Comments by "John Lucas" (@johnlucas8479) on "The Armchair Historian" channel.

  1.  @Bullet-Tooth-Tony-  You are right, decision made at the time was based on what information was available to the decision makers. The Operation was high risk, which if successful would have provide important strategic benefits, as well as reducing the V2 threat. The question is any one responsible for the failure, my personal position is No. With the benefit of prefect 20/20 hindsight armchair general can create a case against who every they wish to place the responsibility of the failure. If you take an objective approach the reason for the failure are: 1) Lack of aircraft resulted on the need for multiply lifts. which have the following impact on the operation a) weather become an important factor. b) to maximize the size of the second lift you need to minimize the 1st Lift losses. 2) Terrain: a) single road b) Location of Arnhem Bridge in the middle of the town. Any approach from the north side of the river work you way through the town an the risk of being caught in Urban street fighting. c) The location of suitable DZ/LZ in relationship to the objectives. 3) The level of German resistance with Ad-Hoc groups. ie on the 18th 2 88 mm guns and support infantry held up XXX Corp for 7 hours at Aalst. 4) Failure of XII and VIII Corp to stop the Germans from cutting the Corridor (Hell's Highway). 5) The delay in taking Nijmegen Bridge: The following Intelligence reports i) The I Airborne Corps had a less optimistic view of the enemy, as described in their Operation Instruction No. 1. This order, published on 13 September, states that the “enemy is fighting determinedly” on the Albert Canal and has “remnants of some good divisions, including parachute divisions.” Their estimate was that German tank strength be put at fifty to one-hundred and that the enemy was reinforcing the Arnhem and Nijmegen areas. Source Jeffson, Major Joel. Operation Market-Garden: Ultra Intelligence Ignored . Lucknow Books. Kindle Edition. ii) The 82nd also had the advantage of not being wedded to a plan and could, therefore, report what it thought was actually occurring at the front. In the general enemy situation section, the annex states, “There is no doubt that the enemy has made a remarkable recovery within the last few days, at any rate in the 21 Army Group Area.”{82nd Airborne Division, Annex 1c to Field Order No. 11, 11 September 1944.} In describing the German units in the area of operations, it is noted that a “broken” panzer division is reported in the vicinity of Arnhem and that it may yield up to fifty tanks. It also addresses 4,000 SS troops that are reportedly in Nijmegen after relocating from Amsterdam.{82nd Airborne Division, Annex 1c to Field Order No. 11} Source Jeffson, Major Joel. Operation Market-Garden: Ultra Intelligence Ignored . Lucknow Books. Kindle Edition. How much did those report especially about 4,000 SS Troops impact Gavin and Browning decisions. We will never know. 6) Montgomery also in his memoirs include lack of resource. There could be other reasons. So why try to place the responsibility on anyone or part of the Operation. Yes Air Plan was not Ideal, but the best possible. Rest of Market plan again was not ideal due to the issue of lack of aircraft and Terrain. Garden had its problems of the single road and issue that effected XII and VIII Corp performance. At the end of the day the only question On the 15th once the full detail was available did the strategic benefits that would be achieve if the operations was successful outweigh the risk of failure due to not ideal plans. If the answer is Yes the operation would proceed, and we know the outcome. If the assessment that risk outweigh the benefits, who would have sufficient information to make that call without the benefit of hindsight. Was there an alternative operation that could have achieve the same benefits at a low risk. The answer to that question was No. The debate will continue due to people personal opinion. That my personal views and opinion base on what I have read on the subject.
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  2.  @thevillaaston7811  A different source with a different view on Montgomery role, question which source is correct and how to find the evidence to proof the correct view Buckley, John. Monty's Men : The British Army and the Liberation of Europe (pp. 213-214). Yale University Press. Kindle Edition. "The key outcome of the 10 September meeting was the green light for MARKET GARDEN, eventually penciled in for launch on 17 September. Detailed planning continued from 10 September onwards, but the scale of the operation and the multiple issues to be resolved undermined the plan more and more as the day of MARKET GARDEN approached. Brigadier Charles Richardson, Monty’s chief planning officer, claimed that 21st Army Group staff were simply handed the plan by Browning’s team and told by Montgomery to implement it. Perhaps the most debilitating shortcoming proved to be the air-power element of the plan. Although MARKET GARDEN involved a significant airborne element, there had been little immediate air staff involvement in putting the plan together. As problems with the airlift emerged, 21st Army Group staff, determined to make MARKET GARDEN a reality, rode roughshod over a series of related air-based problems, whilst air staff refused to budge on some fundamental aspects of the plan. Montgomery did not become fully aware of this problem probably until 15 September, by which time it was far too late to change the plan. Insofar as Monty had failed to include the air staff properly in the planning process, this deficiency was self-inflicted and he was paying the price for this approach. Consequently, the input of air staff and any scope for shaping the plan accordingly were limited."
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