Comments by "Mitch Richards" (@mitchrichards1532) on "TIKhistory"
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I read it, along with several books by Glantz, Stahel, Keegan, etc. Suvorov/Rezun wrote a simplistic story based on a theory and his facts are mostly just anecdotal evidence while at the same time he ignores far better sources and information.
He lists divisions and corps that the Soviets supposedly had but really only existed on paper. How does a Soviet tank corps that has 40% fill of personnel, 30% of its equipment, is mostly untrained, and is missing key personnel fight a war? Many Soviet units fit that description and were in danger of evaporating in space as they left their assembly areas without proper leadership, proper communications gear, and no ability to coordinate logistical support, artillery, or even communicate with higher. They didn't fight poorly because they were surprised, they fought poorly because that is all you could expect from any unit in that early state of development.
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@davemac1197 Your idea of military strategy is demonstrating concepts better applied to the operational level, not the strategic level which 100% involves politics. SHAEF G4 is just one staff component, one war fighting function that gets a say in informing the Commander. In this situation of what to do in Aug/Sep of 1944, the G2 and G5 would be far more influential in shaping the decisions of leadership. G2 provides the enemy situation, their capabilities, etc. and the G5 is taking that into consideration against Allied capabilities (which includes G4 statistics, etc.) within the confines of an overall strategy.
After Falaise, German transportation and logistics were a shambles, and the opportunity to liberate France on the cheap was there to be had as a result. The broad front was a low risk/high reward proposition that put great pressure on the Germans everywhere at the same time while also serving the political agenda in regard to restoring France as a power.
Monty's ideas are sound at the operational level and make sense given the situation, but they are riskier, remain below the level of grand strategy, not synced with the Tehran agreements, and inferior to the broad front in terms of coalition warfare.
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It's interesting to watch people who think they are so intelligent and discerning about history, propaganda, etc. fall for the most basic and elementary sales tactics. In regard to a sales hook, or simply the laws of supply and demand, people remain prone to falling for "secret" information, or since it claims to be suppressed, censored, or controversial, it MUST be true. This defies logic, but human psychology isn't about logic, it's about emotion.
Irving knew this, it was his style and how he captivated an audience. Academic criticism of his work only makes his audience defensive of him. His career is better as a case study in psychology than it is history. He was a great salesman who knew his customers.
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@reichstreu3362 In regard to "Eisenhower's Death Camps". If you support that theory, how do you account for Wehrmacht MIA distribution? To mean, the Wehrmacht unit and personnel records track last known whereabouts of missing personnel, of which we know how many went missing, on what front and when. If 1.1 million remain MIA on the Eastern Front and 41,000 in the West, what front is the "missing million" located? Check out this video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SXTGfG3mlXA at the 4:45 to 5:20 mark. And also: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0WpAMCD1jHo at 2:10
Each Wehrmacht Soldier, living or dead, has a unit personnel file with their status, deceased (when, where, where buried), alive (current address) Missing (last known whereabouts, any efforts to locate, family requests, etc.).
Where does this information factor in your belief or faith in "Eisenhower's Death Camps" since it clearly demonstrates that there was no mass death there. You know?...no bodies ever found, not even pics of bodies or even starving men?
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There is much mention of better trained officers coming out of the academies/schoolhouses to replace older officers of the Civil War era. First of all, an officer coming out of an academy or schoolhouse is a STUDENT being thrown into a position of leadership without the luxury of a Western style NCO cadre to lean on. They know the schoolhouse process, solution, etc. and that's it. According to COL David Glantz, most of them came into a situation where there weren't enough officers to keep up with the overly rapid expansion of the Red Army, so most were put into levels of command one or two levels higher than what they were trained for. You cannot assume that a schoolhouse adequately trains an officer to be proficient at their job, that is actually rare even in Western armies.
Now picture a freshly trained student/officer taking command at a level above his training with a unit lacking manpower, specialists, equipment, and training, then being thrown into combat against an enemy that is far superior. That kind of explains what happened in 1941, no?
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Horses were really not an issue, the key to German logistics was the railroad. Logistics works in echelons, the rail lines carry the bulk supplies to the Army railhead, trucks carry it to Corps depots, trucks carry it to Divisions, trucks carry it to Brigade level, then you may or may not have horses. The Infantry divisions used a lot of horses to drag artillery, field kitchens, equipment wagons, etc., but still had trucks for connecting back to Corps depots. Horses only operated at the tactical/short range level. There were no long roads back to Germany full of horses.
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The information environment in the collective West is open, very few controls, which makes us very vulnerable to information warfare conducted by Russia and China. They actively seek to exploit our divisions, fan any flames of discontent, and make us less likely to want to stand together as they look to gobble up Ukraine, Eastern Europe, Taiwan, and replace the West across the world economy.
When it comes to these speeches, I immediately wonder who created these and why? It's not some sort of useful public service, or history curiosity, and the timing with the Israeli/Hamas/Hezbollah/Iran issue seems to be an obvious driver.
Who is pushing these and why? Who is looking to create dissent and what's the ultimate agenda?
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"Please explain why Stalin dismantled the Stalin Line":
When the Soviets signed the Nazi-Soviet Pact and dismembered Poland, occupied the Baltic States; the border moved West which made the Stalin line obsolete in terms of geographical location and doctrine. The line was too far back to support Red Army doctrine of multi-echeloned defense/counter-attack. The enemy was to be stopped at the border before the 2nd echelon counter-attacked. A new defensive line was being built further West to meet doctrinal requirements, it was shorter and thus cheaper also. As it was being built, the Germans unexpectedly quickly defeated the French. This hastened the pace of the building of the new line, and hastened the moving of the old line's weapons and equipment to the new locations. The Soviets did not have the resources and manpower in peacetime to man and equip both lines. War was not expected in 1941, therefore the Stalin line's weapons and equipment were removed, stored for future installation, etc. Properly stored weapons, ammunition, etc. don't require maintenance or manning, thus time and money are saved.
This is all explained in detail from original Soviet documents in multiple books.
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@paulmarren7970 You're not following... Irving made Holo caust denial statements, he made rac ist statements, so she referred to him as such in her book. He sued her for libel, his speeches, lectures, interviews, jokes, articles, etc. were referenced and it was proven that he was what she said he was. He was a denier at the time and remains a ra cist.
When you freely make comments of that nature in public, often, on the record, and someone calls you out on it, its not wise to try and capitalize on libel when you're guilty. Irving found that out the hard way.
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lol, you repeat all the Suvorov/Rezun B S like a parrot. Do you say 1 million like Dr Evil?
1 Million paratroopers... Ok genius, name the drop aircraft and how many the Soviets had on hand. If you have "1 million" paratroopers and a handful of limited aircraft, do you really have any offensive airborne capability? (F no you don't!)
The Soviets had 27k tanks, of which about 2000 were new models, and of the rest, about one in five actually worked (due to being old, worn out, etc). On paper the Russians have thousands of tanks today, but they can only field about 2500 in Ukraine. They never throw anything out and they tell the world how many they have and how strong they are to intimidate; these things don't change.
Oh and the tanks that could run on the autobahn that Suvorov talks about? That was a failed design copied from a British tank, and oh yeah... It might be of interest that there was NO AUTOBAHN when those tanks were designed and built. LMAO
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@aloz52 Nope, the physical evidence is the Red Army on 22 June 1941. Regardless of a dubious story about a secret document, what was actually carried out is tangible physical evidence. MP41 and DP41 as carried out are what matters, not a supposed document that claims something that is essentially facts not in evidence. The Red Army in the Western Military Districts of the Soviet Union is Summer of 1941 was not capable of strategic action. The men, material, logistical base and tactical dispositions do not support Suvorov's or any other Soviet offensive plans theory. What part of this isn't clear. The Red Army's offensive striking power was their Tank Corps, have you bothered to look up where they were and what state they were in as of June 22 1941???? Only 2 of them were near combat capable, the rest were still being formed. The process of forming tank corps takes months, and thats before they can even start training for corps level operations! Seriously...the conspiracy BS is like crack to you people. You don't know what you don't know, so you avoid actual critical analysis and go for the easy answer. Join a real military history forum, be humble. I did that literally 20 years, an MA in WWII military history and several visits to former Eastern front battle sites later. Stop drinking the conspiracy kool aid.
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@AK-qy5iw Skydiving was a youth sport? Ya ok...
The Red Air Force had no drop aircraft. Solve that issue.
The 25k tanks were obsolete, worn out, very few worked, they were no longer being produced and had no spare parts production. That just a few issues... Now throw in that the Tank Corps were only forming up in 1941, and had no trained crews, supporting arms, logistics support, etc. The few T34 and KV tanks were brand new, lacked crews, lacked ammunition, radios, spare parts, etc.
David Glantz makes all of this clear and used Red Army documents that you can actually check...unlike Rezun's BS.
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user-wj6dt5bq3w What exactly is there to disagree with when looking at Red Army strength, dispositions, and force readiness is Summer of 1941? I'm talking specifics by unit, by personnel and equipment. I know how long it takes to train personnel, train a unit, equip, deploy, and what it takes to sustain a unit in the field. A thorough investigation of the Red Army in 1941 reveals beyond any doubt whatsoever that they were not going to attack in 1941. I will debate anyone face to face on that... Anyone. I have 30 years in the military, studied Russian doctrine, have an MA in WWII military history, etc. I trained Ukrainians last year... I'm a professional, not an amateur. Just putting that out there to avoid low level banter on the topic.
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user-wj6dt5bq3w I did not cite a bogus point, I referenced THE point. Military capability of what is possible or not possible is THE point. In the Khalkin Gol campaign of 1939 it took the Red Army about 6 weeks to build forces and overcome a single Japanese Infantry division. It took them 4 weeks to build up a reinforced Corps to do the job. Now look at the Western Mil Districts with their 76 Corps that were understrength, underequipped, undertrained, under supplied, and in many cases still forming. Key indicators include war time establishment of trucks was below 30%, which means Red Army logistics cannot function in the field or support operations (offensive or defensive). Logistical hubs, nodes, and requisite stockpiles for offensive operations were not established or even in the process of being established and no order for that purpose has ever been found or mentioned anywhere.
You or the authors you mention cannot deny these indicators, and the Red Army of 1941 could not conduct offensive operations without them being addressed, its physically impossible, and it takes time measured in months to address.
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@dayswithoutjewishtricks0416 Totally false and completely unimaginative BS response...
There is a definition of what a fact is, a definitive " historical method" (look up the term) used to establish facts, and revisionism does NOT recognize established fact or use the methodology to provide them. Revisionism remains much more of a faith based approach to History and relies on distortion, fabrication, etc. It appeals to people with a psychological need to be "in the know", "see things others don't", and above all, a need to feel in control of the world around them and not be a "sheep". That's you dude, and its all in YOUR head, just a bunch of self serving BS. Look up "conspiracy psychology" and you'll find that they have your profile, and they can accurately predict your reaction to information that F's with your self image as someone who thinks they can see through everything. Thank the cyber age for your world view, you're just an average Joe that's going along with the trends of the moment. "Awake", Red Pill, etc. is just the fad of the day. You have a retro mullet too? lol
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@svyatoslavleonenko9787 Hmmmm, combat ready... So, a formation with say 1000 tanks. How many trucks does that number of tanks require for logistics? It seems that the Soviets got that calculation wrong in a big way, no? Maybe thats because they only started forming units of that size 10 months prior to Op Barbarossa and didn;t have time to fully man, equip and train them to be able to operate as a unit and learn the lessons that come from that? If your 1,000 tank unit lacks trucks, lacks mechanics, lacks wireless radios to coordinate refuel, re-arm, maintenance, etc. and is untrained in large scale operations, is that combat capable? If so, by who's definition? Now, take that 1,000 tank unit and subtract hundreds of tanks and thousands of men, while still keeping it more or less untrained and how do you think it will do in combat with a 1st class enemy. So tell me about the battle of Brody and how the Soviet tank corps performed and why they performed that way?
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@svyatoslavleonenko9787 "Because that quantity of sov. troops was impossible to withdraw ". Not true, they're strategic dispositions clearly show they were spread over a great distance in width and depth. Many were engaged in building new defensive fortifications while stripping the old Stalin line. In order for the Red Army to conduct a strategic attack as Suvorov suggests, they required a mobilization of motorized assets from the Soviet industrial and civilian sector, which takes many weeks. There is no order to that effect or any evidence it was being done. It was however in the orders for Soviet mobilization, which were not executed. How do you account for the Red Army supposedly planning to attack and ignoring their own mobilization requirements in regard to the lifeblood of logistical support to their decisive maneuver units??? Just how do you conduct a strategic attack with undermanned, under equipped, under-trained Tank Corps that rely on a fraction of the logistical support required and those trucks are 4x2 with minimal cross country capability? Every Soviet offensive from Khalkin Gol, Finland, Saturn, Uranus, Neptune, Bagration, etc. that included a massive stockpile prior to the offensive, as well as deception and surprise, but this ONE single time, the largest offensive ever for the Red Army they decided to ignore all of their own expertise and just roll the dice? lol, seriously? Suvorov's theory is for fools...
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@svyatoslavleonenko9787 lol, ok you quoted tank statistics without anything else in the combined arms team or logistics... Hmmm, Wehrmacht, 600,000 motor vehicles with a 95% readiness rate. Soviet readiness rates? Probably around 50-60% on paper. In reality it was much lower. Why? Dunno...maybe because motorized equipment requires trained mechanics, with shop space, with tool sets, with electricity, with spare parts and service kits, oil and lubricants, etc. The Red Army went through a massive expansion during the purges and had a small fraction of the leadership that was required to man all of its units. If everyone is new, mostly incompetent...then who the Fck is training who???? The blind leading the blind??? Tell me again about the battle of Brody? Why did the Soviet formations of 1,000 tanks lose most of their strength before combat even happened?
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@svyatoslavleonenko9787 BTW: "Another problem stemmed from the failure to fully equip tank units like the mechanized corps with the vast range of other vehicles needed to make them truly mobile and effective formations. For instance, in terms of supporting the maintenance heavy mechanized corps, no less the vast numbers of rifle corps forming the Red Army's bulk, the Red Army of June 1941 was supposed to have 836,000 motor vehicles and tractors/prime movers on hand. Instead, it could only marshal 314,200 such vehicles on its books. Worse yet, only 77% of those were even in running condition. Fuel shortages were also endemic in spite of the fact that the Soviet Union was one of the world's leading oil producers. Some units, such as the 33rd Tank Division, reported shortages in fuel, oil, and lubricants reaching well over 90 percent in the days prior to the onset of the German invasion. Among other things, this meant that the basis for supporting mobile operations was almost completely lacking - a huge problem given the comparative advantages enjoyed by the Wehrmacht in fighting a war of maneuvour. Again this shows where sheer numbers hardly tell the whole story. After all, the Red Army's tank park dwarfed the Wehrmacht's own tank strength. And, in the first five months of 1941 some 1,503 of the 1,684 tanks rolling from Soviet factories were T-34 and KV-1's .But how many of these tanks really could be used? Or for that matter, how well could the Red Army even fight, given shortages in trucks were far from the only problem." http://globeatwar.com/article/state-red-army-june-22-1941
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Hit ler was a failed artist and a former Corporal in the Army, that was his education level. He was an ignorant bigot with strong opinions. Take that description and picture him in a room of military staff officers advising him of enemy capabilities, possible options, etc. He did NOT have the education, acumen, or experience to fully understand what they were telling him, lacked the ability to see errors, omissions, other opportunities, etc. If you look closely at key situations, where he was adamant about his own decisions in the face of contrary advice, you can see his simplemindedness very clearly. He was actually a classic case of Dunning-Kruger. Not a madman, just a simpleton in way over his head and the weight of the situation destroyed his mental health by 1943.
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15,000 Soviet tanks.... The main reason is that the Soviets never threw anything out. Of that 15,000 tanks, less than 1,800 were new. The majority were old, unserviceable, awaiting parts for repair, etc. Their readiness rate was absolutely terrible. 15,000 on paper with about 3,500 operational. The Soviet Western Military Districts had 2.6 million men in them, that's a front about 1,500 miles wide and 300 miles deep (5.7 Soldiers per sq mile average). The Armored units were more than a day's march from the border, not co-located with their fuel and ammunition supplies and as previously said, were not in any shape for operations. Does that sound like an attack plan? lol
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Interesting video, but for me the clarification to the numbers game starts with Wehrmacht statistics for "Vermisste" (Missing). There is a much clearer statistical set for the number of men known to have gone missing in the East, from unit records, personnel records, etc. Whether those men were KIA, died from wounds later, were captured and executed, etc. before being processed as Soviet POWs doesn't matter. What matters is ensuring that the number of men lost, on what front, when, is captured as accurately as possible. If there is any ambiguity, opportunists like James Bacque will show up like vultures and try to capitalize. If Germany had 3.2 million men MIA on the Eastern Front and 1.92 million were later repatriated, it still means that 1.3 million men were lost on THAT front. Comparing sources and estimates over POW death rates without MIA context leaves room for Bacque or other "revisionists" to create their false distorted narratives.
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You would have been far better off showing the German squad and company TOE vs a Soviet squad/platoon/company. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-rKRt5zVZgw A comparison like that clearly shows the firepower of each formation.
That and German tactics revolved around the MG, not just at the squad level, but all they way to battalion. An Infantry battalion had a full MG company, as well as a lot of other MGs. Depending on the quality of the formation, they could have MG34, MG42, MG08/15, ZB26, MG13, MG81 ground mount, etc. They also made about 500k Semi-auto rifles, another 450k Sturmgewehrs, and soaked up a lot of older MP28, MP34, MP35, and also used Italian Beretta 38 sub guns.
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