Comments by "Mitch Richards" (@mitchrichards1532) on "Why You NEED to Think Critically | Suvorov and Keitel's "Preemptive Strike" 1941 Idea" video.
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I read it, along with several books by Glantz, Stahel, Keegan, etc. Suvorov/Rezun wrote a simplistic story based on a theory and his facts are mostly just anecdotal evidence while at the same time he ignores far better sources and information.
He lists divisions and corps that the Soviets supposedly had but really only existed on paper. How does a Soviet tank corps that has 40% fill of personnel, 30% of its equipment, is mostly untrained, and is missing key personnel fight a war? Many Soviet units fit that description and were in danger of evaporating in space as they left their assembly areas without proper leadership, proper communications gear, and no ability to coordinate logistical support, artillery, or even communicate with higher. They didn't fight poorly because they were surprised, they fought poorly because that is all you could expect from any unit in that early state of development.
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"Please explain why Stalin dismantled the Stalin Line":
When the Soviets signed the Nazi-Soviet Pact and dismembered Poland, occupied the Baltic States; the border moved West which made the Stalin line obsolete in terms of geographical location and doctrine. The line was too far back to support Red Army doctrine of multi-echeloned defense/counter-attack. The enemy was to be stopped at the border before the 2nd echelon counter-attacked. A new defensive line was being built further West to meet doctrinal requirements, it was shorter and thus cheaper also. As it was being built, the Germans unexpectedly quickly defeated the French. This hastened the pace of the building of the new line, and hastened the moving of the old line's weapons and equipment to the new locations. The Soviets did not have the resources and manpower in peacetime to man and equip both lines. War was not expected in 1941, therefore the Stalin line's weapons and equipment were removed, stored for future installation, etc. Properly stored weapons, ammunition, etc. don't require maintenance or manning, thus time and money are saved.
This is all explained in detail from original Soviet documents in multiple books.
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lol, you repeat all the Suvorov/Rezun B S like a parrot. Do you say 1 million like Dr Evil?
1 Million paratroopers... Ok genius, name the drop aircraft and how many the Soviets had on hand. If you have "1 million" paratroopers and a handful of limited aircraft, do you really have any offensive airborne capability? (F no you don't!)
The Soviets had 27k tanks, of which about 2000 were new models, and of the rest, about one in five actually worked (due to being old, worn out, etc). On paper the Russians have thousands of tanks today, but they can only field about 2500 in Ukraine. They never throw anything out and they tell the world how many they have and how strong they are to intimidate; these things don't change.
Oh and the tanks that could run on the autobahn that Suvorov talks about? That was a failed design copied from a British tank, and oh yeah... It might be of interest that there was NO AUTOBAHN when those tanks were designed and built. LMAO
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user-wj6dt5bq3w What exactly is there to disagree with when looking at Red Army strength, dispositions, and force readiness is Summer of 1941? I'm talking specifics by unit, by personnel and equipment. I know how long it takes to train personnel, train a unit, equip, deploy, and what it takes to sustain a unit in the field. A thorough investigation of the Red Army in 1941 reveals beyond any doubt whatsoever that they were not going to attack in 1941. I will debate anyone face to face on that... Anyone. I have 30 years in the military, studied Russian doctrine, have an MA in WWII military history, etc. I trained Ukrainians last year... I'm a professional, not an amateur. Just putting that out there to avoid low level banter on the topic.
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user-wj6dt5bq3w I did not cite a bogus point, I referenced THE point. Military capability of what is possible or not possible is THE point. In the Khalkin Gol campaign of 1939 it took the Red Army about 6 weeks to build forces and overcome a single Japanese Infantry division. It took them 4 weeks to build up a reinforced Corps to do the job. Now look at the Western Mil Districts with their 76 Corps that were understrength, underequipped, undertrained, under supplied, and in many cases still forming. Key indicators include war time establishment of trucks was below 30%, which means Red Army logistics cannot function in the field or support operations (offensive or defensive). Logistical hubs, nodes, and requisite stockpiles for offensive operations were not established or even in the process of being established and no order for that purpose has ever been found or mentioned anywhere.
You or the authors you mention cannot deny these indicators, and the Red Army of 1941 could not conduct offensive operations without them being addressed, its physically impossible, and it takes time measured in months to address.
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@svyatoslavleonenko9787 Hmmmm, combat ready... So, a formation with say 1000 tanks. How many trucks does that number of tanks require for logistics? It seems that the Soviets got that calculation wrong in a big way, no? Maybe thats because they only started forming units of that size 10 months prior to Op Barbarossa and didn;t have time to fully man, equip and train them to be able to operate as a unit and learn the lessons that come from that? If your 1,000 tank unit lacks trucks, lacks mechanics, lacks wireless radios to coordinate refuel, re-arm, maintenance, etc. and is untrained in large scale operations, is that combat capable? If so, by who's definition? Now, take that 1,000 tank unit and subtract hundreds of tanks and thousands of men, while still keeping it more or less untrained and how do you think it will do in combat with a 1st class enemy. So tell me about the battle of Brody and how the Soviet tank corps performed and why they performed that way?
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@svyatoslavleonenko9787 "Because that quantity of sov. troops was impossible to withdraw ". Not true, they're strategic dispositions clearly show they were spread over a great distance in width and depth. Many were engaged in building new defensive fortifications while stripping the old Stalin line. In order for the Red Army to conduct a strategic attack as Suvorov suggests, they required a mobilization of motorized assets from the Soviet industrial and civilian sector, which takes many weeks. There is no order to that effect or any evidence it was being done. It was however in the orders for Soviet mobilization, which were not executed. How do you account for the Red Army supposedly planning to attack and ignoring their own mobilization requirements in regard to the lifeblood of logistical support to their decisive maneuver units??? Just how do you conduct a strategic attack with undermanned, under equipped, under-trained Tank Corps that rely on a fraction of the logistical support required and those trucks are 4x2 with minimal cross country capability? Every Soviet offensive from Khalkin Gol, Finland, Saturn, Uranus, Neptune, Bagration, etc. that included a massive stockpile prior to the offensive, as well as deception and surprise, but this ONE single time, the largest offensive ever for the Red Army they decided to ignore all of their own expertise and just roll the dice? lol, seriously? Suvorov's theory is for fools...
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@svyatoslavleonenko9787 lol, ok you quoted tank statistics without anything else in the combined arms team or logistics... Hmmm, Wehrmacht, 600,000 motor vehicles with a 95% readiness rate. Soviet readiness rates? Probably around 50-60% on paper. In reality it was much lower. Why? Dunno...maybe because motorized equipment requires trained mechanics, with shop space, with tool sets, with electricity, with spare parts and service kits, oil and lubricants, etc. The Red Army went through a massive expansion during the purges and had a small fraction of the leadership that was required to man all of its units. If everyone is new, mostly incompetent...then who the Fck is training who???? The blind leading the blind??? Tell me again about the battle of Brody? Why did the Soviet formations of 1,000 tanks lose most of their strength before combat even happened?
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@svyatoslavleonenko9787 BTW: "Another problem stemmed from the failure to fully equip tank units like the mechanized corps with the vast range of other vehicles needed to make them truly mobile and effective formations. For instance, in terms of supporting the maintenance heavy mechanized corps, no less the vast numbers of rifle corps forming the Red Army's bulk, the Red Army of June 1941 was supposed to have 836,000 motor vehicles and tractors/prime movers on hand. Instead, it could only marshal 314,200 such vehicles on its books. Worse yet, only 77% of those were even in running condition. Fuel shortages were also endemic in spite of the fact that the Soviet Union was one of the world's leading oil producers. Some units, such as the 33rd Tank Division, reported shortages in fuel, oil, and lubricants reaching well over 90 percent in the days prior to the onset of the German invasion. Among other things, this meant that the basis for supporting mobile operations was almost completely lacking - a huge problem given the comparative advantages enjoyed by the Wehrmacht in fighting a war of maneuvour. Again this shows where sheer numbers hardly tell the whole story. After all, the Red Army's tank park dwarfed the Wehrmacht's own tank strength. And, in the first five months of 1941 some 1,503 of the 1,684 tanks rolling from Soviet factories were T-34 and KV-1's .But how many of these tanks really could be used? Or for that matter, how well could the Red Army even fight, given shortages in trucks were far from the only problem." http://globeatwar.com/article/state-red-army-june-22-1941
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15,000 Soviet tanks.... The main reason is that the Soviets never threw anything out. Of that 15,000 tanks, less than 1,800 were new. The majority were old, unserviceable, awaiting parts for repair, etc. Their readiness rate was absolutely terrible. 15,000 on paper with about 3,500 operational. The Soviet Western Military Districts had 2.6 million men in them, that's a front about 1,500 miles wide and 300 miles deep (5.7 Soldiers per sq mile average). The Armored units were more than a day's march from the border, not co-located with their fuel and ammunition supplies and as previously said, were not in any shape for operations. Does that sound like an attack plan? lol
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