Comments by "TheThirdMan" (@thethirdman225) on "Imperial War Museums"
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@Mustapha1963 So basically everything the? Look, ALL tanks have their limitations. If your criteria were to be used, the only tank that would meet it would be the Maus.
But if you take the trouble to read how these things were used, you’ll find that the Sherman was a very good tank which was highly thought of by its crews. In this day of the internet, gamers in particular, have contributed a large swath of information based entirely on tank v tank on a level playing field (Tank battles are never fought that way).
That is not the best way to assess a tank.
If you are a designer, you will most likely try to minimise compromising the triangle of effectiveness. If you are an end user, you probably want the thickest armour and the heaviest gun available and neither could ever be big enough. If you are a senior army commander your values are different.
It has to stop somewhere. And what about the commanders? They needed a tank that could be there and work well, while providing high levels of effectiveness. The Sherman did that probably better than any other tank in WWII, barring the T-34-85.
Just because a Sherman could be defeated by a Tiger doesn’t mean the Sherman was not a good tank. In fact, the two only rarely met. But the fact is that about 85% of the work of a tank in WWII was in the role of infantry support. Only maybe 15% of the time did they come to blows with enemy tanks.
This was reflected on both sides. Only 15% StuG III’s ammunition was AT. The rest was HE. The British tank units used one Firefly for every 5 75mm versions. The 75mm gun was very good at infantry support. The 17-pounder, less so. The two complimented each other and again the German ratios and British ratios agree.
Read James Holland’s book Brothers in Arms and Steve Zaloga’s book, Armored Champion. Holland describes the war from the perspective of a British Army tank unit from D-Day to the end of the war. Zaloga tries to assess the best tank of each year of the war from various perspectives. He’s done a great job. IMHO, it’s arguable that there was no greatest tank of WWII but some were better than others. The Sherman was pretty good. It was also one of the more survivable tanks. Casualty rates among American tankies were quite low.
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@lqr824
"But it wasn't just the cost of the aircraft, you also needed 50% more fuel than the Mustang, so 50% more tanker trucks, 50% more tanker boats, etc. etc. The P-47 was on the other hand cheaper for losing probably fewer pilots and airframes in similar circumstances."
Oh, God, another Greg rigmarole. Rinse and repeat...
The directive from Hap Arnold to his Chief of Staff, Lt Barney Giles in October, 1943, was to find a fighter that could escort the bombers to any target in Germany in six months, even if it meant developing one from scratch.
Cost was no object.
Giles knew the range potential of the P-51 and there was no practical cure for the P-47's lack of range. Drop tanks could not make enough difference to matter and Republic were way too slow making changes to the design in response to the needs of the USAAF.
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What killed the Luftwaffe was the P-51.
By the end of 1943, the USAAF in Europe had shot down 451 German fighters. 'Operation Argument', also known as 'Big Week', was a tactic intended to draw the Luftwaffe into a battle it could not afford and everyone knew it. In February, 1944, the P-47s shot down 233 German fighters, the P-51 got 89.5 and the P-38 got 32.5. In March, the P-47 got 175, the P-51 got 251 and the P-38 got 25. In April, the P-51 shot down a massive 329 German aircraft. The P-47 got 82 and the P-38 got 23. And the Mustangs did it with half the number of squadrons the P-47 had. The figures remained that way for the rest of the war. The P-51 also destroyed 30% more ground targets than the P-47.
By mid year, Flak was more of a danger to US bombers than fighters were. It was only then that the fuel problem really started to bite but the Luftwaffe was already defeated. The P-51 ended the war with 4,950 German fighters shot down in 213,000 sorties. The P-47 shot down 3,082 in 423,000 sorties, so the hit rate of the P-51 was nearly three times as good and it did so without suffering exceptional casualties.
The P-51 wrecked the Luftwaffe.
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Greg is a lousy source for information on the P-47 and it is simply staggering that so many people have fallen for his conspiracy. ALL of Greg's figures are theoretical, many are estimates and all assume optimum altitude and throttle settings. This was almost never the case. Furthermore, all his assumptions are for the 200 gallon ferry tank which was unsuitable for combat since it was semi-conformal, unpressurised and could not be jettisoned in an emergency. The idea that this was some kind of conspiracy against the P-47 is ridiculous. Even by the time of Mission 250 - the first USAAF raid on Berlin - most P-47s could not go past the Dutch border. A small number could not go past Magdeburg.
By the end of 1943, the USAAF in Europe had shot down 451 German fighters, the vast bulk - 414 - went to the P-47. 'Operation Argument', also known as 'Big Week', was a tactic intended to draw the Luftwaffe into a battle it could not afford and everyone knew it. In February, 1944, the P-47s shot down 233 German fighters, the P-51 got 89.5 and the P-38 got 32.5. In March, the P-47 got 175, the P-51 got 251 and the P-38 got 25. In April, the P-51 shot down a massive 329 German aircraft. The P-47 got 82 and the P-38 got 23. And the Mustangs did it with half the number of squadrons the P-47 had. The figures remained that way for the rest of the war. The P-51 also destroyed 30% more ground targets than the P-47.
By mid year, Flak was more of a danger to US bombers than fighters were. It was only then that the fuel problem really started to bite but the Luftwaffe was already defeated. The P-51 ended the war with 4,950 German fighters shot down in 213,000 sorties. The P-47 shot down 3,082 in 423,000 sorties, so the hit rate of the P-51 was nearly three times as good and it did so without suffering exceptional casualties.
The P-51 wrecked the Luftwaffe.
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@keithstudly6071
"Even after they were available for fighters it was 2 months before 8th AF started using the extended escort range in their mission plans. It appears that the 'bomber mafia' was intentionally limiting the use of fighter escorts in 1943 to prove that they could do the job alone. With the paper drop tanks that they did have in late 1943 the P-47 could escort bombers deep into Germany. They just weren't allowed to."
Please stop repeating this. It's incorrect. Greg, from 'Greg's Airplanes and Automobiles', has persuaded a lot of people that there was this conspiracy against the P-47 by the US high command who apparently wanted to kill as many US airmen as possible. In fact, Greg is quite wrong. The salient feature of his videos is charts and numbers. He quotes no historical/operational evidence whatsoever. So when Greg says a P-47 could fly to Schweinfurt, he's talking about a P-47D-25 flying at optimum altitude and throttle settings.
Escort work was anything but optimum. Even then, the chart he uses is calculated and subject to test flying.
Secondly, Eaker was constantly requesting new aircraft, including fighters and getting nowhere. So this was not about 'the bomber will always get through'. He couldn't even get the bombers he wanted, much less the fighters. In fact, Eaker was openly opposed to the Schweinfurt raid because he knew the 8th Air Force wasn't ready. But the fact was, it was a priority target and it had to be bombed. (Middlebrook) This wasn't because of ny 'Bomber Mafia'. It was because it took those back in the US a while to understand how serious the problem was. Communication was not like it is today and Hap Arnold spent quite a lot of 1943 travelling to theatre around the world. On top of that, he suffered two heart attacks that year. (Holland) By the time of the crisis in October, he directed his Chief of Staff, Lt Gen. Barney Giles to find a solution in six months.
This can be found in James Holland's book, 'Big Week" and Martin Middlebrook's book, 'The Schweinfurt Regensburg Mission'.
The USAAF had ordered 1,350 P-51 Mustangs on 9 October, 1942 and by mid-1943, they were ready. Given the distractions of 1943, it's understandable that Arnold didn't quite manage to put two and two together but Giles did and the first Mustangs arrived in England in December. (see: Holland) No 'Bomber Mafia' conspiracy.
Secondly, it would not have mattered what they did, drop tanks were not the answer to the P-47's problems. It is an axiom that it takes half the fuel in a drop tank to get the other half there. What increases range is internal fuel and the P-47 simply did not have enough. The P-47C, which was still in widespread use during 'Big Week', had an internal fuel capacity of 256 gallons. The P-51 had 269 gallons and was about 50% more fuel efficient. The P-47D-25, which was the first model to exceed 300 US gallons internally, did not arrive until May of 1944, by which time it was largely too late.
The other problem was that the P-47C was only plumbed to carry a centreline tank. By the time of Mission 250, the first large-scale USAAF raid on Berlin, about 20% of the P-47 fleet had been modified to carry tanks under the wings. This was a very slow process, completed in the field and requiring cutting metal. On the mission, those fitted with a 108 gallon centreline tank got no further than the Dutch border. Those with the second tank could only get to a point just short of Magdeburg. The specifics of this mission are extremely well documented in 'Target Berlin: Mission 250, 6 March, 1944', by Jeffrey Ethel and Dr Alfred Price.
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@robertelder164
”Very low loss rates in total, sparky. P-47 got you home.”
Myth.
The P-47 spent a much lower percentage of its time in hostile airspace than the P-51 because of its range. If you only stick your toe in the water you’re not going to get as wet as if you jump in. In statistics it’s known as ‘survivor bias’.
Yes, it had low loss rates but they were only marginally better than the P-51 (0.73 v 1.18) for much lower time in enemy airspace.
This claim that ‘the P-47 got you home’ is also largely unfounded. If you weren’t in hostile airspace, then any aircraft stood a better chance of getting home. Of course there are anecdotes but the P-51 was more likely to engage in combat than the P-47, which usually has to turn for home before the Luftwaffe attacked the bomber stream.
In ground attack, the P-51 destroyed 30% more targets than the P-47 in half the number of missions. Yet according to P-47 fanbois, the P-51 couldn’t do ground attack because it was a liquid-cooled flying death trap that could be brought down by a cockeyed school kid with a slug gun.
In air-to-air, the P-51 scored 60% more victories than the P-47 in half the number of missions.
By every objective measure, the P-51 was the better aircraft. That’s why it was replacing the P-47 by the end of 1944. The more you look, the more obvious it is, no matter what the cool kids are saying.
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"The P-47 arguably broke the back of the Luftwaffe in '43 and early '44.”
Okay, let's look at a few things about that. First of all, the USAAF shot down 451 aircraft up to he end of 1943, with the P-47 accounting for 414 of them. Let's put that into perspective. That year the RAF shot down 3,300 German aircraft out of a total of 22,000 which the Luftwaffe lost. In other words, the P-47 accounted for about 2%. Hardly breaking the back of the Luftwaffe.
Furthermore, the Luftwaffe put up a pretty fair fight up to mid-October when most of the bombing was paused while an escort solution was found. Meanwhile the Allied forces were reorganised under Eisenhower in preparation for D-Day. But before that the USAAF was being pasted by the Luftwaffe on operations like Schweinfurt and Regensburg because the P-47s had to break off before the Luftwaffe attacked. Why would they do otherwise? Not bad for a force that had already been decimated.
"It should also be noted that with the introduction of the 'paddle bladed' airscrew, the climb disadvantage disappeared. Besides the water injection, the Allies also had the huge advantage of better, higher octane fuel which allowed pilots to wring the most power from their engines."
That's a bit of a distraction. All well and good, of course but not if it has no effect on the fight. The fact was that until the problem of lack of range was resolved by the Mustang, the USAAF could not carry out their goal of strategic bombing. So, whatever its attributes, the P-47's limited range makes its high altitude performance and the paddle prop (which was by no means universal in the P-47 fleet) something of an irrelevance.
The paddle prop wasn’t mainstream until mid-1944. The D-25 variant didn’t fly its first mission until May 1944, by which time the Mustang was scoring at a much higher rate. I’m happy to provide those figures with references.
Greg is dead wrong about this.
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