Comments by "King Orange" (@kingorange7739) on "The MAIN Reason Why Germany Lost WW2 - OIL" video.
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@timobrienwells "No, TIK is not on the ball. His claims are wrong and unsubstantiated.." - Elaborate
"Germany did not lose the war because of oil." - Not by itself
"The Germans had tight but sufficient supplies of oil through the war until late 1944." - Not necessarily. U have to understand, that while Germany has enough oil to continue to wage the war, it was not enough to sustain any major operation. Hence why Kursk was the last major German offensive on the eastern front.
"Operation Barbarossa did not fail because the Wehrmacht ran out of fuel. It failed because of poor decisions at critical times. It also suffered from logistical problems due to distance and weather, as was expected." - I will give u that. But Tik is only saying the oil problem was adding to their logistical issues which were true. Even Potential History covers this.
"TIK has claimed that the Germans had more vehicles in 1942, but no fuel to run them." - To run all of them in a consistent offensive, yes.
"He makes this claim without any supporting evidence whatsoever." - Watch some of his later videos. He provides more sources during those.
"If this ludicrous claim were true then why did the Germans then produce even more vehicles in 1943 and 1944?" - U mean mainly tanks? Because they actually did not produce as many U boats or aircraft. But to answer ur question in the most basic sense, It was because u want good reserve of vehicles when the country sake depends on it. Plus since by 1943 they were fighting a war on the defensive, they could afford more vehicles since oil was not getting consumed as much.
"If they had no fuel for them, what would be the use? The whole claim is just ridiculous and uninformed." - Not really. Ur trying to treat it like Tik is saying Germany had zero oil after 1941. What he is trying to say is 1941 was their last chance to get oil before the deficit began affecting the Wehrmacht. This is why only AGS advances in 1942. Since they only had enough oil to supply one army group in a major offensive.
"TIK's problem is that he does not know his subject matter." - How so?
"He completely ignores, or does not know about, the doubling of synthetic fuel production from 1941 onwards." - He literally has a video link in the description covering Germany's synthetic oil production.
"He also ignores the large increase in domestic crude production in and around Germany during the same period." - True, but while that helped a great amount. It was never going to be enough.
"TIK reads and believes historical revisionists." - Such as?
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@timobrienwells "TIK claims that Operation Barbarossa failed because of a lack of fuel." - I will agree of his overemphasis on it. But even TIK states himself that oil was not the only factor.
"He presents no evidence to demonstrate this." - Later videos have more sources to back his claims. Once again, research them. Also other historians have covered and sourced this.
"His own source that he uses for this assertion, Toprani, refutes this claim! Toprani explains what happened with fuel supplies in Operation Barbarossa, and he plainly states that the Wehrmacht did NOT run out of fuel during Barbarossa. They had logistical issues, but NOT a systemic shortage." - Which is true, they did not run out of oil. But, their logistics combined with the lack of supplies, oil included among them was crippling the Wehrmacht advance. And by German economic advisors, they stated that they only had enough oil to carry all 3 Army Groups till October. Now obviously we know they were slightly wrong, it was more till November. But it was hitting a critical point. But regardless of Barbarossa. It was clear that due to both logistical and oil problems that only Army Group South would avance in 1942.
"Germany had enough fuel to mount major operations like Barbarossa in 1941and Blau in 1942, priority
Elaborate
"German manpower and industry were the limiting factors." - Clearly not. German Industry was a problem from a lack of streamlining production, but Germany already lost before those became consequence. As for manpower, Germany was not suffering full manpower shortages till mid 1943. So once again, it does not have an effect given that the war was already lost by that point.
"By 1942, Germany was fighting the Soviets in the East," - Yes.
"the British in North Africa," - 3 divisions were in North Africa, give me a break.
"the Allies in the Atlantic," - Kriegsmarine does not have an effect on the eastern front.
"and the air war over Germany was already ramping up." - Yes, and? They were not affecting the eastern front at the time. Yes the airwar was still happening, but it is kind of negated when the airpower could not be properly utilized in the east. It was not even needed too much for Blau other than the Battle of Stalingrad.
"Added to that, they had large defensive garrisons all over Europe from Norway to Greece," - Which were tiny compared to the amount committed to the east. It is once again distracting from the core issue.
"and they were fighting a partisan conflict in Yugoslavia." - Yes, and? Not many divisions were stationed there compared to the east.
"Germany had too many commitments by 1943 to launch any large scale offensive operations. It was not about fuel." - Again, that is simply false. The east remained priority, meaning that what was going on in the rest of the fronts was not affecting the east. If anything, what was happening in the east was affecting those other fronts. Again even a surface glance would make it clear that a lack of German supply, fuel being most among them that Germany's offensive capabilities were dying off. Blau was much smaller in scale than Barbarossa. Kursk had to combine AGC and AGS since neither had enough fuel and supplies by themselves. Bulge in 1944 was nothing more than a last hail mary done by an army that knew that they were going to lose. Not to mention that in the case of both Kursk and Bulge, it was pretty much dead on arrival.
"TIK does not give any real numbers to back up his assertion about the German fuel situation." - Yes he does, watch his other videos related to the Soviet economy, reserves of Romania, and German synthetic fuel.
"He makes claims without evidence." - Just like ur doing rn. No offense, it is not like u sourced anything to back ur claims either. And since ur attempting to debunk an already established info. The burden of proof falls on u.
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@timobrienwells
"I have seen TIK'S other videos, and he does not produce any numbers to demonstrate that Germany ran out of fuel in 1941, or 1942." - https://youtu.be/URBlC-wjXiQ 2:18
Um, no.
"The Wehrmacht did not have a lack of supplies during Operation Barbarossa." - Source?
"What they had was major logistical issues on two occasions.
The first was during the period of the rapid advance in June/July when the motorized units outran the supply services. Eg AGC advanced 450 kilometers from Brest Litovsk to Smolensk in 25 days.
The second was in October/ November when the rainy season and the rail infrastructure led to wide scale breakdowns in supply. Neither of these events had anything to do with a fuel shortage." - Yes they did. June and July wasn't affected by oil since the fuel crisis by estimates were not taking effect till October to November time. The rainy season added to this problem since fuel was also getting burned up at a higher rate.
"In fact, AGS kept advancing from Kiev to Rostov in November 1941, a distance of 600 kilometers." - Ok, this one I will give u. However even if we were to agree that oil did not affect them in 1941, it did not change its effects within 1942 onward.
"The Africa Corps was 4 and a half divisions by late 1942, and there was a large Luftwaffe support force. By May 1943, it was a force of 250,000 men." - I already told u this. 1943, does not matter by this point since Germany already lost the war. Secondly, sources? Third, 4 is still a drop in the ocean compared to 151 divisions that was allocated to Barbarossa.
"The Kriegsmarine was a large and increasing drain on the resources of the Reich in 1942." - True, which I agree was a mistake. But u realize ur only backing my points. Because just take a guess which resource they were putting the most strain on.
"The air war was already having a big effect on the military resources of the Reich. Not only the damage to industry and infrastructure, but also the large allocation of fighter planes and 88 mm Flak guns needed to defend German skies. Both of which were needed in other theatres." - True, but like I said before. Germany in both 1941, and 42 had air superiority over the Soviets. Yes more air power could of helped, but by no means did it compromise their operations in the grand scheme of things.
"Fuel had nothing to do with whether there were large Operations in the East." - Yes it did. If u look through multiple sources TIK and Potential History provides in their videos, u would find that part of why Blau's advance was so slow was due to running out of fuel and having to wait for more fuel to be brought up. This is also why only AGS advanced. Trust me, do u not think that Army Group North and Center could advanced, they wouldn't had? Also once again. Sources!!!!
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"The Red Army had 6 million men in the field in 1943, while the Germans had only 3 million." - 2 things, one it was only 5 million, secondly. Ur ignoring other Axis forces that brought the invasion force to almost 4 million in 1942. The Soviets only outnumbered them by a million men. While it is a noticeable amount, it wasn't unbearable. Espicially since Germany still had superior tanks, air superiority, and were more organized at the time.
"TIK has made the claims. His own source, Toprani, refutes his claims." - Quote please. Also that is not his only source.
https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/114GiK85MPs0v4GKm0izPj3DL2CrlJUdAantx5GQUKn8/edit#gid=0
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@timobrienwells "The supply crisis of October / November had nothing to do with a fuel shortage." - According to what? Ur arguments are literally just devolving into "No that's not true."
"It had initially to do with the rainy season that started mid October just after the completion of the first battles of Operation Typhoon, and which brought most motor vehicles to a halt, and it also had to do with the breakdown in the rail infrastructure, which Albert Speer talks about in his book." - two things.
1. That does not disprove oil as a factor. Yes it was not the only reason, but it still very much was more than likely a factor.
"Fuel was not getting used at a higher rate in October. Again Toprani says that fuel consumption hit a peak in July, and then fell rapidly after that. " - Which in fairness was a mistake on my end.
"To claim that the supply crisis of October/November was because of fuel is unsupported nonsense." - I nor TIK said it was direct causality. But it was without a doubt a factor that made their logistical situation even worse.
"The only point about the Africa Corps was that it was yet another commitment that Germany had to allocate resources to." - Once again, 3-4 divisions.
"And sending men and equipment all the way from Germany to Tunisia, across the desert to Egypt, losing half of your supplies on the way to allied air and sea action was a considerable drain on resources." - True, but once again, that did not have an effect on the eastern front. If u research North Africa u would know Rommel was constantly being undersupplied. It was clear even at surface glance that Germany would rather have the Afrika corp undersupplied than the east.
"There is no evidence that the Kriegsmarine was severely constricted by a fuel shortage in 1941 or 1942." - Dude, u realize if Germany had no fuel shortage, that their entire navy and Italy's could of been in use. Yet for most of the war, it is sitting in port. It may not be explicitly stated, but there is enough evidence to imply it.
The constriction was more on the construction of new U-Boats to replace loses.
Albert Speer in his book says that if Germany did not have to use many hundreds of Flak 88's in air defense, that the same guns could have doubled their anti-tank strength on the Eastern Front. His book is online." - Ok and u do realize that 1, Germany accounts alone do have to be taken with a bit of salt. 2. Anti tank guns was not going to make enough of a difference when Stalingrad is what drained most of Army Group B, and that had little Soviet tanks in full use.
"AGN and AGC did not advance in 1942 because Hitler had made the Caucasus the strategic objective." - And? In Barbarossa. There were multiple strategic objectives. U would be quick to realize that only AGS could be fully supplied.
"They also could not advance because they barely had enough reserves for defending their front." - According to what evidence?
"Both AGN and AGC had large Soviet offensives to deal with in 1942 ," - And?
"and the forces they had were only just adequate. " - False, u realize Army Group Center were getting more men than even Army Group South despite AGS taking priority for the offensive. So clearly if manpower was the only concern, Army Group Center could of advanced no problem.
"The reasons for fuel shortages were just as you said. The supply services needed to catch up, not because of a lack of supply." - Within Army Group South alone. Not the entire German Army. Stop cherry picking.
"4th Panzer Army travelled several hundred kilometers from Karkhov to Voronesh, then into the Don bend in a little over two weeks from June 28th 1942." - Yes, and?
"Germany was producing more fuel in 1942, than in 1941." - First off source? Secondly. At what point? Because later in 1942, Germany takes part of the Caucasus. So is this at the tail beginning of Blau? And 3. Even if that is the case, Production verus stocked are 2 seperate things. It does not matter if Germany produces more oil if it cannot make up for the deficit.
"The other reason for the fuel shortage was that Hitler tried to run the two phases of Operation Blau simultaneously, instead of consecutively as in the original plan. This is what his decision on July 13th produced when he split ADS into AGA and AGB." - I am aware. However that being said, it does not address the core of the issue. Germany would of had to go those distances either way.
"Supply issues, and not just with fuel, were the result." - Which I agree on. I am not saying fuel was their only supply problem.
"Your numbers for the Eastern front in 1942 are not entirely accurate. According to Glantz and House[ When Titans Clashed], the totals for mid-1942 for the axis was around 3.5 million, and for the Red Army 6 million." - That does not make my source inaccurate. We have 2 different sources in use. But ur forgetting that many Soviet soldiers on the front were hospitalized very quickly from the losses of 1941.
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@timobrienwells "Oil production did not affect Germany's ability to conduct offensives." - The offensives they did cover no, but the ability to conduct consistent offensives yes. Once again, AGS took priority but Germany's oil demands dictated that only Army Group South could advance. Yes other factors came into play mainly Soviet counter attacks in the center, but that still does not account for neither North or Center advancing, nor does it Army Group South's own struggles of it. Yes Hitler splitting the forces was a major factor, but the distances would of had to be covered either way.
"Not even the Battle of the Bulge would qualify." - Mainly because most of what remained of German supply was put into the offensive. But even with that, it was almost dead on arrival.
"The existing and increasing manpower requirements were the main reason why Germany could not conduct offensives later in the war." - Ok, that would work for things like Bulge and even Kursk. But it does not explain Blau. Since like I heighlited before. Not only did Germany replenish most of their losses from 1941, but on top of that. Army Group Center received more reinforcements than the south and became a larger fighting for. Surely if supplies, oil among them were not an issue, they would of attempted an attack on Moscow in 1942. Taproni himself states in P39 that German synthetic oil production in 1942 was not going to make up for their deficit. As it could only 11,700,000 tons for a 15,000,000 ton deficit.
"They simply could not match the human and industrial resources of the allies." - Except early on, that was not the case. Britain and Germany pretty much had equal industrial power. So then u run into the issue that if oil was never a concern like u claim, then Hitler would have little reason not to wait before attacking the Soviets.
"No amount of oil would have enables the Wehrmacht to put more men into the fighting formations." - Within 1942, more men wasn't necessarily needed to conduct their operations. Look up David Stahel and he too will mention Germany's dire oil strain as one of the primary reasons for invading in 1941. As not even Romania or the Soviet trade could make up for the deficit.
"Germany was short of everything in WW2 because they took on too many opponents at the same time." - Such as? Within 1942, the only real enemies they were dealing with was the British, what remained of free France, and the Soviets. And once again, North Africa was a side theater of only 4 divisions. Over 75% of the German army was going east.
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@timobrienwells "Going into the Caucasus was part of Hitler's "Lebensraum" idea. This idea had governed his thinking since WW1. He had always wanted to expand into the east and to use the resources there to build a German superstate.
This thinking was not entirely wrong, but Hitler's method of trying to achieve it was wrong." - I disagree
"Manstein in his book correctly stated that the only way to successfully exploit the resources of a conquered nation, was to defeat that enemy nation militarily, so as to enable exploitation." - Except that does not work either for many reasons. Mainly, u cannot defeat the Red Army in the traditional sense. Because Germany did defeat the red army in 1941, but there was another red army, and another, and another. Taking Ukraine and the Caucasus, while needed to address Germany's own food and oil crisis, was also needed to attempt to starve the Soviets of those same resources.
"Hitler wanted to exploit the resources first while still fighting the enemy nation. " - Because in a way that was the only way to defeat them. Germany had no choice, they were not going to have the fuel, raw materials, or even manpower to deal with a long attritional war. So taking those resources was essential to ensure that Germany could hold back the Soviets.
"But as Manstein and others have pointed out, while your enemy is still active militarily, there is no guarantee that resources can ever be successfully exploited." - True, but like I said before. Manstein is not applying that the Soviets is not a traditional enemy of Germany. Germany was use to fighting smaller countries like Poland and France. Not a massive nation like the Soviets. So yes, Mansteins logic would work on a smaller country, but it cannot apply against a nation where just defeating their army is not an option. The Soviets had over 30 million in reserve. So trying to do a man to man fighting war was not an option for Germany. Not only because of their own resource limitations. Oil being among them. Contrary to ur belief TIK is not the only one to cover this, but also to deprive the Soviets of their war making potential.
"And this is exactly what happened in the Caucasus. Maikop was captured in August 1942, but it never produced much oil to speak of because the Red Army remained undefeated." - No, they failed to extract much oil because they had to spend time rebuilding the oil fields since the Soviets destroyed it before retreating. Once again, defeating the Red Army in a traditional sense was not an option.
"Same with the mineral and food production resources of the Ukraine and the Donetz basin." - To a lesser degree yes, but once again. That has more to do with scourge earth than the Red Army.
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@timobrienwells "Operation Blau was Hitler's idea, and he was putting the cart before the horse." - Not necessarily. He was loading the carriage before the horse moved. Like I said before, the Red Army could not be defeated in the traditional sense. Hell not even Britain or the USA thought they could. So for Germany, seeking and exploiting the resources was their only options to continue to maneuver type war they wanted to fight, otherwise they would not have the supplies later on and would lose the static war that would follow.
"What Germany needed to do in 1942 was impose a strong defeat on the Red Army and then try to negotiate a way out of the conflict." - Once again, how do u defeat an army of over 30 million men in reserve? Germany tried ur method in 1941 and it did not work. Because once again, everytime a Soviet army group got encircled, there were 2 more ready to take their place. Attrition was something Germany could not win without crippling Soviet war making potential and ensuring their own resources were completely covered.
"Instead, Hitler thought that he could build a self-sufficient fortress, but he was wrong." - He was more correct than Manstein. Once again, the fortress of resources was the only hope he had for the Nazi regime. As their own output alone without trade was never going to be enough. The problem with trade of course being not only did the Nazis hate trading but as well as the fact of the British blockade.
"Operation Blau did not suffer from a systemic lack of fuel, and I have seen no historical data to demonstrate that. It did suffer logistical shortages, but that happened with almost every offensive." - In fairness German logistics were shit. And I confess that tanks running out of fuel during the campaign does have a lot to do with logistics. But once again, these problems are only centered with the fact that Army Group South took priority in offense. If all 3 army groups could of been supplied properly for the offensive, all 3 would of tried to advance. In fact, part of the reason why Army Group Center was ordered as hard as they were to stand their ground was so they could be in a position to attack Moscow the next year.
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@timobrienwells "The Wehrmacht did not have the resources to advance on all fronts in 1942." - Oil being most among them.
"All the oil in the world would not have changed that." - It would of improved their movement of mechanized forces since that was the main thing they were struggling to move. Why do u think they had German scouts use bicycles?
"They did not have the manpower," - False. As I have shown before. Germany only had 40,000 less troops in the east than they did at the beginning of Operation Barbarossa.
"and their economy was not much more than on a peace time footing." - Not really. I will agree that their war economy was not on the right footing, however in the grand scheme of things, that would not affect them anymore in Blau than it did in Barbarossa.
"Armaments production was still on a relatively low level, as Speer points out in his book." - True, but did not affect the Blau campaign overall. There are little to no cases of Germany running of of munitions during Blau. If u care to argue otherwise, please provide an occurrence.
"Germany did not need to invade the Soviet Union in 1941. It was receiving food, mineral and oil shipments from the Soviets all the time." - Except as multiple historians have pointed out. The trade with the Soviets was not making up for Germany's deficit. In fact it is shown through their oil consumptions that not even 2 Romanias could make up for it.
"Hitler wanted to invade it. The increasing domestic crude and synthetic fuel output would have covered German needs." - Except it didn't. David Stahel notes this, that 1941 was the last year that Germany could conduct the offensive with the fuel to move the mechanized units as needed to finish the campaign in 3 months. The time they thought it would take the bring down the Soviets.
"There was not a 'fuel deficit' in 1942. You cant have a 'deficit' of something that you dont have." - Do u not know what a deficit is? If Germany is draining more oil than it can adequately produce, that is a deficit. And according to economic advisors in Germany, the deficit would begin affecting the German military after October of 1941. Even if u want to argue that it was not the case in 1941, it definitely has factually became a notable issue in 1942 onward.
"The Germans had tight, but sufficient supplies of fuel in 1942," - For Army Group South.
"and they ended the year with a surplus." - 1. Source? 2. U mean after they were tied down in Stalingrad?
"By the same logic Britain had a 'deficit' for fuel too, but they kept their forces supplied." - Except they didn't. Britain could still import oil unlike Germany, not to mention Britain had control over the middle east and ended up splitting either Iraq or Iran, I forget which one with the Soviets in 1942. So no, that logic does not apply. Germany did not have the ability to produce oil on its own and its trade was cut off from most of the world due to the British blockade. Since the main oil exporter to Germany was Venezuela.
"By 1942, Germany was fighting the Soviets in Russia, The British and the US in the air war over Germany and in the Atlantic," - Which did not make a difference on the Wehrmacht.
"and they had their big commitments in North Africa." - 3 divisions is not a major commitment. Christ, Norway had more divisions.
"Added to that were at least 1 million men in occupation forces from Norway to Greece." - First off, source. Secondly, u realize that it does not make a difference since I noted before, Germany for the most part replenished their forces from 1941. Their forces may not be at 100% full strength but the manpower was definitely around. The problem was they could not adequately supply the forces they already had.
"They did not have the manpower for major operations." - As I noted before, that has already been debunked. At worst, Germany only had a couple hundred thousand less than the previous year. Which while notable, is not going to cripple them. Blau had more men going into it, than Army Group South did during Barbarossa. So once again, manpower was not the problem in the grand scheme of things.
"North Africa consumed a disproportionate amount of resources because of the length of the supply line, and because of the loses due to naval and air attacks by the British." - Except once again. North Africa was not prioritized at all in troops or supplies. Rommel notes constantly how under supplied the Afrika corp was. Note that is only 3 divisions. So once again, North Africa was not taking an effect on the eastern front. Also worth noting that the US does not get actual troops to Africa until the tale end of 1942.
"The Germans could not and did not exploit the resources of the Soviet Union because they could not defeat the Red Army." - Again, not really. I have told u this before. Germany's own logistics and supply shortcomings did far more harm to Blau than the Red Army ever did. Yes, the Red Army won. But ur failing to account that Germany's mistakes in Blau were more to do with arrogance and lack of foresight, than trying to get the resources.
"They could never secure the Caucasus, as it was too large an area at too greater distance from the Reich." - I would argue against that as well. Blau came very close for Germany succeeding in its objectives. Yes the distance was a problem, but Germany had no choice. Their fuel deficit and the need to starve the Soviets dictated that Germany had to do this attack. It was a throw in the dice. If they attacked, they might of lost, but if they did nothing, the certainly would of lost.
"While the Red Army remained in the field, grabbing resource areas was meaningless. as Manstein, and Halder and Guderian, and Warlimont clearly stated. Hitler thought otherwise and he was proven wrong." - U realize the same Halder who sabatoged Barbarossa, the same Manstein who lost over half of his tanks during Barbarossa. The same Guderian who left major Soviet forces in pockets between the tanks and infantry? U fail to account that these generals made their own errors in judgement just as much as Hitler. Also it is like I said before again and again. The red army could not traditionally be defeated. If Germany went by Halder's logic, Germany would never take the resources and the fight would just go on forever. Without depriving the Soviets of the means to fight, a 4 million force is not going to be able to defeat a 30 million force.
"By early 1942, Hitler had a tiger by the tail, and he needed to eliminate one of his enemies, either by force or by negotiation. Otherwise the war was lost." - I will be fair u have a point here, but once again. Ur failing to account that the Soviets could not and would not be defeated without being deprived of their means/resources to fight.
"Germany had enough fuel resources to keep on fighting for 4 years after it invaded the Soviet Union." - yes to continue to fight the war. That is not the same is conducting consistent major offensives to keep initiative in the war. Japan kept fighting till 1945, does that mean they had any chance of winning after Midway? No. Because once again, Germany by 1943 did not have the proper resources to keep the initiative in the war. All they were doing after that point was delaying the inevitable. Ur also failing to account for the factors that allowed the Germans to have that possibility.
1. (I will give this to u despite ur over exaggeration on it) Increase Synthetic oil production
2. Italy defected to the allies, so Germany secure Italian oil reserves which helped a great amount but was not going to be enough.
3. Demoterization of multiple German military assets. (Kriegsmarine was getting docked in 1943, Luftwaffe was grounded in many areas which was part of the reason why allied bombings became easier from 1943 onward, Scouting vehicles such as Trucks, Military cars, ETC)
4. Combining Army Group resources (Scale of operations were decreasing meaning that oil could more adequately get to areas.)
5. The Germans were mostly fighting a defensive war at this point, so fuel is not getting used as often.
But even with all of that. It was not going to be enough.
"It may have desired the resources in the East, but it did not require them for national survival." - Once again yes it was. Germany was not going to just magically get oil. They could not trade because of the British and now American blockade. There were only 2 options they could get oil from to fix their deficit. The middle east or the Soviet Union. And we know which one they chose. But regardless. 1941 was their last opportunity to get the oil before it began affecting them. Even Marshall Temachenko knew this when the Germans invaded.
"Russia was defeated in a 'traditional sense' in WW1." - No it wasn't. First of all, Russia and WW1 and the Soviets in WW2 are very different animals both militarily and politically.
Secondly. While I do count the Germans beating the Russians in WW1, u have to account that was under very different circumstances and very different objectives. 1. Germany more a less just needed to knock Russia out of the war to defeat France. They were not trying to conquer the entire Russian lands like the Nazis were trying in WW2.
2. The Russian means to fight never left. Instead it was just fighting itself. So even with the German victory. It was only obtained through Russia destroying itself. Both of these are advantages Germany had in WW1 that the Nazis were never going to have in WW2.
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@timobrienwells “You have presented no facts to substantiate your opinions.” - Yes I did. I already showed you both statistics and sources. Quotes from Taproni and references to David Stahel most respectively.
“Show us the evidence that the Germans did not have enough fuel to launch offensive operations.” - First off, I already showed info related to the deficit. Secondly, I don’t even have to. I already stated this before. Ur the one trying to debunk TIK with his already established claim, meaning the burden of proof falls on you, which you are yet to provide. So I can use the same logic on you. Provide me evidence that Germany did in fact have the fuel needed to pull another Barbarossa in 1944 like you so claim.
“You don't have that evidence, and you know you don't.” - Laughs in “First War for Oil” and “Opertation Barbarossa and Germany’s defeat in the East”
“Operation Blau was proceeding while the Luftwaffe was fighting all over Europe and Africa, and while the Kriegsmarine was fighting in the Atlantic.” - Ok, like I said before. Yes, the luftwaffe had to defend key positions in western Europe, but that has nothing to do with whether mechanized units could properly move east. Also once again, Africa had 3 divisions. 3!, Even Norway had more divisions.
“There was obviously enough fuel for those operations.” - None of which were major. Germany was dealing with the Atlantic and Air campaign since 1940 and was separated from what the Werhmacht were doing. It is not like air defenses are going to use as much fuel as a major summer offensive, which utulizes moterized, armored, and aerial units. And in the case of Blau, sea units as well. Not to mention ur point is kind of negated since by 1943, much of the luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine were grounded.
“You don't have any real knowledge or understanding of this topic, so stop trying to pretend that you do.” - I clearly have more than u given that most modern historians have come to a similar conclusion and unlike you, I have provided sources to back my points.
“You have no idea what the historians say about this issue.” - Really now, I already listed 2 books that backed my points, not to mention there are dozens of historical videos that cover this as well.
“You are just pretending that you are informed.” - Maybe look at the mirror.
“Your lack of detailed knowledge has been obvious from the start.” - Really now. Once again, I provided sources, logic, and reasoning, u didn’t. U cannot call ur self knowledgeable when ur arguments just come down to “Na uh, that ain’t true.”
"I have been willing to carry you for a few rounds but you have out worn your welcome." - U haven't carried anything. U have not even factually supported ur claim.
“No, it is only you who does not know what he is talking about. You are totally uninformed about this issue.” - Again how so?
“I have been overly polite, even though I knew that you did not know what you were talking about from the start,” - Ur to talk. Provide me a single bit of evidence to state that Germany had enough oil reserves in 1942-43- or 44 to do a Barbarossa style offensive. Care to show any stats of German supply deficits or stockpiles? No? Then clearly it is u who does not understand the topic.
“but putting up with your childish ignorance any more is no longer worth it.” - LOL. Now u must be trolling. U know, I don’t care how much an argument frustrates me, I would not find it in my self to call my historical opponent a child. Especially if I had no grounding to back my debunks. But clearly some just lack that kind of maturity to make the adult decisions. ;)
“You are a child.” - 1. I am probably older than u r. 2. If I am not older than u, then u need to go take a communication class so u can understand how to civilly talk to people. If u cannot do that, then u can fuck right off.
“Oi was an issue ,” - Funny, I am a child by ur logic, yet I can at least spell oil.
“but not the critical one.” - 1. Sources? 2. If that was the case then there is literally no reason why Germany would not pull another Barbarossa in 42.
“It was not the reason the Germans lost the war.” - Sources?
“But you would not know anything about that.” - Coming from the one who cannot even provide a source to echo his point. LOL, I am seriously questioning if ur trolling. U have not provide a single proper source to back ur claim that Germany was in fact not suffering an oil crisis.
“You are entirely clueless about this topic.” -
“Stop being such a silly, childish fool, and admit the fact that you have no idea what you are talking about.” - Hahahahahhaha. Ok now ur funny, because by that logic, ur calling TIK, Potential History, David Stahel, Taproni, Marshal Timoshenko, Paulus, Military History Visualized, The Armchair Historian, and more fools as well. Mind u that all of these people back my point. I question if u can truly find someone who can flat out say that Germany had enough fuel reserves to pull an offensive the size of Barbarossa or Blau in 1944.
“You have no idea what the historians have said.” - My list begs to differ. Not to mention like I said, u have not provided one historian that holds the same conclusion as urs. And as I have stated before and will say again. Ur the one trying to argue against an already established point, meaning it is on u to find the evidence to debunk it. I have nothing to prove to u. U have to prove it to me and the majority of people. Because even schools for how outdated they are, have now begun teaching the oil crisis. Granted, they were 8 years late, but still counts for something. So once again. Show me some stats that show Germany’s stocks and usage of motorized units in 1944. If u cannot do that, then I will accept your defeat. Good day. Jackass.
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