Comments by "TheThirdMan" (@thethirdman225) on "Neville Chamberlain and the Politics of Appeasement" video.
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@carlireland5049
"Britain and France remained the world’s military superpowers and together were still much more militarily stronger than Nazi Germany in 1938."
They could still have done nothing about it. For a start, the French strategy was to remain within her border behind the Maginot Line. Secondly, Britain's advantages were her navy and air force, neither of which could have done anything to stop the Germans. Absolutely everybody knew this.
"Part of the reason why World War II began with a nine-month period without any fighting between the Western Allies and the Axis was that even at the beginning of the war Germany still needed time to rearm, while the Allied governments were still afraid to send their soldiers into major battles."
Nothing to o with fear. Everything to to do with practical reality. The RAF, for example, could have done virtually nothing, visa a vis bombing because their aircraft lacked any kind of decent payload/range performance. In 1939, when the RAF did attack, they were absolutely shot to bits by the Luftwaffe.
"The Nuremberg tribunals later revealed that the Wehrmacht soldiers reoccupying the Rhineland in 1936 were under orders to retreat with even the slightest Allied resistance."
That's just a tactical withdrawal. The Germans used this to great effect throughout the war. It doesn't mean they were going to lose if attacked. They also knew that France - who had the largest army they would encounter in the west - was configured to support the Maginot Line. To make any kind of attack would run counter to all their training and equipment.
"So I don’t find Britain and France’s defense cuts, even in the context of the Great Depression and the aftermath of World War I, a valid excuse to delay rearmament."
Yeah, history doesn't care about that. The state of Britain's economy in the early 1930s was so parlous that they had to abandon the gold standard. How the hell would they pay back their debts under those circumstances? How would they pay for rearmament? People think this is easy and it just isn't. Secondly, the biggest cuts to defence spending were carried out under the auspices of one W. Churchill when he was Chancellor of the Exchequer in the 1920s. His view was that a pilot in a fighter was no more use than a man on the ground with a rifle. Britain's rearmament program started under Chamberlain in 1937, while Churchill grumbled about 'the years the locusts ate'. Blame shifting if ever I saw it.
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Problem 1:
The Sudetenland was the most heavily fortified part of the country and - as anyone who has traveled through there knows - is steep and difficult for an army to traverse. This area became strategically unimportant (not irrelevant) after the Anschluss because it opened up the whole south eastern border, a place the Czechoslovaks didn't envisage as a potential invasion point. And in contrast to the Sudetenland, it was largely a flat plane and much easier for an army to traverse..
You are correct that Hitler didn't care much about Henlein and Henlein knew it. When someone suggested to him that he go and talk it over with Hitler, he told them he didn't have easy access. At least the man knew where he stood.
Problem 2:
The alliances depended on who was prosecuting an aggressive war. France had an agreement that she would come to the assistance of Czechoslovakia if Czechoslovakia was attacked. The Soviet treaty was much the same. But if France attacked Germany to defend Czechoslovakia (well, you would, wouldn't you?), that would constitute an aggressive war and all bets were probably off. That treaty was largely a sham anyway, since the French had been signing treaties with all and sundry in the interwar years, mostly at the expense of the Soviet Union and in many ways, to get back at their own domestic left wing.
Problem 3:
Britain had no treaty obligations to any of these parties. Chamberlain was nagged into getting involved by the French - mostly Georges Bonnet - and this would be to his own personal cost. It was, in fact, the single biggest mistake he made. The second 'peace in our time' speech was also a mistake.
Problem 3:
This was lot more complicated than it first appears and there is little encouragement for anyone to bother to understand it.
First of all, Chamberlain was a very experienced politician and negotiator. This was established earlier in the video. Hitler was a total noob who had never had to negotiate anything more than his pay packet. When they met at the Berghof, Chamberlain, on the diplomatic principle that you never ask a question you don't already know the answer to, asked Hitler what else he wanted besides the Sudetenland. This left the Fuehrer a little flummoxed because he had expected to be allowed to harangue Chamberlain about the unfair treatment of Sudeten Germans (and Germans generally). Benes was a whole 'nother story. The Czechoslovakian president didn't like the Sudeten Germans and didn't really want them because he thought them troublesome. That said, he wasn't ready to carve off the Sudetenland - or any parts of it - just yet. In May, 1938, the Czechs started their own provocations in the Sudetenland, precipitating something of a crisis which the British tried to resolve through Lord Runicman and the British Mission. Benes, rather than using the opportunity to resolve the problem, spent too much time politicking. He would agree with you one day and disagree with you the next to change the deal. He'd sign something one day and come back the next with a suggestion for changes. He'd tell one person one thing and another person something quite different. Benes was addicted to making deals. He was, in the words of his contemporaries,' too clever by half'. It was this indecision that left him with no choice but to follow French and British military advice.
The other thing that's not known is that the Czechoslovakian government was far from united on the matter. The Prime Minister, Milan Hodza, was a Slovak and the leader of the Agrarian party - the largest in the parliament. They didn't care one way or the other what happened to the Sudeten Germans. They saw them as more trouble than they were worth.
TBC
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Problem 4:
Hitler had a low opinion of Chamberlain but he actually described him as a 'Schlappschwanz', which basically means, 'weak dick'. Hitler's opinion was almost certainly a result of being out-manoeuvred and embarrassed by Chamberlain every time they met.
Chamberlain had an equally low opinion of Hitler and the rest of the Nazi hierarchy, whom he knew to be rank amateurs, addicted to cheap political stunts and theatre. This became overwhelmingly apparent at Godesberg.
Problem 5:
This is the notorious 'Godesberg Memorandum' and caused the biggest blow up of the entire process (which took two weeks and numerous meetings). Hitler and Chamberlain had met the previous day and Hitler had played the ranting tyrant, going on endlessly about the treatment of Germans but not articulating anything that could have been construed to be policy. Chamberlain, unfazed by theatrics, reverted to parliamentarian mode and wrong footed Hitler again, asking him detailed questions to which the Fuehrer had no answer. When they met the next day, Hitler's manner was the congenial mein host as he presented the memorandum to Chamberlain. Chamberlain instantly saw it for what it was: a list of demands and pushed a somewhat embarrassed Hitler for more answers. At some point in this meeting they were interrupted by Ribbentrop - the only one who was actually pursuing a war - who burst into the room. This took on the form of high comedy, rather than the high takes it was meant to and was more like a man slipping on a banana skin.
Ribbentrop announced that the Czechs had mobilised. Chamberlain went pale and said there was nothing more to be said and turned to leave.
Had Chamberlain walked out the result would have been war and everyone knew it.
Ribbentrop buttonholed him and asked about the memorandum. Chamberlain had been briefed on Czech mobilisation and knew it was another Nazi stunt, coming frame the cheapest crook in the pack. He confronted Ribbentrop with the fact that the talk of Czech mobilisation was wrong. He then pointed out that the 'memorandum' was actually a list of demands. Ribbentrop, ever the fool, insisted it was a memorandum because that was what it said on the top! Chamberlain told him that he was more interested in the contents than the title. He then threw the document on the table and left the room. At that stage, the situation was definitely headed for war and Hitler invited Chamberlain back for further discussions the next week.
Problem 6:
Chamberlain gets the blame for this but it was Hitler who issued the invitations. The problem was not the situation. The problem was what the Allies were going to do vis a vis the Sudetenland territorial claims.
Problem 7:
The Czechoslovaks elected not to fight. That was their decision and theirs alone. The Poles fought and fought like hell. The Dutch and the Belgians fought, both without support and knowing they would be defeated. Even the French, despite the legions of pathetic jokes about them, also fought. The Czechs did not fight. So even if the British and French had agreed to go to war over this, it should be screamingly obvious that there was absolutely nothing that would sway the Germans because everyone knew there was nothing they could do about it.
Problem 8:
Britain had not obligation to protect Czechoslovakia. Nil. Nada. She had no treaty agreements with them. End of story.
TBC
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