David Himmelsbach
TIKhistory
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Comments by "David Himmelsbach" (@davidhimmelsbach557) on "The BIG Reason the Luftwaffe Failed at Stalingrad | Airlift Statistics and Demyansk Comparison" video.
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@David Briggs
I don't comprehend your lack of comprehension.
8th USAAF destroyed the refineries that were in Germany (not Romania) and their adjacent tank farms where the Luftwaffe held its avgas reserve stocks. It was from these tank farms that the Luftwaffe passed on avgas to units across Nazi occupied Europe -- primarily Germany, itself, at this point in time.
This period was branded the "Big Week" by the USAAF -- and many a propaganda film// newsreel was released shortly after its success. The burning avgas, and more, took days to cook off. The smoke cloud was visible forever into the distance.
These stocks were refined fuels -- not crude oil -- which is what the US 9th AAF ( Tidal Wave, North Africa) and US 15th AAF (many raids, Foggia complex) hit around Ploiesti.
Yes, Ploiesti had some refining capability, but its real claim to fame was the production of crude oil. Wiki has everything all screwed up.
[The primary goal of Tidal Wave was the Tank Farm. ( Which was adjacent to the refinery complex.) It was obvious from the start, that a tank farm is self destructive once it's lit, and that once things really get rolling, the burning crude oil and refined products will spill out and ruin the nearby refinery.
They also made for a Fat Target whereas the refinery, itself, is actually a pretty tough target. ( It's always made out of high quality THICK steel, commonly thicker than tank armor!) The sensitive and touchy components would be TINY. ( valves and pumps ) The electrical controls in a refinery are always inside rigid steel pipe as no sparks from the power system can ever be permitted to ignite gases or fuels.]
Yes, other German refineries could still produce avgas, but they couldn't re-form crude feed stock up into higher octanes. The Luftwaffe had to settle for that natural fraction of crude oil and synthetic crude oil that distilled off as avgas. For most feedstocks this was a pathetically low fraction. Such a process is know as a distillery -- not a refinery.
[ In the oil business, a distillery is derisively termed a 'teapot.']
It was just enough avgas to let the Luftwaffe limp along. It became common for the Luftwaffe to just sit on the ground and let the Americans do their worst, as the Luftwaffe couldn't put up enough fighters to even mix it up with the escorts.
Shortly after the Big Week, Ike took personal command ( ie redirected Spaatz) ordering the 8th and 9th AAF to ignore German industry and to concentrate on the the transport grid. This went on for months. (March, April, May, June... Ike didn't release these air forces until the Cobra breakout, itself a massive heavy bomber tactical attack.)
It was at this time that Speer and Galland made a MAJOR plea with Adolf to use the respite to train a whole new batch of fighter pilots while the sky over Germany was clear of USAAF fighters. But they lost the 'debate.' Both of them later published their tale in Reader's Digest. ( 1946, IIRC ) [ Strange... as Speer was in the docket at the time.]
Their pitch was basic: this is the last time that the Luftwaffe has any shot at re-blooding the fighter arm, and that all bomber pilots have to be re-tasked away from bombing the enemy. The US 8th AAF is destroying Germany's war industries. This must be stopped at all costs, or the war will be lost for lack of production.
Also, during the respite, Speer threw every man at rebuilding crippled refineries -- and he even opened up fuel plants inside hollowed out mountains. ( These cavities were originally dug out for other critical war industries (IIRC, radio tubes) -- but were taken over for liquid fuel production. )
Fortunately for the Allies, Speer was largely unsuccessful.
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Paulus was never going to break out. He was a deer-in-the-headlights kind of fella.
The ONLY shot that the Germans had was to cut the panzer corps loose right from the start, BEFORE the Soviets pocked them with the infantry. As necessary, the lesser valued panzers would've been left behind so that enough fuel was there for the best panzers to make it all the way to German supply heads near Rostov or west of the Don.
The Don bridgehead HAD to be priority. In the event, it wasn't. The Soviets even conned the repair troops there to advance forward into the Stalingrad pocket!
( German survivor's accounts.)
These repair troops were soon a priority to fly out of the pocket, being at the top of the list. They had to leave all of their tools behind, (weight)
Once the 16p,24p,29m etc were outside the pocket, they could immediately begin to rip the Soviet light infantry to pieces... totally frustrating the encirclement.
That the above was not done is a tribute to Paulus. He froze. Guderian, Hoth, Rommel, not one of them would've froze.
Panzers are useless on defense. Why Paulus let them stay with the infantry is a complete mystery. You would've expected Hube to be howling.
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"Hitler took hours to reply: 6th Army could break out, he said, but it
still had to hold existing fronts north, east, and west of the city.
This was manifestly impossible. Paulus now showed his moral cowardice.
He informed Manstein that his one hundred tanks had enough fuel to go only twenty miles. Before he could move, air deliveries had to bring in 4,000 tons of fuel. There was no possibility of this, and Paulus knew it.
Drawn between Hitler demanding he stay and Manstein demanding he move, Paulus clutched at the straw of fuel to do nothing. Not even to save his army was Paulus going to buck his Fuehrer. Yet he and Manstein knew that the fuel could have been allocated to half his tanks, giving them mobility for forty miles—enough to break through.
In the week that followed, the fate of 6th Army was decided. For six
days Army Group Don had run every conceivable risk to keep the door open. But Manstein could leave 4th Panzer Army in its exposed position no longer."
https://weaponsandwarfare.com/2016/05/04/manstein-saves-the-army/
Paulus has many detractors.
IMHO, Paulus and his panzers had to squeeze the trigger way back in November -- before the ring was closed. The infantry had to stay put.
Somehow, Paulus and von Manstein didn't see the strategic need to stay on the Volga as a war-winning -- and ending -- move.
It's just that you didn't need the panzers staying inside the pocket to block the Volga.
If put back in full supply, the 24p, 16p, 29m, 3m, 14p would've shredded the Red Army. Its lead elements were light infantry. They didn't even have heavy weapons. That stuff was so difficult to move that it took days to get it across the Volga and up to the front.
The Volga's river ice has to be seen to be believed. It's one compression ridge after another.
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Someone should've told the Luftwaffe that most of the fuel in air flight is used to come to altitude.
Instead of landing their Ju-52s and the occasional Go-244 and He-111 (the Luftwaffe did some crazy stuff) they should've just parachuted the goods down to the boys.
I read somewhere that one T-34 brigade was sent straight across the steppe to a Luftwaffe base that was supporting this airlift. He tore the place up, so the story goes, and was given the medal: Hero of the Soviet Union.
If anyone knows the truth about this tale, speak up.
The plane in TIK's video that's all shot up looks like a likely victim of a ground attack, perhaps the one I've read of.
The story went that the brigade caught the Germans totally by surprise and that the tanks just rolled down the flight line shooting everything up with machine gun fire. The Germans were so far to the rear, that they assumed that they were safe. They'd not even put up a perimeter defense of any kind. The base didn't even have ground troops.
That was the story.
&&&
TIK, when you're talking such huge plane numbers, one has to ask: Where could the Luftwaffe station such a large fleet?
The typical Luftwaffe air strip was a tiny operation able to handle less than 40 planes.
Further, just hauling avgas to the various bases would've been a first class bitch. The German rail head stopped at the Dieper. ( European gauge) Then they humped the goods across that river by truck. ( a 100,000 prisoner operation I've read ) and either trucked it all the way, or -- if lucky -- transferred the goods onto Russian scaled flat cars for further transit.
If anyone knows more about the zany German logistical solutions for Case Blue -- this is the place to pipe up.
I've read nothing but conflicting tales: trucks all the way or trucks to steam locomotive trains east of the Dnieper. I'm corn fused.
But, I'm convinced that this is a big part of why Case Blue went totally off the rails. (Heh)
The Nazis just couldn't afford to burn that much motor fuel... but they tried... anyway.
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@Worthian
The Ju-52 had EVERYTHING going against it.
The DC-3// C-47 was adopted virtually world-wide by 1938 -- and was the obvious choice for the Luftwaffe. But the Nazis wouldn't have it.
Hungary already had built DC-3s under license, BTW. Their version used Daimler liquid cooled motors -- essentially the same ones needed by the BF-109. When the war came, further access to these engines ended. The total run of Hungarian DC-3s was tiny, BTW. You'll only find them as a footnote.
Airliners of the period did not have cabin pressurization. IIRC Howard Huges brought that into being with his Lockheed machine.
What this meant in practice was that airliners// cargo planes just didn't fly above 12,000 feet. ( The average Joe is going to need oxygen once you pass 15,000 feet. Some Sherpas can take it, but not the average guy. )
The USAAF produced a training film for heavy bomber crews compelled to face German FLAK.
( FLAK = AA or AAA depending upon the period. During WWII the major combatants started adding radar control to their AA -- with the British leading the way -- just as you'd expect. All British advances were kept top secret, so don't expect to find any contemporary documents until well after the Cold War was over. )
In this USAAF film it is asserted that -- at working altitudes -- pilots must assume that 1,000 feet of altitude buys them one-second of FLAK flight-time. The Luftwaffe was so proficient -- with all the practice the USAAF was giving them -- that they could project// predict where the bomber stream would be if they stayed on a given heading for more than X seconds -- with X = (feet in altitude) / 1,000)
What this meant in practice was that Ju-52 and C-47 had to jink all over the sky every few seconds.
This reality goes a long way towards why USAAF pilots were staining their underwear June 6, 1944. They were WAY too low, and were not permitted to jink. The experience of flying through a fire storm of FLAK just has to be experienced to be believed.
One of my old business pals was the SINGLE most off track 82nd paratrooper on the night of June 6, 1944. He was Lieutenant in charge of his plane. His pilot was so whacked out that that he couldn't bring himself to punch the GREEN light. This led this particular stick of paratroops to land right in the middle of the 17SS Motorized Division. He fluttered down straight into a motorized company of SS men, with lights ablazing. If you grab a map, then you realize that my man was dozens of miles south of his drop-zone. He had to surrender before he even hit France.
[ Events have reached the absurd when an entire SS company is surrounding one lieutenant in the middle of a French wheat field. Gavin mentioned my pal in his tome: "On to Berlin." Yes, they met. Gavin chuckled that "Al" had won the booby prize. He was an instant legend among captured American paras, BTW. ]
Later as a PoW he was put on starvation rations. That's where the German guards threw out three potatoes to a hundred prisoners. That was chow time.
In the days immediately preceding his liberation by the Red Army, his pals were fed nothing. The German supply system had broken down. Even the guards were not getting their proper rations. (!!!) All of the roads had become clogged with fleeing German citizens -- all headed west.
Al never had a nice thing to say about the German prison system. He felt that "Stalag 17" got everything wrong, too light.
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@Whitpusmc
The Soviets were getting staggering amounts of FREE economic inputs for their war economy on top of weapons systems transfers.
Avgas
Explosives
Lubricants ( industrial cutting fluids + the stuff you're thinking of )
Signals cables ( ie phone lines )
Copper
Steam Locomotives
Rails, too
Machine tools ( the most sophisticated ones, at that )
Tungsten Carbide bits -- from USA and Sweden -- the latter bought with gold by the USA. These are the REAL reason for the Soviet production miracle.
Medical supplies of all types
Military food -- ie rations suitable for mobile operations
Tanks, planes, trucks, ...
Tires, rubber hoses of every type,
100% of Russia's radio tubes. (!!!!!)
All of the above was FREE and in epic quantity.
Oil drilling rigs + drilling tool bits
Critical oil refining technology -- especially high tech catalysts
Atomic secrets and example materials suitable to clone America's plutonium production reactors at Hanford in Washington State. Obviously, the blue prints were sent over, too. Materials without instructions would be largely worthless. These shipments were duly listed circa 2000AD -- and posted to the Internet by Russian college kids. They had access to the astounding database of LendLease transfers -- but did not know the significance of the atomic materials, even though they were highlighted as 'atomic materials.' Only an atomic scientist// technician would realize their import.
Yeah, I fell out of my chair. Klaus Fuchs could never have sent these materials to Moscow. ONLY FDR and Harry Hopkins had that level of authority. Even traitor J. Robert Oppenheimer couldn't export atomic technology.
Yes, he was the Primary traitor, giving Uncle Joe every imaginable atomic secret. JRO was the ONLY person in the entire Manhattan project who could go anywhere, see anything, know everything. For everyone else, knowledge was compartmentalized. JRO didn't trust FDR. That was his motivation. Oh, the irony.
[ Of course, Harry Hopkins, traitor, sent these on their merry way. FDR let Harry stand in for himself when he was feeling tired. By 1944, Harry was busy, indeed. Harry's private diary makes it plain that he was a Bolshevik, himself, a real True Believer. These sentiments were kept hidden from the nation for fifty-years after WWII ended. ]
Tail-gunner Joe was right: FDR infested our national government with Stalinists.
Today that role has been replayed by 0bomba -- who has slotted CAIR operatives all through our Government. The effect is the same as before. We are naked to our enemies.
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@ ger du
You'd think so, wouldn't you?
Once back in full supply, the panzer troops would've had a field day mowing down Soviet infantry that simply could not dig fox holes in ground frozen so solid.
Remember that their heavy weapons are still sitting on the east side of the Volga until the river is made 'truck worthy.' This entails a brutal slog of dynamited ice peaks followed by spot re-flooding to create extra thickness and a flatter, sweeter ice bed for the trucks -- and their brittle tires. At the temperatures involved, any sharp ground// ice will ruin a truck tire -- instantly.
[ A hole must be bored though the ice so that cold water can be pumped up and over -- sprayed like you'd make snow for skiers on a mountainside. This snow is then compacted -- as if it were asphalt -- until the ice-road is both strong and sweet. This process takes days to pull off. The Volga south of Stalingrad is just huge. Think: Mississippi, Rhine, Vistula, Waal, lower Thames.
While all of this was going on, the Germans are shelling the engineers performing this work. Crossing even further down river would've made encirclement all the more difficult... and require even more troops... a lot more.]
The Germans were to discover JUST how frozen solid that ground was when they had to pull back and set a new defense.
1) You either started a bonfire and thawed the ground, which would be quite a trick on the treeless open steppe...
2) Or you blasted the earth with howitzers pointed down. This craft was first performed during WWI. It was something that Adolf Hitler knew all about -- and recommended to his generals. You do have to watch your step and it is laborious. But, at least you'll end up with some sort of hole in the ground.
Ammo consumption goes crazy, though.
This method had best be done before Winter really sets in. When that happens, you may find that you need five shots to get any decent depth. The early attempts just about bounce off the dirt.
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@Alexander
Wrong.
American LendLease was already kicking in and influencing the Eastern Front by September 1942.
The Germans were giggling and laughing when they captured American jeeps at Stalingrad, still strapped to flat cars, still in USA markings, at that time, in the very beginning of the assault of the city proper.
Boston bombers* (A-20) were already actively frustrating Army Group A on its way to Baku. The Red Air Force instantly fell in love with this light bomber and used it to attack German bridging attempts and supply columns during the Summer of 42.
(That'd be a great title for a period military film for the Caucuses Campaign.)
(*) Boston bomber was the British slang for this machine. It was also labelled the Havoc by the USAAF. Thousands were sent to Russia.
LendLease aid was ESSENTIAL to the Soviet victory against Case Blue, aka Uranus.
The Americans rolled up and trans-shipped military grade land-lines to the USSR. (Western Electric// Bell Telephone) It was these cables that kept STAVKA in control of events while blinding Gehlen as to what was going on. Just as at el Alamein, the radio net was used to fake out the Germans. The Reds stopped using their command radios for their original purpose. Instead, phoney radio activity was used to totally spoof the German B'dienst teams. They lulled the Krauts to sleep.
This rush shipment of land-lines was so hush-hush that they travelled by oral command -- and were flown in. ( The first American - Soviet LendLease link was by way of Alaska to Siberia. This explains the crazed tempo of the ALCAN Highway construction.)
The land-line cables discussed here were removed from American infantry divisions only days after they arrived -- on the QT -- on the down low -- and without paperwork. We only know any of this because, more than half-a-century after the events, ancient GIs have detailed all of this because they, personally, did the work. They were signals troops.
The demand for these land-lines was so intense that the mobilisation of American formations was delayed for almost a full year. It took that long for Western Electric to 're-wire' the Soviet armies. They had priority.
American land-lines were the magic secret that faked out the Germans twice: el Alamein and Uranus. I would posit that they were significant military events... and they happened in 1942.
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@LtBrown
For anyone curious as to what is entailed in making an ice bridge, check out "Ice Road Truckers."
Keep in mind that the American & Canadian truckers are crossing virtual mill ponds versus the mighty Volga.
During the annual freeze-up the Volga cascades relentless compression ridges -- each much taller than a commercial truck. They start out looking nothing too spectacular -- and then they just build and compound away. By the end, they look like the scene from "Superman II", the movie, where the man of steel has his abode in a crystal palace of ice shards. Superman has much better house-keeping, that's for sure.
Even Lake Ladoga was a piece of cake compared to the Volga.
The Red Army had combat engineers hopping all over the southern wing of the Uranus advance. Getting down, across, and up the Volga bank was a first class bitch. It's the reason that the German army thought twice about marching eastward to encircle Stalingrad, something that most cardboard generals would've thought of straight off.
The northern wing of Uranus was LONG. You were still crossing major rivers, but at least the crossings were east and north of the battle front. Still, the Reds had to hide their logistical preparations where they crossed such obvious channel points.
The Germans arrogantly assumed that the Soviets just couldn't do something that the Germans couldn't do. It's a fact of WWII, the Reds, the Brits and the Yanks schooled the German army on logistics -- and the dullards never picked up on the craft.
Once the Red army was across the Don, it still had to contend with peasant tankers who only knew how to beat a burrow// ass. The reason that the T-34s had epic failure rates turned largely on the astounding ignorance of its drivers -- and crews generally.
The contrast with the USA Armored Corps was night and day. The typical American tanker had been in his Sherman for about two years before it was sent into battle. ( 2nd, 3rd, 4th Armored, especially ) The result was that once they got away from head to head tank shots, they ran wild all over every German formation -- including Panther battalions. Even the pop-gun 75mm would destroy Panthers from the side or rear. This became the standard mode of counter-attack. Panthers were just mobbed. StgIII and Mark IV were at even greater hazard. This is why no German panzer attack really got rolling against the Americans. They needed to punch 'clean air' -- a tank-free seam.
During the Bulge, the 7th Armored and 10th Armored just ruined things for the Germans. Within days, Joachim Pieper's unstoppable panzers were stopped.
It never happened, but if Shermans and T-34s met, the Shermans would've utterly destroyed their opponents. The T-34 had about HALF the glacis armor of the Sherman, while their guns were rather similar in penetration. The Sherman would've been five times as reliable. So after but a few days of combat, there would've been no T-34s left. Most would 've been abandoned due to running gear issues.
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@Neil
Your line of argumentation is weird.
1) Ju-52s are TRI motors -- although I'd agree that they follow the stats for modern single engine reciprocating aircraft.
The ONLY salient point to modern readers is that the Ju-52 fleet had to fly OUT, land, take OFF, and Land on one fuel load.
That's brutal even now, let alone back in late '42.
This equation was last seen during the Berlin Airlift... and at least the Red Air Force was not shooting down USAF/ RAF machines.
( France was a joke at the time. )
2) The BIG issue for the Luftwaffe was that they couldn't easily avoid Soviet FLAK: 76.2mm guns -- and the occasional 85mm gun.
Either one was more than able to rip the Ju-52 to pieces.
These FLAK batteries were relevant because the Luftwaffe quickly determined that they couldn't get into the kessel during daylight.
Which rather stands to reason: most of the 24 hours available were in the dark in the first place.
The number of Luftwaffe pilots able to fly at night, navigate at night, was VERY much less than the total of pilots in the ranks.
This latter fact does not get much mention, BTW.
When you add up all the risks, the damages, the kessel was destroying he Luftwaffe. The Germans were not losing the average pilot, they were losing he very elite pilots.
This was all compounded during the Spring of '43. You'd scarcely believe the Lufwaffe fatalities when the weather broke.
The Red Air Force had been TRANSFORMED.
It was now receiving AMAZING amounts of British ( think Iranian ) and American avgas.
Yes, yes, the British, British Petroleum, were shunting astounding amounts of avgas up from the Persian Gulf once the rail lines were squared away.
Even before Uranus, the USA was shipping astounding amounts of LendLease aid: jeeps, tanks, -- the WORKS.
It's FALSE that LendLease kicked in only after Kursk.
LendLease was RESPONSIBLE for BOTH Uranus and Kursk.
The flood had already started.
1942 LendLease reached astounding figures -- from the start.
It just kept intensifying as the war years rolled on.
This causes moderns to miss the astounding impact of LendLease.
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Fortunately it's not that far. All that the panzers have to do is beat Soviet infantry marching across the snow on foot.
1) The lead elements had no heavy weapons until days passed.
2) The pincers didn't close up until THREE days passed. You might run some calculations as to how much faster a Mark III tank is versus a bunch of ground pounders.
3) The supply echelon would chase down the westward panzers, there can be no doubt about that.
4) The T34s coming down from the north have to cover twice as much ground -- and are racing AWAY from their supply echelon.
5) During this race, the panzer can pretty much stay right on their own supply trails// roads if you want to call them that.
6) The departure of the panzers would take with them as many soldiers as could reasonably ride on top -- just for the shear joy of escaping the pocket. Expect many volunteers.
7) No small number of the panzers would be half-tracks -- which are absolute death for light infantry. They're more deadly than Mark III panzers. They pack more machine guns and have better visibility. They also don't do so bad with fuel consumption.
8) In the actual campaign, Paulus sent the panzer regiments up to fight -- in a swirl -- with T34s -- northward. BIG mistake. They needed to race away from the Soviets and then shield their own supply echelon. Going all the way to Rostov was merely a term of art, as it would be expected that the supply stream would meet the panzers some place around the Chir river// or Kalach.
9) The 11th Panzer was located to the west of 6th Army and would've been very able to hook up with the 14th Panzer Corps or 24th Panzer Corps or both.
10) The key thing being that panzers are virtually worthless on defense. Their mobility is their number one asset.
( Kind of the same with helicopters, and helicopter troops. If they stay
put, they get shot to chit. )
As for your estimate of the fuel available to the panzers at start: wrong.
Those numbers came from Paulus AFTER he'd burned through their gasoline supply chasing off to the north, and then wheeling back into the pocket. (!!!) Most accounts omit the fact that this is what Paulus & Company did in the days prior to the pocket being sealed up. Yes, they went up and back -- back into the Stalingrad pocket. (!!!) This one pointless chase burned up the very fuel that would've permitted all of them to escape to the west.
That's called BAD leadership. NO WAY would Guderian, Rommel, Hoth, ... bring panzers back into a kessel, an obvious kessel.
The panzers had to break out BEFORE they were breaking out: BEFORE the Soviets ringed them in. The closure took THREE DAYS. The panzers could've shot out in less than six-hours. Paulus didn't even post sentries// observation posts to his rear. Yes, the Red Army advanced all that way ON FOOT without Paulus realizing what was unfolding. He really was surprised when the ring was closed. Even then, the panzers could've shot through it -- because the Russians had no anti-tank weapons of any kind. They couldn't even dig fox-holes in that cold weather.
( When the Germans retreated out of their fox-holes -- they couldn't dig replacement holes further back and in, either. )
None of the Soviet weapons and positions you posit were in place until a week had passed. Getting anything across the Volga, the southern wing, was a bitch and a half. The Soviets had to use dynamite to blow the ice ridges out of the way so as to finally have a truck route. Yeah, that process took days. All the longer because the Germans were shelling them at the time. (They were crossing that close to Stalingrad. The Russians had their own logistical nightmare on the east side of the Volga, too. )
To make things short: your thesis lies bleeding, wait, it's dead.
So sad.
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