Comments by "Sean Cidy" (@seancidy6008) on "[Barbarossa] The Major Errors and Blunders - Or why Barbarossa Failed" video.

  1. The Major Error seems to be military subordination to and faith in the government: implementing Hitler's decision with the resources made available and doing so in the expectation of success although Russia was too big and well armed for the German force that Hitler tasked with conquering it. That is what I think what MHV is saying. However, the encirclements that the early German campaigning in Barbarossa enjoyed was substantially due to having the element of surprise over stand their ground Soviets (no Soviet plan to fall back to defensible lines along rivers) which would have been lost with more thorough preparations than the ones the Germany army actually did make. Whether there was any real blunder is unclear; it might well have been telegraphing Barbarossa much too early to have something as ponderous and difficult to conceal as an enlarging and reequipping of the German army. Hitler fooled Stalin and gave his army the best chance, they were careful not to waste that advantage. While the argument that a non-diverted drive on Moscow would have had its flank exposed to the strong Soviet forces unmolested in the south is a very tenable one, that is precisely why after some wargaming there was an Army Group South (and North) incorporated into the original Barbarossa plan. Army Group South had the job of preserving the flank of Army Group Centre's drive on Moscow. So the Soviets in the South would have been moving to fighting on a second and reversed front when they attacked German Army Group Centre's drive on Moscow. At this stage of the war the Soviets were much worse in offensive mobile operations than when defending ground, where they could use artillery. Lastly, a relentless drive on Moscow was not actually made although every German military professional was of the opinion that it ought to be. We can say a German offensive such as Stolfi postulated would in the event have probably gone the Moscow defenders' way, but you cannot say it certainly would have because Germany lost the war without trying that stratagem. Hence, there remains a possibility that going straight at Moscow, as not merely Guderian but Von Bock wanted to, might have succeeded. It follows therefore that swiftly going straight at Moscow with all of Army Group Centre offered the only possible chance of victory at that stage of the war, and ought to have been tried. Both Hitler and some of his generals share the blame. For an objective of Nazi Germany becoming a World Power, Hitler after having made the big decision for a rapid conquering of European Russia by surprise attack on the USSR, should have then deferred to the Army's judgment on how to do it. In the summer of 1941, Germany's Generals should have presented a united unwavering demand for a concentration of all of Army Group Centre's resources on attacking Moscow ASAP.
    1