Comments by "Colonel K" (@Paladin1873) on "Drachinifel" channel.

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  86.  @dovetonsturdee7033  I just finished reading Hore's 22 page article and find it does not actually contradict the article by Barker I recommended. However, Hore does leave out some critical information. The 18 aircraft from Ark Royal that he mentions were part of an earlier plan. The ongoing evacuation at Dunkirk delayed and eventually scraped this plan. I could find no mention by Hore that long range tanks would not be required for the operation. In fact, he quoted Admiral Dudley Pound’s statement that 60 Swordfish were already configured with long range tanks. Pound, however, was incorrect. Only 18 aircraft aboard Glorious had the tanks and they were not presently installed (a process that took a day to complete). The Swordfish that had conducted the 510 mile round-trip mine-laying mission to Stavanger had used them, and it was the results of this test operation which showed one serious flaw in the plan. The aircraft lacked sufficient engine oil to ensure their safe return, two having been lost on the homeward flight from the raid when their oil tanks ran dry. Both articles (Hore and Barker) deal in a degree of conjecture because critical information is missing and won't be released until 100 years has elapsed (a unique and extraordinary secrecy requirement in itself). About the only thing I believe everyone agrees on is that Churchill very much wanted to mine Lulea, and damn the political consequences. It would all be overcome by events shortly as the Germans overran the French iron ore region and the country capitulated. Maybe we'll learn more in 2041 when the official records into the Glorious loss are finally released.
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  125.  @z3r0_35  I don't quite see it that way. I agree that for Germany oil was a critical concern throughout the war, but there were many other factors at play which also prompted the timing and decision to invade the USSR. Prior to hostilities in 1939, Germany imported about 2/3 of its oil from the western hemisphere. This source was effectively shut down by British naval blockades, so Germany upped its imports from Austria, Romania, and even the USSR until they accounted for 1/4th of their oil supply. This was not enough. Even when augmented by synthetic fuel production, which by 1944 had reached more than 124,000 barrels per day before the 8th Air Force and RAF bombed it into the stone age, Germany could not meet its war machine needs. What is most interesting is why from 1940-41 the USSR sold Germany nearly six million barrels of crude oil (about 250 million gallons). Stalin assumed Hitler would invade someday, so he attempted to placate him with a trade agreement. In theory the Nazis could have kept buying oil and grain from the Soviets, but their visceral hatred of the Communists was only rivaled by their hatred of Jews. They wanted to destroy the USSR, eradicate most Slavs, create some living room for an expanded Germanic empire, acquire a breadbasket (Ukraine), and have access to more oil by attacking through the Caucasus and capturing the Soviet oil fields. This last goal would serve the dual purpose of providing the Nazis with much needed oil, while denying it to the Soviets. But why invade in the summer of 1941? Why not attack earlier in the spring or better yet, wait until 1942? One reason is that the German economy was running or borrowed money it could not pay back. So, when in debt, attack your neighbor and steal his wealth (robbing Ivan to pay Paulus). But the Wehrmacht was not built as a strategic expeditionary force, nor did it have suitable numbers of long range bombers to attack Soviet industry behind the Urals. It also lacked a properly sized and equipped armored force for this mission. And it remained primarily dependent upon a horse-drawn transportation system throughout the war. In a protracted war of conquest, logistics is the key to victory, not the mere size, leadership, and training of an army. The deeper the Nazis drove into the USSR, the more they had to detail forces to protect their rear and flanks, and the more they expended transportation resources to feed the needs of the Heer and Luftwaffe. Prior to the start of Operation Barbarossa, Hitler wasted time, aviation resources, and fuel trying to subdue Britain after the fall of France. This forced a crucial delay in the timetable for Operation Barbarossa, which would contribute greatly to German failure in the long run. It also meant the Luftwaffe was not at full strength when their invasion began. But Hitler believed the longer he waited, the more powerful and capable the Soviet military would become. He saw the effects of Stalin's massive purges of his officer corps. Tiny Finland greatly bloodied the Soviets in the Winter War of 1939-40, so Hitler wanted to attack the USSR before the Soviets could correct their leadership deficiencies. Germany was gambling on a short campaign that would cause the Soviet forces to rapidly collapse. German planners did not accurately account for the size of Soviet manpower and materiel reserves, nor did they consider how incredibly stubborn Soviet forces could be. All of these factors came into play. I don't believe any single one dominated the decision to invade or was the cause of Germany's defeat. It was an aggregate effect that led to the invasion, its timing, and its ultimate failure.
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  149. Regarding Admiral Earnest King's reaction after reading a surprising detailed newspaper account of enemy ships involved in the fight, here's a bit more detail. King read the story in the Washington Times-Herald, but it originated in the Chicago Tribune. Like King, FDR was infuriated by the printing of such extremely sensitive information, so much so that he wanted to send Marines to secure the Tribune Tower building and arrest its publisher, Robert McCormick. Cooler heads prevailed, and while the subsequent investigation led to a grand jury investigation, the jury threw out the indictments against the Tribune, its reporter (Australian war correspondent Stanley Johnston), and the Tribune's managing editor (J. Loy "Pat" Maloney) after Navy Secretary Frank Knox refused to allow Navy cryptanalysts to testify. This action effectively nullified the case because these were the only men able to explain and confirm exactly what damage had been done to military operations by the information leak. Without their testimony, the entire matter was rendered mute. At the time this no doubt perplexed those involved in the case, but Knox was acting on the prudent advice of Admiral King, who had come to realize the Japanese had not changed their codes after Midway. This meant they were not aware we had broken them, therefore any public trial would greatly increase the chances of the Japanese discovering the underpinning reason why they were ambushed at Midway. It was far better for the war effort to let sleeping dogs lie. Admiral King, well known for his vindictive nature, had to settle for scuttling the promising career of one of his rising stars, Commander Morton Seligman, the wounded executive officer of the Lexington. King blamed him the most for the security lapse. Seligman was "beached" by direct interference of King and later passed over for promotion to captain. He retired in 1944, still suffering from the effects of his injuries, though the slight from King meant his career was over and he no doubt knew it. War claims all kinds of victims.
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