Comments by "ricardo kowalski" (@ricardokowalski1579) on "Military Aviation History"
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IMO The F4 Phantom was the high tide of the FighterMafia vs the Heavy Jet Mafia
They were both wrong at that time
The F4 had no gun, because the heavy jet mafia argued that missiles had already eliminated close in dog fights. That was a mistake, the missiles at that time sucked big time. The fighter mafia took the early development stage of missiles as evidence that dog fights ruled and that they were right.
As a reaction to poor missile performance, Fighter mafia's idea of a high thrust to weight ratio, small(ish), light(er), armed with cannon and not much else won the day, we all got the F16.
A few years go by and missiles improve greatly. By the time the AIM9L and the AMRAAM mature, there is no need for agility or dogfighting. Hell even helicopters are capable of shooting down jets (J CATCH results) At this time the original error of Fighter mafia to keep dogfighting as a key requirement is revealed.
Then Stealth came along. If they do not know you are there, they cannot shoot missiles at you, much less intercept and dogfight you. Radars and sensors have pushed stealth back and we are again favoring standoff missiles over cannon.
In the future, when unmanned expendable cheap platforms allow taking increased risk, we may get another round of airframe specialization and arguments. The interesting detail is that the fighter mafia has never championed unmanned fighters
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9:45 "we accomplished our mission"
The devil is in the detail: what was the mission?
The mission was not to fly in, fly out, land a sucker punch and get away with it.
The mission was to " immobilize the USN Pacific Fleet ". And on this it was a failure.
Please read that again. The objective was not "weaken", reduce, hinder, diminish, or get an advantage.
By April, the USN was mobile enough to strike Tokio.
The proof of the immobilize failure is that the carriers are drawn out to Midway. If the IJN had succeded in immobilizing the fleet, they would have never planned for the USN to sortie out to Midway. They would have pounded them at Oahu anchorage. The very fact that the IJN knew the USN fleet could and would sail negates the "immobilization"
HAVING SAID THAT....
-what was the best way to ensure the fleet was immobile? was it the oil? the drydocks? blocking the channel? The how is very much up for discussion.
-Did Fuchida or anyone have the foresight to ask for a third wave? I am not buying it
-The failure to include the oil tanks in the target list is indicative of the same IJN mindset that logistics were un-important. That courage, willpower and valor can make up for lack of fuel, hunger or ammunition
-It IS very telling that Fuchida sees the importance of logistics when questioned by american officers, which are versed and have in their doctrine that logistics wins wars
ALSO... I will say this much. The rapid turn arounds and forward fuel stocks were vital for Coral Sea and Midway.
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