Comments by "Colonel K" (@Paladin1873) on "TIKhistory"
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I spent 30 years in the military, so I well understand the need for good communications and coordination. I also understand how an organized retreat can be done without suffering the sort of losses the Soviet military did in 1941. The Germans did not engage in constant blitzkrieg. No army does because no army can. Lightening strikes require quick followup by support troops, and preparation for the next strike. The only way to trap your enemy during these attacks and lulls is to cut of his means of escape. This is much easier said than done because the deeper into enemy territory you go, the harder your logistics become. Flank security requires the deployment of more troops, thus further straining your supply chain. As an example, in 1940, the German army was unable to take full advantage of the rapidly unfolding ground situation in France after the success of their initial attacks. They had the French and British forces trapped around Dunkirk, but they lacked the ability to quickly crush them on the ground because the Allies had formed a strong, tight defensive perimeter. The same thing happened to US and UN forces in Korea in 1950 in the retreat to the Pusan peninsula. Stalin, by contrast, did not take advantage of the vast Soviet landscape to begin a strategic withdrawal. Instead, prior to the beginning of Operation Barbarossa, he placed the bulk of his front-line forces in exposed offensive positions. This led to massive Soviet Air Force losses on day one of the attack. The Soviet army in 1941 was quite capable of executing the traditional Russian tactic of trading land for time, but during that crucial time this policy was mostly abandoned by order of Stalin, resulting in millions of men being captured of killed in the first few months of fighting. The blood was on his hands, not that he much cared. Mass murderers never do.
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Vlad, you quote the opinion of Liddell Hart as though it should be accepted as fact, yet there has never been any clear documentation supporting the claim that Hitler issued a stop order so he could negotiate with the British. You also engage in the fallacy of an "either/or argument" without considering other options with regard to Dunkirk. I've little doubt Hitler and his generals were considering any and all options during this phase of battle. If he could have negotiated England out of the war, he would have. If he could have smashed the forces at Dunkirk, he would have. He certainly preferred not to continue the war against England because he had bigger fish to fry - the invasion of the USSR. But he had to contend with the politcla reality that England had a new British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, who steadfastly refused to surrender or negotiation. This put Hitler in the position of having to continue a costly war with England and postponing the timeline for operation Barbarossa, all leading to fatal results in the long run. And to answer your question, yes I would argue with anyone who believes there is a single explanation for the German failure at Dunkirk. As in most battles, there are a number factors that, collectively, will result in defeat or victory. Even before the dust has settled, those responsible are busy touting their genesis or denying their culpability. If you don't believe that, read a couple of books about the American general Mark Clark. One will paint him as a great military leader, while another will claim he was our worst commander, if only for his failure to block the German 10th Army's retreat after the coordinated Allied breakout from Anzio and breaching of the Hitler Line. This is just an example. Similar works have been written by or about other leaders, with Montgomery being perhaps the most egregious example of a selective self-serving memory.
As for Korea, what do you mean by "untrained, unprofessional Korean "troops""? If you are referring to the South Koreans, you would be correct, but North Korea at the start of the war had a professional army built around the Soviet concept of heavy armored forces and fully equipped with Soviet weapons. They steamrolled over the South, despite the mountain ranges, and were only stopped in the Pusan area by the UN buildup of forces and the lack of supplies reaching the North Korean army. Like the Wehrmacht in France and later Russia, their supply line was incapable of sustaining their advance in the face of increasing opposition. The terrain may have differed, but the results were the same, and that is the point I am making. The rest of your comments conveniently ignore the fact that Soviet forces were forward deployed into vulnerable positions, without proper defenses, and were not allowed to redeploy to more effective positions or retreat in a timely fashion by direct order of Stalin. This is well documented historical fact, not supposition. As a military planner, Stalin was a complete imbecile, who had a nasty tendency to shoot anyone he thought too competent (and thus a perceived threat to him), those who might disagree with him, and occasionally, just to keep everyone on their toes, he'd even shoot his loyal sycophants.
To address your last few comments that question my comprehension of rapidly unfolding tactical situations, I should point out that I spent most of my career in logistics, including deployment planning and execution, and command and control. If you think I don't have a grasp on all the factors involvement in military operations, you are mistaken, but you'll have to take my word for it, which it appears you do not.
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