Comments by "MC116" (@angelmendez-rivera351) on "PragerU"
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1. Suppose God is omniscient.
2. Because God is omniscient, God knows all false statements, all true statements, and all absurd statements.
3. Because God knows which statements are true and are not, this implies God knows why they are true. Better said, God understands the criteria that a statement must meet in order to be assigned the propositional value "True".
4. Suppose the set of such criteria can be signified by K, and it has multiple elements K(1), K(2), ..., K(N).
5A. If there cannot be no such criteria, then the assignation of the values "T, F, A," are arbitrary, ergo truth and/or knowledge are subjective.
5B. If there are such criteria, then God must know them, because God is omniscient by premise #1.
6. This implies God knows that "Any proposition P(0) that meets the set of criteria K is true" is in itself a true proposition. We call this proposition P(1).
7. If P(1) is true, then it meets K.
8. Therefore, P(2)="P(1) is true because it meets K" must itself meet K.
9. Therefore, P(3)="P(2) meets K" is also true, which implies P(3) meets K.
10. By induction, P(X)="P(X-1) meets K" also meets K for any X.
11. This induction implies that for any statement to be true, the statement must be true because it meets a criteria, and this conclusion must be valid because it is known to be true, and as such it meets the criteria which make it true, and the above must also be true...
12. Premise 11 is an infinite regression.
13. Infinite regression is a logical fallacy, Argument Ad Infinitum.
14. Therefore, conclusion of premise 11 is invalid.
15. Premise 11 is invalid because premise 5B must necessarily yield an argument ad Infinitum.
16. Therefore, 5B is invalid.
17. Therefore, 5A is true because there either is a set of criteria or there is not, it is a Boolean conditional.
18. Therefore, truth is arbitrary and subjective.
19. If truth is subjective, then any statement cannot be known to be true, false or absurd.
20. Because no statement can be known, God cannot be omniscient.
C: Therefore, God is not omniscient.
Q.E.D.
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The idea that the existence of God is a proper axiom to sustain objective morality is flawed.
Suppose God really was omniscient, which it could not be, both because omniscience is logically impossible and because the Bible presents some instances where God is portrayed as omniscient.
If that were the case, that would mean God does know right from wrong.
However, why does that matter? God can say whatever it wants without regard for that knowledge. Yes, maybe God does know right from wrong, but when God tells us, “Thou shalt not kill,” how know we that God isn't lying to us about this being a moral obligation? How know we that God actually does know morality? The only possible way to connect the premise to its conclusion is be proposing that God is infinitely good, but this is impossible since omniscience is not compatible with ultra benevolence. Hence, morality, as it is dictated by God, is not objective. It fails to the Euthyphro dilemma.
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IngRand'lo Russell I never claimed P(1) is true independent of the other propositions. It does require proposition P(2) to be true, and P(2) requires P(3), ...P(N) requires P(N+1), ad infinitum. So it is an infinite regress.
"What is truth?"
That question can't be answered precisely because of the infinite regress. If the answer is objective, that means that there exists an objective determinant that operates by objective standards to define truth, and when the definition is met by a proposition, that proposition is necessarily true. However, accepting this necessarily yields premise 11 as a consequence. Thus truth cannot be objective. Instead, we must say "Truth is X, Y, Z." and we must declare this definition to be true a priori: it's an axiom. It cannot be argued a posteriori because of infinite regress. But because the question of what is truth can only be answered a priori, it is subjective. So truth can literally actually be anything. That's the problem: that's why omniscience can't exist, because axioms are a necessary logical consequence and axioms make omniscience impossible.
Yes, the statement "Truth is subjective" must necessarily be subjective, which means that in some inconmensurable domain of axioms, Truth is objective, and perhaps God is in fact omniscient and does exist, but this domain of axioms is not logical: that is to say, infinite regress and contradictions aren't assumed to be logical fallacies. However, that isn't how we operate and the reasons are very intuitive, tautological by definition.
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demoeder That isn't a problem, given that semantical and grammatical rules are subjective. Thus, whether a sentence is semantically correct and grammatically correct is subjective.
In any case, that is irrelevant, because the semantic structure and grammatical structure does not make the sentence true. One can construct the proposition "I am in Mars.", and this proposition is both grammatically correct and semantically valid (no oxymorons), but by no means is it true. The truth value of a sentence is clearly not determined by its grammatical structure, the content itself goes beyond grammar. The sentence “an electron has negative charge” cannot be determined to be true or false based on grammar, and the semantics of the term "electron" is extremely debatable and non objective. We humans assign names to objects, so it's subjective, they don't have inherent names or definitions. So there is no liars paradox here. And there is no problem with proving common assumptions wrong. Science does that on a daily basis (Humans don't have 5 senses, but more).
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IngRand'lo Russell You've not replied to my question, but I'll proceed with my explanation anyway, since a specific answer given by you is actually not necessary.
You made the proposition P(0)="Truth is Objective", and you claim P(0) is true. What makes P(0) true though? Why is your claim justified within the domain of logic? You can claim "P(0) is T BECAUSE it satisfies K". Okay. But then my following question is, what makes this last claim, P(1) true? And this question is in fact relevant. If satisfying K does NOT imply being true, then satisfying K is irrelevant, which means that P(0) remains an unjustified claim and thus dismissible. P(0) can only be true if P(1) is true. But that's a conditional. So the question is what makes P(1) true. Now you get a composition of propositions, because the answer would then again be "P(1) is true because it satisfies K". Now, you fail to understand why this is a problem. It begs the question, what makes this new proposition, P(2), true? Once again, P(1) is only justified if P(2) is. What you're failing to understand is that, I'm postulating the definition P(N) is T <=> P(N) satisfies K, but this definition is arbitrary and by no means is it necessarily true. So I must justify [P(N) is T <=> P(N) satisfies K]:=P(N+1) by saying P(N+1) is T <=> P(N+1) satisfies K. But then this itself needs to be justified. Postulating that two things are equal doesn't make it true. "P is true because it is true" can't be concluded from "P is true because it satisfies K" like you think: it fails because the conclusion requires the premise to be proven true. Remember: any claims about the nature of truth are themselves presumed to be a truth. If I say "Truth is subjective", then this very statement must necessarily be a subjective truth. Similarly, when you provide any standard for justifying a claim as true, the claim that the relationship of a claim to such a standard makes the claim true is itself another claim that must be true, which means the very relationship we evaluate to determine that P(0) is true must itself be true before we conclude P(0) actually is true.
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IngRand'lo Russell What you're failing to understand is that every claim needs justification. Arbitrary claims are dismissible and this is why arguments with no logic in them are regarded as invalid. But giving a justification, while it is enough in practice, it is for all logical purposes never enough. See, if you make the claim, "The sun is yellow" and you justify it by saying "science", most people will accept this justification because people a priori assume science is true. But that a priori assumption is still just an assumption, it isn't justified. Why should we actually assume science is indeed true and it works? You can try to justify that by saying "well our senses", or whatever justification you want to give it. But the justification is in itself a claim that requires justification... a.k.a, it is indeed an infinite regress. In practice, we never take it that extent because it is impractical to be unnervingly skeptic, but that by no means does it mean objectivity actually exists on a fundamental reality. This is exactly what premise 11 meant to say, but of course I wrote as a formal logic proof so it wasn't obvious. But now I explained in layperson terms and this what it comes down to: any justification to a claim is in itself a claim that requires justification. This is why objectivity can't exist, and this is why knowledge doesn't exist in the way we think it does. Thus that's why omniscience isn't possible. We're used to thinking of knowledge as just storing facts in our mind and relating them, and distinguishing them from fiction and falsehood. But that's not how it works: in order to determine whether something is true or not, you need a reference frame, a set of axioms to assume. Depending on the set of axioms, the statement will either be true or not. It works very much in the same way one can't simply say a distance is long without referring to a scale, an instrument of measurement, and the conditions at which the measurements are made. It's not so counterintuitive: it is already known absolute time doesn't exist either and that reference frames in physics are relative. But physics is merely mathematics mixed with observations to fix variables and elements, and mathematics are merely a branch of logic. So relativity in physics, which is proven, can only really work out if logical proofs are themselves relative to the assumed set of axioms, and this conjecture was what I proved more formally above.
And yes, such a proof is itself relative to the axioms of logic I assumed, but that isn't a problem and it does not make the proof dismissible, because the axioms I assumed are the so-called common axioms that are pretty much universally assumed (although also universally misunderstood).
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IngRand'lo Russell IngRand'lo Russell You have the guts to try to pull a Philosophy 101 argument when I'm a philosophy major, HA! Pathetic.
Listen. Let me make this as clear as I can.
The statement "Truth is ___." cannot be completed. Do you want to know why it can't be? Attempt it yourself. Complete the statement "Truth is ___." yourself, it seems to be so important to you. Once you complete it, I'll explain why it can't be completed.
Saying "Believing X is absurd" isn't an argument Ingrad. Now it's my turn to retort Philosophy 101. Why is believing that truth is subjective absurd? Why is the belief in God not absurd? What is your criteria for saying that a proposition is absurd?
No, you keep misunderstanding the truth argument. The proposition ("Truth is objective" satisfies K) is assumed a priori, but by no means is this what I was challenging. Yes, P(0) satisfies K. But why does that make P(0) true? Why is K the set operator that makes P(0) true and not a different criteria L or M or N? See, it doesn't matter whether ("Truth is objective" meets K) is true or not, and it doesn't matter whether it is true a priori or a posteriori. What does matter is that meeting K is what makes "Truth is objective" a true statement, according to you, but such a claim is not justified. The claim (Meeting K makes "Truth is objective" true) must and is itself being claimed to be objectively true. But this implies the claim itself must both meet K and be converted to a true statement by virtue of meeting K. Now, meeting K is arbitrary and can be assumed a priori, but you must still prove that [Meeting K makes (Meeting K makes "Truth is objective." true.) true.]. And now you get a circularity, because this new proposition can once again be assumed a priori to meet K, but it'll beg the question about whether meeting K makes it true because that is what you were trying to justify in the first place. We're not trying to justify it meets K, we're trying to justify that meeting K makes a claim true. And yes: it needs to be justified. It can't be true a priori because if L, M, and N all exist, I can just claim that P(0) meets M and make it a priori, but then I still must also justify that meeting M makes P(0) true. Otherwise, by allowing a priori assumptions, you get arbitrariness, contradictions and subjectivity. Because that means that whether meeting K makes true or meeting L makes true is arbitrary and can be chosen. No, in order for objectivity to hold, one must PROVE (a.k.a a posteriori) that meeting K is what makes something true as opposed to meeting L or M. And trying to prove that is what leads to infinite regress. I was never trying to dispute that P(0) meets K: in fact, assuming a priori that P(0) meets K is necessary in order for my argument to proceed, and I did assume it all along.
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IngRand'lo Russell And that's exactly why "Truth is __." CANNOT be completed. Because saying "Truth is X" is a truth claim itself that therefore must be justified by saying ("Truth is X" is X), and this therefore by [("Truth is X" is X) is X], but this again will need be justified, because if it isn't, then by no means can we ever conclude that ("Truth is X" is X) to be true, and since this must be true and justified, but it isn't, we can't conclude "Truth is X" is itself true.
Think of a real life example. Let's visualize rape. Why is rape wrong. Instead of dealing with truth, let's deal with wrong. "Why is rape wrong?" Well, rape is wrong because it is an action that meets criteria K. But why does meeting criteria K make rape wrong? I mean, yes, in the K-ist current of ethic thought, rape is wrong, but not in the M-ist current of ethic thought. So then you must justify choosing K over M. So you say "K is not wrong and justified whereas M is in that K meets K and M does not". Okay, K meets K, but why does that make it true? See, it's impossible to properly answer "Why does meeting K make P(N) true?" without engaging in infinite regress. See, you said "Truth is objective" is true because believing "Truth is subjective" absurd. But what makes the statement "Believing 'Truth is subjective' is absurd" itself true? Therein lies the problem. Every justification needs a justification, but the question isn't how do I justify it, the question is why does this justify it as opposed to that other thing. Of course, there is one way to prevent this regress from happening. And that is to make "Meeting K makes P(0) true" an axiom. In other words, you must say that P(1) is true because I declare it to be true a priori. But that is equivalent to subjectivity because K is arbitrary, so you can axiomatize absolutely any definition you want and choose for completing the statement "Truth is ___", and that is exactly what subjectivity is. A priori truths aren't much different from opinions.
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IngRand'lo Russell 1. No, being a philosophy major does not imply I have it all figured out, but your retort was condescending so it deserved the typical response of declaring credentials. You can pretend you understand philosophy better than I do, but that is irrelevant if you're incapable of posing simple argument.
2. What is truth subjective to? Well, I already answered this. It is subjective the set of axioms you assume and the circumstances under which you assume those axioms.
3. 2+2=4 is not an a priori truth, so your argument is not even sensical. I can prove 2+2=4 starting by assuming the Peano axioms, which are very intuitive to assume.
4. "Truth is knowledge of the things as they are, as they were, and as they are to come." Truth and knowledge are synonymous? That's just as bold of a claim, and most people would disagree, obviously. Anyhow, that statement already fails to the argument I've been posing. For the claim to be true, it must satisfy the criteria that assign it the truth value. You have given no such criteria, actually, because the concept of things "being as they are" is already subjective and it depends on whether you subscribe to solipsism, Platonism, empiricism, realism, etc. So that is already a claim saying that truth is subjective. Had you made a claim that appeared more objective, you'd've more of an argument. But here is the issue.
5. Let's assume you did give such criteria K for saying the claim you made was true. We could verify that your claim did satisfy K, but then we would need to show that meeting K made the claim true by also subjecting such a relationship to K and proving that would make the relationship true, but then this even larger relationship... and you get the point.
6. You misunderstood claim 6. I'm not questioning why the claim is true per se. I'm instead pointing out the fact that if God knows that P(0) meets K, and if God knows that K is supposed to exist as objective determinant, then the relationship "P(0) true because K" must itself be true. God knows it is true. But whether he knows it or not is not particularly relevant. P(1) being true is a logical consequence of the biconditional requiring that P(1) itself meet K. In other words, God's knowledge of P(0) being true is independent of God's knowledge of P(1) being true, but the act of P(0) being true is not independent of P(1) being true. And similarly, P(1) being true is directly dependent upon P(2) being true, etc. See, God knows that such a sequence of P(N) is true all the way to infinity, so that's not the issue. The issue is the existence of such a sequence in the first place. In order for it to be logically valid, it can't be infinite, but if it isn't infinite, then at some point one must merely declare any arbitrary P(N) to simply be true without justification, to simply say "Let P(N) be true" a priori and make it an axiom on its own account. And then K would have to also be determined arbitrarily, at the discretion of the subject making the claim. So it is either subjective, or an objective infinite regress, but an infinite regress isn't a valid option so the only option is subjective.
7. You declared that saying that Truth is subjective is equivalent to claiming Truth does not exist. That is only true if you assume a priori truth must necessarily be objective and should not be otherwise, an assertion which is itself arbitrary and not really justified. And here is the problem: "Truth exists not" can only prevent self-contradiction if the claim itself is not a truth. Yet if it is not a truth, then it is either absurd or false. So, not much of an argument, because the axioms we assume with logic do not really allow it to be an argument.
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IngRand'lo Russell "Let me ask you..." (I'm just stopping the elipsis here because I'm addressing the entire paragraph)
That's clearly not how justification works. Not because I'm incapable of providing a justification for a random claim does it mean EVERY justification does not require a justification of its own: that's VERY non sequitur on several levels. See, science is in itself an assumed set of axioms, and one can very much "choose" to not choose them. Of course, people do choose them because it's practical and instinctual and it appears counterintuitive to humans to assume other axioms. Scientists ADMIT this: they know science is based on a bunch of assumptions that can't ultimately be proven at all. They understand that for any logical framework to arise, axioms must be assumed. This is also true of mathematicians: most of them understand mathematics is a human construct that works by axiomatization. There are literally thousands of papers based on this. How do we know natural numbers can be added together to form other natural numbers? By the Peano AXIOMS. And can you choose to reject such axioms? Of course you can! Entire fields of mathematics are based on this, and even they have practical applications. Is "Division by 0 is undefined" an objectively true statement simply because it is mathematical? No. It's true subjective to the Peano axioms. There is a different set of axioms you can assume where division by 0 is allowed, and the resulting structure is called a Wheel. This is called wheel Algebra. And even amateurs of mathematics know of wheels existing.
So, your point about my inability to justify science is moot, because in practice we don't try to justify science, we assume it a priori. However, objectivity does require justification, because objectivity requires that there's a way by which all claims can be concluded a posteriori. So the infinite regress argument holds.
I already explained what it means for truth to be subjective in the paragraph above.
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Shea O'Donnell the Bible contradicts itself though. There are several chapters in which God lies.
That said, perfection and omniscience are both logically impossible, so such an argument is wrong anyway.
Additionally, even if God were truly perfect, that would not mean that whatever God says is not an opinion. If morality is determined God, then it is arbitrary, hence an opinion. If God determines morality based on knowledge about the universe, then objective morality can only come from the universe itself, not from God. Hence, either way, it still fails.
Just accept it, damn it. It isn't logically possible for God to be the basis of objective morality. There isn't anything wrong with that.
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Paul Elpers The problem with that argument is that the choice of God as an objective determinant is completely arbitrary, hence subjective itself, because there is no objective standard that allows us to choose between the morality of God as presented in Islam or of God as presented in Christianity, or of God as presented in Judaism. Additionally, God does change his morality quite a few times before reaching the current one, according to the Bible. Objective morality under Christian theism really just means the opinion of God dictates morality, which once again falls under the objective category. The problem is that objectivity cannot stem from any entity whose existence entails a form of consciousness, because by definition if it does, it becomes subjective. That is just what the definition of objectivity and subjectivity are. God would need to not be a consciousness, but rather some sort of force, except that contradicts the properties of God as presented in the Bible.
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Paul Elpers The reason why infinite knowledge won't imply objective morality nor authority is not related to knowledge, but rather to the self-contradicting nature of objectivity itself. The problem is that Dennis is posing the argument with a question of epistemology (a.k.a, How do you know murder is wrong), but in reality the correct question to ask is, "Why is it wrong?" What makes murder wrong, what characteristic of the act of murdering makes it a wrong moral action? We can see it as a spectrum: one side of the spectrum dictates that actions that meet the standard corresponding to such side are wrong, and the ones on the other side are correct. I can appeal to the axioms I assume and my instincts to justify my knowledge of morality, but I can't justify saying that something is wrong without first answering, "What makes it wrong?" What does it mean for something to be wrong? No matter what answer U give or God gives, not because of knowledge, but because of the fact that objectivity fails to be possible. So you see now why infinite knowledge is irrelevant.
See, the issue here is, no matter what justification you give to the answer of that question, the justification will itself always require justification. This problem arises from the nature of objectivity itself and how truth operates. The burden of proof and the nature objectivity require that justification exists and that there is no arbitrariness. But this then inevitably leads to an infinite regress, which s a logical fallacy. Which is why objectivity isn't a thing.
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Allow me to rephrase what I've said. A priori propositions are not opinions, but if they must be assumed axiomatically, and if they are arbitrary, then they are subjective, because such a choice as true or false is dependent upon the subject claiming the proposition. The fact that you assume that "Truth is knowledge of things as they are, as they were, and as they are to come" to be true a priori, arbitrarily, and axiomatically, implies it is a subjective claim, and it is subjective to the stream of epistemological thought that one subscribes to. The fact that God knows that K implies a truth-value assignment for P(0) and P(1) we assume a priori, but any attempt to justify renders infinite regress, and axiomatizing this renders subjectivity.
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