Comments by "TheThirdMan" (@thethirdman225) on "" video.

Zero pilots gave RAAF Spitfire pilots a very hard time during the defence of Darwin in 1943. Winning tactics are decided before any attack is made. The Japanese invariably attacked out of the sun and as usual, most victims never saw their attackers. The Zero was, in its own way, at least the equal of the Bf-109, although very different.
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"For the record, Zeros slaughtered Mk 8 Spitfires at first over Australia, Mk 1 Spitfires wouldn't have been a problem during the BOB." No, that isn't true. For a start, the Zeros mostly fought against Mk VC Trop models over Northern Australia. They saw very few combats against the Mk VIII. The introduction of the Spitfire into Australian service was necessary because the fighters we are using - the Kittyhawk and the Buffalo - could not compete with the Zero at altitude. In fact, the Buffalo was no competition for the Zero at all. Bu the biggest thing about the Spitfire was the propaganda value. Some of this was just contemporary racism but most of it was the glamour of the Spit, whose reputation had followed it everywhere it went after the Battle of Britain. Secondly, I would argue that the contest was a lot closer and the exchange rate was about 1:1. The best source, by far, on this is 'Darwin Spitfires', by Anthony Cooper. It describes virtually all the combats that happened between the RAAF and the Japanese Navy and army (there was only one Army raid). While the RAAF ultimately made further incursions unprofitable for the Japanese, it was no thanks to the Spitfire, which was very unreliable suffering cannon stoppages and - worse - constant speed unit failures. There was really only one example of a Japanese fighter that kind of stereotypically folded up. That was a Ki-43, shot down by Flt Lt Tim Goldsmith in the only Army raid. The RAAF also used outdated and frankly, foolish 'big wing' tactics, with which the RAF were also saddled after the political fallout of the Battle of Britain. That said, there is little doubt that the Zeros gave the RAAF a hard time. Even at the end of 1943, Japanese pilots were still extremely well disciplined and deployed excellent tactics, like attacking out of the sun. Furthermore, the Zero was employed in a role that most would find surprising: high altitude. The bombers frequently came over at 25,000 feet and their escorts at least 3,000 feet higher. Their combat formation flying was exemplary, despite the lack of radios. I strongly recommend you read 'Darwin Spitfires'.
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If anyone wants a real picture of what this was like, I recommend reading, 'Darwin Spitfires', by Anthony Cooper. It was remarkable how ineffective the Spitfires were, in no small part due to spectacular levels of unreliability and wing adherence to the 'big wing' policies of the RAF. The Zeros attacked out of the sun more often than the Spitfires did and the Japanese used much more effective three aircraft formations. They were highly disciplined and gave the Spitfires a very hard time. Ultimately, while it was assumed that there would be no contest, the two types achieved close to parity. Much has been made of things like dogfighting, turn radius, top speeds and all that other guff but in fact, most combats were decided in the usual way: the victims rarely saw their attackers. On that basis, I'd say the Zero was every bit as good as the 109 in combat and there's no difference you can put a postage stamp on, much less live on.
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@patwilson2546 No. That was part of it but it was much more complicated than that. Almost all the dogfights were inconclusive. Those combats that were conclusive were generally a result of being bounced out of the sun. The RAAF’s radar network was improving rapidly and the controllers vectored the intercepts so that they came out of the sun - if possible. I can only think of a couple of dogfights that produced a result and those were equally distributed. The trouble was that the RAAF leadership (Caldwell) was steeped in ‘big wing’ doctrine and line abreast/line astern tactics, which made getting into that position more difficult and the Spitfires were often bounced by Zeros before they could get into an advantageous position. It’s almost impossible to pin the result down to any one factor and the Spitfire’s phenomenal level of unreliability hampered RAAF efforts. On the other side, the Japanese didn’t have radios so they relied on their extraordinary levels of training and discipline. ’Darwin Spitfires’ is an amazing book.
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@JWZelch The land based Zero was usually known as the Zeke.
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I think this is the best way to look at it. Have you read 'Darwin Spitfires', by Anthony Cooper? Zeros could have easily escorted German bombers to London and beyond without raising a sweat. They could have flown from airfields in Northern France and easily attacked airfields in the North of England. They could probably have escorted KG5 from Norway. Japanese pilot training was excellent. Their formation flying was first rate and the tactical discipline equally so, despite functioning without radios. Certainly over Northern Australia. I think the RAF would have found them a very tough opponent in the Battle of Britain.
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When did the F4U defeat a jet in the Korean War? The Sea Fury is claimed to have done it.
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@egocyclic "The Greg’s Automobiles and Airplanes YT channel has a deep dive into a U.S. wartime technical evaluation of the F4U & F6F against contemporary versions of the Bf109 & FW190A." Greg doesn't read history. The problem is that he has convinced himself of how history should have been without knowing about how it was. Now in the context of those comparisons, there's not a whole lot more to go on than spec sheet warfare. Even so, I still think that the kill in any combat will still go to the pilot who achieves surprise. It's always been the case and top speeds, rates of climb, turn, roll or acceleration are actually not a substitute for understanding combat tactics. Take it and enjoy it but don't take it too seriously. You're right: I don't like Greg, not even the videos of his that I thought were okay.
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I strongly recommend you read, 'Darwin Spitfires', by Anthony Cooper. The Zeros gave the RAAF Spitfires a very hard time in the defence of Darwin. There were many reasons for this. The theoretical advantages of one over the other were rarely a factor. Surprise was a huge factor.
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Where did you get this from?
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@jacktattis Nothing to do with what I said.
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@jacktattis I’ve got a better idea: you stop quoting data blocks and trying to deduce history from it. Read Anthony Cooper’s book, ’Darwin Spitfires’ and you’ll see just how different things were from your conjecture.
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@jacktattis The hand over of P-47s to the 9th AF started in April, 1944. The 8th had mostly converted by D-Day. By October, the only FG still operating P-47s was 56th. They converted in early (January or February) 1945.
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@jacktattis That doesn’t answer your question.
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@jacktattis "I will" Good. It's one of the frankest and best-researched books I've read. Cooper has covered everything. I won't tell you the conclusions but they are extremely well-considered and with more backup evidence than perhaps any book I have seen on a specific air campaign. I knew very little about the defence of Darwin until I read that book. And I say that as one who profiled a Spitfire Mk VIII pilot. The difference was that in the defence of Darwin they were operating Mk Vs and once it was over, the Japanese went away, Australian pilots didn't see many Japanese aircraft..
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@Sentimentmedia234 No, that is not accurate. There is almost never a single, simple answer to these things and it wasn’t the case here either. While it’s certainly true that attempting to turn with Zeroes was foolhardy, there were many, many other factors that caused problems for the RAAF and they were never cured. In the end, the result was more or less a draw but due to other factors, the Japanese simply stopped attacking northern Australia. The RAAF never actually defeated the Japanese in the formal sense. They just went away, which was kind of like victory by default. If you want to learn more about this then read Anthony Cooper’s book. It’s still probably the single best book I’ve read this year (I’m on number eight at this stage, after a slow down mid-year due to teaching commitments).
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@ What other Spitfires flew against the Zero? Can you cite some specific examples and why they would be any different, since the RAF and RAAF used the same tactics and basically the same aircraft? I know Sqn Ldr J.H. ‘Ginger’ Lacey flew late model Spitfires in Burma but without specifics, I’m not prepared to make any assumptions about what might or might not have happened. I’m pretty sure Gp Capt. Frank Carey did too but again, I’m reluctant to make any assumptions. I haven’t gone into any specifics yet because, if you’re really serious about this, you’ll read Cooper’s book. He goes into forensic-level detail to get the best picture of what happened. You owe it to yourself to read it. I assure you, the picture is far more complex and some aspects were likely common to RAF and RAAF experience.
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@Sentimentmedia234 Yes but I'm asking for specifics. Apart from that, RN Seafires... that didn't happen until much later. I thought you were talking about the Mk VIII... Okay, the point that I'm going to make is, in one sense, pretty simple: there was almost never any doubt that getting into a turning fight with a Zero was a bad idea. They knew this early on, well before the Spitfires arrived in Australia. In the RAAF, they heard from the Americans and did not attempt it in their Kittyhawks over New Guinea. Again, this is a lot more nuanced that just turning circles but the RAAF Spitfire pilots already knew about the danger of trying to out turn a Zero. It's effectively a non argument. Yet in spite of this and for a myriad of other reasons, the RAAF did not do well against the Zero. Certainly not as well as they expected. Some of this was tactical, some was pilot behaviour, some was equipment. You need to read Cooper's book to understand it.
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@ I’m not going to get into a theoretical, data block- based discussion with you about this when there is documented and pretty conclusive evidence already out there. The Brewster Buffalo is an irrelevance. The Americans had already flight tested a Zero before any Spitfires arrived in the Pacific theatre. Read the book. I doubt there’s a single specific volume that goes into warts-and-all detail the way Cooper does. He makes performance metrics virtually irrelevant. You’ll understand why if you read it. I tried to point this out to that other poster but he kept posting things like, ‘My Spitfire book says…’ I doubt he ever bothered to read Cooper either. Data block figures don’t allow anyone to guess historical outcomes. That’s not history. And by the way, you’re dealing with someone who interviewed and profiled an RAAF Spitfire Mk VIII pilot (P.O. Geoff Marsh, probably gone now) so I didn’t just get my information from books or worse, YouTube videos. He knew people like Caldwell. If you have better sources, go for it. But if you can find specific examples, I will read them with great interest. I really don’t have anything further to add except that ‘Darwin Spitfires’ is a bloody great book and everyone with an interest and a desire to understand the context would find it riveting.
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@Sentimentmedia234 "And does this in anyway support the argument that the Zeroes was "a match for the Spitfire"?" Results suggest it was. "Because all the performance metrics certainly don't support this. It's cold hard fact. Just because RAAF Spitfires didn't do well against Japanese Zeroes doesn't mean that the Zeroes were a match for pristine, proferly flown Spitfire." Aaaaand here's the difference. Data block and ideal world situations figures are of no value when the verdict of history says otherwise. What if it wasn't 'pristine, properly flown' and what of the Zero? This is the problem with the internet: everyone expects to be spoon fed and they expect to have their personal prejudices confirmed. In that respect, I'm not very different. But where I am different is that I read books. Funny how very few people do that or if they do they go straight to the data blocks and posit that the specs must decide the result. What good is that when the results say otherwise? Furthermore - and this started with you saying that Zeroes got the better of Spitfires until the Spit pilots stopped trying to turn with them - the Allies knew very well what the Zero's turn potential was because the Americans had test flown one. In June 1942, well before any Spitfires arrived in the Pacific theatre, Petty Officer Tadayoshi Koga crashed his Zero in the Aleutian Islands. Koga died in the crash but the Zero was in good enough condition to be quickly repaired and test flown in September. The Australians defending Port Moresby knew not to get into a turning fight with the Zero. There was plenty of information on the aircraft available. By the time the Spitfire arrived, it was a given that trying to dogfight a Zero was a high risk strategy. The point is that it wasn't tried in the first place because the RAAF was aware of it and that this is a non-argument. "Tactics and pilots quality matter alot, but it's not the fault of the plane." Paying lip service to tactics and ignoring the aircraft... Superficially, this would seem to make sense but not when they play second fiddle to what you call hard, cold fact. Here's some hard cold fact for you: the Japanese - specifically, the Zeroes - were not defeated by Spitfires over Darwin. They were pulled out because they were needed elsewhere in Japan's contracting empire. They could easily have kept going, though their raids were pretty ineffective. You'll have to read Cooper's book to find this out. "We all know that the F6F did incredibly well against the Zeroes, yet in Fleet Air Arm service the Germans did not find anything notable about the F6Fs, but German pilots greatly respected British Spitfires." Sorry but this is a massive 'So what?' moment. Let me tell you something: I interviewed and profiled an RAAF Spitfire Mk VIII pilot (Geoff Marsh, probably gone by now). He knew all the big guys like Caldwell. I grew up surrounded by WWII pilots, including one (Reece Thomas) who had flown every marque of Spit up to the Mk XIV. One of my Dad's best mates was a 'Black Lysander' pilot. Through him I met dozens of others. I shook Adolph Galland's hand in 1974 (for what that's worth). I knew two Mosquito pilots. Those were the circles I moved in when I was a youth. I've been reading military history for well over 50 years. I know what they thought because I knew them. And I knew their flaws too. Now every day on the internet, some punter comes along and tells me I don't know what I'm talking about because some data block figure says this or that. If you look further back in this abortion of a thread, you'll find that another bloke tried the same thing. He too baulked at actually reading something, preferring instead to blurt out, 'My Spitfire book says data block, data, block, data block...' That is NOT history, no matter how anyone spins it. At best it's conjecture. Above all, it's f*cking lazy. But if that's your view you're welcome to it mate. You're wrong. Don't tell me I'm wrong because you're too lazy to read. I'm going to keep this as polite as I can. Go to Amazon and find a copy of Anthony Cooper's book 'Darwin Spitfires' and read it. You should do this because RAAF No.1 Wing was the first unit to operate Spitfires against the Japanese anywhere. If your claim was true it would be in that book but it's not. If you're really interested in air combat history you'll love it. It's 530 pages and I knocked it over in a few days. Cooper has done it properly.
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@ I told you I’m not going to argue hypotheticals with you. Read the book. It was known. The RAAF knew from the start that trying to out turn a Zero was a bad idea. Why should the Spitfire be any different? There were a couple of occasions when people tried, even though they knew what would happen if they did. That’s how Sqn Ldr John Jackson was lost. But he’d probably gone tropo by then anyway.
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@ Now you’re trying to justify your lack of relevant information. For the purposes of this exercise anecdotes ARE facts. If they weren’t, then you could just do the Kelly Anne Conway and throw everything out in favour of ‘alternative facts’ and history becomes whatever you choose to believe. Come back when you have read the book. Unless, of course, you think you have some pride to save. In short, you’re wrong. Provably wrong. You have a choice: you can keep trying to defend an indefensible position or you can accept that the first first claim you made was wrong and move on. Most of the other things you’re drawing on, like sweeping generalisations and a few false equivalencies, are not relevant. The RAAF knew about the Zero and avoided turning fights with it. And they were the first to pit Spitfires against Zeros. The reasons they didn’t do better are multi fold and I’m not going into that level of detail here, which would involve me giving you a précis of the entire book.
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@ The laws of physics suggest that the aircraft with the lowest wing loading should have the highest turn rate. That was the Zero and the engineering examination proved that. Stop trying to play semantics. You actually don’t know what you’re talking about.
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@Sentimentmedia234 What evidence have you got that actual says ‘No, that didn’t happen. The verdict of history is wrong’? What I have is better evidence. I mean documented fact, not a few data block figures that may or may not make any difference.
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@Sentimentmedia234 Let me remind you of what you said before you try to claim something else: "That's because Spitfire pilots tried to turn fight with Zeroes as they did against the Germans which was a big mistake and played into the Zero's strength as the Zeroes could outturn the Spitfires, once Spitfire pilots changed tactics and utilised energy tactics the Zero was once again outclassed." For the purposes of this discussion, two things matter: first of all, you provided no backup for this claim. Secondly, I provided historical examples that it did not happen and certainly not the way you claim. Everything else is either a distraction/irrelevance or an attempt to use conjecture where it's not appropriate.
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"nteresting, in a dogfight, yeah the Zero was better than the Spitfire, but at low level. The higher it got, the more its performance suffered. At mid-altitude, the Zero and Spit's performance was pretty even." Where did you get this from? The RAAF experience of Spitfires against Zeros over Northern Australia told quite a different story. "Anyhow, Spitfire pilots, like the Americans learned, getting height and booming and zooming led to great results." And the Japanese? Even towards the end of 1943, Japanese pilots still flew excellent combat formation and employed excellent tactical doctrine. Despite what most people think: that the Zero was purely a dogfighter, their pilots had their greatest successes using bounces, usually out of the sun. Bu wait! Isn't that 'zoom and boom'? In their combat against RAAF Spitfires, most of their dogfights were inconclusive, while their bounces produced positive results. None of this had anything to do with the Spitfire and the Zero being evenly matched in a dogfight. In fact, it had a lot more to do with tactics. Even in 1943, the Boelcke Dicta still held true, perhaps more so. "Initially, they'd have the advantage, but once tactics were soughted out, I think they could have been in trouble." I don't know why. I think it would have been a very dangerous opponent for the Hurricane. Even the Spitfire struggled against it. Furthermore, it carried enough fuel for its presence to have been potentially decisive. Raiding London would have been easy. Even Northern cities and airfields would have come into play.
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That depends on the size of the tank.
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The Bf-109 racked up a lot of its claims on the Eastern Front.
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I think you would be surprised. During the defence of northern Australia, the Japanese came over at altitudes of between 25 and 28,000 feet. Even at that altitude, they gave RAAF Spitfires a very hard time.
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@bizjetfixr8352 "Of which, about 15,000 of them were Soviet pilots." There, fixed it for you.
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Not really. They left the G6 in production way too long.
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"First, the superiority of the Zero over the P40 and F4F is overstated. Dog fighting depended on multiple things; the aircraft capabilities, the ability and experience of the pilots, the tactical situation at the beginning of the battle, and (IMHO, most important) whether the pilots used their aircraft's strengths and avoided their enemy's." In the defence of Port Moresby by RAAF 75 Squadron, aircraft capabilities had little influence. As soon as 75 got there, the first thing Sqn Ldr John Jackson did was plan and execute an extremely successful raid on the primary Japanese base at Lae. Virtually all his pilots were novices who had done no formation flying and hadn't even fired their guns. The 'Zero v Kittyhawk' battles never really came down to dogfighting and nearly everything was about surprise attacks, out of the sun or out of cloud. The terrain in New Guinea played a much bigger role than anyone gives it credit for. "Both the P40 and F4F had excellent records against the Zero overall; from the Flying Tigers before the war, to the adaptation of tactics by US pilots (the Thatch Weave, in particular) - this allowed US pilots to effectively battle the Zero, even before better US fighters arrived." The Flying Tigers didn't fight against Zeros, though that doesn't mean they didn't fight against competent Japanese pilots. That said, units like 75 learnt early from the experience of Chennault. But a lot of the assumptions that are made on the internet about the way the Japanese fought are misguided. "A direct comparison is a difficult one to make, since - as noted - they were designed for radically different strategic purposes. I don't believe that a Zero and a 109 ever faced off in real combat, so there is no way to make a 1v1 judgment" More a question of the strategic situation. The Germans would have given there eye teeth for an aircraft with the range performance of the Zero during the Battle of Britain. And look what happened once the USAAF got its hands on the P-51. Same deal. In short, it's called power projection. "Japan's pilot training program was very inefficient - Germany's produced better basic pilots at a faster pace." I disagree. It's true that Japanese pilot training eventually suffered. However, it happened a lot later than most people - even me - realised. There were still plenty of competent, highly disciplined Japanese pilots, who employed excellent tactics as late as the end of 1943, as the Australian Spitfire pilots found out in their defence of Darwin. By comparison, the bleeding away of German pilots, particularly on the Eastern Front, meant that by 1943, the average new pilot in the Luftwaffe had 110-120 hours, including 10-15 on type, while the average American had 600+ with 50-100 on type. The Germans peaked just before Barbarossa.
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The 109 had more variants and more highly developed in most respects than the Zero. That said, there were Zeros that were still giving the Allies a hard time as late as the end of 1943.
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@ramimariewilson4672 ”Yes, till the Corsair Hellcat showed up.” Fixed it for you.
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@ramimariewilson4672 The Corsair was a significant capability increase but its early combat record was blunted by its poor handling. For that reason it was withdrawn from carrier use and used as a land based fighter until quite late in the war. The Hellcat had no such problems. The Corsair was claimed to have a K/D of 11:1 compared to 19:1 for the Hellcat. The Corsair shot down fewer than 3,000 Japanese aircraft, compared to 5,169 for the Hellcat. As good as the Corsair undoubtedly was, it was the Hellcat that won the air war in the Pacific.
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@ramimariewilson4672 If you read Eric Brown’s pilot notes, he says that the Corsair suffered from poor control harmony which, combined with its long nose, made it a handful in deck landings. The post war history of the two aircraft is irrelevant and whether or not the Hellcat was slower is academic. The Hellcat pilots still shot down at least 40% more Japanese aircraft than the Corsair.
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@ramimariewilson4672 Even if the Hellcat’s K/D was 13:1, that’s still greater than 11:1.
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@ramimariewilson4672 What doesn’t?
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@ramimariewilson4672 I don’t entirely agree. They don’t matter so much if I accept your figure of 13:1 but they do matter if my figure of 19:1. I’ve never seen 13:1 for the Hellcat before. I’ve only seen the 19:1 figure.
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And yet this had very little effect on the way the Japanese fought in WWII. Their highly disciplined pilots, still functioning without radios as late as the end of 1943, employed excellent combat tactics, avoiding dogfighting and attacking out of the sun wherever possible. Their section formation flying was also very good and the oft-quoted stereotypes about the way they are usually said to have fought don't hold a lot of water. The assumptions about altitude are among the least reliable. If the right combat tactics are used, 'getting the maximum performance out of the aircraft' isn't really a part of it. You bounce your opponent, shoot him down before he realises it and go home. The 'maximum advantage' is the same, whatever you fly (within reason; you can't reasonably expect a Wirraway to be competitive with a Zero). The Boelke Dicta held as true in WWII as it did in WWI. But would that be considered 'zoom and boom' tactics? Because that wasn't supposed to be to the Zero's best advantage. Yet that's easily what got them the most kills. By a long way. Very few of their dogfights over Northern Australia were conclusive. Their bounces out of the sun easily brought them greater success.
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The Zero's combat performance rather gives the lie to the idea that its brief was impossible to fulfil. I suggest you read 'Darwin Spitfires', by Anthony Cooper. It will give you an excellent idea of how the Japanese actually used it. Even if the Zero was designed with manoeuvrability in mind, the pilots still observed good combat tactics, like attacking out of the sun. Even after the Battle of Midway, the Japanese were still a formidable force and remained that way probably until at least the end of 1943. Most of their problems, even then, were largely of someone else's making, since the Army and the Navy rarely agreed on much.
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