Comments by "J Nagarya" (@jnagarya519) on "ARMED PROTESTERS arrive at Oregon Capitol" video.
-
5
-
3
-
@stephenbermingham6554 A "right" to possess guns does not include committing crimes with them. This is George Washington on how to deal with these fake "militia" that are NOT authorized to take the law into their own hands --
_George Washington and Militia
_
. . . .
The New Jersey militia had contributed little to the sudden turn of events in favor of the American army. The reluctance of Jerseymen to join the fray had reflected not only a divided population, but also the fear of a supposedly invincible enemy, and the inability of the new State to establish its military command and provide direction. Writing to [Governor] Livingston 24 Jan. 1777, Washington chose to emphasize the latter failure in a heated letter critical of the States lawmakers.
"Sir: The irregular and disjointed State of the Militia of this Province, makes it necessary for me to inform you, that, unless a Law is immediately passed by your Legislature, to reduce them to some order, and oblige them to turn out, in a different Manner from what they have hitherto done, we shall bring very few into the Field, and even those few will render little or no Service. Their Officers are generally of the lowest Class of People; and instead of setting a good Example to the Men, are leading them into every Kind of Mischief, one Species of which is, Plundering the Inhabitants, under pretence of their being Tories. A Law should, in my Opinion, be passed, to put a Stop to this kind of lawless Rapine; for, unless there is something done to prevent it, the People will throw themselves, of Choice, into the Hands of the British Troops. But your first object should be a well regulated Militia Law; the People, put under good Officers, would behave in quite another Manner; and not only render real Service as Soldiers, but would protect, instead of distressing, the [10] Inhabitants. What I would wish to have particularly insisted upon, in the New Law, should be, that every Man, capable of bearing Arms, should be obliged to turn out, and not buy off his Service by a trifling fine. We want Men, and not Money." [FN 13, The Writings of George Washington from the Original Manuscript Sources, 39 vols., ed. John C. Fitzpatrick (Washington, 1931-1944), VII, 56-57.]
When the Assembly reconvened on 20 Jan. 1777, it waited another two weeks before finally sending to the council a measure which incorporated both exemption fees and the practice of substitutes. The frustrated Governor asked the Assembly to erase these practices from the law and force the people to answer the muster.[FN 14, Votes and Proceedings of the General Assembly of the State of New Jersey {VPS}, 1st session, 94.]
The plea went unheeded. On 15 Mar. 1777, the State's first general militia act included the use of substitutes and exemption fees. However, the new code did include one section which was to assume greater importance as the war progressed. Listed last among the various ways whereby the Governor might call out the militia was the following, "with the Advice of the Legislature, when sitting, or in their Recess, with the Advice of the Privy Council."[FN 15, Acts of the General Assembly of the State of New Jersey {Acts}, 1st session, 1st sitting, 13 Mar. 1777.] Combined with his chairmanship of the Council of Safety, created two days after passage of the militia law, Livingston's use of the Privy Council vaulted him into the center of power. Legislative weakness had perhaps left him no other choice.
Languid passage of this first major militia law focused attention upon the leadership crisis faced by New Jersey's revolutionary government. Legislative deliberations on the militia bill posed a challenge to the Assembly's constitutionally pre-eminent position. Faced with a military crisis and the need to take action, the Assembly had procrastinated and the impetus for militia reform came from the Governor, not from within the legislature. Moreover, the chief executive's recommendations incorporated new, far-reaching and dramatic changes. The Assembly's response was to back away and return to a status quo which failed to meet the State's needs. Furthermore, Livingston's inability to convince the Assembly of the need for revision of the militia code may have greatly influenced his own assessment of the leadership needs of the State. While the legislature considered the militia bill, the Governor had written to Washington that the lawmakers "are so [11] unduly influenced by the Fear of disobeying the constituents that they dare not exert themselves with the requisite Spirit of the exigencies of the War.[FN 16, Margart Burnham MacMillan, The War Governors in the American Revolution (New York, 1943), 234-235.] The legislature's failure to extend its authority to confront the Loyalist challenge reinforced Livingston's critical assessment. Thus in March 1777 he moved to assert his leadership. Directing the efforts of the Council of Safety and the Privy Council, the chief executive assumed a dominant role seemingly at odds with the intention of the State Constitution.
The basis of the Privy Council's military authority came from the legislature. According to the Constitution the Governor was the commander-in-chief. Nevertheless, the lawmakers chose to inhibit this authority in the March 1777 militia act having the Governor, except in case of surprise invasion, consult with the legislature, or in its absence, the Privy Council before calling out the militia. In effect, the legislature created a military high command. This command, however, chose to exceed its authority by directing militia units while the legislature sat. The result was a high degreee of effectiveness lacking during previous military crises.
The principal test of the Privy Council's command arose in 1778 during the British march across New Jersey from Philadelphia to New York, culminating in the Battle of Monmouth on 28 June. Between February and June a constant flow of correspondence with military commanders kept the Privy Council abreast of the latest movements of the British forces. With each bit of news, the Privy Council responded accordingly, advising Livingston on deployment of the militia. In preparation for the battle, forces from at least seven counties, from all parts of the State, were moved into position to harass General Henry Clinton's army. Some units were stationed by the council without the approval or disapproval of the legislature.[FN 17, See entries for 23 and 28 Feb. 1778, 63 and 64; and 21 Mar. 1778, 71.] The Jerseymen's raids and attacks are credited with forcing Clinton to halt his march and fight.[FN 18, John Richard Alden, The American Revolution 1775-1783 (New York, 1954), 202.] The battle at Monmouth was indecisive with both sides claiming victory. However, a notable feature of the campaign was the turnout of the Jersey militia. This fact was not [12] lost on General Washington, whose sentiments regarding the militia were in marked contrast to his thoughts of January 1777:
". . . the Militia of this state are also thanked for the noble Spirit which they have shown in opposing the Enemy on their march from Philadelphia and for the Aid which they have given by harassing and impeding their Motions so as to allow the Continental Troops time to come up with them."[FN 19, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, XII, 130.]
There were, of course, reasons other than the spirited leadership of the Privy Council for the militia turnout. As the State continued to function, more people identified with its existence. Previous military successes by Continental troops, especially the surrender in October 1777 of British forces commanded by General John Burgoyne, gave those loyal to the State the will to fight. Such victories seriously tarnished the British aura of invincibility. Nevertheless, the new infusion of leadership by the Privy Council cannot be discounted.
As in the case of the Council of Safety, the legislature recognized the Privy Council's effectiveness and continued to delegate increased military powers to it. When the militia was to be alerted for a possible campaign in conjunction with the Continental Army, the Privy Council was empowered to command the mobilization.[FN 20, Acts, 5th session, 2nd sitting, 27 June 1781.] . . . .
Minutes of the Governor's Privy Council 1777-1789, New Jersey Archives, Third series, Volume I (Trenton, NJ: New Jersey State Library, Archives and History Bureau, 1974), Edited, with an Introduction, and Notes by David A. Bernstein, pp. 10-13.
1
-
_The NRA's Two Second Amendment Lies
_
The gun industry political front NRA tells two lies about the intent of the Second Amendment.
1. That the Second Amendment protects an "individual" "right" to possess guns.
Comparison with the several prior Supreme Court decisions, and the legislative history -- the Congress' Debates of the writing of the Amendment, which are LEGAL AUTHORITY -- shows that Scalia's "Heller" decision is an outlier. In "Heller" he falsely held that the Amendment protects an individual right -- for which he was excoriated by legal experts across the political spectrum for ignoring this adjudicatory standard:
When a conflict over the interpretation of a law cannot be resolved within the text of the law, one reverts to the legislative history of the law -- in this instance Congress' Debates of the writing of the Amendment.
The facts from those Debates:
The subject of the Amendment is well regulated Militia, and its purpose to establish a National Defense, relying on that Militia. The Militia is not an individual, and is a public institution, regulated under both Federal and state constitutions and laws; thus the Amendment is irrelevant to the issue of private, individual gun ownership:
James Madison is called "the father of the Constitution," and the gun industry/NRA claims that Madison wrote the Second Amendment. If both of those are facts, then the word "people" is consistent in meaning from beginning of the Constitution to the end of the first 10 Amendments. The first three words of the Constitution are "We the people," not, "We the individual".
This is the first draft of that which became the Second Amendment, which the gun industry/NRA calls the "Madison" Amendment -- but which it never quotes. [Here I clarify it for the logic-impaired]:
"The right of the people [PLURAL] to keep and bear arms [this phrase is the well-regulated Militia, and was drawn from four state constitution Militia Clauses] shall not be infringed; a well armed, and well regulated militia being the best security of a free country: but no person [INDIVIDUAL] religiously scrupulous of [AGAINST] bearing arms [in well-regulated Militia] shall be compelled [INVOLUNTARY] to render military service [in well-regulated Militia] in person."
Source: Creating the Bill of Rights: The Documentary Record from the First Federal Congress (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, Paperback, 1991), Edited by Helen E Veit, et al., at 12. (This volume is readily available from Amazon.)
Note the word "compelled": Militia service was a DUTY -- not a "right". And note the words "people" and "person": if a person -- individual -- claimed "religious" exemption from that DUTY, his case was scrutinized individually.
The only "individual" "right" Congress debated was that last clause -- "but no person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms shall be compelled to render military service" -- and it was obviously dropped from the proposed Amendment before it was ratified. Thus the Second Amendment obviously does not protect "individual" ANYTHING.
Only by ignoring the legislative history -- Congress' Debates of the writing of the Amendment, which are LEGAL AUTHORITY -- could Scalia falsely hold that the Amendment protects an "individual" "right".
2. That the purpose of the Amendment was to establish a "right" to "take up arms" against the gov't -- which is refuted by the Constitution itself:
Art. I., S. 8., C. 15. The Congress shall have Power To provide for calling forth the Militia to . . . SUPPRESS INSURRECTIONS.
The Founders themselves twice established the precedent on the point:
Under the Articles of Confederation, "Shays's" rebellion was suppressed by the state's legitimate well-regulated Militia, and the rebels charged with, tried for, and convicted of, TREASON, and sentenced to death.
And under the Constitution, AFTER the Second Amendment was ratified, the "Whiskey" rebellion was suppressed by Federalized Militia, lead by George Washington, and the rebels charged with, tried for, and convicted of, TREASON, and sentenced to death.
The Congress, as a co-equal branch of gov't, has the authority and power to overturn Supreme Court decisions.
Overturn "Heller".
PLEASE CIRCULATE INTACT.
1
-
1