Comments by "TheThirdMan" (@thethirdman225) on "Asianometry"
channel.
-
305
-
161
-
22
-
12
-
10
-
7
-
7
-
7
-
6
-
6
-
5
-
5
-
4
-
4
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
The Collins class is the only submarine that has ever been built for the unique Australian theatre. Nuclear submarines cannot do what is needed to defend Australia and they were not even considered in the original request for tenders.
The Collins class has spent its entire career engaged in highly secret work of surveillance and special forces insertion. For this they are ideally suited and it was with these missions in mind that they were designed in the first place. The Collins was also built with other factors like salinity in mind. Those missions cannot be performed nearly as effectively by nuclear boats.
The Japanese Sōryū class, while technically a good submarine, did not have enough range and was too cramped inside for Australian submariners. There were also several stumbling blocks regarding any potential design changes.
The German design had acoustic problems that were never fully explained for reasons of secrecy.
The French Suffren class was a pretty easy choice but there needed to be some considerable changes, not just the conversion to diesel, to make it work.
There were other factors to consider. A partnership with Japan was useful to us and championed by Abbott because it would have presented the possibility of a diplomatic triumph, particularly in light of American ambitions in the northern Pacific and the South China Sea. That would come back to haunt us later.
The Suffren (Attack) class was not just the best choice for the Navy, it presented us with a much more flexible and potentially useful option in partnership with France, which is still a major player in the Pacific. When the deal was done, the door was left open to the possibility of Australia acquiring the nuclear variant if such a need was ever identified.
The AUKUS deal threw all of that good work into the bin and gave us nothing in return. Proponents of nuclear point to speed and endurance advantages without considering the mission.
AUKUS was a political decision made by people who were neither expert in the needs of the submarine fleet or interested in the defence of Australia. These were people whose interests let in getting as close to the United States as possible, while simultaneously wedging the Labor opposition on security matters. Ironically, AUKUS actually makes us less secure and at far greater costs.
The choice of the American Virginia class was not considered by anyone expert in such matters. The US Navy is what might be called a blue water navy. It is designed to operate thousands of kilometres from base. The subs are designed to break up battle fleets and supply lines. They are hunter/killer submarines and they are good at that. They are not designed for the coastal needs of Australia.
AUKUS commits us to something we don’t want or need. It commits us to a China containment strategy which is only really of interest to Americans and makes war much more likely. This “change of defence requirements” existed only in the minds of the Liberal Party, it’s secret and duplicitous Prime Minister and a few like-minded anti-China hawks in the federal public service.
Worst of all, any Australian Virginia class subs will never be completely independent. They will always have ultimate control from the United States, something that the French would never have done.
And last week we found out that it’s highly unlikely that we will ever receive the American subs. The yard is supposed to be building two boats per year but can’t manage more than 1.2 at the moment. They hope to reach 2 per year by 2028 but that’s optimistic at best.
AUKUS is the single dumbest defence decision that Australia has ever committed itself to and things are getting worse, not better. I’m left wondering just how long the Collins can continue. They are still very good subs but their hulls must be starting to reach the end of their fatigue lives.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@lelsewherelelsewhere9435
"The reason we "can't" do it today is money. Also, bad management."
First bit right. Not so much the second bit. Without a signal from the top that they're going back to the Moon they can't go. Management isn't to blame for that.
"The new Nasa moon capable SPACESUIT is going to cost MORE THAN THE ROCKET THEY WILL USE TO GET THERE!! Also, it's like the 3rd one they developed in 15-20 years, getting rid of all the others completely instead of slowly improving them over time."
The old ones couldn't be adapted to do what the new ones will do. The next Moon missions will be much longer and if you know anything about how space suits are constructed, you know that, over time, they wear out. That's not such a bit deal if we're talking about a pair of denim jeans but it matters a lot if the suit's ability to remain airtight is compromised.
And these suits are in no way comparable to the suits worn on Soyuz, Crew Dragon or the Space Shuttle. What is needed for an EVA in LEO is very different from the Moon. The biggest limiting factor is dust. It's as abrasive as hell. And these new suits will have to survive missions lasting months and all have to be custom made, from the length of your inseam to the span of your hands and pretty much anything that goes in between.
"Poor management, poor goal setting, being to friendly to big business friends, etc."
This is too generalised. The fact is that, until Artemis, there was no serious plan to return to the Moon. And since NASA is an agency, rather than a constructor, it is axiomatic that it has to be friendly with big business, otherwise they would have to build it themselves. Artemis at least proved it was possible and with new and better methods than Apollo.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1