Comments by "Miriam Weller" (@miriamweller812) on "Military History not Visualized" channel.

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  18. Don't get what's so hard to understand about this. While it's impossible to see the details with the "fog of war" or what you want to call it, the overall picture is pretty clear. Russia started with a shock offensive to push the coup regime into giving up (what would have worked without NATO demanding to burn down Ukraine), combined with securing as much of th Donbass region as possible. To ensure this, a pinning operation was done by Kiev, with a few thousand soldiers, clearly not enough to take even a small city, even less a million city like Kiev, but enough to force the enemy to act and secure their capital - taking away from the ability to act in the south and east. Overall this would have been already over at this point, but then NATO started to pump billions of oil into that fire - clear goal: ruin Ukraine (to pillage it) with the hope to push Russia into chaos (to pillage it), however this should have worked. Since it was clear at this point, that with the coup regime being crazy enough to sacrifice a whole generation of men for this and NATO not stopping to pump weapons and money into it until they can't, Russia switched to a defensive attrition warfare. Overall they made a fortress out of the controlled regions they cared for (Kharkiv obvioulsy not part of it, since they did almost nothing there and a simple look on the map shows, why: to hold it wasn't worth it, but massively increased the length of the frontline = bad strategy). It's likely that they would have loved to hold Kherson city, since they got the city with near to no fight at the start and they hold it well even with the massively disadvantage of that 100m wide river in the back, but when the attacks on the dam began, the risk became to high and civilians had to be evacuated anyway, from which point on defending the city became rather pointless for the disadvantage the river in the back came with. So we got these two "victories" of the coup regime, which pretty much just were in areas Russia gave up, one because there was no reason to hold it and shortening the frontline was strategically much better. The other, because the risk of flodding was to high and of course using the River FOR you, instead of having it against you was strategically much better, though in that case it was still a hard decision to give a mainly undamage city to the peopel who are known for abusing them as cover, leading to its destruction. After this, we got a massively fortified frontline on Russian side, from which the war the NATO/Banderas army down with the main focus on limiting own losses. They got nothing to hurry and what is nicer for a side than the enemy creating a shooting gallery for you, by moving his troops in front of your artillery (and so on) over and over again? The fall of Bakhmut and alike, those are just side effect of the attrition, that the coup regime even with all the NATO mone and weapons can't even hold a city anymore against some mercenaries, even though they pump tenthousand of soldiers into it (what is insane enough, a cauldron is one of no the worst position you can be in, to walk into one on purpose is just... insane).
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