Comments by "doveton sturdee" (@dovetonsturdee7033) on "Why didn't France fight to the end in 1940?" video.
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@xXArnOdu974Xx In 1936, the French regular army was 320,000 strong, with a large number of modern tanks, and, if necessary, the ability to call up large numbers of reservists. German had only re-introduced conscription a year earlier, and was aiming to build an army of up to 300,000 men in time. Germany, in addition, had a small number of light tanks, of Marks I & II.
Germany sent very few troops into the Rhineland, some 5,000 at most. Are you really saying that the French regular army could not cope with 5,000 Germans?
As to your apparent conviction that France was incapable of acting independently without the British holding her hand, what sort of support do you think Britain, with a tiny peacetime army, could have given on land? Air support, and the security to French communications with her colonies that the largest navy on earth offered, but, as the French General Staff knew, even if you don't, Britain was not a land power, and only briefly became one in 1916-18 because of the fear of German victory in WW1.
You don't seem to know much, except for your conviction that, whenever something went wrong, it wasn't the fault of France.
I won't bother replying again, as you appear to be beyond education.
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@brianmacc1934 Not quite. The Royal Navy certainly began gathering resources from 20 May, in the event of evacuation being necessary, but on 22 May, 1940, the British were intending to support the French 1st Army in any attempt to break out and regain contact with the main French forces. This, the 'Weygand Plan' had initially been ordered by Gamelin, but was cancelled by Weygand, and then belatedly re-ordered, by which time German infantry had caught up with their armoured spearheads. Moreover, the plan was known to General Billotte, commander of 1st Army, but not to Gort, and Billotte himself died in a car crash on 23 May. His successor, Blanchard, took over on the same day, but failed to co-ordinate with his subordinate, Gort, leaving Gort with little or no idea of what he was expected to attempt.
Gort actually made the decision late on 25 May, when he diverted his 5th Division from an attack on Douai to his North-Eastern flank, in order to oppose an attack by Army Group B's 6th Army. The 50th Division was sent in support, and the two divisions fought the successful and largely forgotten Battle of the Ypres-Comines Canal, which held back 6th Army until 28 May. Had Gort let 5th Division join the Weygand attack, the probability is that 6th Army would have made any evacuation at all from Dunkirk impossible.
You might read a detailed explanation in 'The Journal of Army Historical Research,' Vol. 92, Number 372, pages 326 - 336, written by Charles More, or the recent book by the same author, 'The Road to Dunkirk - The BEF and the Battle of the Ypres-Comines Canal, 1940' of 2019.
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@brianmacc1934 Oh, I apologise. I thought you actually knew more about the facts than you do, and thus wasted my time giving you a more detailed reply than you deserved.
The fact is that the pre-war allied planning for a war against Germany basically followed what had happened in WW1, in that the French would initially be responsible for most of the fighting on land, whilst the British would gradually take more responsibility as their land forces were built up by conscription and by the arrival of troops from the Commonwealth & Empire. Whilst this was going on, the Royal Navy (the largest on earth at the time) would re-impose the blockade on Germany which had been so successful in WW1.
The British were not a significant military power on land, but had a small, totally mechanised army of around 13 divisions based in the UK. This force would support the best French forces in the north in support of Belgium, but there was no possibility of this force alone challenging the over 100 divisions deployed by the Germans, as should be obvious even to you.
What 'Dunkirk Fable?' You mean the one where the Royal Navy, ordered to evacuate 40,000 'specialist' troops, successfully evacuated 338,000, of which over 120,000 were French? That fable? The evacuation was, and is, never portrayed in Britain as anything other than a defeat. Even Churchill said that 'wars are not won by evacuations,' but the success of the RN ensured that it was 'merely' a defeat, and not a catastrophe. Similarly, there was no attempt to 'degrade' the French. The British sought to keep France in the fight, and even began landing fresh troops in Cherbourg, until Weygand told them that the French army was no longer able to offer 'organized resistance.'
Oh dear. There I go again. Wasting my time explaining facts to someone who is fairly obviously too prejudiced and too ill-informed to be able to accept them.
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Rubbish. The British sent their entire field army, including a number of half-trained Territorial Divisions, to support France. The British were a sea power, with the largest navy in the world. As a result they were not a major land power, but relied on the experience & professionalism of the French, who were. From pre-war meetings the French high command knew precisely what to expect from Britain, which was a small but well equipped and entirely mechanised field army, which would be reinforced over time by conscription and by the arrival of troops from the Commonwealth & Empire. Basically, a repeat of WW1. Don't try to blame the British for the collapse of France.
Of the nationalities you list, the Scots are British, and very small numbers of individuals from the others joined the British, usually as pilots. You missed the substantial Canadian contribution, which included a division of troops in 1940.
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