Comments by "Quizmaster China" (@QuizmasterLaw) on "RECOMMENDED! A Fantastic Book for any WW2 Enthusiast" video.

  1. https://www.daad.de/deutschland/studienangebote/sommerkurse/en Do learn German first and wait till you can read German fluently before learning Russian. Knowing German well makes learning Russian much easier. Please also google "Vladimir Skultety" he is a polyglot who is even better at foreign languages than I am. He is on youtube and does tutoring. He is brilliant and a good person. Military History Visualized will surely have good ideas for tutors and such.
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  2. You make an interesting argument about the German officer corps, which by the way is new (which doesn't in itself mean its adequate or inadequate, correct or incorrect) Thing is... the theory you advance is inadequate because it does not account for 1) the political background considerations effecting the general staff, which were frankly chaotic. 2) this theory does not cover the rise of the Waffen S.S. as a parallel military structure. Politically the 3d Reich was nuts. Hitler advanced the idea of a "Fuehrerprinzip" the leadership principal, that anyone under him had absolut power in their field but was absolutely responsible to him. This allowed some to emerge brilliantly, examples are Speer and also the Todt organization. Others were less effective. Some institutions were in constant crazy chaotic conflict, which was notably the case of the numerous parallel military structures: Luftwaffe ground units (not just parachute troops or AA artillery, nor even only the Herman Goering "Parachute Tank Divsion" which never parachuted and wound up the size of a tank corps). Hitler built these parallel institutions both to concentrate power in his own hand (divide and rule) and also because he knew the Wehrmacht were, shall we say "unenthusiastic". Sure, the tank corps and parachutists were enthusiastic. But regular line divisions were not. To add to this chaos there are various allied armies. Sometimes Hitlers military judgements were incorrect, sometimes they were correct, the same can be said of Wehrmacht general officers. Perhaps the nazis were compelled to static warfare due to oil, Hitler's military inexperience, or both. However, that is not the same thing as saying that the German general staff's method of waging war changed. Incidentaly, the USA post war took up the German (Prussian) way of war: broad ranging initiative in lower units, confidence courses, air-land battle, it really is all nothing other than German pre-war military theory with modern telecomm and helicopters. The fact the USA took up the German military model to me indicates that the German general staff did not change their way of war fighting but were compelled to decisions due to resource shortages and Hitlers tendency to micromanage via Fuehrerdirektive.
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  3. You describe a counterintuitive and probably ahistorical theory, with alternative explanations which can be literally provided in one paragraph. You yourself point out the book you review uses not one Russian language citation, presumably also nothing at least (unreliably!) translated from Russian. This to me makes it not worth my (limited) time to read. It's fine that the gent wishes to contrary my own views, but then he also has the burden of making his case, and proving his point. Inadequate sources deprive his argument of any credibility, particularly as his views go against the mainstream.
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  4. As to Why I post it (other than the love of truth and hatred of lies, half truths, and disinformation): I figure you are determined and motivated and so you deserve some ideas and guides which will drive your own research. The position you (implicitly) advance here means it's proponent also has to prove the point. It's an interesting hypothesis, because it contraries the mainstream, so maybe after determined research it may prove true? I'm not holding my breath, but disciplined research does turn up counterintuitive view and views contrary to the mainstream. So by all means work this angle, just understand it's probably incorrect but may (or may not) lead to other useful insights. I don't regard it as unworthy of research, but yeah, it's a contrarian view.
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  5. There is a mainstream consensus view that Hitler's micromanagement and especially his "fortress" mentality lost the war and all that went against the German general staff concept. It's certainly the case of Stalingrad and also in operation Bagration, the destruction of army group center. You have elsewhere argued this order was rational due to fuel shortages. I don't regard German fuel shortages as that bad: retreat at Stalingrad was certainly possible at least till November, and also was possible in many other "fortress cities". A more important reason for Hitler's war losing fortress cities order than oil shortages was distrust of the Wehrmacht. This distrust was so great that Hitler created numerous parallel military structures. The "fortress order" however had this effect" Now his soldiers would fight to their utmost! Even the unwilling, for they have no choice, they are surrounded. When your military strategy centers on desperation you're probably on the losing side and not a brilliant general. Another reason for the fortress order, again this has nothing to do with fuel or transport, was to exterminate Russians. Exterminate. (see: Kommissar order. See also: Einsatzgruppen). Time after time -- this is historical fact -- Hitler would order units with no prospect of relief to stand fast whereafter they were besieged and annihilated. This also happened at Brest in the Western front but most often occured on the east, where most of the fighting was. It wasn't primarily due to oil shortages there are other more accurate explanations. You are arguing that the German generals, not Hitler, changed tactics. They really didn't. They were however constrained by Hitler, supply, and compelled into winnable battles which they lost the most famous of which is Uranus and Bagration.
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