returned to home bases at night. Among other things, maintenance for, in particular, Spitfire squadrons could only be carried out by their specialist ground crews. The Spitfire was a rather more technically complex aircraft than the Hurricane. Further transfers stopped when Dowding appealed direct to Churchill that Fighter Command was being crippled by losses in France. 'They begrudgingly agreed to take a token number of French and Belgians.' Really? 120,000 men, or one in three of those lifted, were not British. The vast majority were French, but some were Belgians who had chosen to continue fighting after their leaders had capitulated. The 'Reconstituted BEF' sent to Cherbourg from 7 June was to have involved the only two properly equipped divisions left in the UK, 52nd Lowland and 1st Canadian, followed by a hastily re-equipped 3rd Division. However, the deployment was terminated when General Weygand informed Alan Brooke that the French army was no longer able to offer organised resistance. The attack on Mers-el-Kebir took place because the French commander there failed to pass on the full text of the ultimatum to his government. The possibility of sending the French Fleet to the French West Indies, which Darlan might have accepted, was never considered in consequence. The Armistice terms required that the French fleet be placed in French Atlantic ports, under German supervision. Something which, for obvious reasons, the British Government could never accept. This paragraph :- 'Just to add another point we the US refused to send planes to help the french in Vietthnam but only a few months later we go in ourselves just to allow American interests to take over.' Makes no sense. It seems to be simple gibberish.
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  30.  @gingerbaker_toad696  Von Rundstedt did not make the decision 'because he felt like it,' but for sound military reasons. Like several of the senior German Generals, he feared a repeat of the Miracle of the Marne, and was anxious to commence the second stage of the campaign. His armour had covered considerable distance on their own tracks, and needed a brief period of service/repair. Moreover he regarded an army with backs to the sea as trapped. The British, however, had long experience of sea power, and regarded the sea as a highway. Still, don't believe me; read instead the opinion of the American military historian Edward G. Lengel, which is as follows :- 'Just as the advance was ready to resume, however, an order arrived from Army Group A, under General Gerd von Rundstedt: The tanks must halt at the Aa Canal. The destruction of British and French forces around Dunkirk would be left to the Luftwaffe. This order remained in effect for two days while Guderian’s tankers champed at the bit, watching in frustration as 340,000 British and French soldiers prepared to evacuate from Dunkirk right under their noses. The Luftwaffe proved unable to stop the famous Dunkirk armada of destroyers, fishing boats and everything in between from carrying the BEF back to England to fight another day. The halt order left Guderian “speechless,” and it has sparked debate ever since. Some writers speculated—falsely—that Hitler had given the order out of a misguided sense of mercy, hoping the British were ready to make peace. German generals, in interviews and memoirs, chalked it up as yet another example of Hitler’s outrageous military stupidity, which had prevented them from winning the war. In truth, there was plenty of blame to go around. On May 23 Field Marshal Hermann Göring had phoned Hitler and demanded his Luftwaffe be given primary responsibility for destroying the Allied forces around Dunkirk. Hitler was noncommittal, but the next day he visited Rundstedt at his headquarters at Charleville in the Ardennes. Some of Rundstedt’s generals had been whispering in his ear that German tank losses were dangerously high. Moreover, although an Allied armored counterattack at Arras on May 21 had failed, many German generals expected another, stronger counterattack. Worrying that a pellmell thrust toward Dunkirk might cost him more precious tanks and leave his southern flank vulnerable, Rundstedt had already issued a temporary halt order by the time Hitler arrived at his headquarters. The führer vacillated between insecurity and overconfidence. The rapid advance of the panzers had surprised even him. Like many of his generals, he worried about tank losses and anticipated a long campaign to conquer Paris and the rest of France. The remaining tanks, he knew, must be conserved for future operations. He, too, worried about Allied counterattacks. Göring’s boasts about the Luftwaffe convinced Hitler the British couldn’t escape Dunkirk anyway. After studying the map, Hitler confirmed Rundstedt’s halt order. He insisted the perimeter around Dunkirk be respected, to allow Göring’s planes plenty of room in which to operate. Guderian and other generals protested, but Hitler stood firm. The panzers held back.
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