Comments by "diehardcat" (@diehardcat) on "PeriscopeFilm" channel.

  1. The differences between these two cases are: 1. B-52s 2. Giap knew well that his troops had a very slim chance of taking over Khe Sanh without solving the B-52 problem. He couldn't solve that problem so he only used Khe Sanh as a diversion. He knew that the Americans had learnt from the French spectacularly embarrassing defeat in Dien Bien Phu so they would be very keen not to let that happen to them (Johnson had a scale model of Khe Sanh in his Oval Office). So if the NAV just assemble near the base and pretend to attack just like they did in Dien Bien Phu, they would attract all attentions there and in turn, cover for the real attacks in all major towns and cities in the South. You can look up the sizes of forces on both sides in those two battles and will see Khe Sanh was clearly a diversion because the NVA didn't commit enough troops to take over the base. 3. Both sides in the battle of Dien Bien Phu knew it was their last battle to win the war, so they brought all they had. France calculation was wrong so it lost. In Khe Sanh's case, taking over that base wouldn't mean much. The US' side still had about 1.5 million troops standing on its side, so it was pointless and stupid to risk a lot for nothing (the Americans later abandoned the base all by themselves). The attacks on all the major towns and cities in the South would make a much bigger bang and really cause panic and deal the death blow to the US' will and intention in Vietnam. 4. To have a better chance, you don't play the same trick twice, so taking Khe Sanh for real when ALL attentions was on it wouldn't be so smart. The similarities in these cases: Giap's calculation was dead on in both occasions.
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  2. The problem is only crooked Vietnamese would choose to serve the French/Americans. That's the dilemma that France & the US can't get out of.
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  3.  @sunshine7453  Actually they're not 'South Vietnamese leaders' because they have neither the support of the southerners nor control of the South.
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