Youtube comments of Tizi 08 (@tizi087).

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  17. A few important bits i feel a bit missing here: Tank numbers are not all, as a smaller more trained force can still achieve a higher combat value than a larger froce (see eastern front) Especially north africa shows this, as at El Ala the brits won, by outlasting the germans in tank losses --> thus montgomery move to wait till all was set in his favour was smart. for those wondering why the brits earlier lost even tough they had more tanks: The reason why the 8.8 became so famous and a tank threat was due to the Germans realising that the training needed to fight aircraft is also handy when fighting tanks and ground targets. Thus the crews were trained for this too and commanders were willing to use the 8.8 in ground combat. See Operation Barbarossa the Complete Organisational and Statistical Analysis and Military Simulation Volume IIA, Askey Nigel page 51-52 --> i suppose nobody is suprised that i have to bring up the 8.8 here. The germans used their flank in the anti tank role while the brits didnt, giving them an advantage Tank heavy units are endangered to counter attacks and have a hard time dealing with infantry and AT guns. See Operation Barbarossa the Complete Organisational and Statistical Analysis and Military Simulation Volume IIA, Askey Nigel page 343 The Germans were the first ones to realise the mistake of tank heavy divisions. The French and British divisions were way more tank heavy than the Germans. The French outset this by dispersing the tanks into their infantry divisions. The brits meanwhile hat two armoured brigades with 342 tanks while having only 2 infantry Battalions. Thus these units suffered heavy losses especially in North Afrika in 1941 and 42 against the Africakorps. See Operation Barbarossa the Complete Organisational and Statistical Analysis and Military Simulation Volume IIA, Askey Nigel page 344 --> the brits like many other realsied quite late how bad tank heavy formations are. When a tank heavy formation losses many of its tanks, it also looses most of its comabt power. Panzer divisions also had many other elements and thus could hold out even with less tanks. You will find many authors stating, that a german tank division with as few as 50 tanks would be capable of all operations. The brits thus got a bloody nose, when they attack with their tank heavy formations, lost many of them and then didnt had the sufficent strenght to stop the german coutnerattack. Panzer divisions showed numerous times, that with as few as 50 tanks they were able to do very effective offensive Operations. See Operation Barbarossa the Complete Organisational and Statistical Analysis and Military Simulation Volume IIB, Askey Nigel page 182 And one always needs to keep in mind, that the germans had the superior training and tank doctrine too! also according to one source the germans had some form of air superiority for parts of the campaign. Fliegerführer Afrika albeit being outnumbered managed to achieve a degree of air superiority till early 1942, mainly due to the battle-hardened I./JG 27. The kill to loss ratio was better than 4 to 1 and aces like Hans-Joachim Marseille [known as the Star of Afrika] were born in this units. See Operation Barbarossa the Complete Organisational and Statistical Analysis and Military Simulation Volume IIB, Askey Nigel page 247 it still an wonderful video, but i feel like it shows a bit too much the numbers without the context. After all combat power is what matters. To exxagerate it: 20 Leopard 2s will very likely win against 200 T26. As their comabt power is vastly diffrent. Even tough the comabt power of the individual tanks in north africa wasnt too diffrent, the training and leadership was. And tank warfare after all calls for mobile operations, something the germans back thenw ere leading in. So it is really intresting to see, how they always succeded in north africa in these operations, while the brits succeded in their well planned battles (something they were suited for)
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  70. ​ @warthoggoulags1679  saying that the soviets have good logistics is one of the biggest jokes i ever read. Especially in 1941 there logistics were..... terrible. While the German Supply was mainly hampered by longer supply lines and the bad infrastructure the Soviets had a chronic shortage of almost all types of transport equipment. Combined with their massive amounts of heavy equipment they had sever supply problems (as tanks and artillery are supply hungry). See Operation Barbarossa: the Complete Organisational and statistical Analysis and Military Simulation Volume I, Nigel Askey page 25 Many of the Soviet units in the western military district had less than half their allocated manpower on 22nd June 1941. Additionally, they lacked missed 33-66% of their horses and sometimes up to 80% of their motor vehicles. At the same time they had all of their heavy equipment. See Operation Barbarossa: the Complete Organisational and statistical Analysis and Military Simulation Volume I, Nigel Askey page 36 23% of all motor vehicles of the Red Army were inoperable in June 1941. Including the whole UdSSR 45% of all trucks were unusable. See Operation Barbarossa the Complete Organisational and Statistical Analysis and Military Simulation Volume IIB, Askey Nigel page 310 The average supply distribution efficiency factor for the Wehrmacht on the Eastern front in 1941 was around 74%. See Operation Barbarossa the Complete Organisational and Statistical Analysis and Military Simulation Volume IIB, Askey Nigel page 299 VS The Soviet SDE with more realistic numbers, was probably around 20% in 1941. See Operation Barbarossa the Complete Organisational and Statistical Analysis and Military Simulation Volume IIB, Askey Nigel page 312 The authors stresses, that the Red Army had massive supply problems in 1941 and if a German and a soviet division would face each other in similar circumstances the former would have almost 5 times as much supply. The author states that the only time when the supply of the two sides became equally bad, was when German motorised corps operated far away from their supply hubs. See Operation Barbarossa the Complete Organisational and Statistical Analysis and Military Simulation Volume IIB, Askey Nigel page 313-314 Soviet truck production fell significantly during WWII! Big reasons for this were, that they retooled factories to produce tanks as well as needing more weaposn for their ever-expanding army. See Operation Barbarossa: the Complete organisational and Statistical Analysis and military Simulation Volume IIIA by Nigel Askey page 107 The Allies provided the Soviets with well over twice the number of trucks the Soviets produced themselves and 3.5 times when the Lift Capacity is taken into account! See Operation Barbarossa: the Complete organisational and Statistical Analysis and military Simulation Volume IIIA by Nigel Askey page 108 --> without the allies there would be no soviet truck park or way less tanks. had a far to small motor industry. “Thus, for example, the 22nd Army since the start of the winter offensive in January had lost its entire complement twice over. Replacements for the fronts on the Western Direction in the period between January and April 1942, though 5.6 times greater in number than in December 1941, were untrained and immediately consumed in the fighting. The artillery of several of the attacking divisions in March-April was down to one-tenth to one-third of a standard allotment of shells and only 10 mortar rounds. It was unable to inflict any perceptible damage to the enemy’s defenses. In addition, the muddy season began in April.” Gerasimova, Svetlana; Britton, Stuart. The Rzhev Slaughterhouse: The Red Army's Forgotten 15-month Campaign against Army Group Center, 1942-1943 (S.84). Helion and Company. Kindle-Version. --> artillery was litrally running out of ammo from all I know the red army didnt had good supply in the first 2 years of the war and needed much lend lease to improve. maybe in 1944 onwards their logistics got better. but in the beginning they were.... really really bad.
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  169.  @lesdodoclips3915  to quote wikipedia: "Browning's intelligence officer – Major Brian Urquhart — obtained information from the 21st Army Group in Belgium and Dutch resistance that German armour was present around Arnhem. This was backed up with aerial reconnaissance that he ordered to be flown.[20] Browning was dismissive and ordered his chief medical officer to have Urquhart sent on sick leave.[21] In fact, SHAEF was aware that there were almost certainly two Panzer divisions at Arnhem but with the operation looming chose to ignore them.[20] Such information would have been gleaned from Ultra intercepts that the First Allied Airborne Army was not privy to and therefore could not act upon themselves.[20]" Anfd from dailyhistory: "The Germans had anticipated that there would be an offensive launched to seize Arnhem, Wesel, and Nijmegen. A senior intelligence official argued that the British and the Americans would use airborne troops. However, he did not predict where the assault would be. Nevertheless, German intelligence provided the High Command with the information they needed to prepare for any planned Allied attack. The German General Model heeded his intelligence officers, and this was to prove decisive. The British had excellent intelligence.[19] They had reliable information on the Germans' movements from the Dutch Resistance, and they could also employ aerial reconnaissance planes to obtain photographic intelligence. One reconnaissance mission was able to provide images that seemed to show German forces in the Arnhem area. This was confirmed by information from the local resistance. This was compelling proof that the Germans had significant forces and that any air assault on the region would be a great risk. The intelligence officer who reported this to Montgomery was not believed. When he tried to persuade Montgomery that there was a large build-up of German forces near Arnhem, he was relieved of his command, and rumors spread that he had a nervous breakdown. Montgomery’s refusal to heed intelligence was to result in a near disaster for the British. It appears that the General refused to countenance anything that contradicted his views as he was utterly convinced of the brilliance of his plans for Market Garden and his own infallibility.[20] " So they knew of at least 2 tank divisions to be worse two SS tank divisions and still decided to use airborn troops while having to few airtransport to send all the heavy equipment with these divisions? and then decide to spread them out? doesnt sounds like a good plan
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  274. TRIGGER WARNING Additonal warning: This comment is written from my point of view, of someone who got bullied for 3-4 years during middle school. I had sucide toughts but never put them into action. About the topic of being weak when you seek help: It's a twisted sword. On the one hand people saying that are totally right. If you find a solution yourself you grow more than when you overcome it with help. I only once seeked for help in during my bad time and school psychologist didnt helped at all. In the end i managed it myself. the result: i dont care about any insults at all, rather if someone talks shit i start talking reasonalbe stuff. just look at bullys when they realise you have skills in speech. About the topic of not bothering others: Well i have an ex school friend. as going trough probably even worse stuff that time. I casually talked with her and discovered soem of her stuff. I honestly offer my help to get her back on the feet. i am yeeled at that I don't understand anything. OK. then it's not my problem. My point is: It's hard to find someone you can talk to. really hard. So having this mindset isn't that bad. because if you open up to the wrong person, the problems become more. Furthermore, apparently there are quite some ways to help people with depression. Nobita managed to find multiple organisations helping young people with anexites and depressions. many probably don't know of them, that is probably a real problem. but if only 24% actually seem to care about these people, why should the state fund organisations? From a very rational point of view (which in this case is very cruel), you always have people who fall back, always some you can't help. it is a rising problem. But on the other hand: How bad is the damaged to the state? Will it benefit everyone if more funding is send an awarness is raised? Personally this topic is difficult for me. because I managed the problems my self and it resulted in a growth. In the end some break while others grow on problems and there are always casualities. But it is our duty to keep casualities low. but we shouldn't forget that completly banning them is impossible. (in my view)
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  303.  @Bullet-Tooth-Tony-  the point is you can only afford methodical battles with more or less war of attrition when you can afford it. so you need to have the better enemy losses to own losses ratio then your enemy. In general the germans had a positive ratio even in these methodical battles. In El Almanein Monty shattered Rommel, thats true. But monty only has a positive ratio because he took over 20k prisoners. When only looking at death and wounded he had more or just simliar than the germans (according to the english wikipedia). But he then let Rommels forces escape (which was also due to sudden rain in the area) As a result the fighting in africa drag on for half a year more, where the germans constanly were in the defensive able to inflict more casualities. So: how long can the Aliies especially britain and its colonies afford these loss ratios? Not unlimited. a methodical approach may give you your current objective, but not engaging in a hunt will lead that you dont take many POWs, these men then return to the enemy lines and will help train the new recruits. Furthermore depending on the course of the battle your enemy may also escape with big poritions of his equipment. so the methodical approach will very likly end in a war of attrition. And that war is won by whom inflicts lethal casualities to the other side first, or rather the side with the better loss ratio. And that ratio was (especially on the eastern front) in the german favor. BECAUSE of said tactical, and operational readiness advantages. So if you constantly fight an enemy who is superior in combat power, and you constantly losse more than him, thats ok if you can keep up the ratio you need to advance, but britain and its colonies also dont have unlimited men, they cant do attrition warfare anything close to the soviets. In my opinion its a misconception to thing battle of material is always a disadvantage for germany. As long as they pay themselves off in a ratio they can keep up longer than the enemy you win. as an example: Soviet winteroffensive 1941. Soviets push the germans back serveral 100 kilometer also by a more or less methodical approach (not in a scale of monti, but the best they could do at that time) rresult: Wehrmacht fell back and took casualities but amanged to regroup and hold the front. Ratio: 10:1 in favor of the germans! but wait, the soviet union only has 3 times the population..... i guess if they keep fighting liek that they run out of men first. Same goes for briatin and its colonies. They fought with better ratios against the germans, but still as far as i currently know, not in ratios they could afford for so long. How to improve the ratio? --> Hunt your enemy afer you defeated them in a mobile warfare, to take POWs and hit the disorganised enemy. In these battles you will probably kill more enemy than you loose your own men You got my point?
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