Comments by "John Lucas" (@johnlucas8479) on "Imperial War Museums"
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@lyndoncmp5751 Show how the FAAA which includes the Air Force Component could have move to France in August. 9th US TCC would need 14 Airfields each capable of handling 4 Squadrons and RAF 8 Airfield capable of handling 2 Squadrons when the 2nd British TAF had trouble moving 2 Groups forwarded in August."
Ritchie, Sebastian. Arnhem: Myth and Reality (p. 214)
"After Falaise, the Allied ground forces drove flat out across northern France while Second TAF, through no fault of their own, were left massively overcommitted to northern Normandy. Coningham was compelled to adopt the most radical measures in order to ensure that at least some of his squadrons kept up with the advance of Montgomery’s more forward units. It was decided that not more than three forward operational airfields should be used at any one time. Certain Wings were left behind temporarily and their transport used to move petrol and ammunition to the forward Wings … There was not sufficient time to construct airfields to keep pace with the advance. Therefore captured airfields were cleared of mines and booby traps and were reconditioned as soon as possible up to the minimum standards acceptable for fighter bombers. Air lift for the carriage of personnel and equipment was used whenever possible, and the forward airfields were moved by bounds each of approximately 100 miles … The rapidity of the advance was such as to make it largely impossible to provide more than a meagre scale of landline communications, and it was only by the use of the [insecure] radio telephone circuits that it was possible to obtain the necessary speech communications … The Airfield Construction Groups RE [Royal Engineers], which were only 50% mobile when fully established, were assisted by a pool of vehicles obtained from other [RAF] Airfield Construction Groups which were immobilized for the purpose, in order to keep them working on the repair of enemy airfields as far forward as possible … Night reconnaissance Wellington aircraft of No 34 Strat/R Wing had to be employed, during this period, for ferrying petrol to their forward airfield in order to keep the other two squadrons in the air. {7 AIR 20/1593, report by Air Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham on operations carried out by Second Tactical Air Force from D-Day 6 June 1944, to VE Day, 9 May 1945, pp. 22–23.}"
So, taking into account 2nd TAF experience you still think that there was sufficient capacity on the continent to accommodate the transports and Gliders by 10th September.
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@lyndoncmp5751 Believe what you what to believe about the movement to the continent was possible. Yes, with enough determination, time and resource anything is possible.
But:
The earliest the move could have taken place was after the cross Seine which only occurred on 18th - 20th August by 3rd US Army and 25th - 28th by British and Canadians.
As Brereton identify the areas north and northeast of Paris as best possible location of FAAA. So, what was time available for the move by FAAA to the continent.
During the period 25th August to 17th September the following Operation were proposed with the start date and proposed D-day. Operation Linnet 1 25th August Planning Started - D-day 3rd Sept or Linnett 2 Sept Planning Started 1 D-Day 4th Sept, Comet 3rd Sept Planning Started D-Day 8th Sept, Market Garden 10th Sept Planning started D-day 17th Sept.
Other operations that did not get pass the planning stage in early sept, Naples 1, Naples 2, Milan 1 Milan 2, (Operations in support of 1st US Army) Choker 1 and 2 (3rd US Army)
Why the move may have been possible in theory if the 22 airfields (the airfields would require concrete runways and tarmacs) could have been made available and all the equipment (including the transportation of all the Gliders and spare parts), supplies, workshops-hangers, fuel storage facilities, and camp sites for the 6 Airborne Divisions in place. However, it would require a period were no operation were proposed, because the planning staff could either plan and execute the move or plan operations. Once an operation is in the planning stage it would be impossible to move the FAAA as all the aircraft and Gliders would need to be service, Airborne Division equipment check, supplies organised. Planning by the airborne divisions of how they going to achieve their objectives. Finally, movement of the troops from their camps to the airfields.
Also, the 9th TCC was also used to fly in supplies to forwarded Armies when they were not grounded in preparation of an airborne operation.
Knowing how thorough you are research a topic before you express an opinion, I assume you when through the following process before you stated the move was possible.
The process:
Stage 1: Calculating the number of truck and or trains needed, and the time required to move FAAA (6 Divisions and 72 Squadrons) from their existing bases to ports for embarkation.
Stage 2: Calculating the amount of shipping and time required to load the FAAA
Stage 3: Depending on the dates only Mulberry B (Cherbourg had limited capacity from late July to mid-August) would be available for disembarkation and unloading of equipment, so you would have calculation the time required.
Stage 4: Once unload calculate the time and number of trucks need to move FAAA from Normandy to their new bases in North, Northeast France.
Have summed up the time need and taking into account the timing of the various operations and supply missions you work out the dates that the move could have been made that would not have causes a problem if any of the proposed operations went live or impacted on the supply missions.
For completeness as both Mulberry B, Cherbourg (after mid-August) and transports companies in France would be working close to 100% capacity you would also workout how many Infantry Divisions or Armoured Divisions or Supplies (Especially ammunitions) or a combined of all three that would historically be moved to France would have to make way to allow the FAAA to move to France.
You would also factor in Montgomery reaction and approval to FAAA priority in movement orders over additional Infantry and Armoured formation as well as supplies.
Based on the outcome of all of the above you conclusion the move was possible, I am interest in the dates you calculated the move could have occurred, or your conclusion the move was possible is based solely gut feel as a way of criticizing Brereton.
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@stephenmccartneyst3ph3nm85 I wonder how successful a daytime Pegasus style glider drop would be, when you consider at Nijmegen the bridge was surrounded 29 88mm AA guns plus a number of 20mm AA Guns (Source: Puts Us Down in Hell (combat History of the 508th PIR) by Phil Nordyke). With H-hour set for 1300 hours on the 17th a predawn Pegasus style attack would give the Germans at least 6 hours warning of an attack on the bridges.
Also how do you know the Nijmegen bridge was undefended? I have the following sources:
Robin Neillands "The Battle for the Rhine" page 109Has the following statement "It was until 1830 hours That warren send a force into Nijmegen. This force somewhat small just one rifle platoon say 40 men. They were to check on Dutch reports that there were only 19 Men at The Bridge"
Phil Nordyke on page 275-6 describe the movement of that Patrol and on page 276 "The firing altered a German machine gun position down the street which open fire pinning down the patrol." On page 287 "Upon arriving in Nijmegen, Grabner reported by radio that he had not seen any enemy paratroopers during the journey. At Nijmegen he found troops of Kampfgruppe Henke in control of the city and the two bridges. Page 288 Oberst Henke was organizing a defensive perimeter around the highway and rail bridges a dispatched a number of squad size units in outposts in order to provide an early warning of any movement by paratroopers into Nijmegen.
Then you got It "Never Snows in September: The German View of Market-Garden and the Battle of Arnhem pages 96-97"
"As news spread in Nijmegen about airborne landings south of the city, Colonel Henke, commanding a spare Fallschirmjaeger Training Regiment staff headquarters, was ordered to co-ordinate the necessary measures to safeguard the two bridges crossing the Waal in Nijmegen. Henke ‘alarmed’ all in situ local forces and took them under command. Kampfgruppe ‘Henke’. It was a force numbering some 750 men. Nijmegen was a city covering 5 to 6 km of urban sprawl. Only limited sectors could be covered. Henke decided therefore to concentrate his forces in two bridgeheads south of the road and rail bridges. They were difficult objectives to secure, because the Waal river is nearly 300 metres wide at this point. A string of defended early-warning outposts was established at the southern edge of the city, manned by small sections of 8 to 10 soldiers. Two traffic circles 1,000 metres south-east and south-west of the bridges – the Kaizer Karel Plein and Kaizer Lodewijk Plein – provided the initial focal points for the defence. Strong points were disposed around the bridges themselves, and established in the small village of Lent opposite on the north bank of the Waal, controlling access and providing observation over both bridges. Important buildings such as the Post Office were also occupied and fortified."
So which source is correct? Clearly, with a force of 750 men at the bridge you cannot say the bridge was undefended.
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@lyndoncmp5751 You claim Montgomery had no authority over the Air Plan, yet in his Memoirs he lists the reason for failure the second point Landing Zone he state "I should have ordered 2nd Army and 1st British Airborne Corp to arrange that at least one complete Parachute Brigade was drop quite close to the bridge, so that it could have been captured in a matter of minutes and its defence soundly orgainised with time to spare. I did not do so. " It would indicate Montgomery though he had the authority to order changes to the Air Plan
Other source
Buckley, John. Monty's Men : The British Army and the Liberation of Europe (pp. 213-214). Yale University Press. Kindle Edition.
"The key outcome of the 10 September meeting was the green light for MARKET GARDEN, eventually pencilled in for launch on 17 September. Detailed planning continued from 10 September onwards, but the scale of the operation and the multiple issues to be resolved undermined the plan more and more as the day of MARKET GARDEN approached. Brigadier Charles Richardson, Monty’s chief planning officer, claimed that 21st Army Group staff were simply handed the plan by Browning’s team and told by Montgomery to implement it. Perhaps the most debilitating shortcoming proved to be the air-power element of the plan. Although MARKET GARDEN involved a significant airborne element, there had been little immediate air staff involvement in putting the plan together. As problems with the airlift emerged, 21st Army Group staff, determined to make MARKET GARDEN a reality, rode roughshod over a series of related air-based problems, whilst air staff refused to budge on some fundamental aspects of the plan.
Montgomery did not become fully aware of this problem probably until 15 September, by which time it was far too late to change the plan. Insofar as Monty had failed to include the air staff properly in the planning process, this deficiency was self-inflicted and he was paying the price for this approach. Consequently, the input of air staff and any scope for shaping the plan accordingly were limited."
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@lyndoncmp5751
1) Explain then why Montgomerys emissary to Brereton failed to persuade Brereton to fly double missions on day one? Why didn't Montgomery simply order it? Why didn't Montgomery in his list of reason for the failure of the operation did not list the lack of a second lift on the 17th. He listed a) lack of resources, b) weather, c) location of the drop zones and d) II SS Panzer Corp, but no reference to a lack of second drop.
2) Explain why Montgomery didn't simply order Taylor of the 101st to expand his drop zone around Eindhoven instead of letting the matter lie after his idea was rejected by Taylor? From Operation Market Garden Now and Then page 24 "Major General Taylor the commander of Us 101st Airborne Division, protested against such extreme dispersion of his division and strongly supported by Brereton. No decision on the matter was reached at the Sunninghill Park meeting, but Brereton took the matter up with Montgomery who agreed after a rather sharp exchange of views to let the matter be settled by direct decision between General Taylor and Lieutenant General Dempsey, commander of Second Army. They meet at Montgomery headquarters on September 12. Since both were good diplomats and General Dempsey was confident that his army could slice through unaided as far as Eindhoven, they reach a solution. "Clearly Montgomery had the opportunity to order Taylor and Brereton to accept the plan but decided for reasons we will never know to allow Dempsey to make the final decision.
3) Please explain how, when Brereton rejected Montgomery's proposal of a paratroop operation on Walcheren Island, Montgomery had to accept it? From Chester Wilmot the struggle for Europe page 545 footnote 1 "The fact that there was so little firm, clear land on Walcheren made it impossible in the opinion of Leigh-Mallory and Brereton, to use airborne troops in the assault upon the island." Also, we have no details of what supporting operation Montgomery was proposing to support the airborne operation. The fact that RAF bombed the dykes on 3rd of October to flood the island and Operation started on 6th with the final assault on the island 31st October, the airborne force would not have survived.
Ritchie, Sebastian; Ritchie, Sebastian. Arnhem: Myth and Reality (p. 98).
"Montgomery did propose using the American airborne divisions in the Scheldt Estuary area in an assault on Walcheren Island, but Brereton raised a number of objections to this scheme. He maintained that plans were still under consideration to use the American divisions in the Aachen-Köln area ahead of US ground forces, that Walcheren’s flak defences were too heavy, that the island made a dangerously small parachute drop zone and that its terrain was unsuitable for glider landings. All of this was probably true, but it is also very likely that Brereton, his predominantly American staff and the US airborne divisional commanders were hoping to see their forces committed to a higher profile action, preferably in support of Bradley’s advance on Germany. In any event, whereas Montgomery’s scheme took for granted a rapid overland advance to Walcheren, which would have been essential to relieve the airborne, First Canadian Army in fact required the whole of October to clear the south and east of the estuary. If an airborne assault had been launched against the island in September, the consequences would have been catastrophic."
Also, Operation Comet was also proposed on the 4th by Montgomery with D-Day set for the 8th.
4) Please explain why, instead of consulting Brereton with the Market Garden plan for his agreement, he didn't simply order it to take place? The meeting that decided Operation Market Garden was between Montgomery, Dempsey and Browning. At no time did Montgomery approach Brereton about Market Garden before he meets with Eisenhower on the 10th September. So, when did Montgomery consult with Brereton about Market Garden?
4) on the 17th both Bomber Command and 8th US Air Force provided support for Market Garden, 2nd British TAF worked closely with 2nd Army providing CAS during Market Garden. So who ordered or requested the Air Force to provide the support to Market Garden?
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@thevillaaston7811
Yes, we been here before, yet you still pushing the line Montgomery had no control over the FAAA, as a reason Montgomery was not responsible for the operation. Yet he had the authority to cancel the operation if for any reason he felt the operation would not succeed. For example, Montgomery felt he needed the 2 lifts on the 17th to guarantee the success of the operation or he felt he lack the resources.
Point is Montgomery always had the final say if the operation was to proceed or be cancelled.
However due to the nature of airborne operation are subject to weather, clearly Brereton would need to decide if the weather conditions on D-day both over the bases and or the target area is suitable to conduct the airborne operation, similar to the meeting on the 4th June that decided to delay D-day from the 5th to 6th because of the adverse weather forecasts for the 5th but suitable conditions on the 6th, as amphibious operations are also subject to weather conditions.
Remember Operation Comet was initial postponed to the 9th due to adverse weather on the 8th It was only cancelled on the 9th. Image if the weather on the 8th was fine, Operation Comet would have gone ahead and there would have been no Operation Market Garden, no US involvement.
The question if the Market Force was unable to take-off on the 17th due to weather, would 2nd Army proceed with Garden alone? The answer is NO.
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@Bullet-Tooth-Tony- Tony the intelligence report for Nijmegen (Source Jeffson, Major Joel. Operation Market-Garden: Ultra Intelligence Ignored )
"The 82nd Airborne Division’s order on the eleventh is probably the most correct assessment of what was actually happening on the front than any other unit’s. The impressive thing about this is the limited amount of intelligence reporting sources they had compared to the units in the field. It is unknown what sources they used for their order, but they were supported by a Dutch liaison officer who may have been a conduit for Dutch Resistance reports that were discounted by the 21st Army Group. The 82nd also had the advantage of not being wedded to a plan and could, therefore, report what it thought was actually occurring at the front. In the general enemy situation section, the annex states, “There is no doubt that the enemy has made a remarkable recovery within the last few days, at any rate in the 21 Army Group Area.” In describing the German units in the area of operations, it is noted that a “broken” panzer division is reported in the vicinity of Arnhem and that it may yield up to fifty tanks. It also addresses 4,000 SS troops that are reportedly in Nijmegen after relocating from Amsterdam.{ 82nd Airborne Division, Annex 1c to Field Order No. 11.)"
Tony must people forget the reported presence of 4,000 SS Troops in Nijmegen. Gavin in his planning needed to take into account those SS Troops.
As to the bridge only be guarded by "When the 82nd landed there were literally just about a dozen German bridge guards,"
This is from Kershaw, Robert. It Never Snows in September: The German View of Market-Garden and the Battle of Arnhem, September 1944: The German View of Market-Garden and the Battle of Arnhem September 1944 (p. 98).
"SS-Captain Viktor Graebner, the 30-year-old Commander of the Hohenstaufen’s Reconnaissance Battalion, reached Elst, 9km north of Nijmegen, at about 1900 hours. In order to fulfil his mission of clearing Betuwe – the island – between Arnhem and Nijmegen, he dispersed his column on either side of the main road. Racing through villages and side roads, groups of armoured halftracks sought out units of enemy airlanded forces, but found nothing. Graebner himself radioed back 2 kilometres south of the Arnhem bridge that there was no sign of enemy. The column re-formed and gathered speed, driving toward Nijmegen. To their relief the approaches to the bridges were already occupied by Henke’s Kampfgruppe. Much of what subsequently happened is based upon conjecture supplemented."
The question which is difficult to answer due to conflicting or lack of information. If there was no delay who would have reach the bridge first. Warren and 1/508th battalion or Henke Kampfgruppe. Because if Henke arrived first, then there a strong possibility the Germans could have stop Warren from capturing the northern end of the Bridge in the same way they stop Frost capturing the southern end of Arnhem Bridge. The result a delay at Nijmegen, then who would be responsible.
At the end of the day without the information it's all speculation.
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@davemac1197
Warren, Dr. John C.. Airborne Operations In World War II, European Theater [Illustrated Edition] (p.153 -159).
Poulussen, R.G.. Lost at Nijmegen: A rethink on operation "Market Garden" (p. 75). R.G. Poulussen. Kindle Edition.
"First Battalion of the 508 PIR was ordered to do so, eventually. Around 1400, 1st Battalion marched off towards their objective, De Ploeg, some three miles away. Around 1600, they arrived there - without German opposition - and dug in. Around 1900, the order to go for the Waal Bridge came. Around 2100, "A" Company finally left and at midnight - ten hours after leaving the drop zone - encountered the first real opposition, in the middle of the city of Nijmegen."
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@Bullet-Tooth-Tony- Tony how are the Lorraine and Hurtgen Forest useless Operations.
If you look at Market Garden compared to Lorraine people love to quote for Market Garden 17,200 Allied losses to Lorraine 55,182. But if you compare Allied Losses to German Losses which in both cases difficult to get the true number but if we look at Wikipeda. For Market Garden at least 13,300 and Lorraine 75,000 were captured you would need to add killed and wounded.
Just on the numbers provided in a war of attrition Allied losses to German losses was 0.773 for Market Garden compared to Lorraine 1.359 clearly Patton's 3rd Army was wearing down the German Army fast in Lorraine than Market Garden.
As the German 5th Panzer Army at one point was involved in the Lorraine campaign before it was pulled out to be refitted for the Ardennes Offensive. The interesting question how its losses suffer in Lorraine campaign impact its performance during the Ardennes Offensive due to the quality of the replacements and whether it was able to fully replace all the equipment lost in Lorraine campaign.
Another point for ever division Germans sent to face Patton south of the Ardennes is one less division available to oppose either the US 1st Army or the British 2nd Army. You can look at Lorraine Campaign playing the same role in September to December as the British and Canadian played in the Normandy Campaign. To draw as many German divisions as possible to the south to assist the drives north of the Ardennes.
Part of US Official Report of the Lorraine Campaign
"Losses inflicted on the German forces in Lorraine were high. Although the number of Germans killed and wounded cannot be determined with any degree of exactness, it is known that at least 75,000 prisoners passed through the Third Army cages during the Lorraine operation. It is impossible to give any reasonably accurate statement of German losses in tanks, guns, and vehi cles. During September the enemy had amassed the greatest number of ar mored fighting vehicles that he was to employ against the Third Army at any time in the Lorraine Campaign. The tank losses sustained by the German armored brigades and divisions in the September battles had been much higher than those inflicted on the American armored formations. In November and December, however, American tank losses incurred in the course of the slow advance through the Lorraine mud probably were considerably higher than those of the enemy. The damage and destruction inflicted on German trans port and artillery by the Third Army and the XIX Tactical Air Command were very much greater than that visited by enemy action on the Third Army. "
So do you still think the Lorraine Campaign was a useless operation.
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@stephenmccartneyst3ph3nm85 You talk about the bridge held by just 20 men. It depends on the sources you read. Below are a number of source and their description of the size of force at the bridge.
Robert Kershaw It Never Snows in September: The German View of Market-Garden and the Battle of Arnhem, September 1944 (pp. 96-97).
As news spread in Nijmegen about airborne landings south of the city, Colonel Henke, commanding a spare Fallschirmjaeger Training Regiment staff headquarters, was ordered to co-ordinate the necessary measures to safeguard the two bridges crossing the Waal in Nijmegen. Henke ‘alarmed’ all in situ local forces and took them under command. Kampfgruppe ‘Henke’, however, had neither the troops or equipment resources to defend the city satisfactorily. There were three companies of the Ersatz Battalion 6 from Wehrkreis VI, a company of the Hermann Goering Training Regiment – which had been in transit retreating northwards – and an NCO school which had already been positioned as bridge security. In addition there were Henke’s regimental staff, some reservists and other troops who had been responsible for guarding the railway station and sidings. It was a force numbering some 750 men. Flak batteries sited to provide anti-air coverage were adjusted so that they could perform a dual anti-tank ground role.
Poulussen, in his book “Lost at Nijmegen: A rethink on operation Market Garden" on page 32 states the following.
“Kampfgruppe Henke, consisting of about 750 nervous Germans - already present in Nijmegen - had been reinforcing their defences, around the Keizer Karel Plein and the Keizer Lodewijk Plein.”
David Bennet in his book A “Magnificent Disaster” on page 73 “In Nijmegen, the defence force under Colonel Henke number 750 men” he then goes on to describe how they were deployed.
Robin Neillands “The Battle of the Rhine” on page 110 states “the Germans had nothing in the town but mostly low quality troops and not many of those.” He was sourcing from the US Official History the Siegfried line.
McManus, John C in his book “September Hope” pages 156 to 162 gives a detail account including the story of 3 men reaching the bridge. He also on page 161 - 162
“In fact, they were members of an SS reconnaissance battalion, probably from the 9th SS Panzer Division, and they had traveled from Arnhem to Nijmegen to buttress the bridge defenses. They were arriving just in the nick of time. Unbeknownst to the Americans, they were joining a 750-man Kampfgruppe (roughly analogous to an American battalion) made up of reservists, NCOs, antiaircraft men, and parachute trainees, under a colonel named Henke and named for him. Only a few hours earlier, Henke had placed the bulk of his force in fortified pockets defending the railroad bridge and the road bridge.”
Zig Boroughs “the 508Th Connection” page 246-247 tells of 3 men (Atkins) separated from the rest of the Patrol and reach the bridge capturing 6 – 7 defenders, holding the prisoner for about an hour. As no other troops show up, left the bridge and as they were leaving could hear heavy equipment arriving” Zig never explain why the rest of the patrol failed to reach the bridge.
This account is restated in Christer Bergstrom “Arnhem 1944 An Epic Battle Revisited 1: Tanks and Paratrooopers” on page 228. “As we were leaving, we could hear heavy equipment approaching the bridge. This was the vehicles of Viktor Graebner Recon Battalion arriving from the north. They arrive just as Aitkin and his men had left the site but were quickly summoned north again as there were reports that British Paratroopers had taken the northern road bridge abutment at Arnhem. Graebner only left two armoured personnel carriers behind in Nijmegen. The question if the bridge was undefended why would he have left?
So, Stephen depending on which narrative you read you will get a different picture of the force defending the bridge. We will never know the true picture.
Also, the attacking force was only a single battalion, not a regiment.
The Intelligence report Gavin had
"The 82nd also had the advantage of not being wedded to a plan and could, therefore, report what it thought was actually occurring at the front. In the general enemy situation section, the annex states, “There is no doubt that the enemy has made a remarkable recovery within the last few days, at any rate in the 21 Army Group Area.” {{132} 82nd Airborne Division, Annex 1c to Field Order No. 11, 11 September 1944.}. In describing the German units in the area of operations, it is noted that a “broken” panzer division is reported in the vicinity of Arnhem and that it may yield up to fifty tanks. It also addresses 4,000 SS troops that are reportedly in Nijmegen after relocating from Amsterdam.{{133} 82nd Airborne Division, Annex 1c to Field Order No. 11.}"
Source Jeffson, Major Joel. Operation Market-Garden: Ultra Intelligence Ignored . Lucknow Books. Kindle Edition.
Clearly the Intelligence report was incorrect, but Gavin would not have known the report was incorrect until 82nd landed on the 17th.
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@Bullet-Tooth-Tony- Tony this is the problem with the Nijmegen saga, you say 82nd waited 7 hours before Warren battalion moved towards the bridge.
The 508th landed at around 1330 hours and left the DZ at around 1400 hours. Their initial object was De Ploeg which was located near Groesbeek Heights.
According to Phil Nordyke "Put us down in Hell" they reached De Ploeg at 1830 Hours, The US Officially at 1700 Hours and RG Poulussen at 1600 hours. Which is correct?
The time they started for the Bridge Willian Buckingham in this book "Arnhem' has Warren moving off at 1900 Hours, Robin Neilland "Battle of the Rhine 1944 " at 2000 Hours and Poulussen at 2100 Hours. So, when did they start towards the bridge?
What time did warren actually reach the bridge? Neilland and Buckingham has Warren arriving at 2200 Hours, while Poulussen at 2400 Hours. Zig Boroughs "the 508th Connection"
on page 247 "As night set in, it became very dark. Pvt Dikcon led 1st Platoon towards the Keizer Karelplein traffic circle. Hostile machine gun fire from the square killed Dikcon.
Sunset at Nijmegen on the 17th was 1847 Hours.
So, when did Warren men reach the bridge?
John McManus "September Hope" page 162
"Enemy soldiers poured out of the half-track and ran in all directions. To the veteran paratroopers who caught glimpses of them, they appeared to be wearing the spotted camouflage uniforms typical of the SS. In fact, they were members of an SS reconnaissance battalion, probably from the 9th SS Panzer Division, and they had traveled from Arnhem to Nijmegen to buttress the bridge defenses. They were arriving just in the nick of time. Unbeknownst to the Americans, they were joining a 750-man Kampfgruppe (roughly analogous to an American battalion) made up of reservists, NCOs, antiaircraft men, and parachute trainees, under a colonel named Henke and named for him. Only a few hours earlier, Henke had placed the bulk of his force in fortified pockets defending the railroad bridge and the road bridge. These were the actual defenders of the Nijmegen bridges, not the paltry squad of misfits portrayed in the Dutch resistance reports. Henke had placed outposts at the traffic circles that led to the bridges. These were the defenders of the Keizer Karelplein who had originally opened fire on A Company. At almost that exact moment, their SS reinforcements arrived. Collectively, these enemy soldiers now stood between the Americans and the bridges."
Key point "Only a few hours earlier, Henke had placed the bulk of his force in fortified pockets defending the railroad bridge and the road bridge."
Poulussen page 32
Kampfgruppe Henke, consisting of about 750 nervous Germans - already present in Nijmegen - had been reinforcing their defences, around the Keizer Karel Plein and the Keizer Lodewijk Plein.( Source Brigade-General Heinz Harmel, commander of the 10th SS Panzer Division "Frundsberg")
As for Viktor Grabner and 9th SS Recon Bn, according to Christer Bergstrom "Arnhem 1944" page 228
"9 SS Recon Bn arrived from the north after crossed the free Rhine Bridge at Arnhem to find out about the situation at Nijmegen. They arrived just as Atkin and his men had left the site, but were quickly summoned north again"
So, what SS Troop arrived at the same time Warren men arrived at the bridge?
So, Tony from the above sources how long did Warren wait before heading towards the bridge? Clearly not 7 hours. If we cannot accurately determine what time Warren would have reach the bridge if there was no delay. How do we know how many Germans were guarding the bridge and the approaches at that time.
The final point you state "Had they gone 7 hours earlier, they would have taken the bridge with little opposition and had time to dig in themselves.", you would be right, but to reach the bridge 7 hours early would require the 1/508th to drop directly on the bridge, which was surrounded by 88mm and 20mm AA Guns.
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@davemac1197 How do you know the bridge was undefended? Depending on which source you used the bridge was either undefended or was defended by an Ad-Hoc force of 750 second line troops supported by 88mm and 20mm AA Guns and that the force was deployed at both ends of the road and rail bridges.
From It Never Snows in September: The German View of Market-Garden and the Battle of Arnhem, September 1944 (p. 96 - 97)
"As news spread in Nijmegen about airborne landings south of the city, Colonel Henke, commanding a spare Fallschirmjaeger Training Regiment staff headquarters, was ordered to co-ordinate the necessary measures to safeguard the two bridges crossing the Waal in Nijmegen. Henke ‘alarmed’ all in situ local forces and took them under command. Kampfgruppe ‘Henke’, however, had neither the troops or equipment resources to defend the city satisfactorily. There were three companies of the Ersatz Battalion 6 from Wehrkreis VI, a company of the Hermann Goering Training Regiment – which had been in transit retreating northwards – and an NCO school which had already been positioned as bridge security. In addition there were Henke’s regimental staff, some reservists and other troops who had been responsible for guarding the railway station and sidings. It was a force numbering some 750 men. Flak batteries sited to provide anti-air coverage were adjusted so that they could perform a dual anti-tank ground role. Nijmegen was a city covering 5 to 6 km of urban sprawl. Only limited sectors could be covered. Henke decided therefore to concentrate his forces in two bridgeheads south of the road and rail bridges. They were difficult objectives to secure, because the Waal river is nearly 300 metres wide at this point. A string of defended early-warning outposts was established at the southern edge of the city, manned by small sections of 8 to 10 soldiers. Two traffic circles 1,000 metres south-east and south-west of the bridges – the Kaizer Karel Plein and Kaizer Lodewijk Plein – provided the initial focal points for the defence. Strong points were disposed around the bridges themselves, and established in the small village of Lent opposite on the north bank of the Waal, controlling access and providing observation over both bridges. Important buildings such as the Post Office were also occupied and fortified."
Poulussen, R.G.. Lost at Nijmegen: A rethink on operation "Market Garden"
"Kampfgruppe Henke, consisting of about 750 nervous Germans - already present in Nijmegen - had been reinforcing their defences, around the Keizer Karel Plein and the Keizer Lodewijk Plein.[ Brigade-General Heinz Harmel, commander of the 10th SS Panzer Division "Frundsberg"]"
Also, Viktor Grabner 9 SS Recon was at the bridge by 2000 hours on the 17th. When you consider that Frost at Arnhem was unable to cross the Arnhem bridge to secure the southern end due to German resistance, what would be Warren chances of cross the Nijmegen bridge if the Germans were present in any strength at the northern end?
So, was the bridge undefended or defended?
Again, looking at various sources and speculating on the missing information, the earliest Warren and his men would have reached the bridge if there was no delay is 1800 hours the latest 2000 hours.
Clearly there was a delay in attacking the bridge, the reason for the delay and who was responsible can be debated until the cows come home.
But with conflicting information from the various sources on the size of German force and the possible time Warren could have reach the bridge can anyone be 100% certain that both ends of bridge would have been captured on the 17th if there was no delay.
The notion that if there was no delay the bridge would have been captured is pure speculation, and even if the bridge was captured, XXX Corp would still need to cross the Island, and the Germans would have had the evening of the 17th and all of the 18th to deployed troops and prepared defensive positions with the men and equipment that historically were deployed in Nijmegen by the 19th when XXX Corp arrived.
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@davemac1197 You may be right about the accuracy of Rob Kershaw information, but in your posting for example "The location of the 21.ULK at the time of the landings on 17 September was either Overasselt (north end of the Grave bridge), or split between Overasselt as a forward position and the Honinghutje road-rail bridges on the Maas-Waalkanaal as their fallback position." just shows that it difficult to get a clearly picture of what was happening in Nijmegen. In your pervious comment under chapter 6 you have a quote about 3 men from the patrol reaching the bridge and was there an hour before leaving, as an example the bridge was undefended, did you ask yourself what happen to the rest of the patrol, why did they not reach the bridge if there were no combat soldiers in Nijmegen?
Anthony Tucker-Jones book Devil Bridge (2020) also quotes a force of 750 in Nijmegen. You would have though he would access to the latest information.
Need to consider what intelligent information Gavin and is staff had access to: From Jeffson, Major Joel. Operation Market-Garden: Ultra Intelligence Ignored
" In the general enemy situation section, the annex states, “There is no doubt that the enemy has made a remarkable recovery within the last few days, at any rate in the 21 Army Group Area.” In describing the German units in the area of operations, it is noted that a “broken” panzer division is reported in the vicinity of Arnhem and that it may yield up to fifty tanks. It also addresses 4,000 SS troops that are reportedly in Nijmegen after relocating from Amsterdam.{ 82nd Airborne Division, Annex 1c to Field Order No. 11.}"
The 82nd was expecting to find SS Force around Nijmegen.
Your comment "It's important to understand the city was clear of combat troops on the first afternoon and therefore wide open for the 508th, as the 1/508th S-2 patrol showed, but only for a few hours." Again, when did the opportunity to capture the bridge passed and could 1/508 reach the bridge in time. As the 508 left the DZ at 1400 hours reached De Ploeg either at 1600 (Poulussen) or 1700 (US Official History) hours who knows when 1/508 could have reach the bridge. What I am saying we will never know with 100% certainty what was the true situation in Nijmegen during the afternoon of the 17th, hence whether the 1/508 would have captured the bridge. It's a debate that is based on speculation and assumptions depending on what sources you think is a reliable source. The best we can say is what is the most likely outcome, based on what reliable information is at hand.
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