Comments by "" (@danieleyre8913) on "Churchill was an idiot" video.
-
12
-
10
-
10
-
9
-
7
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@leojohn1615 LOL at your authoritative tone, as if you’re in any position to mouth-off what the French army of 100-85 years ago should have done (especially given your simpleton appreciation of events).
It is an irrefutable and well known fact that France suffered from chronic manpower shortages since from the end of the First World War, that’s why they had to recruit men from the African colonies and force older reservists, many of them veterans of the First World War by then in their 40s, back into “Series B” divisions.
Germany’s GDP in 1939 was close to 140 billion dollars whilst France’s was only 105 billion and the UK’s was 120 billion. Germany no more imported materials than France and the UK did (LoL what natural resources are in the British isles?).
At least France actually prepared themselves for any future major war!
The French just weren’t in any position to mount any offensives against Germany, they didn’t have enough mobile forces, not enough ammunition supplies & reserves, not enough heavy weapons, not enough modern weapons, and not enough men. They weren’t going to be in any position until at least 1941. And actually the French did recognise by 1938 that advances in automotive technology called for a change in doctrines and for an army based more on mass concentration of mobile forces and medium tanks (hence the SOUMA S36 tank), but it’s hard to change an existing large army overnight, especially when your industry keeps faltering.
Your ideas about history are frankly just laughable. Especially your idea that the French stopped advancing becuase they were afraid of casualties (yeah, right!) or that the Germans “decided to go around the Maginot line because they lacked forces” (ahahah ah no).
1
-
@leojohn1615 What are YOUR sources? The history channel?!
You don’t understand macroeconomics and it is frankly hilarious how you continue this when you clearly don’t know much.
Of course the French were adapting to a more mobile form of warfare, they had guys like GLM Brocard, Christian Bruneau, Charles de Gaulle, ACE Bruché in their army. Two proper armoured divisions based around a core of tanks, Division Cuirassée or DCR, were formed in January 1940, with a third formed in March and the fourth (commanded by de Gaulle) that formed-up on the 10th of May, literally on the day the Germans invaded, and the first of the three to form with proper medium tanks instead of improvising a mix of B1 infantry tanks and some light cruiser tanks.
The French had also had 2 light armoured divisions, formed in the 1930s and another formed in February 1940, based around a core of light cruiser tanks with supporting motorised infantry. The first 3 Panzer divisions were of a similar composition until literally the months leading up to the Invasion of Poland.
You seem to think that the entire French army sat in the Maginot Line or something. And the French manpower shortages are well documented, it is hilarious how you are doubling down on that and says a lot about you as a person.
And the Germans could import and borrow from whoever they liked before the war and that includes during the Sudetenland crisis that you imagine the French should have attacked during.
As for the German general doubts; you’re unsurprisingly confused. German generals, including Heinz Guderian himself, were worried and skeptical once Hitler adopted Manstein’s plan for a risky mass manoeuvre through the Ardennes, a crossing at Sedan and then using the concentration of armour for flaking the best French forces that would advance into Belgium. And they were right to, as this plan was highly risky and its success was on an extremely thin margin that was almost a failure.
Not that it was even relevant to bring up. As the question was about a possible massive French offensive, not the German offensive.
1
-
@leojohn1615 And once again: You haven’t provided any sources for your funny claims first!
Anyone who has actually read up on France during the war knows about the issues they had with compiling supplies, as much as they would know about their manpower shortages. But of course; doing that would require something more than just a vapid judgment call so it wouldn’t suit you.
And actually; the manpower shortage in France in the 30s wasn’t that far from where Germany was towards the end of the war, they were both resorting to men over 35 years old. The French just weren’t immoral like the Nazis and didn’t start conscripting teenagers.
But that was an idiotic thing for you to mention anyway as we are not talking about the late war, we are talking about the late 1930s when Germany had large manpower reserves and when you think that France could have destroyed Nazi Germany with a military offensive.
And yes, by simply thinking that it all came down to GDP and that combined GDP is some advantage proves you have no understanding of macroeconomics. Here’s something you should know; the nation with the biggest GDP in 1939 was the USSR. And the GDP of the USA in 1939 was slightly smaller than France’s. Yet which nation ended up supplying its allies with ample war material again?
The French army high command DID embrace mobile warfare and independent armoured formations. De Gaulle was treated as one of the forefront thinkers by French leadership, you must be American to believe the myth of otherwise. The French had begun mechanisation first of anyone, before Germany. They actually had the first independent light armoured division in 1935. They just never got around to upgrading it to a full armoured division.
The French military was let down by its industry’s inability to supply them. They didn’t form stand-alone armoured divisions until later in 1940 (less than a year after Germany managed) because they couldn’t as they didn’t yet have the material to. The French military and French government didn’t have control over their industry, and France was not some totalitarian dictatorship like Germany where the Government could step in and take control to get what they needed.
And that “and we know how that went” really shows up your lack of critical thinking and general ignorance. The Dyle plan was a sound plan, and seeing as it didn’t sink in the first time; the German plan was highly risky and almost came to a massive catastrophe for them and really got through on a lot of luck going their way. The German crossing at Sedan succeeded against all odds (thanks to some fortunate timing of fighter air patrols and lucky artillery barrages) and the replacement of Gamelin with Weygand fatally delayed the French counter offensive intending to cut-off the German armoured spearheads by two days. But of course the deployments and movements of large armies is beyond your comprehension zone.
And this deriding French leadership as “incompetent” again debunks your belief that they could have launched an offensive against Germany during the Sudetenland crisis.
And furthermore; the “schwerpunkt” totally mobile warfare mostly used by Nazi Germany, and not adopted by anyone else, isn’t the best nor the one and only way to fight a war as you seem to imagine. After all; Germany did end up losing the war, and the gamble in France came very close to total catastrophe for the Germans. The overall doctrines only suited Germany with its massive industrial base to produce armoured vehicles and artillery pieces but manpower inferiority to the Soviets and allies overall. It could not have worked for Italy nor Japan with their much smaller industrial bases & inability to produce armoured vehicles, and the Japanese grand battleplan & infiltration based doctrines worked well enough without the massive material and fuel demands. It did eventually stutter against Soviet doctrines based around defence in depth, mass assault, deep operations, and over large fronts. And it became decreasingly effective in general over the course of the war, with the British Grand battleplan approach and the US superior firepower approach increasingly being able to handle it.
Your earlier claim that it was mimicked by all armies post war is total nonsense. It was studied and included in the possible doctrines of NATO, particularly the “firebrigade” mobile defence, which was judged the best way to stall a possible Soviet invasion of Western Europe until American reinforcements arrived. But it was not adopted for operation’s beyond NATO with the USA sticking to superior firepower doctrines in Korea & Vietnam and the British and French sticking to grand planned battles in all their wars. And it was not adopted by any communist block country, who instead used soviet style mass assault and defence in depth doctrines,a en the Chinese sticking with human wave doctrines.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1