Comments by "Archangel17" (@MDP1702) on "Henry Stewart History" channel.

@piotrmalewski8178 The problem with pointing to the historical occupations of Moscow as a reason why it wouldn't have changed anything for the Nazi's is that Moscow became a lot more important in terms of government and logistics over that time. It was by far the most important train logistics center in the entirety of Russia and arguably critical in the defence of most of European Russia. Also Napoleon never meant to hold Moscow, he literally left it without being pushed for it and unlike with the Nazi's his capture of Moscow was a consequence of a deep trust, not a subjugation of Russian territory from the south to the north;
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@effexon Why do people keep insisting oil should be the only concern? The Nazi's also didn't take oil by diverting resources from Moscow and even if they immediately went after the Baku oil fields, these most likely would get sabotaged and bombed into oblivion, requiring a long time to get back operational and a lot of protection in terms of planes and AA. Yes, Germany needed oil, that doesn't mean they couldn't fight without it. Taking Moscow would deal a huge blow to the Soviet morale and greatly damage Soviet logistics. Leningrad would all be cut off from the Soviet logistics system and even Murmansk also, making supply efforts from allies very very difficult. Not to mention tha Moscow was a major supply depot in of itself. Also if the Nazi's could take Moscow, they could bunker down there and very likely the Soviets would try to retake it, weakening themselves on other parts of the front, which the Germans could then potentially profit from. And if Leningrad would fall, a lot of German troops would also be freed up to help in the Defense of Moscow or the push in the south. Moscow wasn't at all as insignificant as many now make it out to be, it likely was the most important strategic location in the entire USSR at that moment. There wasn't really a way for Germany to quickly get oil production from conquered territories, so the goal should have rather been to deal a big decisive blow as big as possible to end the war fast, or at least put the Soviets on the backfoot long term and not give up the initiative.
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