Comments by "David Himmelsbach" (@davidhimmelsbach557) on "The BAD BOY of Operation Market Garden | General 'Boy' Browning" video.

  1. Actually the fact that objective -- the Waal bridge terminated inside Arnhem rather forced the situation. I agree that it's a real puzzle why Browning -- the REAL decision maker -- ever thought so highly of the, so-called, heights. ALL of Gavin's admissions were made to cover his idol's reputation. Do you think that a one-star general is going to PUBLICALLY dis the founder of British Airborne; the godfather of the American Airborne? Dream on. One of TIK's 'problems' is that he actually believes the written words of these world class liars. Generals HAVE TO LIE. It's part of the job requirement. There is a sub-section for lying to protect the reputation of one's superiors. The tit-for-tat is that if you're world class liar, then your superior showers you with grace -- and promotion. Gavin's account is pure BS. It was Browning that had this brain fart. For protecting Browning and Browning's reputation, Gavin was deemed promotable. And in short order he gained another star. (October '44) Oh my! A little history is in order. The US Army sent guys to Britain such that they could go through British airborne training. American officers grabbed ALL of Browning's writings -- and much else -- on the way to build parachute force. They took it as gospel and the first division to be so tasked was the 82nd. Take a wild guess which famous fella was its commander? Omar Bradley, that's who. He booted it up. Then he went next door and booted the 28th Division -- America's original (and oldest, duh) National Guard formation. It was created of Civil War// Union Army vets from Pennsylvania. Within the next few years this formation was cloned wherever the old Union Army had vets. And then it kept going, and going. Now you know why Bradley was one of Marshall's FAVORITE boys.
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  2. @Treblaine Ike had standing, General Orders about how American officers were to behave with the British. 1) Absolutely NOTHING was to pass your lips that would insult or denigrate British military prowess or contribution to the fight. 2) Rule #1 goes double for senior British commanders. 3) When under the command of senior British officers, your role is to go along -- and provide absolutely no static -- don't even open your yap. Under no circumstances should you attempt to correct a senior British officer or to show him up. 4) It is forbidden to gloat about American technical excellence and production prowess. Any SHAEF (USA) officer would be sent packing if Ike heard anything indicating that you've violated #1-4 rules. And, I might add, there was a steady stream of departures from SHAEF all through the war. Ike wanted team players. The only folks allowed to blow off steam were our allies. 1) They'd been in the war years longer than the USA. 2) They were under far more stress back home than any American. ( V2s, V1s -- they'll do that. Rationing will do that. Gavin knew all of the above. Ike was delighted with the performance of the 82nd and 101st. Lest we forget, the Americans lost more men (dead) during MG than the British did. (!!!) The British won the 'captured para' sweepstakes, though. The American Airborne ( nee XVIII Airborne Corps ) fought continuously pretty much from the second day onward. 15th Army just keep trickling in from the west, and scratch formations kept popping up out of Germany. Which brings up another point, MG basically crippled 15th Army. The only route left to it required tip-toeing across the Dutch sea barrier, leaving all heavy equipment behind. It, the 15th Army was eventually slotted in north of 6th Panzer Army during the Ardennes offensive. (Bulge) In all of the planning, this 'reflux' of 15th Army was not anticipated. It really bogged down the 101st.
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  3. It's not Gavin: it's the drop zones for the 101st Airborne. It should've been dropped between the two critical bridges. Then the Allies win, going away. The Son could've been bridged by XXX Corps -- which is exactly what happened. 101st Airborne made virtually NO contribution to the battle. What they did do didn't need them -- and could've been done better by XXX Corps. The fault for that drop goes to the British: Monty or Browning. It's an epic fail.
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  4. You must understand that ALL of the generals so quoted are hiding the fact that Bletchley Park is decoding German radio traffic. It would've been signals intelligence, human intelligence and flat out paranoia and miscalculation that created the 1,000 panzers. Further, most of those panzers would've been HALF-TRACKS. Even half-tracks would've been nightmares for the paras. Germany was still producing half-tracks at quite a clip -- and the key factories were only a two-hour drive from the battle! And the Germans WERE pouring half-tracks, Tigers, Panthers, you name it into Arnhem to rebuild 9&10 SS divisions. Further, American tank factories produced X amount of tanks per month. Intelligence simply assumed that something like that number, say .3X, would spit out of Germany's tank factories in the Ruhr. They assumed that most of Germany's production was going to the east -- but now that Monty was knocking on the devil's door -- that ALL of the Ruhr's production would be vectored their way. Adding it all up, you start to see where Big Numbers come from. ( For paras, half-tracks are just as deadly as panzers, and perhaps even worse. Look what happened to Frost ! )
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  5. @John Burns The two American airborne divisions took more fatalities than the entire British force... all due to the intense fighting required to hold 15th Army at bay... etc. Then toss in the 107th Panzer brigade... Horrocks made a mistake in putting so many Shermans in the front. British grenadiers and infantry were consistently found to be too far in the rear. This also applies to bridging equipment and boats. The contrast with Patton is illuminating. Patton always kept his bridging engineers up near the front -- even if it meant displacing combat formations. ( And he used British bridging equipment, too. ) He understood that when you need them, you just can't wait, you can't wait at all. It should've been obvious that the Son bridge was at ultra-high risk of being destroyed. It was too close to the front. It was too far from 101st drop zones. The 101st would've had to -- literally -- drop right on top of it. Fat chance: too much FLAK right there. As it was, the Bailey bridge took quite a while just to bring up from the rear. For such a short span, it took a shocking amount of time for XXX Corps engineers to set that bridge.
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  6. @caelachyt John Burns lives in an alternate reality. Monty needed ALL of the bridges. Arnhem was never taken. Interdicting the northern approach was insufficient. The Germans had to be driven entirely away from the Arnhem bridge. If they even controlled one end, the southern end, then they could blow up half of the bridge -- at least -- and totally scupper MG. Because of the pill box at the north end at Arnhem, the British had absolutely no way of getting across the bridge on Day One -- even if the recon vehicles had made it to the LZ. Not landing paras on the island ruined any chance for MG to work. The island was the natural place for all reinforcements to arrive. It was safe from German attack -- if you only took the precaution to take out// capture the ferry. If paras had come across the Arnhem bridge -- from the south -- at the outset -- it wouldn't even matter if the II SS Panzer Corps were in town. The paras would've barricaded the bridge with mines and whatnot before Grabner even showed up. The ferry was ignored -- and stayed ignored. MG went off the rails the second Grabner got up a head of steam.
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  7.  @chuckschillingvideos  Take it further. Gavin was a ONE-STAR general -- and the youngest, to boot. ONLY an army commander had any voice in the re-deployment of the USAAF. And he'd have to beg for it. There is only one man who force it: Eisenhower. The USAAF was kicking and screaming WRT Ike's "Transportation Plan." Ike was totally alone on this grand-tactic. He was proven 100% right. Forever after, the USAF has obeyed Ike's dictum.
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  8. @John Burns You can't solve Arnhem bridge with the SS sitting on top of it from Day One. MG needed to go the WHOLE WAY. Nijmegen bridge was ultimately captured -- after tremendous loss of life. Arnhem bridge was NEVER in prospect of being captured. Deal with it. It's for this reason that it didn't matter what Horrocks, Gavin, or Frost or Urquhart or anyone else did. Failure was baked in by Browning by not dropping paras onto the island... the central position. This is the kind of stuff that's taught at West Point and Sandhurst -- to first year students.
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  9. Frost would've been a lot less optimistic if he new that an SS battalion was squatting -- out of his view -- across the southern end of Arnhem bridge. He had no idea that it was there -- until Grabner rolled north. Sadly, Grabner was hardly alone. Germans kept pouring onto the island by way of the ferry. That scuppers the whole operation.
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  10. @John Burns It STILL does not sink in. From the first hours the II SS Panzer Corps was in sole possession of the southern end of Arnhem bridge. That RUINS MG. It means that even if every other player executed perfectly, the SS would merely blow the Arnhem bridge -- from the south side -- and escape via the ferry. Browning's // Monty's plan did not have ANY provision to guarantee that the entire bridge would be captured. We now know -- for a certainty -- that the recon elements of British Airborne had absolutely NO CHANCE of getting past the pill box at the north end of Arnhem bridge. We now know -- for a certainty -- that the II SS Panzer Corps had access to the south side of that bridge -- and could NOT BE STOPPED as the Allies had NO TROOPS on the island. No-one to stand in the way -- and no provision for TAC air to sink the ferry. The Germans were going to get to the south side -- even if Captain Grabner had not rolled over the bridge before Frost got there, others would still do so. In the film, a PIV is shown advancing north across the bridge. Whether that actually happened in real life, it certainly could have happened -- as the PIV was light enough for the ferry. There would've been Krauts crawling all over the south end of Arnhem bridge if the Nijmegan bridge was lost on day one. So, the MG scheme was hopeless from the first. Half of a bridge would never get XXX Corps across the river. Indeed, if Nijmegen were lost Grabner would've spent all of his energies -- right from the start, pounding the daylights out of Frost. He still would've set up his 88s to frustrate XXX Corps. If he brought even two 88s with him, he could've blown Frost to heaven from the south side of the river, too. All of these things would've been 'automatics' for the SS. Browning HAD to drop paras on the island the first day. Failing to do so sunk the entire enterprise. When you think more on it, Browning can't even allow Grabner to cross the bridge in the first place... he can't even be allowed to get onto it... not even the north side. He actually blew it by not leaving a rear guard to frustrate Frost. That error made MG look like a closer run than it was.
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  11. The Primary Objective was going the WHOLE way. With the 2ss Panzer Corps sitting right on top of the southern Arnhem bridge, there was NO WAY that XXX Corps was going to cross it. It would be detonated long before that.
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  12. Tracked vehicles, even the Universal Carrier, tore up the mud that the Dutch call soil -- just because of the way that they steer. You raise an interesting point: why weren't Universal Carriers used to augment the Shermans by going off road? This battle begged for jeeps precisely because XXX Corp would face virtually no opposition on the island -- if they got there in time. Control of the twin bridges would mean that only the few ferries could make the transit. And they should've been captured and pulled to the island -- or -- failing that -- sunk by TAC air. &&& That British Airborne destroyed their proximate ferry -- instead of hauling it to their bank -- still boggles the mind. They no sooner destroyed it than they discovered that they HAD to have it. Whoops! That this particular ferry was totally over-looked is also remarkable. The Allies had Dutch advisors -- but such questions weren't put to them, obviously. The ferries discussed here used to be the only way to get to the farmland on the island. They were anything but a secret to the locals. I could just cry. BTW, late in the battle, the Germans found dominating ground well west of the Arnhem bridge. They were not driven off by XXX Corps artillery fire nor TAC air. It was this position of observation that made it Hell to close up to British Airborne. The SS was able to call down 150mm artillery fire all across the island, directed from this spot. (!!!) Google YouTube 60 years after MarketGarden for a four part Dutch retrospective. This location is shown about 82% of the way through the video.
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  13. The biggest problem with XXX Corps is that Monty didn't think to ask for a thousand jeeps. Jeeps would've permitted mounted infantry to roam all over the polders -- in a way that no other Allied vehicle could do. After the bridge was taken, jeeps could've raced all over the polder -- no need to stay on the elevated road -- and swept any and all German light infantry from the field. It's astounding that this was not thought of by either army. If you're not aware, one of the Big Things done prior to MG was the transfer of THOUSANDS of American trucks to the British forces. Monty begged Ike for them -- and got them. The US Army actually disbanded some truck regiments -- for a time -- to provide these trucks. Monty got priority for other stuff, too. These transfers were the primary reason for Monty's sloth. His own lorries were in such sad shape that he needed 2,000 GMC 2.5 ton trucks. Bradley mentions it in his autobiography.
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  14. @John Burns They were racing towards THEIR battle. The flank was repeatedly attacked even as XXX Corps was fighting its way to Arnhem. The 101st also had to defend the flank of XXX Corps. TIK goes into some detail about these actions.
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  15. @John Burns Ike prioritized the entire front. About the only Army Group he didn't favor was 6th Army Group. He had a grudge with Devers. Earlier in the war, Devers -- in England -- denied Ike's demand that additional B-17 squadrons be sent to him in Africa. Devers justified this denial because he'd received explicit orders from Marshall and Arnold. Left to his own devices, Ike would've delayed the 8th Air Force bomber offensive just about forever. Ike NEVER forgave Devers. Naturally, Bradley and Patton sucked up to Ike and froze out Devers, too. By the end, Patton laughed and giggled, he'd trapped two German armies and 6th Army Group. Ike, Bradley and Patton thought that was just a riot. The idea that Ike favored Monty -- and you believe that, too -- tells us all we need to know about how un-grounded you are. MG proved -- to Ike's satisfaction -- that Monty's scheme was lame, hopeless, in fact. 1) Hitler could ALWAYS vector elite troops against such a spearhead, whether it was British, Canadian or American. It didn't matter. 2) The German army was losing its azz when its infantry had to fight against Allied infantry. Battles with German panzers were never that lopsided. In fact, they were a bitch. ( Goodwood ) Ultimately, Patton was right. The traditional invasion route to Germany was the BEST invasion route. Everything further north proved to be brutally difficult to pull off. Bradley's fiasco in the Hurtgen was even worse than Monty's during MG. It ran MUCH longer and had a MUCH higher blood price. Think of it as the Somme in slow motion -- and in the forest -- the Allies' version of Stalingrad.
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  16. @John Burns It was ESSENTIAL that the Allies seize Arnhem bridge... ALL of it. Losing the southern half = total failure of MG. For the SS would surely blow the bridge into the river before XXX Corps could do anything about it. As Grabner showed, the SS could cross virtually the whole distance before Frost could shoot. But the SS needn't even travel that far to set explosives. Indeed, as a matter of fact, the Dutch had ALREADY placed explosives in both bridges. They were pre-charged with explosives before 1940. This was not unusual. So all that the SS had to do was to double check the charges, the wiring, and boom, down she went. The Dutch explosives were PERFECTLY set to take the bridge down ENTIRELY. Further, the detonation cables ran to the south side of the river. The Dutch always assumed that the Threat came from Nazi Germany, not Belgium. Hence the Nijmegen cables went to the post office cum telephone exchange ( where a Dutchman severed the link -- right at the start of the battle -- he immediately realized that Nijmegen bridge simply HAD to be the Allies objective, too obvious it was.) Ditto for the Arnhem bridge. Its detonation cables led straight to the south side. In short, Frost couldn't do a THING to stop the SS from dropping the entire bridge into the river. This destruction was pre-engineered -- by the builders of the bridge, themselves. The SS didn't need to even bring in explosives or cables. The Dutch had done all of their work for them. (!!!) Monty never could cross the Rhine in Holland. He (wisely) didn't even make the attempt. Urquhart was mistaken that Monty would find British Airborne's pitiful bridgehead suitable for 21st Army Group. The reason for the 'sloth' of Horrocks, and Monty late in the battle was due to the fact that both understood what I've posted here. At a minimum, the local Dutch had spelled it all out. Arnhem bridge was a goner. No Dutchman could save it buy cutting the cables. Deal with it. MG went south once the Big Brains kept every airborne unit away from the island on Day One. ( Over the protests of both Gavin and Urquhart, BTW. ) Yeah, I could just cry. In all airborne operations, the drop zones are THE critical decision. If you get them wrong, God help you. That's what happened here.
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  17. The woods in question were in GERMANY. They were astride the Dutch/German border. Any Dutchmen wandering across that border at that time would be nabbed -- for sure.
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  18. @Steve Bletchley was not given a time-line within their intercepts. It's a pretty good bet that Bletchley was tapping into morale boosting chatter between Adolf and OB West about its reinforcement priority -- which was -- in fact -- at the top of the stack. Hitler had ALREADY decided to counter attack out of the Ardennes even before the Allies rolled up to the West Wall. Yes, in his imagining he would repeat his super-success of 1940. All of this was in his head even before Paris was liberated. Quite simply, Hitler had ALWAYS assumed that his play was in the west, and that only Britain and America were sensitive to casualties, for clearly, Stalin was not deterred by even insane levels of blood. The disposition of Browning's HQ betrays the fact that he KNEW that the ONLY terrain suitable for a counter attack by panzers lay directly between the heights and the German border. Everywhere else, the ground was so soft that tanks bogged down. This was why Hell's Highway was an elevated highway, why XXX Corps tanks had to stay up on that 60-mile berm. The CRAZY thing about 1st Airborne and 82nd Airborne drop zones: they weren't on the island. The zone between the two bridges was an ISLAND in the Rhine river delta. The Germans couldn't get on it except by the bridges and a ferry. This ferry, indeed both ferries, were totally ignored by Browning and Monty. ANY Dutchman could've, would've brought them up. They were the traditional way of reaching the farmland that WAS the island. The island had no Germans, no FLAK, no nothing. No place to hide panzers, either. The island was the OBVIOUS place to take all subsequent air drops. It just screamed: land here, land here, land here! All of the FLAK was in Arnhem. That's where the RAF was taking a beating. BTW, the RAF DID adjust its drop zones after crews bitched about loads lost to Germany. However, no matter what was done, the SS kept over-running the new, tighter, drop zones. That's how fast the 1st Airborne was shrinking its perimeter. It was but a short time before its pocket was so tiny that the RAF couldn't hit it. Any plane making the attempt would have no more than a two second window between crossing the Rhine and reaching the (far ) German line. That's why the film is painting a false picture WRT the RAF. Its crews were not that stupid. What had happened is that British Airborne had lost the ability to defend its perimeter early in the fight. . ALL of Airborne's problems traced back to Browning's selection of drop zones. He had the PERFECT spot -- the island -- and he didn't select it. Urquhart and Company could not redeem that catastrophic error no matter how much blood they spent.
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  19. @John Burns Gavin DID follow orders. His General Order ( from Ike ) was to NEVER lose Browning -- nor to tarnish Browning's reputation. Taking the Nijmegen bridge became a SECONDARY objective. If Browning was lost and the bridge taken, Gavin would've been sent down in disgrace. Even taking that bridge would not make the 2SS Panzer Corps disappear. Lost in all of the hand-wringing, the sloth of XXX Corp just guaranteed that the Arnhem bridge would be blown up. This would've happened IMMEDIATELY once it was clear that Nijmegan was lost to the Allies. The Arnhem bridge was saved precisely because it led to Nijmegen. IIRC, eventually the Germans pulled back and blew it up. The ONLY way that the Arnhem bridge could be won was by way of changing the 101st's drop zones on day one. The Germans had be be denied the ability to get to the southern end of the Arnhem bridge, and British Airborne needed IMMEDIATE reinforcement as the city, itself, could easily absorb an entire infantry division. The ONLY drop zone that could be ABSOLUTELY guaranteed was that of the ISLAND. So you had both Urquhart and Gavin wasting their time and men defending the unnecessary when the island was RIGHT at the twin bridges. Duh. Putting the 101st on the island would also mean that Browning would have 18th Airborne Corps right to hand to defend his HQ and the Germans could not stop further parachute drops. British Airborne would NEVER fail to obtain drops, either. The island was the central position -- and the British didn't see it. The Americans were told to SHUT UP -- to never opine on British operations. Even Bradley and Patton, who totally disagreed with MG, would not utter a peep! They merely groused about it, referring to events in the most elliptical fashion. Patton didn't even dare run his mouth off in his diary. All because Ike had put them on notice. If three-stars are choking in silence, imagine one-star Gavin!
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  20. @ John Burns Without the Arnhem bridge, XXX Corps is actually going nowhere. And it was lost when the Germans got sole access to its southern end. That happened on the first day.
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  21. @John Burns There is no way that the SS does not blow the south end of Arnhem bridge before they are attacked by XXX Corps. It'd arrive a full day late -- even if everything clicked perfectly. Browning HAD to take the Arnhem bridge from the first -- just like Gavin ought to have taken Nijmegen bridge from the first. Instead, the British captured merely the northern approach. Captured is too strong a word, interdicted is a better term. I certainly don't blame Frost, nor Gavin nor Horrocks. I blame the PLAN. It's the drop zones. These should've been Brownings specialty -- even beyond that of Monty. I think that's why Monty backed away from MG. He logically felt that Browning is THE British expert on airborne operations. The Americans felt the same way. He goofed. The Poles should've landed where the 101st did. The 101st should've landed on the island. British Airborne could logically stay with Browning's LZs. The 82nd could've logically gone with Browning's scheme... as the only solid ground suitable for half-tracks -- the REAL worry -- lay between the heights and Germany. And Germany was the one place that the Dutch didn't have any agents. Alternately, the British chould've just left their gliders at home, and landed what paras they had south of Arnhem bridge. Or they could've stayed with gliders per the original operation -- and landed the paras south of Arnhem bridge... far enough away that FLAK was not a nightmare. Since the typical FLAK battery was not right on the river, C-47s flying south of it any distance at all would've been impossible for FLAK guns to hit: too low, too far away, too obstructed by buildings. By the time the Germans reposition, it's all too late.
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  22. @John Burns Lastly, Plan A was for British Airborne to send recon jeeps ahead to seize the Arnhem bridge. That plan would NEVER work. The north end of the bridge was manned by a machine gun nest in a pill box. They wouldn't get any further than Frost's boys. Since there was no provision to take out the second ferry, the one the Germans were using up river, there was no way that British Airborne would ever be able to take the southern end of the Arnhem bridge. The southern bridge had to be taken by parachutists landing on the island -- on day one. These troops would then be in a position to put the hostile ferry out of action -- if not capture it. No, the British plan STUNK. Even the capture of the Nijmegen bridge would not get XXX Corps across the lower Rhine. The final bridge had to be in hand -- right from the start. British Airborne should've left their gliders back in England. THEY were the sole reason for the crazy drop zones for the British.
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  23. @Nick Join the Peace Corps and make an impression. My Nephew did. He discovered that they really ARE fools. It really is hard to save them from themselves. It doesn't take too long before frustration kicks in. To the locals, all of your advice, everything, smacks of arrogance. For you are challenging the wisdom of their fathers, all of them. The fact that they a taking craps in public, drinking out of mud puddles, and trying to get by on $0.00 dollars per day for a lifetime.... It's so easy to criticize. The fact is that MOST societies are vastly inferior to the USA. 1) They resist - often violently - to new thinking, to new ways. Many times this resistance is shocking. You'd think that clean water would be an automatic 'seller.' Nope. No project gets MORE resistance than any scheme to bring in clean, fresh water to a village, to a town, to a city. Such thinking is the LAST thing on the local's mind. Your proffered project is universally deemed a total waste of money. "What were you thinking of?" 2) They are parochial in the extreme. They really hate their neighbors down the road, or over the hill. [ Florentines still hate Venicians and vice versa. (sp ?] 3) Lying to you -- and each other -- is a local art form. Hell, it's a competition. This reaches extremes with Muslim Arab culture. This is the tic that caused so much grief in Iraq during reconstruction. Local 'talent' would lie about every phase of construction or repair. When you'd visit a work site, you never knew what to expect. You'd be thrilled if the foundation was actually poured. And so forth. Need I say it? ALL of these loser societies would regard the Americans as the 'problem.' Too arrogant, and all that. The REAL problem is that all Americans are naive. We can't imagine societies that are quite that disfunctional. Yet, eventually we come around to the truth. Their cultures prohibit adoption of even a fraction of what we deem normal behavior. Those few souls that figure things out promptly try and flee to the West. They have totally given up hope WRT their own neighbors.
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  24.  @wbertie2604  But, but, but -- there are no accounts of XXX using it during the advance. Even the film omits it. But, then, it omits the GMC 2.5 trucks, too. The film makes it seems like British lorries were used. My Father lost his 2.5 ton truck to Monty -- his entire truck regiment did. This transfer is NEVER addressed in British tellings. It delayed M-G for 72-hours -- straight off. I have little doubt that Monty was thinking that all-wheel drive would be just the ticket for the polders. It was as obvious as blue sky that British lorries would be stuck in the mud. Monty knew that turf like the back of his hand. I still go with "Monty should've asked for jeeps." If the US Army is able to cough up 2,000 GMC 2.5 trucks on no notice at all -- then thousands of jeeps would've been just as available. Like the trucks, Ike would've ordered that American jeeps be taken straight away from their current users. Ike actually stopped the Red Ball Express for Monty's Big Plan. This aspect is suppressed in Allied tellings. So M-G was a disaster for what it stopped elsewhere on the front... as in everything. Aachen would've been captured without a fight but for M-G. (!!!) Yup. This tale is taboo in Allied military circles -- same as the bloody Hurtgen. All of these fiascos tarnish the glowing reps of Monty, Bradley and Ike. So -- they 'didn't happen' -- and that's official.
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  25. @Magnus They (incredibly) depended upon the Dutch explosives and Dutch detonation cables. Keep in mind that Bittrich gave express orders to NOT blow up the Nijmegen bridge. As a result, the attempt was a last second affair. Whoops. But, the impulse was there. No such reluctance would EVER be shown at Arnhem. The arrival of XXX Corps dispelled any crazy notion of Germany launching a counter attack. Bittrich suddenly shut up. Shooting up paras was one thing, the Irish Guards was a totally different kettle, all right. A Dutchman had sabotaged the detonation circuit right from the start. It ran into the town precisely because the Dutch figured that the Threat came from Nazi Germany -- not Belgium. They did have a back-up detonation connection that ran back to the opposite bank. This was the one the SS activated. The problem for the SS was that the back-up circuit was in SERIES with the primary detonation circuit. No Dutchman explained that to them. Everything looked kosher right up until nothing happened. It's not as if the SS could test the circuit without dropping the Nijmegen bridge into the Waal. (They assumed.)  Being a civilian, none of the military paperwork// write-ups ever caught this. Hell, the Allies didn't even know that the detonation cables ran through the post office cum telephone exchange. ( in the same building... right at the base of the bridge... obviously built at the same time. ) Neither side prioritized getting into the post office// telephone exchange. It just didn't hit the average soldier that this was 'magic' ground. Military (unit) histories are not going to waste ink praising a heroic civilian. For some crazy reason, the Allies looked past the fact that all of the locals were allied with them. When the Germans figured this all out, they starved the Dutch. They had them down to eating boiled tulip bulbs, which makes for a very expensive and tasteless meal. Once Grabner got across the Arnhem bridge -- long before Frost arrived, MG was dead, dead, dead, dead, dead. Without Grabner, Gavin waltzes across Nijmegen bridge, no matter what. THIS explains why both Browning and Gavin placed it on such a low priority. 1st Airborne was assumed to have blocked Arnhem bridge from the get-go -- and everyone knew that there were no Germans on the island. Hell, it was naked farmland. It only had a hamlet north of the Waal at Nijmegen. Arnhem bridge could never be taken, was never taken. Interdicting the north approach did not constitute bridge capture. Arnhem bridge had massively long approach bridging that went on and on. The bridge had to be pretty high over the river, while the surrounding land was way low. What this meant was that when Frost shot up Grabner, Grabner was already leaving the bridge proper and descending the northern approach. This is why Frost had to shoot from the upper levels, and why 2nd Para could shuttle from side to side underneath the massive approach. It also meant that mortars, etc. couldn't reach under the approach. The SS had to slug it out, man to man, in street fighting. Even the panzers were rather freaked out because they had to wade among tall buildings that provided Molotov fire bomb opportunities galore. The SS took tremendous casualties while attacking Frost. All of the above explains why ignoring Dutch and Ultra intel that the II SS Panzer Corps was in the area was such a catastrophe. And that event happened up at 21st Army Group and AA Army levels. No-one below the rank of army commander was let in on the Ultra secret. It's for this reason, that Browning must be assumed to know all about Ultra -- and that Ike may have told Gavin to assassinate Browning at the last second -- rather than let Browning fall into SS hands. For there was no way that the SS would not torture Browning to cough up what he knew. Browning should never have landed with his boys. He simply knew too much. In the Pacific, USN Captains suicided themselves rather than be caught by the IJN -- for just this reason. Once Browning was on the ground, he lost all control of events. 1st Airborne needed him, critically, to un-phu-ck their air drops. He could do it. I can't think of anyone else with the authority to step in and stop the insanity of dropping supplies to the SS. BTW, every time the RAF boys complained about what they saw, the drops were adjusted. Then the SS ran over the new drop zones. The RAF could never 'find' British Airborne in its ever shrinking perimeter. By the end, the perimeter was so tiny that the RAF would need 'smart chutes' to hit the bullseye. 1st Airborne really didn't have a drop zone any more. As for the 1,000 tanks story... that just HAD to come down from Bletchley Park// ULTRA... who probably intercepted Adolf's promise to OB West that they were priority. Hitler's promise was in connection with his Ardennes offensive. Bletchley had no idea that the panzers were to be assembled for November ( the original Bulge target date was mid-November ) not mid-September. And, yes, OB West was the priority for all panzers. The Ostheer had to make do with what StgIIIs, Hertzers, and PAK that they got. The only Ostheer formation that was kept up to strength was Gross Deutschland. ( Hitler was a 'Colonel' for one of its brigades, BTW. Heh. Yes, yes, he made himself honorary Colonel of a brigade. How many hats can that tyrant wear?) Naturally Bletchley assumed the worst, as did Browning. It's a VERY good bet that the so-called estimate from Gavin's S-2 came instead from Browning. Gavin would never have been clued into ULTRA. The lie that the intel came from his S-2 was generated to hide its source as being Browning. ( and ULTRA) After the fiasco was over, the estimate looked embarrassing, of course. So Gavin 'owned' it. For falling on his sword, Gavin was given his second star. He was definitely one of the Big Boys after MG was over.
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  26. @caelachyt Yup. I'd say everyone would have to agree with you. Browning took advantage of Urquhart and Gavin. Both were leading their divisions into a drop for their first time. With more experience under their belts, both would've thrown those insane drop zones back in Browning's face. He picked them, not Monty. Monty merely trusted Browning to get such things right. Monty knew he didn't know the airborne art. Both armies accepted that Browning was the Big Brain and the fella that had created both the British and American airborne corps. For the American airborne was nothing but a clone of Browning's op. The Americans did change some of the PT and related gear, but that's about it. I suspect that Gavin spent a LOT of time picking Browning's brain. Remember that Gavin wrote the American how-to text for the airborne. The island was rejected solely because it was deemed bad for gliders. This thesis was not even put to the test, BTW. It was merely assumed to be true. It would've been a SNAP to make any glider tip-over proof for the island. Merely put a runner way out in front of the glider, extending from its nose, in effect a ski-nose. Such an extension is not going to have a significant influence on drag or in-flight handling. Then, at the end, when the glider is at risk of flipping over, such a leading runner would stop the turning motion. The whole glider was made out of wood, and England was overrun with super-skilled furniture makers -- the boys that made the Mosquito the super-plane that it was. They could've patched this 'fix' together in their sleep -- if only someone would've asked. More generally, I'm astounded that this fix was not adopted because time, and time again, glider pilots were being injured because their craft had no energy absorber out in front of them. The envisaged ski nose would've been engineered to break and bend UNDER the pilot's position. He, himself, should've had the equivalent of a Mae West across his chest so that even if he was pushed forward, his body was cushioned. This 'pillow' could've been slipped on just prior to the landing sequence. Simple, no ? It's also rather baffling that Panzerfausts weren't made part of the TO&E of the airborne now that so many had been picked up all across France. ( Dropped only once, never fired. ) The British PIAT was revealed as a dud long before MarketGarden. BTW, Panzerfausts and Bazookas were known to be super effective in urban combat, effective against much more than tanks. Why the Airborne landed in Arnhem without a bicycle battalion? What a mistake that was. A fire-team on bicycles would've been perfect for scouting out ahead of the battalions. Instead, 1st Airborne kept stumbling into SS men as a main body. They didn't pick up a Dutch telephone ONCE when it counted. Indeed, they were instructed to NOT use the Dutch phone network. Good grief. Can't any Brit speak Hindustani ? It, Hindustani, worked like a charm in North Africa... 8th Army, anyone? Who in the 21st Army Group hailed from 8th Army? Wouldn't that be just about anyone in high command? Horrocks O'Connor Monty My how they forget.
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  27. Politics dictated that the Airborne Army keep the fighting out of the Dutch cities. Look how that turned out. (!!!) What made the most sense -- and what actually transpired -- did not conform to what the Allies wanted to plan for.
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  28.  @myroseaccount  Adolf PROMISED his western generals "a thousand tanks" and Bletchley Park found out about his assurance. German war production in 1944 totally eclipsed all that had gone before. So DON'T use 1941 metrics -- or even 1943 metrics. Speer had the numbers going through the roof -- right up until SEPTEMBER 1944. Yeah, the Krauts were building as many tanks in a month has they had in six-months earlier in the war. Next, the real worry for any parachute commander is not tanks -- it's HALF-TRACKS. They sport more machine guns... and their crews will have their heads on a swivel. Infantry HATE, HATE, HATE, attacking half-tracks for this reason. Adolf could've easily had 1,000 half-tracks sent to the fighting... given enough lead time. What Bletchley had picked up on was Adolf's pitch about his grand November counter-offensive against VIII Corps in the woods. He had visions of 1940 on his syphilitic brain. Lost in all of the posts: the ONLY terrain that could support tanks was where Gavin focused his attention. His PRIMARY mission was to protect Browning -- his hero. If an Allied 3-star ARMY COMMANDER had been lost to the enemy -- that would've been the end of Gavin's career. Due to his rank, he was able to be read-in-on Ultra. No-one else was. So the 1,000 tank tale HAD to have come from Bletchley and HAD to have become knowledge via Browning to Gavin. Gavin's account was spewed out to protect Browning's reputation AND the existence of Ultra. Plainly, Browning let Gavin in on the Big Secret. And, since you're asking: YES, Adolf DID promise his generals that they had priority #1 and that 1,000 tanks were to be given to them for the up coming counter-offensive. So Bletchley was not really wrong. They did not have a date-certain to go along with Adolf's pledge. He also pledged some crazy amount of fighter-cover, too. The counter-offensive was supposed to occur in November. In the event, it was launched in mid-December. The delay was primarily about GASOLINE. And yes, panzer production was insufficient to properly equip his attack force. For example the 12SS was never brought back up to strength. Elsewhere on YT there is a whole lecture on its problems. They were vast. The 12SS had been gutted by the Canadians and the fiasco of Falaise. Browning was in charge NOT Gavin. It was HE who had received the estimate from Bletchley -- and Bletchley's track record was towering at this point. The reason that Gavin was not so concerned about the magic bridge is because he believed British intelligence estimates -- and reasoned that 1st Airborne would entirely prevent German reinforcements from coming down from Arnhem. BTW, the solid ground was GERMAN ground. He, Gavin, had no Dutch spies telling him what was up in Germany, proper. He also figured that since this turf was the FIRST German soil to be occupied by any Allied force, that a stiff reaction just had to be in the cards. In this he was RIGHT. It's just that the Krauts couldn't do a very good job with an instant-outfit.
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  29.  @myroseaccount  IF -- and that's a BIG IFF -- Bletchley Park DID get things right. They received inside dope -- but even Adolf didn't know WHEN his directive would be fulfilled. His intent was for his counter-offensive to go off in mid-November. Bletchley merely gave Browning -- and SHAEF -- the heads up about where Hitler's head was at. The idea, posted by TIK and others, that the G2 of the 82nd Division had access to or CLOUT enough to influence Browning and Gavin... well everybody rejects such an assertion... including TIK. Gavin was BSing the public -- a job requirement for ALL generals. There is ONLY one source that had total credibility WRT German intentions: Bletchley Park. Browning was the ONLY general read into Ultra. ( WRT to Market ) Corps commanders routinely doped out what was up -- but had to settle for suspicions. When Bletchley tells Browning of the tyrant's directives, that intel HAS to be taken seriously. FYI, early in the war, Winnie did not use the term 'Ultra' as a source. Instead, he conjured up a totally fictive agent. And that agent was purported to be stationed within Nazi high HQ. What then happened was that his generals REFUSED to believe that the agent was real, REFUSED to act on said intel, and walked straight into one fiasco after another. This blindness is the PRIMARY reason for British defeats in North Africa for quite some time. Winnie finally doped out that he would HAVE to somewhat come clean with his army commanders. The source of the intel was changed to 'Ultra' -- and Winnie informed his army commanders that anyone stupid enough to ignore Ultra would be on the chopping block PDQ. Suddenly, British fortunes in the desert war really picked up. But to keep the Ultra secret -- secret -- ONLY army commanders were read into the secret. Gavin, Ridgway, et. al were left in the dark. Ultra was the reason why Patton gained such an astounding reputation within 3rd Army. Ditto for Monty. Rommel's rep in North Africa also entirely turned on his intel. The British destroyed his B'dienst team -- and Rommel never was smart again. Heh.
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  30.  @myroseaccount  By rule, Bletchley's intercepts and conclusions remain top secret, for the most part, to this day. And they are SO MANY. To dope out what really happened you must think like a detective surrounded by liars -- which is what ALL generals are. No general ever publishes memoirs that make themselves, their armies or their nation look bad. If you ARE a bad liar, you're never going to reach such a high rank. This reality is true at all times for all armies and all generals.
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  31. @ Stephen -- Browning WAS sacked. That's what a prompt transfer to India meant. SHAEF -- as a whole -- could not admit that Browning let them all down.
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  32.  @wbertie2604  The German offensive (the Bulge) should NOT have been a surprise. The US 28th Division sent a patrol over the Our River a full 48-hours before December 16th. The boys reported back that panzer activity was through the roof (not so quiet at all) and that a Kraut attack could be expected at ANY time. ALL 28th Division men were keyed up. (All other accounts -- movie and otherwise -- are phony. On film, the 28th is usually portrayed as being clueless -- asleep in their foxholes.) This report went up to up the line: battalion, regiment, division and corps. Then it ran into Hodges and Bradley. They buried it. These were the two Big Brains that were fooled. Imagine dismissing the report from a foot patrol of such a nature. Yup. Bradley did so. Naturally, because of his rank and stature, ALL US Army accounts bury this tid-bit. I don't have the time, but I could dig up the names of the soldiers on the patrol. These same fellas were captured and had to endure Hell in the worst PoW camp you could imagine. It, the camp, even has its own video out there on YT. (Mark Felton) His account does not go far enough.
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  33.  @wbertie2604  But, but, but -- the Colonel was convinced, too. The Krauts made THAT much noise. The 2nd Panzer and 26th VG were right in front of these guys. When Ike hear the intel of the first day -- he leapt all over it, PDQ. He figured -- rightly -- that this is EXACTLY the kind of stunt that Adolf was prone for. Not so, Bradley, who was STILL poo-pooing the reports sixteen-hours after the attack began. (!!!) He sent the 7th and 10th tank divisions off to XIII Corps -- almost under protest. This is in his own auto-bio. It's as close as he comes to admitting that he'd screwed up. BTW, 2nd ID was to attack on the 16th -- a Bradley schemed attack, of course. Its commanding general disobeyed his corps commander... and stopped it. (Gerow, V Corps) Later Gerow apologized. The 2nd ID would've been mauled -- as the Krauts had preregistered fires awaiting them... plus king tiger tanks and the 12SS boys. By going over to defense, the 2nd ID totally screwed up the 12SS. Adolf expected Big Things -- and yet nothing. Middleton was NOT fooled. Fuller was not fooled. The Krauts could not tramp around with battalions of tanks, stugs, half-tracks and such in slippers. Their end-connector squeal is just too much to muffle. The Armored Cavalry up north also was howling about end connector squeal. Piper was right in front of them. It was Bradley who was dismissing these reports. Only in glancing, in his auto-bio, does Bradley admit that he was fulsomely dismissive of Kraut capabilities at this point. Though a bona fide genius, he utterly failed to imagine what a truly desperate dictator would do, what powers he could summon. In military lingo: Bradley blew it. He was not getting just the one report. When Fuller sent the intel up the line -- he did so with his own written assurance that the dope was spot on.
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  34.  @wbertie2604  But it WAS blown when the British came close to it. That it would be was obvious to everyone for miles around.
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  35.  @wbertie2604  But, but, but, Ike DID take trucks from the Red Ball to meet Monty's request. THIS is what had Bradley and Patton howling to the Moon. My Father lost his truck to Monty. He sat on his azz for ten-days until new GMC's came from Britain. His whole regiment did. This sit-down was the end of the Red Ball.
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  36. TIK's presentation is pretty awesome but there are elements that need to be laid forth: Monty's panic request for 2,000+ GMC deuce & half 6x6 trucks. That delayed the show by three-days right off. Monty's failure to request jeeps by the thousand -- this is inexplicable. The US Army could've coughed up thousands in no time. It'd take the Brits about 5minutes training time to drive a jeep. The 82nd and 101st proved that jeeps could drive ANYWHERE in a polder, their ground pressure and 4x4 drive made it a snap. Monty FROZE the front line by his own volition. Yup. Even the START LINE is where it was because Browning and Monty wanted this airborne drop to be quite the show. Yup. They'd experienced so many cancelled drops because the Allied armies (typically the 2nd Army) over-ran the intended drop zones. These were always intended to take river-lines. (Patton went south very happily because there were no serious river lines in front of him until late in the advance. He was following the classic route of invasion -- and damn well knew it. Monty was NOT taking the normal invasion route. The lower Rhine has usually stopped EVERY army. It's the Afghanistan of Europe. It's the reason that Switzerland has been invaded more often. ) THIS is the emotional back ground behind Monty and Browning's mutual decision to stop the 2nd Army. Right off, they figured that the war was over and that, having built it, it was time for the Airborne Army to be employed. This would be its last shot. These rivers were the ONLY target left in Northwest Europe that justified an airborne assault. [ A similar panic hit the American 10th Mountain Division. It had been trooping all over Colorado for YEARS to scare Hitler into keeping a complete army up in Norway. Only late in the war, it panicked. It had to get into the war, PDQ. When it was committed, it blew the German army clean out of Italy in extremely short order. But that's another story. ] TIK never brings up the single most obvious boner: why in the Hell was the 101st dropped so close to XXX Corps when the twin prizes begged for it to land between them? It's not as if there were ANY FLAK guns in the middle of farmland. Duh. The need to protect landing zones had NO MEANING as this zone was an ISLAND. Get it? It was totally devoid of ANY Germans. ( I'm not going to count the bridge micro-garrisons. ) So, you could land ANYWHERE on the island. It SCREAMED: land here, you won't even bust your butt! It's panzer-proof, too. Once the bridges are blocked the ISLAND is impossible for the Germans to get onto. Blocking the occasional ferry attempt would be child's play. IMAGINE, your critical targets are north and south of an unoccupied island -- made so by rivers so vast that it takes the largest bridges in Europe to get across. And the Germans have no boats to speak of. No amphibious capability at all. And then imagine two excellent British generals ignoring these salient facts. -- But not just them -- let's toss in their staffs -- and the American airborne generals, too. Folks, this is VICTORY DISEASE on steroids. ALL involved wanted this battle to go off as a show piece. And it blew up in their faces. VICTORY if any of the following: If the start line was advanced prior to MG, 101st dropped correctly, Jeeps used by XXX Corps for its infantry, TAC AIR, Browning up in the sky -- like Ike, sure, he'd lend his P-51 to Browning, VT fuses for XXX Corps, Dutch telephone net actually used, Dutch advice actually taken, Hindustani used as British code talk, Recognition of the Waal ferry -- the one British Airborne blew up -- and then needed. [The assignment of USN blimps on day 2. There was virtually no FLAK until you're right over Arnhem. Blimps are floating mountains in the sky -- TOTALLY rigged for ground observation. They all had radios out you rears -- and optics beyond belief. Binoculars so heavy that they had to be mounted. (!) They could see a rat from 4,000 feet. Unlike a plane, they just hover. Subs and troops just run away when they see a blimp overhead. You just can't shoot them down. And they're bring absolute artillery and mortar Hell down upon you.] [ Most of the British regulars spoke Hindustani. Generals and troopers, alike. The US used Native Americans in the Pacific, why pray tell this was not an obvious play for the British with so many called back from India? ] Suddenly the 'Gavin Thesis' lies dead and buried. Frost is right, TIK is wrong. This was a British operation, and Gavin, et. al. were told from on high, don't cross the Brits up. Don't make waves. Let them make ALL the decisions. Don't fight senior British officers at any time. Imagine the repercussions if you turned out to be right! The chit storm would never die.
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  37. @sneaky They were standing next to each other. The ONLY source that could be credible WRT the tanks HAD TO BE BLETCHLEY PARK. They'd picked up on Adolf's pledge to the Western Front. They did not know that the tanks would only show up December 16, 1944. And at that time, they WERE a surprise. So now, who really looks smart?
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  38. @JohnBurns -- incorrect. The British recently tested those radios. Yes, they still had such radios in their possession -- and they were taken by investigators to Salisbury plain -- in optimal conditions -- and it was soon discovered that they, the radios, NEVER had decent range -- PERIOD. With the best operators, in ideal weather, in ideal terrain with radios totally squared away -- they STILL could not transmit // receive much past 2.5 miles. This was broadcast by the BBC. They had a show that looked back, forensically, at many famous British battles. Time and time, again, they've discovered that the old historical version accepted for perhaps centuries is and was totally wrong. Famously, they discovered that the entire narrative about Agincourt was totally wrong. British long bows had NOTHING to do with Henry's success. The French actually just killed themselves. Strange, but true. The British Army simply did not test its radios for range -- certainly not First Airborne. On manuvers the boys never got that far apart... and these were tactical radios. Driven by batteries, they were power hogs, too. (All tube driven electronics just sucks down the juice, which is why the range was so limited. To get more range, they needed line power -- not batteries.)
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  39. Watch the BBC broadcast. It's up on YouTube. The British made it crystal clear that even when everything is PERFECT those radio sets can't reach past 2.5 miles... 3 miles is a real struggle. Comprehend THAT. But British Airborne needed WAY past 2.5 miles for their comm link. Telling us all that they can't even get to 2.5 miles is to just pile onto their misery. And the irony is: the Dutch could NOT talk the British into using their phone. Say, has any thought about using CODE to send messages? Then even if the Germans heard transmissions -- they'd still be lost. How stupid could the British be? This kind of decision belonged in the lap of Browning and Monty. No-one else could have the authority to rig up a code for MG. BTW, Monty always bypassed his army commanders. He expected them to handle the backroom// COO role. You'll note that they were virtually never caught on film, whereas Monty was the face of the British Army in Northwest Europe.
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  40. This post is totally non-responsive to my assertion that the adoption of a voice code for the Dutch telephone network would've been up to them and no-one else. It's an issue that only an army commander or army group commander could take the lead on. In the crush of events, neither man thought of using the telephone network right under the German's nose. One of the tricks used in North Africa was to use Hindustani. Many senior officers could speak Hindustani, which was all too much for the Germans.
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  41. Robin is under-stating Monty's technique. Monty had his own boys camped out at all relevant subordinate HQ. No they did not commute back and forth as Robin tells us, they stayed parked there. This was ultra evident during Monty's command days during the Bulge. He had liason officers at 1st Army and all of its Corps. These fellas were simply shadows of the relevant commanders. They were there SOLELY to observe and fink. One is reminded of Red Army political officers. The story with Monty was that he was a control freak -- but very forward looking. So he had excellent relations with every general officer to serve under him. Gavin though Monty was just terrific. The guys bitching about Monty always turned out to be his peers and above all his superiors. Even Ike found Monty to be a handful. FM Alexander found Monty difficult to work with, too. The fact is that Monty's ego was so vast that he would only issue orders -- he would not take orders. Monty spend weeks chaffing at the bit because Ike wouldn't let him have his way with the narrow thrust concept. MG proved just how wrong Monty was. The problem with the narrow thrust scheme is that the rest of the Western Front would then go quiet. That suited the Germans perfectly. Germany was falling apart with its infantry formations when in the defense. They were not competitive. Whereas Hitler could always scratch up a handful of elite formations to stymie the Allies... of which MG is the stand out example. Monty simply was not Monty for this battle. He had victory disease. Heck the entire Allied command had victory disease. Bradley went so far as to shut off artillery ammunition deliveries! Wow. THAT'S victory disease. Victory disease explains the behavior of ALL of the Allied generals. Gavin had it BIG TIME. Obviously, so did Browning. That's why they were so un-stressed about taking the bridge. The ONLY guy with his head on straight: Frost. He should've been running the division. He certainly had the track record for outstanding leadership and judgment.
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  42. Even THREE days would've made a difference. Yup. That's how THIN the front line started out. Most of the Germans that XXX Corps fought at the start line had just arrived -- in the last few days. A week prior the front line consisted of snipers and the occasional machine gun nest. That was it. Period. Amazing, no? The line was where it was because the British simply stopped, took a break, upon orders from on high. This is ANOTHER one of Monty's boners that no Brit wants to look at. There was no military utility in stopping. Patton would NEVER have stopped. The Son would've been behind British lines if they had merely proceeded normally. So, the ENTIRE launch line was where it was because Monty and Browning wanted it there. Shocking, but true. The GG were PISSED when MG opened up. Suddenly they had to really fight hard. Previously it had been a motor march!
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  43. Tedder, Alexander, yup you know better than them. Tedder and Ike BOTH deemed Monty a handful. EVERY American general wanted Monty sent upstairs so that Alexander could be brought up from the Med. Talk about EGO -- Monty had actually forgotten that FM Alexander EVEN EXISTED. Freddie had to remind him that Ike had a replacement in mind that Churchill would certainly fall in love with: FM Alexander -- a man who used to be Monty's BOSS. Yeah, he forgot about his own prior commander! That ends this discussion. Talk about an ego bigger than the planet. Who here reading could forget their prior boss, prior commander? He did!
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  44. @John Burns After Bulge, Ike pushed Monty to the curb. This explains why the British Army group was "pinched out" as they say when the Allied armies crossed the Rhine. Ike basically cut Monty off of American support... once he crossed the Rhine. From that point onward, Monty had to TOTALLY rely upon British logistics. He couldn't get out of first gear. The boobs south of him then proceeded to over-run Western Germany so fast that it alarmed Stalin. By the end, Monty had to ask Ike for the 82nd Airborne so that the Reds would not roll into Denmark. He got them. Gavin, the 'loser' jumped into his jeep and then rolled Northeast across Germany using nothing more than his side arm and an American flag, pennant mounted on his jeep. From time to time, he'd even have Germans saluting him! Being behind American lines was a dream come true for them. In his book "On to Berlin" he recounted how weird it was. For before he rolled, the British had led him to believe that intense resistance was to be faced. However, it was a cake-walk... a motor-march. By the end, Gavin had reached the Baltic... not Berlin! Heh. And, keep in mind, Gavin admired both Browning and Monty. Loved them in fact.
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  45. Ike had taken 9th Army away from Monty by the end. Gavin, a Monty-phile -- big time, specifically stated in his book that the release came from IKE. Monty HAD to go to Ike to get this division. Ike pinched 21st Army Group out of the Front. By the end of the war, not one British formation was there to shake hands with the Russians. This was deliberate. A snub, for sure. Seeing the lay of the (political) land, Monty accepted the TOTAL surrender of Nazi Germany in his 21st Army Group HQ on May 5th, 1945. When Ike heard the news, he flipped, ( off camera ) and informed Monty that the surrender could ONLY ever occur at SHAEF HQ. Please send your reps. Monty was not on hand, IIRC. Ike would also not appear in the ceremony. He deliberately stayed in the next room. He wanted to strangle the Germans, of course. Ike actually had a TERRIBLE temper. Marshall told him even a single additional outburst would be enough for him to be sent down in shame. Further, Ike was to NOT micro-manage subordinate commands. Upon the attempt, he'd also be sent packing. These General Orders from THE General explain what many Brits find inexplicable... Americans, too. The Ike they 'know' is Mr. genial. His military record says the opposite. One of the reasons that Marshall hated McArthur was that McArthur took a fulsome chit on Ike's 'military jacket.' As a result Ike was a mere Lt Col at the start of WWII. He was three stars in less than 12 months once Marshall was 'hip' to what McArthur had done. He'd lied... for years on end. Free-riding Ike's work as if it was his own. (!!!) Unforgivable. Any lesser rank would've been court martialed. But, McArthur was already a national hero. [ Likewise Johnny Carson, known to every American as Mr. fun guy was, in fact, too tightly wrapped and was routinely drunk as a skunk -- and Johnny was an ANGRY drunk. He really did need Ed McMahon to chill him down// double as a body guard. ] Lastly when Zhukov heard that Ike had taken the surrender he wigged out. The Germans HAD to perform the same ceremony for the Red Army. Each one of these German surrenders was total and complete across the board. Monty's ceremony has been Winston Smithed down the memory hole. Yet it was not a bit different than Ike's or Zhukov's. All of which proves that it takes three times as much effort to surrender as it takes to declare war. Heh. You MUST be kidding about the North Sea. The Russians were already on the North Sea and had been there for months and months. The issue was DENMARK. You're exposing how twisted your 'logic' can be. Not unreasonably, Monty wanted to be standing in place to shake hands with the Russians. Once it was obvious that this would never happen he dialled Ike and had the 82nd stand in for him. That must have been as much fun as gargling shards of glass. Well, at least on paper, the 82nd would count as a subordinate command to 21st Army Group. That had to count for something.
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  46. @John Burns You live in an alternate reality. Bradley slipped 9th Army into the merge between 21st Army Group and 12th Army Group. That was his political solution. The 9th Army was but an over-grown corps at that time. 1st Army consisted of 15 premier divisions. Marshall told Bradley that was his limit. Bradley, 12 AG commander was actually running 1st US Army at the exact same time. Hodges was nothing more than a go-fer and yes-man. Bradley routinely reached past Hodges to Gerow and Collins -- his twin favorites. Both reached 4 stars in the post war era, IIRC. (And Bradley 5 stars.) Upon Marshall's dictum, every new division to land went to Patton... until 3rd Army became a monster. Then Marshall told Bradley, what goes for Hodges goes for Patton: no more. Simpson was FORCED upon Bradley. He wanted Gerow. He had to eat crow and explain to Gerow that he was not in a position to dictate army commanders. Simpson came out of the National Guard, IIRC, was McNairs favorite. But whatever, Bradley came to fall in love with Simpson: who NEVER provided Bradley with any grief whatsoever. He was totally the opposite of both Hodges and Patton. Simpson was ALL business. Monty QUICKLY realized just how lucky he was. Simpson beat Hodges all to Hell. Further, the new American divisions were 'cleaned up' doctrinally. They'd been cross training with American veterans, only the best were given this assignment, and so small unit tactics late in the war, with totally virgin infantry divisions, were night-and-day better than what was seen in Normandy. And Monty was sitting in the catbird's-seat as they rolled in. One of them was the 104th. It was commanded by Terry Allen. He HATED Bradley. He couldn't have been HAPPIER than serving under Simpson and Monty. The 104th was an elite formation. Allen made it the sole and only night fighting infantry division in the USA. It pulled off miracles. Need I say it? Monty just loved that division. It was constantly used as an infantry spearhead. It moved faster than most armored divisions, BTW. The Germans were simply not at all prepared for night attacks. They'd just fall apart. Simpson would batter them by day -- and then unleash Allen's 104th after nightfall. That's all she wrote.
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  47. @JohnBurns Wow, what are you smoking? The Russians have been 'on the Baltic' all the way from Prussia, you moron. The reason Monty needed Gavin was to stop them from marching into Denmark, indeed, conquering that whole nation. The reason Ninth Army was removed from Monty was as a snub. It sure as hell surprised Monty. And he was NOT happy. Ninth Army was 90% of his attack power. The rest of 21st Army Group was bled out... intolerant of casualties of any kind. Six-years of bleeding was more than enough for those boys. In Bradley's autobiography he relishes this humiliation of Monty -- quite bragging about the ENTIRE Russian-American front being just that. Arriving after the surrender ceremony is NOT what Monty had in mind. He'd insulted Ike, Bradley, Patton and Hodges -- repeatedly. That had consequences. BTW, when NATO was founded, Ike and Monty were brought back into harness. Once Ike left the scene, Monty was straight out the door. Like hell he wanted to be around a superior that was his junior in the history books. Even so, Monty continued to run down American military acumen until he died. He didn't have a kind word for Alexander, either. (!!!) He dissed him as being basically a pretty boy, harmless enough as long as he followed (Monty's) instruction. What a pill.
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  48. @B A While amusing , the war was not going to stop for tolls. The usual toll was paid in blood , anyway.
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