Comments by "david boi" (@davidboi4025) on "Hindustan Times" channel.

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  133. The Houthis were added to the list of FTOs in a last-minute designation by the Trump administration on January 19, 2021. President Biden revoked the designation based on humanitarian concerns on February 12, 2021; however, the Houthis’ attacks targeting commercial shipping in the Red Sea have renewed the debate about listing the group as an FTO. The Department of State is the U.S. agency tasked with designating foreign groups as terrorist organizations if those groups meet the legal criteria in section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), as amended: (1) It must be a foreign organization; (2) The organization must engage in terrorist activity . . . or terrorism, . . . or retain the capability and intent to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism; [and] (3) The organization’s terrorist activity or terrorism must threaten the security of U.S. nationals or the national security (national defense, foreign relations, or the economic interests) of the United States. The Annex of Statistical Information that the Department of State released on April 15, 2023, uses three inclusion criteria to determine whether an incident should be deemed a terrorist incident: (1) The violent act aims to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal; (2) The violent act includes evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to an audience (or audiences) larger than the immediate victims; [and] (3) The violent act occurred outside the precepts of international humanitarian law insofar as it targeted non-combatants. Based on the Department of State’s legal criteria, the Houthis meet the first and second criteria because the Houthis are a foreign organization that engages in terrorist activity. Concerning the third criterion, strong evidence shows that Houthis directly targeted U.S. nationals and U.S. national security. For example, Houthi missile attacks in January 2022 targeted a military base in Abu Dhabi with 2,000 American troops stationed at the facility. Its ballistic missiles struck three commercial ships, and a U.S. warship shot down three drones in self-defense during the assault in December 2023. Its another attack hit a US-owned container ship with a ballistic missile in Gulf of Aden on January 15, 2024. Based on the Department of State’s inclusion criteria, the Houthis meet the first criterion because they are fighting against the internationally recognized Hadi government in Yemen to achieve the following political, economic, religious, and social goals: reverse economic underdevelopment, end political marginalization, and achieve greater autonomy in Houthi-majority regions. The Houthis also meet the second criterion because their violent acts are intended to send a message to the entire country of Yemen and neighboring countries. As one example of evidence of this intent, the Houthis attacked Saudi Arabia numerous times from 2018 to 2023, mostly with drones and missile launches from Yemen. Within Yemen, the GRID records that the Houthis were the perpetrators of 1909 attacks from 2018 to 2022. Finally, the Houthis meet the third criterion. Again, according to the Annex of Statistical Information, it is clear that the Houthis’ violent acts targeted non-combatants because 29 percent of the victims were civilians. To conclude, given the capacity of the Houthis to commit violent acts and the involvement of regional powers in the conflict in Yemen, it would not be wrong to conclude that the Yemeni conflict and the death of innocent Yemeni civilians will continue. Houthis will be a strong pawn in the game played by Tehran and serve the interests of its regime in the region. The United States removed Houthis from the list of FTOs due to humanitarian concerns in 2021, but its growing threat in the region has pushed Houthis to knock on the door of the terrorist list.
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  186. The Houthis were added to the list of FTOs in a last-minute designation by the Trump administration on January 19, 2021. President Biden revoked the designation based on humanitarian concerns on February 12, 2021; however, the Houthis’ attacks targeting commercial shipping in the Red Sea have renewed the debate about listing the group as an FTO. The Department of State is the U.S. agency tasked with designating foreign groups as terrorist organizations if those groups meet the legal criteria in section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), as amended: (1) It must be a foreign organization; (2) The organization must engage in terrorist activity . . . or terrorism, . . . or retain the capability and intent to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism; [and] (3) The organization’s terrorist activity or terrorism must threaten the security of U.S. nationals or the national security (national defense, foreign relations, or the economic interests) of the United States. The Annex of Statistical Information that the Department of State released on April 15, 2023, uses three inclusion criteria to determine whether an incident should be deemed a terrorist incident: (1) The violent act aims to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal; (2) The violent act includes evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to an audience (or audiences) larger than the immediate victims; [and] (3) The violent act occurred outside the precepts of international humanitarian law insofar as it targeted non-combatants. Based on the Department of State’s legal criteria, the Houthis meet the first and second criteria because the Houthis are a foreign organization that engages in terrorist activity. Concerning the third criterion, strong evidence shows that Houthis directly targeted U.S. nationals and U.S. national security. For example, Houthi missile attacks in January 2022 targeted a military base in Abu Dhabi with 2,000 American troops stationed at the facility. Its ballistic missiles struck three commercial ships, and a U.S. warship shot down three drones in self-defense during the assault in December 2023. Its another attack hit a US-owned container ship with a ballistic missile in Gulf of Aden on January 15, 2024. Based on the Department of State’s inclusion criteria, the Houthis meet the first criterion because they are fighting against the internationally recognized Hadi government in Yemen to achieve the following political, economic, religious, and social goals: reverse economic underdevelopment, end political marginalization, and achieve greater autonomy in Houthi-majority regions. The Houthis also meet the second criterion because their violent acts are intended to send a message to the entire country of Yemen and neighboring countries. As one example of evidence of this intent, the Houthis attacked Saudi Arabia numerous times from 2018 to 2023, mostly with drones and missile launches from Yemen. Within Yemen, the GRID records that the Houthis were the perpetrators of 1909 attacks from 2018 to 2022. Finally, the Houthis meet the third criterion. Again, according to the Annex of Statistical Information, it is clear that the Houthis’ violent acts targeted non-combatants because 29 percent of the victims were civilians. To conclude, given the capacity of the Houthis to commit violent acts and the involvement of regional powers in the conflict in Yemen, it would not be wrong to conclude that the Yemeni conflict and the death of innocent Yemeni civilians will continue. Houthis will be a strong pawn in the game played by Tehran and serve the interests of its regime in the region. The United States removed Houthis from the list of FTOs due to humanitarian concerns in 2021, but its growing threat in the region has pushed Houthis to knock on the door of the terrorist list.
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  425. Many experts have considered the US practically impossible to invade because of its well-funded and extensive military, major industries, reliable and fast supply lines, large population and geographic size, geographic location, and difficult regional features. For example, the deserts in the Southwest and the Great Lakes in the Midwest insulate the country's major population centers from threats of invasion staged from neighboring Canada and Mexico. An invasion from outside North America would require long supply chains across the Pacific or Atlantic Oceans, leading to a dramatic reduction of overall power. Furthermore, no existing nation possesses enough military and economic resources to threaten the contiguous United States. It should also be noted that both Canada and Mexico enjoy generally-friendly relations with the US, are deeply economically intertwined, and are militarily weak in comparison.[29][30] Military expert Dylan Lehrke noted that an amphibious assault on either the West Coast or the East Coast is simply too insignificant to acquire a beachhead on both coasts. Even if a foreign power somehow managed to prepare such a massive operation, and do so while remaining undetected under the unrivaled size of the American intelligence apparatus, it still could not build up a force of any significant size before it was pushed back into the sea. In addition, Hawaii is largely protected by the consistently forty thousand-strong US military presence with valuable assets, which acts as a major deterrent to any foreign invasion of the island state and thereby the contiguous US.[31] Thus, any continental invasion with even a remote hope of success would need to come from the land borders through Canada or Mexico. An attack from the latter would probably be more feasible due to the Great Lakes blocking much[clarification needed] of the Canadian border, but California and Texas have the largest concentration of defense industries and military bases in the country and thus provide an effective deterrent from any attack, with the Southwestern desert spanning the two regions dividing any invasion into two. An attack launched from Canada on the Midwest or the West would be limited to light infantry and would fail to take over population centers or other important strategic points since there are mostly rural farmland and unpopulated national parks along the border accompanied by powerful airbases located hundreds of miles south. That provides US military personnel or militias an advantage to conduct guerrilla warfare. As the US has the highest rate of per capita gun ownership in the world, there is significant capacity for civilians to also become guerilla fighters.
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