Comments by "Quizmaster China" (@QuizmasterLaw) on "TIKhistory"
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TIK the exact reason Hitler built up the S.S. transforming it from a political security detail to a military formation, a parellel army is Because the Wehrmacht was NOT all kinds of okay with the genocide or massacres which the S.S. went on to commit.
The distinction matters; sure the Wehrmacht committed war crimes. So did the Red Army. So did the U.S. and U.K. armies for that matter. But it was the S.S., and only the S.S. which was purpose built from the ground up as an army for the commission of genocide both in occupation (the Einsatzgruppen) as well as in combat (the Waffen S.S.). Wehrmacht units regularly refused to carry out the Komissar order including orders from the high command. Hitler's response was diabolically clever: keep the army moving forward and Then follow up with the Einsatzgruppen to "finish the job".
btw by 1942 there were no jews left in occupied eastern europe. But that's another issue for another time.
The Soviets are less trustworthy sources than the ex nazis and ex Wehrmacht because of the cold war. The nazis were defeated and their only hope was cooperation. The Soviets were undefeated and so had every interest in secrecy and lies, dezinformatsiya, perhaps you hav heard of it? This doesn't mean we should be uncritical of the Wehrmacht's survivors. But we have to understand their histories in political contexts. German, even ex nazis history though perhaps less reliable than UK or even US histories is much more reliable than pre-1990 soviet hystery rhymes with mystery for a reason.
By now you surely have read about Maskirovka, Tainost, Dezinformatsiya, Kompromat, Aktiivne Meropriyatiye, RIGHT?
Leninism took Sun Tzu's advice that all war is deception to heart and executed that idea with thorough rigor and this fact is reflected in Russian military and political doctrine to this very day. (See: "special warfare", See also, little green men...). We have good cause to be more sceptical of the Soviets account than of the defeated Germans.
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Plenty of people paid in blood to make these words true, and many more would have.
We shall go on to the end, we shall fight in France, we shall fight on the seas and oceans, we shall fight with growing confidence and growing strength in the air, we shall defend our Island, whatever the cost may be, we shall fight on the beaches, we shall fight on the landing grounds, we shall fight in the fields and in the streets, we shall fight in the hills; we shall never surrender, and even if, which I do not for a moment believe, this Island or a large part of it were subjugated and starving, then our Empire beyond the seas, armed and guarded by the British Fleet, would carry on the struggle, until, in God’s good time, the New World, with all its power and might, steps forth to the rescue and the liberation of the old.
The defeat of the USSR, though in fact impossible, would not have ended the war. And the war would have still been won by the allies because of ULTRA and MANHATTAN.
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Probably your statistic is overly generous and/or includes internal deportations. Stalin most certainly did evacuate Jews once it became all to obvious they would simply be murdered. Mostly however, no, apart from internal deportations. Sure, vehicles going into combat zone with troops and ammunition might well have transported out either key personnel or children maybe even women. Most refugees even in W. Europe fled on foot.
This isn't to argue against Stalin's choices or the Russian/Soviet war efforts. But there was no mass evacuation of civilians in Sevastopol, Leningrad, Stalingrad, or anywhere else. Individuals, sure, but an organized effort? Aside from Jews and internal deportations, nope.
если хочешь доказать твой правда здесь, я читаю.
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Ok, this one is very good, you have earned my respect, and no I don't give it away nor to just anyone. You correctly identify the resupply problem which predated(!) the failed airbridge. Now I can fill you in on some details, but we will both be left with more questions than answers (get used to it, murky deals)
Uranus would not have been parried, even if the divisions had not been stripped away. Yes, Uranus had a much easier time of it because of the substitution of less well trained, less well equipped, and fewer Hungarian, Romanian, and Italian troops for German ones. However, the lines still would have been overstretched and with too few tanks to meet
1) mass artillery barrages (deadly effective, consistently ignored in Western analysis: cannons are not sexy, but mass artillery is very very effective)
2) T34 C tanks. They really were much better than anything Germany was fielding in 1942. Sure they were available before, but not in numbers and when available as the inferior A variant with a low velocity cannon.
3) Improved Soviet tactics. All those noobs in 1941 are now either dead or no longer noobs. They are still tactically inferior to Germans but as History shows are now tactically superior to Romanians, Italians, and maybe even Hungarians, unlike 1941. And there are more of them than there are Germans, and they have learned to concentrate their forces for massive local superiority.
4) No fifth column. All those Stalin haters in 1941 are now Hitler haters. There is no fifth column, and was barely one to begin with: Stalin killed or jailed all the fifth column (and lots of other people who were not crypto fascists). He killed many innocent people, but all the guilty ones. Ah, Marxism!
5) Partisans. Like artillery and deception operations Western analysis of Russian and Soviet military tactics ignores and underestimates how useful arty, party, and masky are.
Part of why our analysis sucks is: The Russians WANT our analysis to suck! Do you think Russian or pro-Russian writers want us to understand just what happened and why? No! Because they are always asking themselves "When is the next war" and "What will we do when they invade again". So they lie and lie or at least keep their mouths shut. Ah, Russia!
6) The fascists would still have enormous supply problems. Very far from home, very cold winters.
7) Lend lease. Russia now has trucks and radios and is figuring out how to use them. Lend lease never shipped high quality combat gear to the Communists, duh, instead concentrating on gear which could not be used to beat the west but would be useful in post war reconstruction, yet was vital for the war effort: transit and radios, both lacking in USSR. Smart Roosevelt, very smart!
We can never know or determine the varieties of espionage sabotage and treachery going on in Stalingrad. Paulus flipped. When? Was it sabotage? Was Hitler trying to blood purge the Wehrmacht? Was Hitler trying to blood purge Sixth Army? We know Hitler distrusted the Wehrmacht enough to build an entire new army, the Waffen S.S. We also know Hitler was not above blood purges, just ask the S.A.! Except you can't, they are all dead. So is the Fifth column in Russia (source of supply, intelligence, not to be underestimated: all dead, see, purges. See also: gulags).
The Strategic objective of Stalingrad was to exterminate Russians, just like Leningrad. This is why those cities were never "really" "completely" taken: they were killing fields.
Why the fascist errors? Over confidence. Many believed the Nazi nonsense of genetic superiority or at least that the Russians were racially inferior. Even in 1942. Every battle they had fought so far they won, even the 1941-1942 winter counteroffensive failed.
It's entirely consistent for Hitler to set up two enemies to kill each other. So Stalingrad might not have been a mistake. We will never know for sure about that one.
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""The foreign policy of the fokish state must safeguard the existence on this planet of the race embodied in the state, by creating a healthy, viable natural relation between the nation's population and growth on the one hand and the quantity and quality of its soil on the other hand.
As a healthy relation we may regard only that condition which assures the sustenance of a people on its own soil. Every other condition, even if it endures for hundreds, nay, thousands of years, is nevertheless unhealthy and will sooner or later lead to the injury if not annihilation of the people in question.
Only an adequately large space on this earth assures a nation of freedom of existence.
Moreover, the necessary size of the territory to be settled cannot be judged exclusively on the basis of present requirements, not even in fact on the basis of the yield of the soil compared to the population. For, as I explained in the first volume, under 'German Alliance Policy Before the War,' in addition to its importance as a direct source of a people's food, another significance, that is, a military and political one, must be attributed to the area of a state. If a nation's sustenance as such is assured by the amount of its soil, the safeguarding of the existing soil itself must also be borne in mind. This lies in the general power-political strength of the state, which in turn to no small extent is determined by geo-military considerations.
Hence, the German nation can defend its future only as a world power."
Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf.
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This is another case of Russian/Soviet disinformation, naming formations as larger (or smaller) than they were to disrupt enemy intelligence. On paper Soviet tank corps were tank corps. But in practice some were reduced to divisional or regimental strength. Meanwhile, army/army group/front were anything, literally. Some of them were "ghost" units, only existing in SIGINT and ELINT. Others were seriously understrength as compared to western equivalents. Yet others were severely overstrength in comparison. No Western commentator seems to have publicly connected the strange Soviet/Russian nomenclature with the intelligence war, which is odd, since maskirovka and tainost are integral to Soviet/Russian military doctrine, and disinformation (deza) was and is integral to USSR/Russian foreign relations. I don't think USSR commanders in the field were at all uncertain as to the actual numbers, equipment, and training of their forces. Likewise, some units were very well trained, and others completely untrained, though Soviet training consistently improved throughout the war.
German nomenclature in contrast was consistent and exact, with the exception of the Herman Goerring Parachute Tank Division (I shit you not it actually existed, did have plenty of tanks and wound up corps sized). The Fuehrers Begleit Brigade likewise had a fluctuating table of organization and equipment. Germans consistently underestimated the importance of espionage/intelligence during the war (unlike in the run-up to the war!)
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MHV is much more accurate. Sure, I speak roughly: We're talking about the world's two most brutal dictatorships, fighting the world's bloodiest war. You're gonna meet IRL nazis and IRL Stalinists.
The purges clearly diminished Soviet military effectiveness, as can be seen by comparing Zhukov against Japan to Timoshenko in Finland. So your proposition is a non starter. You equate getting sacked and needing to find a new job (with no blacklist btw) to being sent to a labor camp (-60% survival rate, thin rations, cold cold winters, literal Siberia) ; or just outright shot. And you think that has no effect on morale, initiative or tactical training? It clearly demonstrably did, and much more so than any "purges" in the West. This is all empirical, verifiable.
You're examining the war practices of two brutal dictatorships in the world's bloodiest war. And you expect what, accolades, when you get it wrong?
However, your video on Stalingrad airlift was worth watching.
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You make an interesting argument about the German officer corps, which by the way is new (which doesn't in itself mean its adequate or inadequate, correct or incorrect)
Thing is... the theory you advance is inadequate because it does not account for 1) the political background considerations effecting the general staff, which were frankly chaotic. 2) this theory does not cover the rise of the Waffen S.S. as a parallel military structure.
Politically the 3d Reich was nuts. Hitler advanced the idea of a "Fuehrerprinzip" the leadership principal, that anyone under him had absolut power in their field but was absolutely responsible to him. This allowed some to emerge brilliantly, examples are Speer and also the Todt organization. Others were less effective. Some institutions were in constant crazy chaotic conflict, which was notably the case of the numerous parallel military structures: Luftwaffe ground units (not just parachute troops or AA artillery, nor even only the Herman Goering "Parachute Tank Divsion" which never parachuted and wound up the size of a tank corps). Hitler built these parallel institutions both to concentrate power in his own hand (divide and rule) and also because he knew the Wehrmacht were, shall we say "unenthusiastic". Sure, the tank corps and parachutists were enthusiastic. But regular line divisions were not. To add to this chaos there are various allied armies.
Sometimes Hitlers military judgements were incorrect, sometimes they were correct, the same can be said of Wehrmacht general officers. Perhaps the nazis were compelled to static warfare due to oil, Hitler's military inexperience, or both. However, that is not the same thing as saying that the German general staff's method of waging war changed.
Incidentaly, the USA post war took up the German (Prussian) way of war: broad ranging initiative in lower units, confidence courses, air-land battle, it really is all nothing other than German pre-war military theory with modern telecomm and helicopters.
The fact the USA took up the German military model to me indicates that the German general staff did not change their way of war fighting but were compelled to decisions due to resource shortages and Hitlers tendency to micromanage via Fuehrerdirektive.
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There is a mainstream consensus view that Hitler's micromanagement and especially his "fortress" mentality lost the war and all that went against the German general staff concept. It's certainly the case of Stalingrad and also in operation Bagration, the destruction of army group center. You have elsewhere argued this order was rational due to fuel shortages. I don't regard German fuel shortages as that bad: retreat at Stalingrad was certainly possible at least till November, and also was possible in many other "fortress cities".
A more important reason for Hitler's war losing fortress cities order than oil shortages was distrust of the Wehrmacht. This distrust was so great that Hitler created numerous parallel military structures. The "fortress order" however had this effect" Now his soldiers would fight to their utmost! Even the unwilling, for they have no choice, they are surrounded.
When your military strategy centers on desperation you're probably on the losing side and not a brilliant general.
Another reason for the fortress order, again this has nothing to do with fuel or transport, was to exterminate Russians. Exterminate. (see: Kommissar order. See also: Einsatzgruppen).
Time after time -- this is historical fact -- Hitler would order units with no prospect of relief to stand fast whereafter they were besieged and annihilated. This also happened at Brest in the Western front but most often occured on the east, where most of the fighting was. It wasn't primarily due to oil shortages there are other more accurate explanations.
You are arguing that the German generals, not Hitler, changed tactics. They really didn't. They were however constrained by Hitler, supply, and compelled into winnable battles which they lost the most famous of which is Uranus and Bagration.
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You make leaps which are possible but not necessarily so - without evidence, which is bad historiography. No doubt, 6th army was starving, no doubt 90% of Stalingrad prisoners "never returned" aka died in prison camps. Likewise this is known to be a much higher rate of prison death. An equally (un)supported inference is "Katyn isn't the only time Stalin ordered a mass execution of prisoners."
This is, barring opening of Russian archives (they won't) one of those unknowable questions I pointed out. Expressly or implicitly, the Stalingrad prisoners were to die, whether by starvation, freezing, or shooting. Was it fair? Was it inevitable? More unknowables. It's entirely possible Stalin was in no position to feed them. It is likelier he did not explicitly order them killed because when you are a mass murderer why leave evidence?
You have no evidence for what exactly happened. No one does, except maybe the Lenin Library or some archive in the Aquarium. Yet, you leap!
Why?
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Your desire to know the truth is clearly sincere and a good goal, so is self improvement; unfortunately, at least as to the war in the east the truth often cannot be known. Maskirovka, provokatsiya, tainost were and are basic Russian military principles. Sun Tzu likewise argues, correctly, that "all war is based on deception". Examples of unknowable questions: Was Tukachevsky really plotting to depose Stalin. We will never know. Did Stalin believe Tukachevsky was planning a coup? Probably, but maybe not! Did Hitler truly believe the Jews, Bolsheviks, and Bankers were conspiring against Aryans? Maybe, maybe not! Did Stalin know Hitler was going to attack? Probably. Did Stalin know exactly when? Probably not. Was Tito really a Russian secret agent? Maybe! Did Beria kill Stalin? Quite possibly, but maybe not.
I don't think miitary management, whose object is to kill, incapacitate, and capture the enemy has much to do with business management, which is about production and sale of products. They're two different fields with only few parallels. Many people confuse them, for whatever reason. Anyway, we study past wars to prevent future wars, and failing that - to win them. Again, not much in common with manufacturing distributing and selling products.
Military leadership is often about the willingness to sacrifice one's own life, always about calculated risk taking, and this whilst literally planning to kill people. Furthermore the military environment features lack of food, sleep, shelter, along with extreme physial exertion. There are so many reasons militself leadership has nothing in common with producing and selling products in peace time it's amazes me that people think they have carry over. Both involve groups of people organized to a common purpose, but beyond that they have not much in common.
If you are interested in business management then go and look into that.
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Casualty counts are ALWAYS wrong and should ONLY be seen as estimates!
1) There are three kinds of casualties: killed, wounded, and missing.
Some of the missing turn up later alive and well! others are in fact dead. and some of those missing are also wounded.
2) The "killing" army has every incentive to overestimate the casualties it inflicted. It may or may not have an incentive to underestimate its own casualties: that depends on the war, the politics -- will reporting heavy casualties get me more supplies or replacements or instead will it lead to me being demoted or transferred?
3) When exactly did the casualty occur? That's not always so clear as "oh, at 3 p.m. on tuesday 24 november" sometimes it's "this week" or even "this month" generally though not "this season". So this also leads to inaccuarate counts.
Its also possible that the same person gets counted dead more than once, once for each unit he's a casualty for the platoon, the squad, the company, the regiment the divsion so one person can easily get counted more than once "this regiment had that many, that platoon this many"
4) Of course after the war there are all kinds of political or professional incentives and agendas which can get the count more wrong or less wrong but which in any event vary from the primary source materials.
Casualty counts are only ever estimates: roughly accurate, but only roughly.
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@rickden8362 From what I read the oil produced in the middle east was of lower quality and would not be so suitable.
You imagine Rommel is able to get all kinds of resupply; he can't, because he didn't. He didn't because of the royal air force and the royal navy. Shipping more tanks, if they even reach Africa (many went to the bottom of the sea, thanks ULTRA!) still need fuel and oil. You're also imagining the British would not have stripped Asia of soldiers further, but they would simply have removed even more troops from Asia. So Rommels grand and glorious unsupplied wehraboo advance o to far, very far distant oil fields (where are the refineries? oh, even if there were refineries on site the British would have destroyed them)... well, like most fantasies about the nazis winning yours too ignores facts. Where are all those Germans going to get water, fuel, ammunition hm? How are they going to evacuate their wounded? And when is Stalin going to see that and decide to attack the much reduced number of nazis in Poland? At best, your unrealistic views result in a quicker loss of East Asia. The axis had plenty of oil. In Indonesia and Vietnam. Yet even there it was unable to be used, thanks to the U.S. Navy.
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@stronkveak5917
[T]he very cannibalism of the counterrevolution will convince the nations that there is only one way in which the murderous death agonies of the old society and the bloody birth throes of the new society can be shortened, simplified and concentrated, and that way is revolutionary terror.
“The Victory of the Counter-Revolution in Vienna,” Neue Rheinische Zeitung', 07 November 1848.
Did you not read our articles about the June revolution, and was not the essence of the June revolution the essence of our paper?
Why then your hypocritical phrases, your attempt to find an impossible pretext?
We have no compassion and we ask no compassion from you. When our turn comes, we shall not make excuses for the terror. But the royal terrorists, the terrorists by the grace of God and the law, are in practice brutal, disdainful, and mean, in theory cowardly, secretive, and deceitful, and in both respects disreputable.
The final issue of Neue Rheinische Zeitung (18 May 1849)''Marx-Engels Gesamt-Ausgabe, Vol. VI, p. 503,
K Marx
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