Comments by "Stephen47 22" (@Stephen-bq4nq) on "German Paratrooper Assault - Corinth Canal 1941" video.

  1. 1
  2. 1
  3. 1
  4. 1
  5. 1
  6. 1
  7. 1
  8. 1
  9. 1
  10. 1
  11. 1
  12. 1
  13. 1
  14.  @haroldgodwinson832  It's not true that our commanders didn't understand how important the air field was a whole brigade was given the job of defending the airfield. We had 4 battalions plus engineer units fighting as infantry and 3 of the 4 professional infantry battalions were positioned to defend the airfield the 22nd directly on it and the 21st and 23rd were positioned just behind hill 107 ready to move up in support. The New Zealand command was told there was going to be a seaborne landing and it was going to be 10,000 strong and the best landing beaches were indentified as stretching from the beaches at Maleme down to Platanias and that is why the brigade was so strung out with the engineer units covering the beaches as well as the 28th Maori. The engineer units were told to be ready to move up to support the forces at the airfield. It's a fallacy that the New Zealand commanders didn't understand the importance of the airfield and the proof is not only in the fact we had 3 of the 4 infantry battalions assigned to airfield defence but also in the orders given to 5th brigade which I will provide here word for word. 5th brigade operation instruction no 4. A. 5 inf brigade will maintain a defensive line running east and west from Platanias to Tavronitis river with special regard to the defence of Maleme aerodrome. B. In the event of the enemy making an airborne or seaborne attack on any part of the area,to counter attack and destroy him immediately. C. The whole essence of the bde's work is a spirited defence. The fallacy that Freyberg didn't understand how important the airfield was has been created by predominantly british historians and it doesn't stand up to scrutiny. The soldiers fought well at Malame and the ground was held the failure came about when the 22 battalion commander walked off the vital ground and the commanders from the 21st and 23 rd battalions did nothing to correct the mistake. They then contacted the Brigade commander Hargest who agreed with the decision to hold the line and not counter attack. All 4 men failed to carry out their orders and that caused the loss of the airfield and to make matters worse Hargest even when he knew the 22nd battalion was talking about abandoning hill 107 contacted Freyberg and told him everything was quite satisfactory living Freyberg completely in the dark about the disaster that was unfolding he didn't find out till the morning when it was daylight and the german planes wes back in the air rendering a counter attack at that point out of the question. New Zealand soldiers on Crete weren't inadequately trained and any analysis of their engagements with the Germans show this our infantry heavily out gunned were engaging the Germans in close quarter battle with bayonets and coming out on top numerous times. Crete was lost by senior leadership failures.
    1
  15. 1
  16.  @haroldgodwinson832  The orders given to 5th brigade clearly show that Creforce headquarters led by Freyberg knew the importance of the airfield and as I stated earlier the 3 battalion commanders and the Brigade commander failed to carry those orders out. That wasn't the fault of Freyberg or the soldiers in the field doing the fighting. On may 16 we received an intelligence report that the sea borne contingent was 10,000 strong and we had also received reports earlier there was going to be a seaborne contingent. It influenced the positioning of the troops because they were told the best beaches to land were from Maleme airfield to Platanias they couldn't box the airfield with troops they had to defend the airfield and the beaches and it left them a battalion short which meant the western side of the airfield was undefended. The divisional commander Puttick recognized the threat but there wasn't a spare battalion to put there. They looked at moving first Greek regiment from Kastilli but there was no transport and no tools for them to dig in with and Kastilli needed to be defended anyway so they had to make the best of what they had. Churchill did not tell Freyberg there wasn't going to be a seaborne landing and our commanders were nervous about it because the Germans had air supremecy and it showed in the battle for Crete the power planes had against ships the Royal Navy suffered severe damage. Our commanders on Crete had no idea what kind of seaborne landing the German could carry out they relied on the information they were given you are looking back with the benefit of hindsight. New Zealand has never shyed away from our role in the loss of Crete it was obvious orders weren't carried about by 5th Brigades senior leadership it has never been disputed and careers were ended because of it. The whole idea of defending Crete in the first place was Insanity because the garrison could only receive 20% of the daily tonnage of supplies needed even if the battle had been won the allies would never have been able to stay on the island it would have to have been abandoned the whole Greece campaign was a waste of time and you can thank Winston Churchill for that
    1
  17. 1
  18.  @haroldgodwinson832  you continue to cherry pick what I say to try and support your argument and it won't work. I have never denied we lost Crete I said that in repeated posts and the 4 men responsible were the battalion commanders from the 21,22,23 and the 5th brigade commander Hargest who failed to carry out their orders. It's portrayed that the whole New Zealand leadership didn't understand the importance of the airfield and this narrative has been pushed by british historians and it's a lie. The directive from Creforce head quarters led by Freyberg to 5th brigade proves this and so does the fact that 3 of the 4 professional infantry battalion were assigned to the defense. You said that the New Zealand soldiers lacked training and any analysis of our infantry on Crete proves this to be wrong. Not one company in 5th Brigades area was overrun in the first 24 hours they all held their postions and prevailed and 22nd battalion withstood having 3000 bombs dropped on them then proceeded to stop an attack by the equivalent of just over two full strength para battalions. All the infantry in the brigade conducted themselves in a very professional manner and the Germans were slaughtered and they have admitted they only got through because we didn't counter attack in the first 24 hours. You look at other actions throughout the battle our soldiers excelled in the night fighting and close quarter battle so it's bullshit to say they were inadequately trained. The failings were with the senior leadership in ,5th brigade who didn't do what they were told they carry that responsibility it doesn't fall on the rank and file who performed well. You take your orders in war you don't just go around doing what you want if the infantry are told to do some thing they do it. And as for showing true grit our soldiers showed real grit at Galatas and 42 street when they were prepared to confront the Germans up close and personal with bayonets.
    1
  19. 1
  20. 1